A Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretory for Finance. would demand from none of them that he should do something which he could not assume responsibility for in his conscience. If he thought that here was something he couldn't do, then he could resign without suffering any disadvantages. I said that all I demanded was for him to carry out my orders loyally as long as he remained in office.
Until March 1941 Mr. Tripp remained in office, and then he resigned because there was something he didn't wish to carry out, and he suffered no disadvantages.
Q Who was his successor?
A Let me say first of all that what Mr. Tripp carried out until March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise, he most certainly would not have done it.
His successor was Rose von Tonningen. Tonningen was a League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who had had tasks similar to those I gave him in The Netherlands.
Q What about the occupation costs? Mr. Tripp that I should receive 3 million guilders per month. Then there were 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first three years, I saved 60 million guilders which remained in The Netherlands as a special donation. check them. The armed forces put in their demands to the Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place them at their disposal. During 1941, the Reich collected indirect occupation costs. The point of view was adopted that not only the costs which were incurred in The Netherlands direct were to be collected, but that the costs of preparations in the Reich should be collected. Fifty million marks per month were demanded, partly in gold.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks or do you mean guilders?
THE WITNESS: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on, that payment was celled voluntary eastern assistance for political reasons, But of course that wasn't so.
Later on, the Reich demanded an increase to 100 million, but I refused. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Tripp retired as General Secretary for Finance because the foreign currency bann which still existed at the time between Germany and The Netherlands was lifted.
A Yes, that is correct. I had an application through my administration that the business traffic between the Reich and The Netherlands should be intensified, and that this foreign currency bann should be lifted to the extent that without using the currency bank guilders could be exchanged for marks and vice versa. Mr. Tripp, but it was subject to the control of currency banks, that is to say, the Netherlands banks as well. Mr. Tripp raised objections, and I passed the matter on to Berlin. Berlin decided that it was to be carried out, and Mr. Tripp resigned. and I published the decree.
I want to say that the president of the Reichsbank, Mr. Funk, was against this procedure, and I can quote as an explanation that the effects at that time were not so catastrophic as they turned out later. At that time, The Netherlandshad been completely cut off; the Reich had reached the climax of its power, and it was to be expected that the mark would be the leading currency in Europe, with which rate the guilder would have had similar ranking Netherlands exceeded the exports from The Netherlandsinto the Reich. Reichsminister Funk always had the view that these were genuine debts, so that the cost of a 41/2 billion golden guilder debt in the event of a different outcome of the war would have had to be paid back to The Netherlands. Finance, Dr. Fischboeck, who arranged this matter contrary to the wishes of the president.
A I don't know whether the proposals came from Fischboeck only. I presume that he must have talked to other officials. But anyway, he put them to me. fines contrary to international law, money fines. individual perpetrations. The large collective fine of 18 millions was imposed in connection with the general strikes at Amsterdam, Arnheim, and Hilversden, in which the entire population had participated. ascertained as being perpetrators.
Q Can you give us any practical examples?
A I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that. There were towns in the South of Holland where that sort of thing has happened. for the hostage camp in Michelgestell. the Michelgestell hostage camp. It wasn't a hostage camp in the full sense of the Word. The situation was that Dutchmen who proved to be members of resistance movements were taken into custody by me. The camp at Michelgestell is not a prison because I have visited it and the inmates of the camp were playing golf. They had leave, in the case of compassionate or other matters, and not a single one was ever shot. I think the majority of the Netherland. Ministers of today were at Michelgestell. It was a sort of protective custody so that they were to be temporarily removed from their anti-German activities.
Q Furthermore, Mr. Witness, you also prohibited the reading of religious lessons, and you were supposed to have admitted Catholic and Protestant preachers to concentration camps. which happened because it was obviously in opposition to the measures of the occupational forces and it was inciting disobedience. That was one individual case, and thereafter it did not happen again. In fact, I even interfered and cancelled the prohibition issued by the police and as a result I was criticized. No priests were sent to concentration camps by me. To the contrary, at the beginning of 1933 and after they had been reported to me, I received a list from the Security Police which contained the names of prisoner who were in concentration camps. The total was around 45 or 50. 3 or 4 of them bore the remark that they had died in concentration camps. Approximately one-third were shown to me and on the strength of the evidence I demanded their release. Another third should be investigated, I demanded during the following six months, and as far as the last third was concerned, I could not make such an application without violating my own responsibility towards the Reich.
There were also other reprisal hostages, and when the Netherlands come into the war, the Germans in Dutch-India were taken into prison and were mistreated. The Reich demanded that 3,000 Dutchmen were to be arrested. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to Buchenwald. urge the authorities of these hostages until they were returned. They were then accommodated in a manner Which can no longer be described as prison. They were given leave, and whenever possible, I released then. In the end, I had less than 100.
Q Mr. Witness, prayers in Church, or prayers for the Queen, were supposed to be prohibited by you.
A That is incorrect. The prayers in the Dutch churches were obvious demonstrations, as is understandable, and they were prayers for the Queen of the Netherlands. There were prayers, at that time, for the Reich Commissioner so that he could be enlightened. But I found nothing wrong with these prayers which would cause me to prohibit them. In 1 or 2 cases, some subordinate authority might have acted and in which I have not concurred been particularly cruel, and that without legal proceedings, you had had a large number of people shot. What do you have to say to that? shot without there being any connection between the shooting and the necessary legal process. This occurred in August, 1942, and the case has already been mentioned in this courtroom. This case was carried out strictly under the so-called "Hostage Law" which has been quoted here. The had been an attack against an Armed forces transport, and 15 or 20 hostages were demanded and were to be shot, and I think the OKH made that demand through the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Higher SS and Police Loader at the lists which had been submitted to me by other departments. That list, has been read out here and I noticed something about that list. The Higher SS and Police Loader stated that the list was to be compiled in keeping with the instructions that existed, and that this attack could be traced to the political nameson the right, those of the opposition and of the resistance, and not to those on the left, therefore no workers were to be shot.
I only exercised influence insofar as I caused the Higher SS and Police Leaders to exclude fathers with several children from that list.
Q Mr. Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the shooting when the camp at Vught was closed? South of the Netherlands, I had so much work to do to keep up the good order in my territory, that I could not concern myself in detail with that camp at Vught which was under the police. The Higher SS and Police Leader usually informed me that the most important political prisoners, numbering about 200, were to be transferred to the Reich, and that the list of several implicated people was to be released. Ordinary criminals were to be placed under the command of the Dutch Police officer, and to be handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I heard that there were cases of shooting, and the only explanation I have is that at the last minute, the Reich prohibited the transporting of these people to the Reich and gave the order to shoot them. I do not believe that the figure can be 600, because Witness Kollpuss has stated that there were 130 to 150, but even at that I think it is a high figure. on the SS and Police Leader Rauter? originated from the resistance movement and it was carried out with British weapons.
Q What do you know about the case Putten?
A Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement. Himmler, at that time, demanded the shooting of 500 hostages. Rauter refused and informe me that there were a number of Dutchmen in the prison who were to be shot in accordance with the Fuehrer's order because they had been convicted of other actions of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was rather large, but now he could not hesitate any longer.
He could not give me the actual figure. In that situation, I could not, in my opinion, prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to control the resistance movement with whatever means we had at our disposal. That movement was started by the Dutch in London and it presented a very serious hindrance to the German occupational forces. in Apeldorp, and that appeared to be a very high figure to me, but Dr. Schoengart told me that Apeldorp had been the center of many resistance movements.
Q Finally, I want to ask you, what do you know about the case Put ten?
A In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three were murdered, The entire case happened to the armed forces, and I know that retaliation measures were planned. I myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of military position. The Higher So and Police Leader informed me that he had the order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population to a concentration camp in the Reich. I said that he should reduce the figure to 40% and later on he reported to me that the death figures in German concentration camps were high. I turned to him and to the Armed Forces Commander to have these men returned. The Armed Forces Commander agreed. Whether this order was actually carried out I don't know.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could make a short pause?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken).
DR. STEINBAUER: Members of the High Tribunal, I should like to return the question of the blocking of foreign currency. was against it, and that he, Goering, as head of the four-year plan made the decision to blockade the foreign currency -- it was to be removed. And he writes "I hold the responsibility." That was a decision which was made by Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course the regular way to infer the Tribunal, your statement as to what one of the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment.
DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn't make it any better. You may ask the witness any qestion about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: On the question of shooting without court sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document, No. 77, page 199. This is F-224, report of Kriminal Kommissar Munt. It is as follows, on page 3:
"In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen demanded the maxim number of victims to be executed. Cristiansen spoke to Rauter, an impulsive and tactless man, of numerous reprisals and the latter on his part applied pressure upon the DDS (Dr. Schoengartner)."
He reports further on page 5:
"These were often prisoners who had already been sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Chief. Reprisals as punishable acts were a matter for the police. After August 1944 and in accordance with an order of the Fuehrer these reprisals were interpreted in the manner that a number of Dutchmen were arrested for entirely different motives and that they were shot on account of acts of sabotage and murder attempts."
A May I explain that briefly? be shot according to the Fuehrer's orders. The Higher SS and Police Chief called upon his court officer for this examination. When there was an attempt to blow a bridge, instead of shooting hostages, these men were taken and shot. It is the opposite of the shooting of hostages. Or at least it was supposed to be.
Q Now, I come to the Chapter iV-B "Concentration Camps and Prisons." My first question: Who was competent in these matters? were competent. For court prisons, the court authorities; that is, the court prisons were under my charge.
Q Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands?
A Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Hertogenborch. Then a police transit camp near Amersfort; a Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg.
I have already spoken of Michelgestell; that was the protective custody camp. And then the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a concentration camp - - but abuses occurred there.
Q What can you tell me about the Hertogenborch Camp? nally intended as such, at that time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands. But Reichsfuehrer Himmler gave an order to make a concentration camp out of it. reasoning that I couldn't prevent Dutchmen from coming into the concentration camp, that I would prefer them to come into a concentration camp in the Netherlands where I might be able to exert a certain influence. place; for example, in the Vught Camp, which you mentioned.
A That is quite true. In prisons, as well as in concentration camps, excesses occurred. In wartime I considered that almost unavoidable, because subaltern people are too little controlled. But when I learned of any such thing I took steps against it. The first time -- aroune 1940 or 1941 --- that my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been brought before it with wounds from a beating on his head. I had the case investigated, the head of prison was punished and sent back to the Reich. In the Vught Concentration where was a high death rate. I immediately started an investigation, using the services of Dutch medical personnel. Daily -- and later on weekly --- I had the death figures reported to me, umtil they reached approximately a normal size. Of course, I don't knew whether the head of the camp reported the normal death cases only or also included the cases of shooting. I don't know that.
In this camp there were excesses; beatings were heard of now and then. The head of the camp was removed and sent to the Reich. I point out that the Higher SS and Police Leader apparently tried to maintain order, although he was not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenfuehrer Pohl. with the words "Woman in Cell". number of women crowded into a cell overnight, and three or four women smothered to death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and did not let up. The head of the camp was put on trial and received at least four years -- I believe it was a sentence of eight years. That is indicated in the French report.
Q. What about the Ammersford camp?
A. That was a police transit camp, that is, for prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts who were to be sent to the Reich, or persons who refused labor service who were being sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than six or eight weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp; not Dutch police, but a voluntary SS guard company, I believe.
Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been killed there. I asked the Higher SS and Police Leader to clear up the case. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to me. According to the documents, severe mistreating occurred, but no one was killed, and the parsons responsible were punished. the fact that concentration camps and prisons in war-time gave an opportunity for excesses. If, here or there, not a severe case but certain mistreatment occurred, I always pointed it out. He then reported to me either that the case had not occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth. tion camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were satisfactory.
I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in the Western Netherlands, which I don't want to indicate as a special circumstance.
Then there was the Westerborg Camp. The Dutch Government set up Westerborg as a completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was made over into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were Jewish order guards, Dutch police guarded the camp, and locked the camp from the outside. There was a detail of the Security Police for supervision in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the camp itself. Every Sunday a clergyman went to the camp, at least one clergyman for the Catholics, Jews, and one for the so-called Christians.
Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that. Ommen was intended as a training camp for these Dutch who wanted to be employed economically in the Eastern Territories; that is, Volunteers. They were orientated on the country, the people. and the language there. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a neighboring penal institute, for work. I received the news that these prisoners were being mistreated; the judges of Amsterdam applied to me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to inspect the camp personally and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to document F-224, on the 5th of March, 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained about mistreatment of the prisoners which they had noted, and about the fact that such prisoners were transferred to Reich institutions for labor. be removed from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal institution, that Dutch prisoners should be returned from German prisons to Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore, of necessity, I took the necessary steps to settle the matter.
Q. I must now ask you another question. Document RF-931 shows that you removed judges who made similar complaints.
A. In my eyes the procedure of the court was incorrect. Those judges did not apply to me, but they asserted openly, publicly, that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration camps and shot. According to the state of affairs as I know it, that was false. I then informed them about the results obtained by the Amsterdam judges. The Neubaden judges refused to issue further judgments on the matter. I asked them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them as persons who refused to work. I could have had them tried by a German court.
Q. Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about conditions in the camps?
A. In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. von Overlijn, could visit all concentration camps and prisons, especially in order to see whether the food packages were being forwarded. Neither Mrs. von Overlijn nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me. I should like to say that this circumstance was especially significant for me because the Dutch complained about everything, and if I received no complaints, it had a vertain calming effect. information planed before me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in concentration camps or prisons. That means the same thing as if today, in the whole German territory, 120,000 Germans were in prison comps. That occasioned me to set up court commissions to visit the camps in order to investigate whether the prisoners could not be released or placed on trial. where there were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.
Q. Witness, you have said that without interruption you waved a struggle against the police in this question?
A. I do not want to speak about a struggle.
Q. Do you believe that you were successful?
A. Yes. I believe on the basis of certain definite facts -I followed the proceedings here very carefully, and we have heard terrible things -- the reports from the Netherlands, it seems to me, are not so bad. I do not want to say that I regret every excess, but such reports as in Breendonk in Belgium, do not exist. There are no such reports. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There is only a single report here -- that is F.677, the report of Brooder -- which attains the level of the usual atrocity reports. fully, since it does not say even who told him this. The reports are untrustworth. They state, for example, that the prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS man. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work. it was perhaps not quite so bad in the Netherlands.
Q. To conclude this chapter, I will go over to the section of the indictment which deals with the question of labor service. That problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field of labor commitment?
A. In the field of labor commitment, we must distinguish between four or five different phases. When I care to the Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed. We registered unemployed, those who expected to be released from the Netherlands military forces in demobilization, and then part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent problem for me to reduce the number of unemployed. In the first place, such an army of unemployed is without doubt the first source of recruits for illegal activities.
In the second place, at the start of the war, it was to be expected that the economic situation of the unemployed would become worse.
At that time we instituted measures which I must call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of 1942; that is, about two years. ities full power to obligate any worker to work abroad. Certainly there was a certain economic pressure; but I believe that always exists in this question. under the Dutch general secretary for social administration. There were German inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring agencies; companies from the Reich hired their own workers. On the whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were hired to work in the Reich. In the period which I called "volunteer", 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to the Reich and about 40,000 to France. By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The reich demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor service. Sauckel, but I received it from Bormann as a direct Fuehrer order. not exclusively in the following way. Young, and as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to the labor office, and they received certificates of obtligation to take up work in the Reich. The Dutch report says that only a few refused. Of course, there were some who refused and were arrested by the police and taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and police leader reported to me that this totaled 2,600. About 250,000 to 200,000 persons were obligated, and the total hired was 530,000. was no lower.
ment of workers. I was urged to draft whole age-groups to send them to the Reich. I made certain that all of these workers received free contracts in the Reich and were not put in labor camps. they were 21 to 23 years old -- and to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the first group; in the second group it was moderate, and in the third it was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by force, and I refused to do so. But at that time, I managed, through Minister Speer, to arrange that the workers would not be taken to the work, but that the work would be brought to the workers. large contracts came to the Netherlands, and the concerns carrying out these contracts were declared "blocked" concerns. That included the Organization Todt. Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were deferred. Deferments for those with dependents were set up by Dutch authorities, over a million. It was clear that that was a Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take steps against it. not were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Fuehrer order to me that 250,000 workers were to be brought to the Reich. He confirmed that I refused that. At that time, Gauleiter Sauckel came to me. He discussed this matter with me. quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the forced recruitment. By "forced recruitment", I mean blocking off whole districts and taking the men out.
pletely. Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. Entirely different action took place in the fall of '44. From experience in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland; that is the Western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands government in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War Ministry. We estimated 50,000 illegal troops. If even one able-bodied Dutchmen joined, the illegal forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland. Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full shiploads of the most modern submachine guns were confiscated by us, but I am convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated by us. The High Command of the Army through the military Commanders, ordered the removal of the able-bodied Dutchman. The measure was carried out completely by the Wehrmacht. A general who was sent for for that purpose, was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his own. The measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local authorities were informed at the last moment or not at all. Of course I knew about the measure and you have the reasons just presented. I could not take the responsibility of protesting against it. I only took a part in order to protect civilian interests, so that the workers in the vital concerns would not be removed. I entrusted the Plenipotentiary General for the total war effort with this, whom Dr. Goebbels had sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue deferment certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you mean that you entrusted it to Himmler?
THE WITNESS: Goebbels, the Plenipotentiary General for the total war effort. unbearable for the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, tem porary lodging, and transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not have any better conditions, but one could not demand this from the Dutch.
Many Dutch people told me at that time that they would be willing to agree this labor commitment, not to aid the German cause but only in order to avoid these severe conditions, if they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The Plenipotentiary General for the total war effort issued the proclamation which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the Labor offices. The lists were recorded. The people were sent home again to get clothes. They were ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the police, but labor officials took them to the Reich for normal work. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact. It speaks of the better transportation conditions of labor mobilization. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons which I have given.
DR STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my document No. 78, USA 195, page 200, excerpt from government report of the Netherlands government, confirms the statements of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is important. "Page 2. Workmen who refused (relatively few were prosecuted by the 'Sicherheitsdienst' (SD)." Then: "Page 3. Apart from that, the measure was not very successful. Certain German authorities seem to have resisted its execution, because many former members of the armed forces received exemption; others went underground...... The result was that in the last month 1943 and in the greater part of 1944 relatively few persons were deported." And then: "Page 6. Until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for deportees was bearable. . . The one who reported for the manpower mobilization in January, 1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities, that is, almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight cars."
THE WITNESS: We had no other cars at that time. I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Fuehrer on the resistance lines cast of the Weichsel.
The transports which came from Rotterdam, and so forth, I used part of them for this purpose and thus I prevented these people being sent to the Reich. I only wished for further transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the Roes camp the treatment was so poor that some Dutch people had died.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next chapter of the indictment; that is, to the Jewish question. The Netherlands government report, USA 195, sums up all ordinances. This was submitted by the prosecution. To aid the memory, I should like to submit this document 1726, so that it may remind you of the laws. The Court already has it. BY DR. STEINBAUER: question? I of course realized that I had to take some position and would have to take some steps in regard to the Jews in the Netherlands. Amsterdam, in Western Europe, is perhaps the host known and one of the oldest Jewish communities in Western Europe. Moreover, in the Netherlands there were many German Jewish emigrants. I will say quite openly that from the First World War and the post-war period, I emerged as an anti-Semite. I need not explain that here. I have said that all in my speeches. I may refer to them.
I had the impression, which will be confirmed everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National Socialist Germany.
There was no discussion of the question of guilt as far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory, I had only to deal with the facts. I had to realize that I had to expect resistance, defeatism, and so on particularly from Jewish persons. that in the Netherlands I had to remove Jews from leading posts in economy, the press, and state positions.
The measures taken from May 1940 to May 1941 were limited to this. The Jewish officialswere dismissed, but with pension. The Jewish firms were registered and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of 1941, Heydrich came to me, to the Netherlands. He told me that we would have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish circles. He told me that the Jews would have to be treated like other enemy aliens. They, like the English in the Netherlands, were to be confined and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of persons involved here, about 140,000, this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did not object to this argument to Heydrich's. I also felt it was necessary in this war which I absolutely considered a life and death struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941, I ordered that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. Now it went on step by step. concerned, were intended from the beginning, but we took this way. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were published with my express permission. Individual measures which are mentioned here were outside my will. For example, in February 1,000 Jews are supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen. I know this about that matter -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): February of what your?
A (Continuing): February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsfuehrer Himmler thereupon ordered 400 young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that time That was the occasion for the general strike in Amsterdam in March 1941.