Mexico
23
2385-PS
diplomatic and political figures in most parts of Europe with the exception of Russia, where I happened at the time not to have any specific contact. These contacts which I maintained with diplomatic and political figures in other countries were based on previous associations, and I kept in close contact through various trips which I made from time to time and more particularly through confidential correspondence and through mutual friends. From all these sources I obtained an intimate familiarity with the aims and methods of German diplomacy from 1933 until I returned to the United States to assume a position in the Department of State about the middle of 1937.
As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate Southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objective in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of Southeastern Europe, were political and economic control, and they did not at that time speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to Southeastern Europe. From the very beginning of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that "it must be our granary" and that "even with Southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany". After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in Southeastern Europe. In a conversation with von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, von Papen frankly stated to me that "Southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's Hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold-. Austria is the first on the program." As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, von Papen in Vienna and his colleague von Maekensen in Budapest, were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.
The Nazis planned to gain their aims by force, preferably by the threat of force alone if possible, and by war if needed. At the beginning, however,—that is in the first two years of the Nazi regime—the Nazis wanted peace to give themselves time—that is time to arm—then to divide and isolate their intended victims. I
2385—PS
have often heard prominent Nazis say in 1933 and 1934, and I translate literally, "We must have peace until we are ready". By the late summer of 1938, they felt themselves ready.
Immediately after the Nazis came into power they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact, the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me; first, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; and second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in Southeastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but preferably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time. In 1934 from a high ranking General in the German Army, whose name I cannot recall for the moment, I learned that they planned to build 1200 planes that year, which was a huge air force for that period and something in terms that no one had thought of before in any country. The rapid development of this air program was obvious to everyone for one could not go out on the streets in Berlin or in any other city of importance in Germany without seeing pilots and air force trainees in evidence everywhere. They were given special privileges and special housing in order to encourage young men to enter the air training program. The rearmament program as a whole, it should be emphasized, proceeded with unbelievable rapidity. It proceeded more quickly, as high Nazi leaders themselves stated to me, than they themselves believed would be possible. It proceeded more rapidly than even informed and trained foreign observers in Germany would have believed possible even though they knew the resources of the German industrial machine.
At the same time that this rearmament program was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout
25
2385-PS
Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, etc. In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November. 1933, from Berlin as follows:
" * * * Everything that is being done in the country
today has for its object to make the people believe that Germany is threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the German people will be with them when they want to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry through their objects
k- k # yy
Military .preparation and psychological preparation were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed to so disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless against German aggression. I well remember one conversation I had with Goebbels in the earliest period of the Nazi Government, in which I expressed the opinion that they could never get away with their program in Europe. His reply was "But you don't know what we can do by creating dissension—without anything being done specifically on our part or which can be laid to our door, we will get these people to fight among themselves and so weaken themselves that they will be an easy prey for us". I can still recall the cynical manner in which he specifically indicated the "sore spots" in Austria and in Czechoslovakia and in other countries and on which by insidious means German agents could arouse dissension and get the peoples in the countries themselves disunited.
From surface appearances and judging from historical standards only, the obstacles to the achievement of the Nazi objec-
26
2385-PS
tives were formidable indeed. Completely aside from the difficulty of bringing about complete coordination within Germany and complete control, and in carrying through such a huge military program, there were these definite obstacles in the political and diplomatic field. In 1933 France was the dominant military power on the Continent. In the interest of security she had formed within the framework of the League of Nations, a system of mutual assistance both in the West and in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were allied in the Little Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had a special interest in Austrian independence which she made definitely clear. From 1934 to 1936, France and Italy each proposed and endeavored to sponsor political and economic accords to strengthen the powers of resistance of the eastern European countries to German designs. Throughout all of Southeastern Europe, France and Italy both were active through their diplomatic machinery in strengthening the position of these countries and of their independence. The most important of these arrangements were the proposed East Locarno Pact, inspired by France and intended to include all countries in the East, ranging from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea, and the proposed Danubian Pact which had for its principal objective strengthening the economic position of the countries of Southeastern Europe by promoting mutual trade relations between Austria and the other countries which had recently been part of thé Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up these alliances and understandings, to create division among members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers, and to divide all of them from France on whose military power the security of these smaller states in the last analysis rested. To some of these countries, particularly Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, Nazi Germany made extravagant and often inconsistent promises of territorial and economic rewards as a price for cooperation in the. German program of aggression against their neighbors. To other countries, especially France and England, Nazi Germany offered the attractive prize of peace and security as the price of giving Germany a free hand in Southeastern Europe. To allay the fears of its neighbors until Germany had completed its military and diplomatic preparations,
27
2385-PS
Germany cleverly proceeded step by step, always giving solemn assurances that the immediate objective was her last. In making these promises she was uninhibited by any scruples as to the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interests to do so. Although these statements were openly made to me as they were I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas publicly.
In this specific connection I quote from a letter which I wrote to Under Secretary of State Phillips in Washington, dated March 24, 1934:
"Her (Germany's) agreement with Poland is only one of a series of agreements which she would like to make to follow out her policy of gaining time and allaying suspicion, but when one realizes what a callous attitude those in power here take now towards agreements of any kind, and hears what they have to say about them, one realizes that they mean nothing more than what they are intended for, i.e. a part of her policy to keep the peace and maintain the status quo until she is prepared to gain her ends through force if they cannot be achieved otherwise".
In the last analysis, however, it was not faith in Germany's promises but fear of German might and possible aggressive action which induced Germany's neighbors, particularly the small ones, to progressively acquiesce in her designs. The huge German rearmament program, which was never a secret, and which was openly announced in the spring of 1935, and Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, all done with only mild protests from France and England, and the failure of the League to stop Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, convinced the peoples of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe that France either could not or would not resist German expansion in the East, that England would not take any positive steps to stop Germany, and that the only thing that was left to them was to make the best possible deal with Nazi Germany.
These, considerations to be sure did not convince all people and all political leaders among Germany's neighbors. The Nazis made plain, however, that any opposition which remained would be
28
2385—PS
helpless. She continued the program of stirring up internal dissensions wherever they existed in other countries and openly aided sympathetic Nazi and Fascist and other anti-Government groups, particularly in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Such briefly was the general plan of "German diplomacy" and political action and economic action during these years. I had occasion to follow the details of its operation from close observation during the years 1933 to 1937.
Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:
" * * * The major factor in the internal situation
in the last week has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. * * * There is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria. * * * The
Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25."
Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.
The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.
29
2385-PS
I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:
" * * * Europe will not get away from the myth
that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are 'diplomats of the old school'. They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."
At this point in this statement I should set forth the following. When the Nazi Party took over in Germany it represented only a small part of the German population. It dominated all of Germany and rapidly assured itself of that domination by means of organization and terror, the details of which are an historical record and need not be set forth here. At the beginning of 1933, although a few of the Nazi leaders, such as Hitler and Hess and Goering, recognized the idea of world domination, they spoke little of it. At the beginning the great mass of the Party and the regime itself had for its open objective the domination of Southeastern Europe. Literally this meant to them at the outset absorption of Czechoslovakia and Austria and complete political and economic control of the other countries down to Turkey. They always excluded mentioning Turkey so as not to greatly disturb Great Britain. As the domination of the Germans increased within Germany as the military program progressed and as the German people increasingly became imbued with the Nazi spirit, and more rapidly than even the most fanatic Nazis had believed possible, their power increased incredibly within and without Germany. Within Germany there was an attitude of complete apathy so far as resistance was concerned. Without Germany in the smaller countries which felt themselves threatened, the fear constantly became greater. It was this growing sense of power and the realization of the fear and lack of measures of resistance from the outside that rapidly caused the Nazi idea to expand with respect to domination over Europe and in fact over the world.
In this connection it must also be borne in mind that most of the higher officers of the German Army during the first years of the Nazi regime lent their aid to the Nazi regime only because
30
2385—PS
2385-PS
they believed that under such a regime they would be able to rebuild the German Army which they had not been able to do under previous German Governments and thus restore the power of Germany in Europe and in the world. At the outset it is probable that only a few of these Generals shared the territorial aggressive idea of the Nazis, but increasingly as the Army saw its power growing from the lower ranks to the upper they became imbued with these aggressive designs just as much as the Nazis.
For a time France and Italy endeavored to counter these moves by Germany, described in the preceding paragraphs. In 1934, Barthou, the very able and discerning French Foreign Minister, endeavored to promote an East Locarno Fact to guarantee the territory of all the Eastern and Southeastern European countries and to provide a guarantee against external aggression by mutual assistance pacts supported by France and Russia. France also continued her efforts to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers which had previously been members of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Italy sought to organize a more limited economic block of Austria, Hungary and Italy.
The Nazi German Government made every effort to prevent the carrying through of these accords. To Yugoslavia, for example, Germany made promises of support for Yugoslavia's ambitions with regard to Italian territory, particularly Trieste, as well as to a share of Austria. Germany's object was by sowing discord between Yugoslavia and Italy to prevent France from reaching an agreement with both of them and hence to frustrate all hopes of bringing an East Locarno Pact into being. In October 1934, I reported from Vienna, as follows:
" * * * The Foreign Minister called attention to
the reports which they have with respect to the intensive diplomatic activities of Germany in Warsaw, in Belgrade, in Sofia, and in Budapest. They have information, he told me, from a very reliable source that the present German policy is to create hopes and unrest, particularly in Belgrade and Sofia, so that when King Alexander goes to Paris he will face the French with a situation which will make it impossible for them to reach any agreement with Italy. The Wilhelmstrasse believes, according to the Minister's information, that if Barthou has no success at Rome the present French Ministry will have to resign on his return and a stronger left Ministry formed, with which the Wilhelmstrasse can reach some agreement. The Foreign Minister said that he did not think the Germans
31
2385—PS
would succeed in this, or that a failure of the French-Ital-ian conversations would necessarily result in a change in the French Cabinet. He did say, however, that the French-Italian agreement would be difficult because he had just learned this morning that King Alexander had been very successful during his Sofia visit which ended just a few days ago * *
To offset any moves in the direction of economic cooperation among the Danubian States, Germany made lavish but frankly insincere promises of economic support, on condition of cooperation with her. During my tour of duty in Germany, a Nazi economist named Deutz (I believe this is the correct spelling of his name) sought me out frequently. He did not occupy a very high position in the Government but was used as one of the active instruments by high Nazi leaders in Southeastern Europe. He made frequent trips to Yugoslavia, to Hungary and also on occasion to Rumania. For some reason which I could never fully determine he sought me out frequently and on returning from these trips he would tell me frankly what he had been doing and of the promises he had made of economic gains as reward for cooper-ting with Germany. At the same time, he, of course, cynically told me that Germany had no intention of carrying through these promises and remarked: "How dumb these people are to believe in such promises".
At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries themselves and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed to so weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program. Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein party in the elections in the spring of 1985 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments and most effective ones which Nazi Germany used as the fear in Yugoslavia, in particular, of a restoration of the Hapsburgs was very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of
32
Hungary to demand the recall of von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of Communism and communist Russia. In Rumania she aggravated the existing anti-semitism, emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Rumanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the Fascist Iron Guard through Codreneau. '
Such "diplomatic" measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them to actively ally themselves with Nazi Germany. Important political leaders of Jugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany. This became so obvious from direct information which I had that I wrote in September 1934, from Vienna, as follows:
" * * * The attitude of the Yugoslavs has been
most disturbing. There is no question but that the Germans have complicated the already difficult problem existing between Italy and Yugoslavia by promising the Yugoslavs territorial and other advantages. There are a lot of people in Yugoslavia who feel that the present Government in Germany will stay, that it will be able to force its will on the rest of Europe and that their best bet is to play with Germany for they will get most out of it in that way in the end. This section of opinion in Yugoslavia believes that Austria will eventually succumb to Germany and that when this comes Yugoslavia will get a good slice of present Austrian territory and in addition have German support against Italy which will eventually lead to her realizing what now seem unrealizable aspirations in other directions. This sentiment in Yugoslavia explains the benevolent attitude shown towards the Nazi refugees from Austria after July 25. Yugoslavia is therefore definitely playing the dog in the manger. She will not break with France for the present and burn her bridges there, nor with the other States of the Little Entente, but she is definitely playing with Germany and it would appear that at the moment is inclined to place more dependence on Germany than on French help. The attitude of Poland has naturally encouraged Yugoslavia and what they believe
2385-PS
to be the wavering attitude of Hungary is an additional element of encouragement to them * * *
In Hungary the same attitude was becoming increasingly obvious. In the same letter I wrote from Vienna in September 1934, with respect to developments in Hungary, I quote as follows :
" * * * In Hungary the revisionist feeling is
stronger than perhaps in any of the other Succession States, and it is this feeling which has the major influence in shaping Hungarian policy. Hungary has been flirting with Germany for some time as you know, but doing it very discreetly. The Hungarians feel very friendly towards Austria. They much prefer to see Austria independent. They don't want German domination in Austria or Southeastern Europe. They infinitely prefer the status quo, even without the treaty revision, to German domination in Austria and eventually over them. But they fear Germany and they are afraid that the present Government in Germany will be able to maintain itself, and this means in their minds definite German penetration to the Southeast. The events of June 30 and July 25 caused a real revulsion of feeling in Hungary and strengthened the feeling that they wanted to see Austria remain independent, but the feeling of fear of Germany has more recently made headway again.
"Kanya, the Foreign Minister, was in Berlin, I think now several months ago, and I know that he saw Hitler, Schacht, Neurath, and Blomberg. He came back to Hungary with the feeling that the present regime would be able to maintain itself, and strengthened therefore in his policy of maintaining an equivocal position. Hungary therefore must be considered among the States constantly wavering and endeavoring to carry water on both shoulders * * * ."
Poland, prompted by her territorial designs on Teschen, and fearful of being caught in a war between Germany and Russia, almost openly began to follow the German line, and particularly with respect to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In the fall of 1935, I reported from Vienna in this connection as follows: " * * * The part which Poland is playing at this time and has been playing for some months is a very dangerous one and, in the opinion of many, not a creditable one. Poland owes her existence to France and Eng-
34
2385-PS
land, and it was Czechoslovakia, whose country they now want to help divide up, who helped to make possible the new Poland. In her eagerness for prestige and additional territory she is willing to turn on her old friends and to play a rather sorry role * * *
" * * * The Czechoslovakian Minister here informs me that Czechoslovakia has an arbitration treaty with Poland which in the first paragraph covers all disputes which might arise. When some time ago the Poles arbitrarily dismissed some twenty Czechs from responsible positions in . Poland and no arrangement of the difficulties could be found, the Czech Government proposed arbitration, and to this day the Polish Government has not replied and refused to take any action. The Poles have an air line between Warsaw and Vienna which passes over Czechoslovakia, and when that was instituted the Czechs agreed with the reservation that when they wished to institute a line over Poland the Poles would agree. The Polish line has been in operation for some time, and when the Czechs recently wished to institute a commercial line over Poland the Poles refused to give permission. The Czechs retaliated by taking action which stopped the Polish Vienna-Warsaw route. It is well known that the Czechs are giving the Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia schools, etc., while the Poles are refusing to do anything of this kind for the Czechs in Poland. It seems to be a deliberate dog-in-the-manger policy which cannot give any confidence in the Polish procedure * * * ."
The effect was to make countries apathetic to the annexation of
Austria and cooperative in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.
I reported in October 1935, in this respect as follows:
" * * * Yugoslavia, because of the fear of her
minorities, prefers Anschluss to Hapsburg restoration in Austria, in the vain hope that this might avoid catastrophe for her. Anschluss would not avoid catastrophe for Yugoslavia, but only postpone it and make it more sure. Hungary remains fundamentally pro-German, due to the false idea that her revisionist hopes will get satisfied in that direction sooner than others. She does not realize that the revisionist satisfaction which she hopes to get from Germany would only be the forerunner of later loss of sovereignty. The fact that there are Hungarians who realize that this turning to Berlin is the sure road to ruin does not keep Hungary from putting her foot on this road.
35
2385-PS
"Because Czechoslovakia has entered into a military agreement with Russia, and Rumania is about to do the same, and Yugoslavia is considering it, Berlin is trying to convince Poland and Hungary that this is a Soviet threat to them. The real object, of course, is to get their cooperation in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the fastening of the yoke on Austria as the first step towards progress to the Southeast * * *
As the Nazi leaders of Germany realized, however, that these limited and uncertain gains were not sufficient to insure the success of her program, they did not lessen their rearmament at home so as to increase terror and fear. Austria and Czechoslovakia might easily have been saved and her neighbors persuaded to combine with them in mutual self defense if England and France at that time, with or without Italy's assistance, had shown adequate evidence of resisting the German program. Nazi leaders at that time were most. insistent and persistent in endeavoring to determine the reactions to their program in Italy and in France and to a certain extent in the United States. They were eager to know to what degree these countries would resist their program. They had no regard as to what the smaller countries of Europe might feel or think or do. Their physical power was already so great that that was no longer a matter of concern to them. I recall conversations with Nazi leaders at this stage, when I happened to see them in Germany on trips from Vienna to Berlin, during which they showed a childish eagerness to get my reaction to what they were doing and when I told them that they were precipitating a war in which Germany would be defeated and her power in Europe destroyed, not for generations but perhaps for centuries, they laughed in my face and said that England and France and we would do nothing and they knew it.
Germany succeeded in preventing any such combinations by creating divisions and by persuading France and England to acquiesce, as the price of peace, in the German expansion in Southeastern Europe, in exchange for precarious security in the West.
While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia. The Nazis made little effort to conceal their motives in supporting Italian colonial adventures. In the summer of 1935,
36
2385—PS
I was formed by a person whose name I do not recall at this time but who was thoroughly informed as to all developments in Germany, that the Nazis were eagerly awaiting an Italian-Abyssinian war to give them a free hand in Central Europe. I reported at that time: .
" * * * He emphasized that in the party it was definitely reckoned with that war between Italy and Abyssinia was inevitable, and that this would cause disturbances in the European situation which the regime felt it must be free to reap all benefit from * * *
Germany, of course, did take advantage of the situation to force Austria into the July 11, 1936 accord, which, as I have explained in a separate affidavit, was the first critical step in the disintegration and eventual downfall of Austria.
The Nazis fully realized, however, the necessity for the neutralization of France and England, as a part of their strategic preparation for war, and they left no stone unturned to achieve it. Almost from the beginning of the Hitler regime, the Nazis sought to make a deal with France. The terms of the deal with France were security for France in the West in exchange for freedom of action for Germany in the East. Very soon after coming to power, Hitler announced that apart from the Saar, Germany coveted no territory of France and thereafter he often repeated these assurances, particularly on the occasion of each new treaty violation or act of aggression in the East. Acceptance of the deal would of course reduce France to a second-rate power. To gain French acquiescence, the Nazis made powerful appeals to all classes of French society. To the left, they played on the profound pacifist sentiment of the masses. To the right, they emphasized the fear of communism, fears which took several forms, either that the Nazis, after the reoccupation of the Rhineland, were invulnerable in the West and could be stopped in the East only by the Red army, or conversely (after the purge of the Russian army in 1937) that Russia could not fight Germany, but intended to let France and England exhaust themselves in a war with Germany and then arise in the end the only victor.
To England, the Nazis made substantially the same arguments, and appealed in addition to those who disapproved of French military hegemony and the alleged inequalities of the Versailles Treaty. As an evidence of their alleged desire to reach a permanent understanding with England, Germany "accepted" a naval limitations treaty and dangled before the eyes of the British Government the prize of a. Locarno Air Pact.
37
2385—PS
In order to assure wider acceptance of these arguments, Germany did not hesitate to attempt to arrange to involve England and France elsewhere in order to give Germany a freer hand in Eastern Europe. Germany actively supported Italy in both her Abyssinian and Spanish adventures, thereby embroiling Italy with France and England. By means of an understanding with Italy announced in 1936, and by the formation of the anti-Comintern Fact with Japan at about the same time, Germany created such potential dangers for England in the Mediterranean and in the Far East as to discourage England from continuing to maintain the commitments undertaken by her in Eastern Europe.
These German measures with respect to France and England were surprisingly effective. The French Ambassador in Berlin,
M. Francois Poncet, who was married to a member of one of the powerful industrial families of France, was persuaded that German military might could not be matched and as I learned from friends in the French Foreign Office, sent home many defeatist reports. As early as the fall of 1935, I learned from these same friends and others that France was preparing to abandon its commitments in the Southeastern part of Europe in exchange for promises of security within her own borders. The Nazis appeared to have equal success in undermining British sentiment. The "conversion" of Lord Lothian and the attitude of the London Times beginning in 1935 are a matter of historical record. The attitude of such conservatives was naturally reflected in British diplomacy.
Germany was ready. She had completed her rearmament program. She had sown discord among her intended victims in Eastern Europe. She had won tacit English and French acceptance for German expansion in the East in exchange for a promise of peace in the West. Germany was ready now to march. The rest is written history.
[signed] George S. Messer smith
Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned, and qualified, in Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 30th day of August, 1945.
[signed] William L. Brewster William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States of America
Service No. 6809 Tariff No. 38 No fee prescribed.
38