' , Berlin, 2 May 1938
The Chief of the Organizational Staff in the General Staff of the Air Force.
No. 50/38 TOP SECRET
3 copies
To the: copy No. 1
Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.
In the following I submit the—
"Organizational Study 1950"
Purpose:
The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force. The result gained is termed
"Distant Objective"
From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942; this will be called "Final Objective 1942"
This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaue, Air Divisions, etc. which is called "Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938"
[signed] Kammhuber
a. Text:
Table of Contents
Section I. Section II.
Assumptions
with it: Inclosure No. 1 (Map) [see Chart No. 10]
Consideration of the Principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in section I.
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Section III. Consideration of further questions.
Section IV. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the "Distant Objective."
with it: Inclosure No. 2 (Distant Objective)
Section V. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 1942. with it: Inclosure No. 3 (Final Objective 1942)
Section VI. Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 1 October 1938. with it: Inclosure No. 4 (Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938).
b. Special Inclosures:
Proposal for the setting-up of flight formations
until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942).........Incl. No. 5
Proposal for dispersal of these formations......Inch No. 6
Proposal for the setting-up of AA artillery until
1942 (New Final Objective 1942) ..............Inch No. 7
Proposal for dispersal of these formations, including increase of mobilization .................Inch No. 8
The Chief of the Organizational Staff.
Berlin, 2 May 1938 No. 50/38 TOP SECRET Organizational Study 1950
I. Assumption.
1. Frontiers of Germany, see Map, Inclosure No. 1. [see Chart No. 10]
2. Organization of Air Force in peacetime:
7 Group Commands: (1 Berlin, 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6 Warsaw, 7 Koenigsberg).
1-3 flight corps are subordinated to each Group Command. Each flight corps consists of 2 flight divisions, each of which comprises—
3 mixed combat Geschwader (2 combat groups, 1 dive bomber group).
1 heavy fighter Geschwader.
Total strength: |
18 flight corps = 36 flight divisions = i08 mixed Geschwader f = 144 Geschwader
36 heavy fighter Geschwader)
25 reconnaissance groups (F)
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Minimum performance:
Range: 6-8,000 km Speed: 5- 600 km
2-4 Air Gaue are subordinated to each Group Command. [Footnote: In the study 32 Air Gaue are assumed (without sea)]
The Air Gaue are Corps commands. They are in charge of:
1. Air defense (AA, light fighters).
2. The Air Gau signal units.
3. The ground organization.
4. Supply.
5. Everything pertaining to replacements (also for
flying troops and schools).
6. The administration.
7. The civil aviation offices.
II. Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in section I:
1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia.
a. One front war, for instance against England. If all 144 Geschwader are employed against England, they must be concentrated in the Western half of the Reich, that is, they must be deployed in such a way, that by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner and save themselves unnecessarily long flight routes. 144 Geschwader require 432 operational airfields. Concentration in one Air Force Group, for instance, in Air Force Group 2, which is closest to England, is therefore impossible. There must be a deployment in depth, which must be distributed over Air Force Groups 2, 1, and 3 at least.
Regardless of whether or not Germany respects neutrality, that is, whether or not planes fly to England via the German Bay, in any case the framework of one single Air Force Group will be split:—
1. Because it is impossible spacially, to accommodate so large an attack force in one Air Force Group.
2. Because it is too much for one Command to have to lead so large a number of formations (18 corps), even if it is given authority over all neighboring Airfield Regional Commands occupied by the attack force.
Hence it follows, that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself must take over the leadership of the attack. A further, and not the least important reason for this is that otherwise
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he would be eliminated, for all practical purposes, if he subordinated the entire attack force to a single Command.
It remains to be decided, whether he is to lead by giving direct orders to the Flight Corps, while the Air Force Group Commands would be responsible only for ground organization and supply, or whether the Group Commands are to be established as intermediate authorities also in regard to operations. The decision is determined—
a. By the numerical strength of the flight troops.
b. By their dependence on ground organization and supply.
Concerning a: What has been said above apropos a single Air
Force Group with regard to numerical limitation, also applies to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself. As a rule one Command should not be in charge of more than 6 larger tactical units. Since in the example chosen 18 flight corps are presumed to exist, these cannot possibly be all under the direct command of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; it is necessary to establish higher commands on an intermediate level. These are the Air Force Group Commands; as the Air Force grows these automatically acquire an intermediate position as operational commands.
Concerning b: Moreover, the dependence on ground organization and supply is an argument in favor of establishing the Air Force Group Commands as intermediate operational authorities, at the same time leaving them in operational charge of ground organization and supply in one form or another. Ground organization and supply are elements of operational command and cannot be separated from the latter without disadvantage. If, for instance, the Air Force Groups were established purely as operational commands for the purpose of dealing the attack forces, the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself would have to take charge of ground organization and supply and adjust them to the requirements of the troops. In view of the assumed extent of the German Reich with its 18 Flight Corps and its 22 large Air Gaue, this task is too large for one central authority to be able to handle it. Since preparations for attack are to be made for several fronts and for several possible contingencies, decentralization by means of intermediate command authorities is indispensable. These intermediate authorities can only be those, which are personally interested in leading the attack, that is (they must be) command authorities, which are in charge of attack forces in wartime and which must also be in charge of the respective ground organization and supply. How necessary this line of authority is, is shown by the fact that not a single Air Command is
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willing to rely on the Air Gaue concerned to "make its bed" "by order" of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and that each demands to be put in charge of the Air Gau or Airfield Regional Command concerned (see the subordination of the Airfield Regional Commands near the Bavarian Ostmark under Air Force Group 1 in the event of "Case Green" and the applications by Air Force Group 3 to be put in charge of Air Gaue XII, Giessen, in the event of "Case Red"). The channel for "applications via the Supreme Commander of the Air Force" simply is too long, there are too many day-to-day frictions and punctures. He who leads the attack will and must not be deprived of control, regardless of whether or not his formations on the ground are properly supplied. "Operational Command," does not start in the air, but on the ground, and preparation by the ground organization is part of the operation, just as much as the tactical preparation of the flight.
*******
Thus the above discussion leads to the result that the Air Force Group Commands must be commands in charge of the attack force and at the same time commands in charge of the ground organization and supplies for this force.
Furthermore, they must be locally bound, because this enables them to make the most of the advantage flying troops have over all other troops, that is, that they can push forward the preparations for war already in peacetime to such an extent that the highest degree of preparedness for action is achieved.
If it is assumed, as in the present study, -that in peacetime the existing 18 Flight Corps are distributed over the whole Reich, while in war they operate, for instance, from the three Air Force Group Commands Nos. 2, 1 and 3 to fight against England, it immediately becomes clear that these 18 Corps Commanders cannot be let loose independently on these three Air Force Groups in order to make their preparations there in peacetime. Since the same preparations must be made on the other fronts, the Corps Commanders would be travelling most of the time, without there being any guarantee that their preparations are sufficient, since they have no command authority in the deployment area and cannot obtain such authority. Therefore they can only submit "requests" to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; the fulfillment of these requests can hardly be handled, still less controlled, centrally.
The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have lo-
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cally bound commands which prepare the air way on their fronts according to the orders and instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and which during the war have a responsible share in the leadership.
*******
b. War on several fronts, for instance, against France and Russia. Assuming that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force intends to deliver the first blow against France, the 144 attack Geschwader will be deployed in Air Force Groups 3, 2, and 1, and the attack will be carried out as in a one-front war. The Air Force Groups 6 and 7 meanwhile make the last preparations in the way of ground organization, so that they can start with the attack as soon as the formations are transferred from the West.
This is a schematic procedure by which one adversary after the other is defeated by concentrating the attack on him. In this case operational mobility consists merely in a swift transfer from West to East, by which, however, it is by no means exploited to the full. Since the operational Air Force is presumed to have a range of 6-8,000 km (individual German aircraft have reached this even today, cf. world record of the Do 18), it can theoretically fly from its home-port to Paris today and to Moscow tomorrow. It can therefore without difficulty operate against the East from operational airfields selected for an attack on France without changing airfields. Since, however, Air Force Group Commands 1-3 are oriented towards France and are the ones most strongly tied down, they cannot at the same time lead an attack against the East, bypassing the Eastern Air Force Group Commands. In such cases the Supreme Commander of the Air Force takes immediate charge of the Flight Corps concerned and directs the attack against the East himself. Air Force Group Commands 1-3 merely take care of preparations on the ground. The formations start from the operational airports they have used hitherto, they fly for instance against Moscow, and return to the airports whence they started. When the action against the East is completed, they are put once more at the disposal of Air Force Groups 1-3 to continue their attacks against the West.
* * * * * * *
Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 19^2. For this compare Inclosure No. 3 (final objective 1942).
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1. The following will exist in 1942 (without sea):
I. 3 Air Force Group Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich).
1 Air Force Command East Prussia.
1 Air Force Command Austria.
II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna).
III. 18 Combat Geschwader.
6 Dive bomber Geschwader.
6 Heavy fighter Geschwader.
VI. Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 1 October 1938. For this compare Inclosure No.
4. (Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938.)
1. The following will exist on 1 October 1938 (sea excepted):
I. 3 Air' Force Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich).
1 Air Force Command East Prussia.
1 Air Force Command Austria.
II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna).
III. 12 Combat Geschwader
3 Divebomber Geschwader 3 Heavy fighter Geschwader (scheduled)
2. It will not yet be possible to form 'mixed combat Geschwader, since the insufficient ranges of the divebombers will not permit this. Nor, will it be possible yet to form flight divisions, composed as assumed for the Final Solution, since the heavy fighter plane is only now in production.
3. In view of the small number of defense forces and certain personnel reasons, it does not as yet seem justified to establish the Air Gau Commands at once as Corps Command Staffs (Commanding Generals and Commanders of the Air Gaue).
Therefore only an interim solution can be chosen on 1 October 1938. This, however, must be of such a nature that the Final Solution is not obstructed, but prepared and enabled to grow out of it slowly and organically.
This results in the following Proposal for the Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938:
(including the new units to be set up at the end of the year)
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d. The establishment of the flying formations will be carried out according to program, so far as their contents are concerned. For organizational reasons it is urgently desired that the establishment period be advanced to the time from 1 Nov. to 31 Dec. 1938, in order to achieve as soon as possible clear organizational and command relationships, which are the basis of any fruitful work. The disadvantage this entails from the point of view of training can be eliminated by letting the flying and part of the technical personnel continue its training at the parent units and schools as long as is necessary, and by not transferring it to the new formations until the middle of December.
This will make it possible to start the next mobilization year already on 1 Jan. 1939, and thus to cut short the extremely unpleasant period from October to the start of the new mobilization plan, whose foundations will be completely changed in all decisive points as of 1 Oct. 38.