THE STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 5TH YEAR OF WAR
Lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (West) to the Reich and Gau leaders, delivered in Munich on 7 November 1943.
I. Review of the most important questions of development up to the present.
II. The Italian betrayal, how it was parried, and its consequences.
General Outcome:
III. The present situation.
Consideration of the individual theaters of war and their characteristic features.
Finland
Norway
Denmark: Keystone of communications with Norway. France with the Netherlands and Belgium the battlefield of the year '44.
Italy: A narrow front with deep flanks.
The Balkans: Guerilla warfare—Supply
The East: Comparison with the Western front, 1917/18
IV. The enemy—His resources and their grouping. His further
strategic intentions. .
' 1
V. The morale of the confederates and neutrals.
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VI. The problems of the German Command in this situation of the struggle along the inner line.
a. The distribution of forces throughout the theater of war
as a whole. .
b. The formation of operative reserves.
c. Comparison between requirements in soldiers and munitions workers.
d. Exhaustion of manpower reserves in the territories under one domination.
The problem of the Confederates and of alien soldiers.
e. Mastering the enemy terror raids from the air.
f. The renewal of effective U-boat warfare. '
VII. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.
a. The German people and its leadership.
b. The German armed forces.
c. The ethical and moral foundation of our struggle.
, d. The unified political and military aim of the Confederates [Verbündeten], protection from Bolshevism.
e. Unified political and military command.
f. The diverging political, military, social and economic tendencies of our opponents, the moral inferiority of our opponents in the West and the purely materialistic foundations of their struggle.
g. The genius at the head of the command.
Introduction
Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th year of war.
I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumors concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call it—a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still some-
921
thing in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not.the peace she expected but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people. .
The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia—these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
I. A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.
II. Consideration of the present situation.
III. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in
victory. .
In view of my position as military adviser to the Fuehrer,
I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own
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personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the. same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.
I. Review
1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in reawakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen] ; in nurturing fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two forces.
2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty [Wehrhoheit] (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armored and air arm.
3. The Austrian "Anschluss," in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now inclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.
This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the East.
4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now'
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became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.
5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland—in itself unavoidable—was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent—after all not inconsiderable in himself—collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.
6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the' East and that in view of the agreements with Russia the two-front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.
7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the West where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the Ruhr area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the Fuehrer had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim of which could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out—as originally planned— that is, in the late autumn of 1939—was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.
8. In the meantime, however, we were confronted by yet another problem which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. The point here lay in opening up a theatre of war which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed twofold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the North would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was realization of our own maritime necessities which made it imperative for us to secure for ourselves free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval support
924
points on'the Norwegian coast. Here too, therefore, defensive and offensive requirements combined to form an indissoluble whole.
The course and conclusion of this campaign are known.. In the main it was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the West with the setting in of the most favorable season of the year, in May 1940.
9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments—destined to do us important service in the further course of the war—but above all the entire Atlantic coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points. Direct threat to the British motherland had by this means become possibje.
The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war into England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore —in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war —it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the Atlantic (for instance, Iceland and the Azores on which in the meantime the enemy had laid his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the Fuehrer refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment could not have provided permanently.
10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41 provided another opportunity of combatting England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which in its turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.
In the measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, North Africa became more and more a German theater of war. Employing our forces in this way—incidentally, no great force was involved—appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space" [Lebensraum].
693260—46—59
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11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in consequence of the unnecessary expedition of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.
12. Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decisions to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.
13. Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of Crete; this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory— a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.
14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.
If today, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly underestimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes.' But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for as long as possible, there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war—the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of all tasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there still remains much that is
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imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.
One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counterblast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the face of this danger and, sooner or later, have been overrun by it.
15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of Tunis effected as a. countermeasure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the North and West coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.
Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.
In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autumn of 1943 :
The first two years of war saw Germany and its later allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the Donetz, up to the gates of Moscow and up to the Volkhov created a wide forefield for thé defense of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, provided the prem-. ises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed, and our superiority in the air was able to make good, at all events in the coastal district, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has eluded us. The landing in England, prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shatter the Soviet Armed
927
Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach us with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.
But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which still lay before us against Soviet Russia.
In the East however, the natural catastrophe of the winter of 1941 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution. [Following paragraph struck out:]
Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side, and thereby creating the possibility of seizing Gibraltar, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, Sorano Sunjer.
It therefore became clear that'we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships.*
After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theater of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the Caucasus and the Delta of the Nile failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inadequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilize the front at Stalingrad and before the Caucasus, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the Volga and along the Don—largely occupied moreover by the troops of our Allies. The 6th Army, consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.
Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea, and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of El Alamein forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they
For—says Clausewitz—every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defense.
had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice. ,
At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armored Army and the Gth Army—but four armies of our allies were lost for good.
The tactical reserves in the East would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would no longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone was the great mobility of the Army and, excepting on the Russian theater of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of manpower, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all domains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.
Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to pass over to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.
So when the positions pushed out, beyond the European front to the South had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: In the East to regain the territories lost there and in the South against the Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.
In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, howeVer, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and the Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.
It was at this stage of the war that the Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press. Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the Duce could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the Fuehrer from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in
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our position in the Mediterranean and our cooperation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuehrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards overthrowing the new Government and liberating the Duce. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far South as possible, that is, on Sicily.
That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further West in the Mediterranean—of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On Sardinia, on Corsica, in Apulia, in Calabria, or—if the thesis of betrayal were true—why not in Rome itself, or near Leghorn or Genoa? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy a& possible in order not to let the base of the enemy air forces come near to the Alps. If the enemy is successful in a landing in Northern Italy then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a moral pretext for their betrayal, or by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability, and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of our officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of the betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were simply incomprehensible.
The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the Fuehrer. The measures to be taken in the event of open betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword 'Axis' would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the Fuehrer at once caused to be moved from the West to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there—and that at a time when the East front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.
How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering Gau's—keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of Italian machinations—in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparations is known to you all. However, somehow or other the Italians explained it all ways, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.
In this insupportable position the Fuehrer agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum.
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Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at Salerno and on the afternoon of 8 September news of the Italian capitulation flew through the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible to gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.
General Outcome: Appendix
WFST/ORG/lst STAFFEL
Armed Forces Operation Staff/Organization/lst Section
1. Arms:
List of Italian Booty
Rifles .....-........
Pistols .............
M.P..................
A.T. rifles .........
MG ..................
Mortars .............
A.T. guns ...........
A.A. guns ...........
Army guns ...........
Ammunition (tons) ...
Motor cycles ........
Armored cars ........
Lorries .............
Motor busses (KOM) .
Trailers ............
Tractors ____________
Tanks and assault guns
M.T. fuel ...........
Horses, mules .......
1,255,606
17,703
13,627
167
38,383
____8,606
961
3,679
5,346
287,502
2,295
1,938
12,708
90
471
293
970
123,114
67,600
2. Aircraft:
Fighters ......
Bombers........
Reconnaissance Transports ....
1,379
886
512
363
Front line
aircraft
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Seaplanes ................... 90
Passenger planes ........... 125
Training craft ......... 1,198
Aircraft engines ......... 499
2nd line aircraft
3. Ships:
Torpedo boats .........
Destroyers ............
Corvettes .............
S-boats ....)..........
Anti-submarine boats ....
Mine-layers ...........
Mine-dètectors ........
Escort vessels ........
R-boats ................
Other small war vessels Merchant ships .........
2J
2!
14
6
71
71
is!
10
51
11
34
4. Clothing:
Overcoats ....
Capes .......
Tunics .......
Pullovers ....
Trousers, prs
Shirts .......
Pants, prs .... Shoes, prs. ....
Caps ..........
Tent squares . Cloth, meters Linen (in m2) Blankets .....
551.000
408.000
524.000
552.000
494.000 1
1.139.000
4.243.000
3.286.000
486.000
509.000
352.000
3.036.000 .
2.522.000
5. Rato materials:
[Note in ink: In far larger quantities than might have been expected]
Iron and steel_______________________ 196,200 tons
Iron and steel scrap___________________ 16,900 tons
Nonferrous metals .................... 78,780 tons
Minerals ............................... 500 tons
Coal .......................?............ 41,000 tons
Timber .............................. 90,000 cbm.
Mercury .................................. 3,400 tons
Asbestos ................................... 100 tons
Buna ..............................'..... 462 tons
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Chem. products (Chloric acid,
hydrochloric acid) ......._.............. 1,900 tons
Industrial oils and fats...................... 240 tons
Tanning materials ............................. 515 tons
Alcohol ....................................... 400 tons
Hides and tallow............................ 21,925 pieces
Leather ....................................... 200 tons
Tyres (cars and cycles)................... 21,000 pieces
Raw material for textiles..................... 493 tons
Quinine .................................... 13 'tons
Raw tobacco................................ 8,800 tons
6. Prisoners of war or military internees:
Italians .................—.547,531 of whom 24,744 officers
British .................... 34,160 of whom 2,615 officers
Americans .................. 1,427 of whom 201 officers
Italian Booty
Arms:
Rifles .................................... 1,255,660
Machine guns ................................... 38,383
Guns ........................................ 9,986
M. T. vehicles ......................................... 15,500
Tanks and assault guns ................................. 970
M. T. Fuel (cubic meters) .............................. 123,114
Horses, mules .......................................... 67,600
Aircraft:
Front line aircraft ............................ 2,867
Other aircraft ................................. 1,686
Ships:
Torpedo-boats and destroyers .................... 10
Other small vessels of war .............................. 51
Clothing for..........................................500,000 men
Raw materials in far larger quantities than might have been expected in view of the constant economic demands.
PW's or military internees:
Italians ...................547,531 of whom 24,744 officers
British .................... 34,160 of whom 2,615 officers
Americans .................. 1,427 of whom 201 officers
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Disarmed Italian Divisions
Definitely disarmed.....................................51 divisions
Probably disarmed ......................................29 divisions
Not disarmed............................................ 3 divisions
South-East
Disarmed:
Rhodes Regina Division 1
Crete Siena Division 1
Greece Cagliari, Piemonte, Forli, Pin- erolo, Casale, Modena, Aqui,
Divisions 7
Albania Brennero, Arezzo, Parma, Fir- enze, Puglie, Emilie Divisions 6
Montenegro Perugia, Venezia, Ferrara, Tau- rinense Divisions 4
Croatia Murge, Marche, Messina, Bergamo, Zaro, Lombardia Divisions ....................... 6
~25
Not yet disarmed up to the present; Main part of Cuneo Division (Samos) and Re Division and Macerata division (North-west Croatia)
South
Disarmed:
Area of Army Group C:
(a) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:
Julia, Tridentina, Cuneense, Rovigo, Alpi Graie, 201st Coastal Division, Ersatz Brennero Division, Ersatz Firenze Division, Ersatz Pistoia Division, Ersatz Ravenna Division ............................................. 10
(b) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:
206th Coastal Division, Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta Division, Cosseria, Trento, Assieta, Livorno, and Torino Divisions.........................................:... 7
(c) Some parts of the divisions probably disarmed:
Veneto, Vicenza, Napoli and Aosta Divisions .......... 4
~21
In addition a considerable number of special units not forming part of a divisional formation were disarmed. .
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Area of Supreme Command South ("OB. SUD")
a. Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:
221st Coastal Divisions, Piave, Grenatieri Di Sardegna, Sassari, Piacenza, Centavro, Ariete Divisions, 220th Coastal Divisions, 215th Coastal Division, Ravenna.... 10
b. Parts of the divisions definitely disarmed:
211th Coastal, Mantua, 212th Coastal, 227th Coastal, 214th Coastal, Picino, 210th Coastal, 200th Coastal, 222d Coastal, Pasubio, Legnang.......................... 11
c. Parts of divisions probably disarmed:
Priuli, Cremona, Calabria, 204th Coastal, Bari, 200th Coastal, Sabauda, (on Corsica and Sardinia) ............ 7
~28
West
Disarmed:
Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:
Em. Filiberto, Pusteria, Taro, Lupi Di Toscana, 223d Coastal Division, 224th Coastal Division. In all 6 Divisions
III
I should like briefly, to set out the characteristic features of the individual theaters of war.
See Appendixes:
[Note in pencil: "Delivered extempore with the help of maps"]
To III Finland
The Finnish front, the Northern abutment of the European defense system. The outermost wing of the East Front, and at the same time the rear cover of the Norwegian front.
Total length of front approx 1,400 km (=% of the total length of the East front), occupied along wide stretches only by means of support points. .
Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North-East: treeless partly rocky Tundra.
Weather: Very various over the terrain as a whole. (Temperatures on 1. 11. from +8° to —18°). In the North long polar night, mud period not materially important.
War supply: Important nickel mines at Kolosjoki near Petjamo (32% of the total European output).
Total population: 3.8 millions.
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Operational possibilities':
No operations on a grand scale possible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for supplying own offensive do not exist only one railway in North-South direction as far as Rovaniemi, branch line Eastwards (Kandalaksha) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk road running North-South (Helsinki-Petjamo). As against this, on the Russian side, high-capacity Murmansk line.
Conduct of war: Consequently, in the main, confined to assault unit activities and enterprises by Jeager detachments, action along the flanks and for roads of special importance. Nevertheless because of the great length of front a strong own (German) force of 176,800 is tied to this front, consisting of the best troops capable of withstanding the nature of the country. Own divisions in good fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.
For air activity on the whole very unfavorable. Terrain affords new possibilities for laying out airfields.
Norway
Protection of the North-Western flank of Europe. Total front length 2,800 km (about equal to East front). Part of the front occupied only by support points, islands not all occupied.
Terrain: Medium-mountain and alpine in nature deeply indented by fjords and valleys.
War Supply: Transportation of Swedish ore via Narvik (22% of total European output). Emphasis in supply lies on communications by sea. Several good big and small ports suitable for distribution traffic.
Coastal district suitable for enemy landings with limited objective.
Operations—on land only possible with limited forces. Railway and road systems very widely meshed, of low capacity, easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). For these reasons the British oper-ations/940 (plus absence of bigger harbors) were greatly hampered.
Own forces in Norway are 380,000 men.
The greater portion of the 13 divisions are employed in coastal defense, partly permanently posted. '
(In Norway about 1,000 guns of over 10 cm. cal. are employed in coastal defense).
Counterattack reserves: 1 Inf. Div. in Central Norway, 1st Infantry and 1 Armored Divisions in South Norway.
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Opportunities of action of own air. arms dependent to a very high degree on weather, particularly in North Norway.
Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval combat forces. Supply for the AOK (Army Command) depends on the security of sea communications. Mean supply efficiency per month by sea = 190,140 BRT.
. Denmark
Key position at entrance to the Baltic the possession of which would make possible far-reaching enemy operations both in the direction of Scandinavia and in that of Germany and extend their influence into the Baltic.
Total length of front: approx. 700 km.
Terrain: For landings from the sea on a large scale the Western coast is little suited (storms, surf); East Jutland and the islands are better suited (but owing to long approach routes and good defensive possibilities unlikely). .
Especially open to the danger of a landing: Esbjerg (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland).
For tanks—possible almost everywhere. Landings from the air possible in the open as well as on the well-developed airfields.
Coastal defense—by support points. Coastal defense forces— 3 divisions, of limited fighting value. In addition, counterattack reserves. Reinforcements have been ordered.
Total formations of the Wehrmacht employed—106,500 men.
» West
1. Terrain: In all 2,100 Km. of coastal front on the Channel and Atlantic and 500 Km on the Mediterranean all of which—in contra-distinction to the coast in Norway—with a few inconsiderable exceptions admit of landings with modern resources.
The interior of the country offers no obstacles to the employment of all formations including tactical armored formations (Western campaign).
A good well-developed communications system both by rail and road enables our resources to be moved rapidly but will also benefit the enemy once he has gained a footing.
Weather conditions do not completely exclude landing operas tions with modem equipment at any time of the year. In the autumn and winter however storms may make a landing on the grand scale a difficult matter.
2. Own possibilities: The position as described makes it necessary to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason—construction of the Atlantic Wall. This coni-m
struction has been in hand for a long time; it is however impos. sible along a front of 2,600 TCm to reinforce the coastal front with a system of fortifications in depth at all points. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than in any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the Maginot Line.
2,692 guns of cal 7.5 cm. up to the heaviest long-range batteries, not including the AA guns and the artillery of the divisions employes. 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, without counting the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,500 (8,449) positions of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. In all over 5.3 million cubic meters of concrete have been used on the constructions.
A belt of fortifications of this kind has the effect however of tieing down considerable forces of one's own. For this purpose we have put in fortress divisions of whom however, needless to say, only a small section in every case can be effective against the enemy. For this reason it is essential to have strong, mobile and especially well-equipped reserves in the West for the purpose of forming points of gravity. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and acutely endangering the general situation. ' .
Strength in the West: In all 1,370,000 men.
* . Italy
1. Ground conditions. Along the front: mountains some of which are Alpine in nature. Less steep country only along the West and above all the East coast. As a result it is possible in part to cut out some sectors of the Alpine regions; on the other hand infantry must be employed in strength to prevent infiltration. Transverse movements behind the front are very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads for a long time.
In addition to these conditions along the front (length app. 150 km.), the factor determining the employment of own troops is the double coastline (on both sides), total length approx. 1,600 km. In addition to landings directly behind our front, the sectors especially threatened are Genoa, La Spezia, Rome, and the whole of the East coast south of Ravenna.
2. The point of next importance to the terrain in determining tactical conditions in Italy is the superiority of the enemy on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by a number of smaller and greater landings directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery action.
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Absolute supremacy in the air. In addition to direct and heavy effect on the troops this air superiority also means constant interference with traffic (especially on the railroads) in the rear areas. Troop movements and supply are affected right far back into the Hinterland.
The enemy's rearward communications across the sea are practically unhampered as our own sea and air forces are nothing like strong enough.
3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with
an immense task. .
In spite of the fact that our forces are hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of all branches of the Armed Forces and auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down our own losses in men and equipment to a minimum since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, since, apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper, the enemy has not up to the present gained any decisive tactical success. However, it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy as he is in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.
Own air arm—in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theaters of war—must coniine itself to forming points of gravity.
Navy: Apart from the employment of a few U-rboats and speedboats, possesses few possibilities of becoming effective against the enemy.
4. Along the coasts—preparation for defense.
Finland: ^
Total length of front about 1,400 km. (= % of total length of Eastern front). Important: Nickel mines Kolosjoki near Pet-samo (32% of total European output). Total number of inhabitants 3.8 millions.
Own strength: 176,800 men
Norway:
Total length of front 2,000 km (equal to length of Eastern Front).
Narvik: Clearing port for Swedish ore (22% of total European output).
Own strength: 315,000 men Approx 1,000 guns over 10 cm.
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Denmark:
Total length of front: approx 700 km. Own strength: 106,500 men
West:
In all 2,100 km of coastal front along the channel and the Atlantic and 500 km. along Mediterranean.
Atlantic wall: 2,692 guns of cal. 7.5 up to the heaviest long range batteries of 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons 8,500 positions, constantly being extended.
Over 5.3 million cbm of concrete laid.
Own strength: 1,370,000 men.
Italy: >
Length of front: approx. 150 km.
Both coasts: in all approx. 1,600 km.
Own strength: 329,000 men.
South-East: ,
Balkans 50% of European output in mineral oil.
100% of European output in chromium ore.
60% of European output in bauxite.
29% of European output in antimony.
21% of European output in copper.
Length of coast line (inch Crete and Rhodes).
Approx. 4,200 km., or twice the distance from Leningrad to the Black Sea.
Own strength: 612,000 men.
East:
Length of front: 2,100 km.
In view of the length of front our own strength is inadequate for a continuous line of positions as in the last world war. Artillery: Monthly production 1,200 guns.
Tanks: At the outbreak of the war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out of date.
Russian losses in tanks from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Railway sabotage: July 1560, August 2,121, September 2,000 line demolitions with- great effect on operations and an evacuation transport.
Reinforcement of the Red Army (lowest point) 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions.
Today highest point up to date: 5.5 millions.
Own strength: 3,900,000. .
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South-East
1. Importance of the South-East. Domination of the Balkans as
an integral part of the Fortress Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political, and economic reasons.
The Balkans provide—
50% of the total European output in mineral oil
100% of the total European output in chromium ore
60% of the total European output in bauxite
29% of the total European output in antimony
21% of the total European output in copper
2. Tactical possibilities. In view of the coast length (including Crete and Rhodes) of approx. 4,200 km, that is, twice the distance from Leningrad to the Black Sea, in the event of an attack by the enemy our own troops would have the following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages. For coastal defense in general all that is necessary is to occupy the harbors and river mouths on the point of gravity principle.
Should the operations move inland, the hills offer good opportunities for blocking and defense.
Disadvantages. A sparse rail and road system involves difficulties in the matter of supply and the movement of reserves.
Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track railway line with an efficiency of 12 trains per day.) B
Difficulties in supplying the many islands of the Aegean (low own tonnage, shortage of naval tactical forces—only a few Italian torpedo-boats—very few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47,000, on Rhodes 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).
3. Present position. Army: In the parts of the Balkans occupied by us, guerilla warfare is now being waged against guerilla bands —some of them well-armed—supported by the Anglo-Saxons to a total strength of approx. H0-150,000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but disunited amongst themselves. A distinction should be made:
a. In Croatia and Serbia between—
aa. Communist bands under the command of Tito to a strength of approx. 90,000 men.
bb. Chetniks under the command of Drazha Mihailovich, to a strength of 30,000 men.
€93260—46—60
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b. In Greece: Nationalist bands under the command of Zervas to a strength of 10,000 and approx. 15,000 Communists.
For the defense against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of 612,000 men.
Landings of any size in the wintertime are unlikely so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after defeating and destroying the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defense.
From the forces of the confederates stationed in the South-East—with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are requested to defend Bulgaria—no material assistance may be expected.
Air arm: At present, in view of the great distance to their jumping-off bases, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon air arm has not made itself felt excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that Southern Italy is occupied by the enemy has become noticeable. *
East
Length of front: 2,100 km. (distance from frontier to Reich to Moscow 900 km., to Urals 2,300 km.)
Terrain: Flat plateau, swamp, and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. In view of the great length of the front the ratio of our own strength is not sufficiently high to admit of a continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by a system of support points and mobile warfare in which threats to the flanks and rear must be accepted. Our line of defense is therefore rather thin and there is difficulty in forming larger gravity points. Where we are opposed by enemy concentrations our forces are always locally inferior.
Russian infantry's fighting value has sunk to a still lower level although their training is noticeably better; on the other hand their equipment is rapidly improving (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). The Russian artillery is being built up on a grand scale. Monthly output 1,2G0 guns. ,
Armored troops: On the outbreak of war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out-of-date.
Strength on 1.10.43: 9,000 heavy tanks of the most modern types. Monthly production 1,700.
Russian tank losses from June 19 A1 to October 19A3: 52,000. Creation of tactical tank formations for extensive tasks (thrust
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into the depth of the enemy's-terrain and destruction by envelopment) employment in the form of points of gravity. '
Formations of special units on a large scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).
Railway sabotage; July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with far-reaching effect on operations and evacuation transport.
Guerilla warfare: The purpose of this is to impede German supply, to make it impossible to use the land, to subvert the territorial formations, organize an armed popular rising, reconstruct the Party organization in occupied territory. Although losses in personnel have been high, remorseless exploitation of all the provisions in regard to fitness for service and extreme restrictions have brought about a gradual reinforcement of the Red Army (Lowest level on 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions today highest level as yet known 5.5 millions), in addition to this, continuous calling-up of replacements [Ersatzgestellungen] and the creation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions).
Total strength of Russian formations :
327 rifle divisions 51 armored divisions
Own strength in the East: 1
200 German '
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian divisions—U,183,000 men
East
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (H)/North No. 006650/43 TOP SECRET
Fuehrer's GHQ, 31.10.1943
3 copies
Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff— copy
East
Length of Front: 2,100 km (Distance of frontier of Reich to Moscow 900 Km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)
Terrain: Flat table land, swamp, and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. Owing to the length of the front ratio of own strength does not admit of continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by means of support points and mobile warfare, in which threats of defense therefore rather thin. Great difficulty
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in forming larger points of gravity. Where opposed by enemy concentrations own forces always locally inferior.
Russian infantry's fighting value sunk to still lower level although their training noticeably improved; on the other hand their equipment with weapons is rapidly rising (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). Large-scale building up of Russian artillery. Monthly production 1,200 guns.
Principles of employment: Fire concentration on narrow sector on the German pattern. For this, fresh formation of artillery brigades and artillery corps. Maximum employment of ammunition.
Armored troops: At the outbreak of war 21,000, mostly light -and out-of-date tanks. Strength on 1.10.43, 9,000 heavy tanks of the latest types. Monthly production 1,700. Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical armored formations for extensive tasks. (Thrust in depth and destruction by envelopment.) Employment by points of gravity.
Formation of special units on grand scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).
Own Air Arm: Length of front in comparison with available forces makes it necessary to concentrate own air arm at the focal points. As a result it is unavoidable that on many sectors of our own land front own troops see little of the activities of their own air arm. However the air arm is there, in spite of this, and contributes very materially to the success of the defense.
The- Russian air arm: remains as before far inferior to our own, but it must be admitted that its command, organization and equipment have greatly improved. The command is maneuverable and strict, organization admits of rapid displacement or follow-on of the formations. Specially unpleasant for our own troops on land is the new Russian battle aeroplane now appearing in large numbers. The Russian air arm is being employed almost exclusively in support of the army; so far operational employment has been quite secondary. Since 1941 the Soviet Russian Command has adapted itself to the principles of the German command. As against the principle "Not a step back!" of the year 1941, since the summer of 1942 tactical withdrawal movements have been the rule. The command has become more mobile, quickly seizes any moment of weakness and makes good use of initial successes. The situation with respect to communications is very bad (wide-meshed low efficiency rail and road system, during the mud season the roads cannot be used at all) so that it is difficult for us to move our reserves. Add to this steadily increasing sabotage on the railways: July 1560, August 2121, Sep-L-172
tember 2000 line demolitions with great repercussions on operations arid evacuation transport.
Guerilla warfare: Purpose is to impede German supply, prevent use of the land, the organization of armed popular risirigs, reconstruction of the Party organizations in occupied territory.
In spite of high losses in personnel, remorseless exploitation of ail provisions in regard to fitness for service and extreme restriction have made it possible gradually to reinforce the Red Army (lowest level 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions, present day highest level so far 5.5 millions) ; in addition continuous calling up of recruits and the formation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions). Own strength in East* 4,183,000.
Munitions industry: Evacuation . (methodically prepared for beforehand) made it possible by the summer of 1942 to return again to the production level of the previous period.
At the present time the Russian food situation cannot be regarded as likely to decide the fate of the war.
Economic losses due to the withdrawal of the front:
Pig iron products ........................ 338,000 tons
Loss in coal production __________________ 460,000 tons
Loss in grain and oil crops .............. 1,854,000 tons
Production of raw timber 6.2 fm
Loss of steel products ................... 10,000 tons
Potatoes approx........................... 1,000,000 tons
Meats and fats ........................... 50,000 tons
Men fit for service ...................... 677,000
Finland
The Finnish front is the Northern abutment of the European system of defense. Outer wing of the East front and at the same time rear corner of the Norwegian front. Total length of front approx. 1,400 km (2/3 of the total length of the East front), wide stretches of the front occupied by means of support points only.
Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North East: treeless and partly rocky Tundra.
Weather: Varies greatly over the area as a whole (Temperatures 1.11 from + 8 to — 18 degrees!), in the North long polar night, mud period is in considerable.
War Supply: Important nickel mines at Kolosjoki near Pet-, samo (32% of the European production).
* Div: 200 German
10 Roumanian 6 Hungarian
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Total number of inhabitants: 3.8 millions. /
Tactical possibilities: Operations on a large scale impossible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for feeding an offensive are lacking (only one in North-South direction as far as Rovaniemi branch line Eastward (Kandalaksha) still under construction. Only one high' capacity trunk North-South road Helsinki—Petsamo). As against this on the Russian side the high capacity Murmansk railway.
Conduct of war therefore limited in the main to activities of assault troops and enterprises by Jaeger detachments. Fighting on the flanks and for roads of special importance. In spite of this owing to the length of the front strong own forces (20th Mountain Army 212,000 men) formed of the best human material capable of standing up to the nature of the terrain are tied down to it. Own divisions in excellent fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.
With respect to air activity, on the whole very unfavorable conditions. Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields. In winter time, owing to the short hours of daylight flying activities are very restricted. Supply in the purview of the air arm very difficult.
Our own air arm is highly superior in value to the Russian, as is regularly proved in all air battles fought in the course of Russian attacks on German convoys by the specially high numbers of aircraft brought down.
Coastal defense is equal to the Russian forces. Combined Anglo-American-Russian landing operations in the area of the Varanger fjord—Porsangerfjord unlikely for political reasons. Collaboration with Finns (trained in forest and winter fighting) good, as before.
Norway
Protection of the North-West flank of Europe. Total length of front 2,500 km (about the same length as the East front). In part occupied only by support points. Some of the island unoccupied.
Terrain: Medium mountains and Alpine in nature, deeply indented by fjords and valleys.
War Supply: Transport of Swedish ore via Narvik (22% of the total European output).
The points of gravity of supply rests on communications by sea. Several good big ports and many small ones suitable for distribution traffic. Coastal areas suitable for enemy landings with limited objectives.
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Operations: On land possible only with limited forces. Rails and road system very widely meshed, of low capacity and easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). These factors (plus the lack of larger harbors) greatly impeded British operations in 1940. Own forces in Norway number 380,000. The main body of the 13 divisions occupied in coastal defense, partly permanently employed. (In Norway approx. 1,000 guns over 10 cm. caliber employed in coastal defense). '
Counterattack reserves: 1 Inf Div in central1 Norway, 1 Inf and 1 Armored divisions in South Norway.
Possibilities of action of our own air arm greatly dependent on the weather, especially in North Norway. Tactical activities directed in the first place above the sea against enemy ships. Possibilities with regard to laying out airfields limited owing to the nature of the terrain, supply difficult. Possibilities of action on the part of the enemy equally, restricted owing to the great distance to their flying bases. In central and North Norway fighters can be employed only from aircraft carriers.
Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval fighting forces. Supplies for the Army Command depend on sea communications [illegible note in German script].
Denmark
Key-position at entrance to Baltic, the possession of wliich would make possible extensive operations in the direction o'f Scandinavia as also in the direction of Germany and make it possible to influence the area of the Baltic.
Total length of front: approx 700 km.
Terrain: West coast little suited to landing operations on a grand scale (storms, surf), East Jutland and the Islands better adapted (but improbable, owing to long approach routes and possibilities of defense.) Specially threatened by landings Ebs-jerg (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland). Passable by armour almost everywhere. Air landings also possible off the air-fields which are very well laid out: Coast protected by support points. Coastal defense forces three divisions of very limited fighting value. In addition counterattack reserves. Rein' forcements ordered. Conditions for the employment of own air forces are good. Communications good. Supply secured. Total strength of all formations of all branches of arms: 110,000.
The defense of Denmark is largely determined by the attitude of Sweden..
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Distribution:
. Chief of Armed Forces Operation Staff........ 1st copy
Deputy Chief/KTb ........................... 2d copy
Op/H) ...................................... 3d copy
VERY SECRET
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op. H/South No. 006652/43 Very Secret
' FUEHRER'S G.H.Q., 2d November 1943
3 draft copies draft copy
Material for the Lecture by the Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.43 Position in Italy
1. Ground conditions: Along the front mountains, partly Alpine in character, only on the West and above all on the East coast rather less steep terrain. This makes it possible in places to cut out sectors in the Alpine area but also makes it necessary to employ strong Infantry forces in order to avoid infiltration. Troops movement along the front line very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads durably. Opponents, mainly Canadians, clever at making use of terrain.
' In addition to the above conditions at the front (length approx. 150 Km.) the employment of own forces is also determined by the long coast lines on both sides (Total length approx. 1600 Km.). Besides landings directly behind our front the sectors mainly threatened are Genoa, La Spezia, Rome and the whole of the East coast South of Ravenna.
2. Next to ground configuration the factor determining tactical conditions in Italy is the tremendous [stricken in pencil] superiority of the opponent on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by repeated landings large and small directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery active.
Absolute superiority in the air. In addition to heavy direct action on the troops, continued interference with communications, especially by rail, in the back areas. Troop movements and supply affected to a great depth in the Hinterland. River communications of enemy overseas practically undisturbed, as our own naval and air tactical forces are far too small.
3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with immense task. In spite of the fact of our troops being hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of
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all branches of arms with auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down to a minimum our own losses in men and material since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, as apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper up to the present the enemy has not gained any decisive tactical success. However it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy, he being in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.
Own air arm—in a difficult position owing to the multiplicity of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theaters of war— must coniine itself to forming points of main effort.
Navy: Apart from employing a few U-boats and speed-boats, no great opportunities of becoming effective against the enemy.
4. Along the coasts—preparations for defense.
5. In the Hinterland mopping up operations on considerable scale have been in progress for some time past in the guerilla-infested areas of Slovenia and Istria influenced from the Balkans. When these operations have been concluded it will still be necessary to keep forces here to maintain pacification. The guerilla activities which break out again from time to time in several other areas are of no great importance. The Italians are not in a position to maintain law and order with their own forces. [Paragraph stricken in pencil.]
6. Disarmament of the Italians after some short and in some cases sharp fighting in spite of our being outnumbered (51 Italian divisions disarmed by 17 German divisions and 2 German brigades) also represents a thwarting of enemy plans which aimed at cutting off the German forces. [Paragraph stricken in pencil.]
7. The enrollment of Italian forces for service at present in progress in collaboration with the Italian Government is' made more difficult by indifference and war-weariness. [Paragraph stricken in pencil.]
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op(H) South-East No. 006651/43 -VERY SECRET
FUEHRER'S GHQ, 1.11.1943
6 copies
. - st copy
. Material South-East for Lecture by Chief of
Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.1943
1. Importance of the South-East: Domination of the Balkans
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as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.
The Balkans furnish:
50% of the total European production of mineral oil
100% of the total European production of chromium ore 60 % of the total European production of bauxite 29% of the total European production of antimony 21% of the total European production of copper
2. Tactical possibilities: In view of a length of coast (with Crete and Rhodes) of approximately 4,200 km, equal to twice the distance from Leningrad to the Black Sea, the enemy, in the event of an attack on their own troops is confronted by two main directions of attack:
a. Making use of Southern Italy as jumping-off place for a landing on the Dalmatian coast.
b. After breaking through the island belt position in the Aegean, to advance on Saloniki and the Thracian coast.
This would afford the following advantages and disadvantage:
a. For the enemy:
Advantages: Support by the guerilla bands.
Disadvantages: The coast with the exception of the ports and river mouths is generally unsuitable for a landing (steep coast, lagoons). After landing the terrain is generally speaking mountainous and short of water, with a sparse system of roads and railways.
Troops who presumably will be unused to fighting in the hills.
b. For own troops: .
Advantages: The coast can be defended, generally speaking, merely by occupying the ports and river mouths.
In the event of operations advancing, good opportunities for blocking and defense in the hills.
Disadvantages: Only a sparse road and rail system. Supply difficulties and poor conditions for moving reserves.
Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track line with capacity of 12 trains per day.)
Difficulties in supplying the many islands in the Aegean (own tonnage is low—shortage of naval tactical forces—only a few Italian torpedo-boats—very few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47,000, on Rhodes 8,000, and 30,000 Italian military internees).
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Further possible enemy operations from the European bridgehead of Turkey and operations against the Bulgarian-Roumanian Black Sea litteral would have to be taken into account should Turkey change the attitude of neutrality she has maintained up till now, or if the unfavorable position in the East should develop still further.
3. Present position:
Army: In the part of the Balkans occupied by ourselves, guerilla warfare is rife against bands of whom some are well-armed— supported by the Anglo-Saxons—to a total strength of 140-150,000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but not in agreement among themselves. A distinction should be made between:
a. Croatia and Serbia:
aa. Communist bands under the command of Tito to a strength of about 90,000. _
bb. Chetnik's under the command of Drazha Mihailovich to a strength of 30,000.
b. Greece: Nationalist bands under the command of Zervas to a strength of 10,000 men and approximately 15,000 Communists.
For the defense against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of in all of 24 divisions* with a total strength of 408,000 men.
Landings in any strength during the winter are unlikely, $> that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after having defeated and destroyed the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defense.
From the confederate forces stationed in the South-East area, with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are required for the defense of Bulgaria, no material assistance may be expected.
Air Arm: At the present time, in view of the great distance to their starting bases, the numerical superiority of the AngloSaxon Air Arm has not yet become effective excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that South Italy is occupied by the enemy is beginning to make itself felt.
4. In September units of 12 German divisions, in spite of some sharp resistance on the part of the Italian formations and great difficulties connected with the terrain, continued to disarm 25 Italian divisions, including Corps and Army units.
Up to the present in all. 304,098 Italians (including 12,575 offi-*The words "24 divisions" struck out; pencil note in margain *612,000 men.*
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cers and 291,519 men) have been evacuated from the area High Command South-East.
Distribution:
Chief of Armed Forces Operation Staff ...............1st copy
Deputy Chief .......................................2d copy
Op (H) South East (army) .............................Sd copy
Op (L) (Air) .......................................4th copy
Op (M) (Navy) .......................................5th copy
KTb [?] ............................................6th copy
VERY SECRET
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op Army/WEST
FUEHRER'S GHQ, 2d November 1943
2 draft copies draft copy
Western Theater of War including the Netherlands and Belgium
Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.
1. Terrain. In all 2100 km of coastal front on the Channel and the Atlantic and 500 km on the Mediterranean, which—in contradistinction to the coast in Norway—admit of landings with modern resources.
The interior of the country presents no difficulties to the employment of all formations including tactical armored formations (Western Campaign).
Good system of communications, road and rail, highly-developed, enables own reserves to be moved quickly but will also aid the enemy should he continue to gain a footing.
Weather. Does not exclude landing with modern resources at any time of the year. However in the autumn and winter, storms may make a landing on the grand scale difficult since this requires continuous good weather at sea for some days. The possibilities of employing the air arm are sometimes restricted in the autumn and winter owing to presence of extensive fields of fog, particularly over England.
2. The enemy. The enemy possesses possible starting bases along an almost continuous circle from Eastern England via the USA, North Africa to Corsica and Sardinia with at some points shortest possible approach routes to the Continent. In all areas the opponent has at his disposal locally superior forces. The enemy formations are fresh and have gained experience in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. He has developed
952
his landing technique and tactics to a high level, so that we must now reckon at all times—with the afore-mentioned reservations —with a landing on the grand scale.
Enemy Air Arm. Numerically greatly superior. Will enable the enemy both to defend his own forces and their supply and to effect the employment of air landing forces on a big scale.
Possibilities for the enemy. A demand on the part of Russians for the establishment of a Second Front in the West and the endeavor on the part of the Anglo-Americans to acquire more weight in opposition to the Russian political demands by gaining a thorough military success are the leading features of the position in the West. Successful .penetration of the Western defenses would very soon break through to the Belgian, North-French and West-German industrial areas and so prove fatal. At the same time this operation would also cut off the U-boat support points in the Atlantic.
Even a minor enemy success involving the creation of a bridgehead would spell danger, since in view of the enemy's superiority in equipment and personnel he would have no difficulty in extending this bridgehead into a breach of our defenses.
3. Our possibilities. The position as described makes it essential to repel and destroy- the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason—construction of t-he Atlantic Wall. The work has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible to provide a coastal front of 2,600 km. at all. points with a system of fortifications in depth. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the Maginot Line, for instance 2,692 guns of 7.5-cm. cal. up to the heaviest long range batteries, not counting the AA guns and the artillery of the employed divisions: [Illegible scribbled question in margin and note —'5.3 millions.'] 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, not reckoning the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,449 installations of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. [In pencil: In all * * * dbm concrete
have been used in the construction].
A belt of fortifications of this type however has the effect of tying down considerable forces of one's own. We have put in for this purpose fortress divisions, of which however, naturally, only a small proportion in each case can be effective against the enemy. Because of this it will be essential to have strong, mobile, and particularly well-equipped reserves in the West. Any weakening of
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these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and will acutely endanger the situation as a whole.
However in the event of an attack in force in the West, even if the said tactical reserves are there, the forces at our disposal will not be adequate. [Pencilled note: 370,000 men.] It will be necessary in this event which will decide the war to employ every German man able to bear arms ,laying the home country largely bare. .
4. Intemql security. The British are continually trying to form
organizations intended to engage in sabotaging the French in-' dustries working for the German munition industry and the lines of communication. They are supplied by air. The Army units employed in security duties, the SD [Security Service], and the French police, as well have been able to keep these organizations under control. In the period from the 20th to the 30th October alone these terrorists lost 12 dead and 380 prisoners. '
Strong forces of the Ersatz Army have been tranferred to France for the pacification of the country.
5. Disarmament of the 6 Italian divisions numbering approximately 50,000 men employed along the coast of the Mediterranean is proceeding smoothly. The employment of units of 2 divisions proved sufficient to nip all will-to-resistance in the bud.
VERY SECRET
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (Army) West
FUEHRER'S G.H.Q., 3d November 1943
4 copies 1 copy
Strength of Army Command West (to date 1.11.43)
1. Employed in coastal defense.....27 divisions and 2 Rgt.
2. Employed in 2d line......... 1 Inf Div. '
2 Inf div being formed.
3 Tactical groups (I.D.).
1 Armored div.
3 SS armored -|
divisions. I being
4 Motorized [ formed
divisions. J
3 Reserve armored divisions.
3. In addition ................. 5 Reserve divisions
46 Divisions plus 2 Regts.
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4. New formations ordered (no 5 Inf divisions
formations HQs and cadres 3 Parachute divisions, available as yet). 1 SS motorized division
, 7 divisions
5. Ration strength (without armed forces auxiliaries and PWs)
—1,370,708.
Ration strength including armed forces auxiliaries and PW's—1,708,990.
Distribution:
Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff .........1st copy.
Deputy Chief ...................................2d copy.
Op (Army)/West ....................................3d copy.
KTb [ ?] .......................................4th copy.
IV
How are the resources of our opponents distributed at the present time, and what are his strategic and tactical intentions likely to be?
England America Mediterranean Far East
separate appendixes
It was doubtful for a time whether the enemy would not transfer his point of gravity to the Far East. This assumption proved wrong. The main mass of the British-American formations capable of employment is undoubtedly in the Mediterranean. Consequently we must reckon in every event with the continuation of the operations there. The only questions remaining open are: in what direction and on what scale? The supplies observed passing through the straits of Gibraltar per month amount to approx. 1.8 million tons, of which approx. 300,006 -tons go through the Suez Canal to the Far. East. This leaves approx. 1.5 million tons for the Mediterranean to be divided between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. That is not much more than is required for normal supply. Presumably therefore it is not proposed to send any new and stronger, forces to the Mediterranean.
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Distribution of the American Army
Europe:
16 Inf divisions.
3 Armored divisions.
3 Armored brigades.
3 Airborne divisions.
7 Mixed brigades.
U.S.A.:
29 Inf divisions.
10 Armored divisions.
1 Airborne division.
Pacific: .
14 Inf divisions.
2 Marine infantry divisions.
1 Armored brigade.
2 Mixed brigades.
Strength of the forces in Great Britain suitable for employment in attacking operations 40-41 Infantry divisions (of whom 4-5 Americans).
4 Independent Inf brigades.
9 Armored divisions.
11 Armored brigades (of whom 1 American).
2 Airborne divisions.
7 Paratroop battalions (of whom 3 Americans).
Of these employed in South-East and South England only, in direct proximity to the starting ports:
18 Infantry divisions.
2 Infantry brigades.
1 Airborne division.
8 Armored divisions.
4 Army armored brigades.
In addition about 1,000 2-4 engined transport aircraft are able to put in approx. 20,000 airborne troops.
It is also possible to reckon with the employment of approx. 20,000 paratroops. j
Troop transport and landing boat tonnage is available for at least 11-12 infantry divisions and 1-2 armored divisions.
The forces and resources at the disposal of the enemy are already sufficient for a large-scale operation intended to force the issue on the Continent. These forces and resources wili presumably be reinforced .still further in the course of the next few months. .
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Distribution of British Forces-Italy:
10 Infantry divisions.
2 Armored divisions.
3 Armored brigades.
1 Airborne division.
5 Commandos.
Western Mediterranean (Gibraltar: garrison approx. 20,000):
3 Infantry divisions.
2 Armored divisions.
2 Armored brigades.
1 Airborne division.
Middle East and Near East: .
15 Infantry divisions and 4 Polish Infantry divisions.
in all ....—................................... 19
4 Inf brigades and —
2 Greek 1 Czech
1 Yugoslav brigades .
in all ....,.......-........................... 8
5 Armored divisions.
5 Armored brigades. .
1 Paratroop division.
V
According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point, of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse as speedily as possible. -Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and benefit from her.
The same does not apply to Sweden. In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12-14 Infantry divisions,
3-4 armored brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the Skagerrak cut off Sweden's contact with England. 1
693260—46—^1
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Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous—but not before.
Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognize this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the Anglo-Saxons either for political or military reasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.
Turkey so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy: Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, and the more England—in order to win the war—enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality. Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique.' She is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against Bulgaria.
Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is. understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.
Concerning the internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.
Rourmnia contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways. We must be clear with ourselves as to that.
In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recog-
958
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nized than in Budapest. In that city a dissolute and strongly Judaified society strata is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contradistinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognized the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.
Japan: There a heroic people is fighting decisively for its existence just.as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. Roosevelt and Churchill want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the Amur or advance against Vladivostok. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the siren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as it can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at Vladivostok and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?
VI
Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command today and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theater of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917') 18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. Today this tactical advantage of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the AngloSaxons steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time, however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to distribute its forces throughout the theater of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong at those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark,
959
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in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the center of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or other to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.
It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the Fuehrer. Stegemann once put this into words as follows: "In war there is always the same conflict:,the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities, its intangible dynamics, and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstances, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed."
Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has a jumping-off base in the Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.
No theater of war can be weakened below a certain level. Our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done. (Appendix.)
This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war: the inter-play and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures. (Appendix.)
How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the bet-
960
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ter weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself. *
If we had not the Fuehrer at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done oh this question. One thing however is sure: it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.
This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labor, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France, and Belgium also to compel thousands of idle ones [Nichtstuer] to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.
The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and skepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of, a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered only by Russians." [In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated.' This has been scratched out in favor of 'conquered.'] Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense Vlasjov army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. Today only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack and one Turkmen division are at the moment undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichsfuehrer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem, and Macedonian manpower supplies. -However, what weighs' most heavily today on the home front,^ and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war—and this cannot be re-
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peated often enough—has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.
The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and ma- ' terial, is then that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they—like any other great trouble—have had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the Fuehrer and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnings and first fruits are there. We shall counter the heavy and powerful armament of the 4-engined bombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavoring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute certainty in all-day and-night raids to lose 10-12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it.
I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their fate.
Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right, since within the first week of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set-backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, setbacks which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defense measures which the opponent has been driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and new highly efficient detector equipment together
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with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.
On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the utmost resolution, with a view to breaking the enemy defense and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.
There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war. ,
For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.
In process of formation at the present time as a tactical reserve 20 Infantry divisions:
4 Italian divisions.
1 Croatian mountain div, 1 Croatian Legionary div.
1 Galician infantry division.
1 Macedonian infantry division. .
2 Armored divisions:
5 Motorized (Panzergrenadier) divisions
2 Northern Armored Grenadier divisions.
2 Assault brigades.
2-8 Parachute divisions.
A. Land forces:
1. Home area
To V
Bulgaria To date 1.11.43
. ............10 Inf Div (of which 1 in
process of formation). I Cav div.
1 Cav brigade.
1 Armored brigade.
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2. Coastal defense . 2 Inf divisions. 1 Cav brigade.
3. Serbian occupied .territory: 7 Inf divs.
In all: ....................................19 Inf divs.
B. Air force (only home area) : 1 Armored brigade. 1 Cav division. 2 Cav brigades. 9 Fighter squadrons (Jagdstaffeln). 3 Combat squadrons (Kampfstaffeln).
11 Reconnaissance and . transport squadrons.
C. Airborne and parachutist squadron's: None.
Roumania To date 1.11.43
A. Land forces:
1. Home area (including Transistria)
a. Fully fit for service.__.... 3 Inf Div.
b. Conditionally fit for service.. 5 Inf Div. 1 Mountain Div.
c. Replenished or reconstituted.. 8 Inf Div. 1 Cav div. 2 Cav div (mot). 1 Armored Div.
2. Russia: 3 Inf divisions. 4 Mountain divisions. 2 Cav divisions.
In all: .............................19 Inf Div (of which 5
conditionally fit for service). 5 Mountain divisions (of which 1 conditionally fit for service). 5 Cav div of which 2 (mot). 1 Armored division.
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B. Air Forces , 1. Home area . .. 7 Fighter squadrons. (modern equipment). . 1 Night fighter squad. 8 Combat squadrons [Kampfstaffeln] 19 Reconnaissance and transport squadrons.
^ 2. Russia (employed with . 4th Air Fleet) .. 5 Fighter squadrons. 4 Combat squadrons [Kampfstaffeln] 6 Battle squadrons [Schlachtstaffelh]. 4 Reconnaissance squad.
In all: ..,................12 Fighter squadrons.
1 Night Fighter squad. 12 Combat [Kampf] squadrons. 6 Battle [Schlacht] squadrons.
23 Reconnaissance squad. C. Airborne and Parachutist formations: none
Hungary To date 1.11.43
A. Land forces:
1. Home area
(all formations conditionally
fit for employment, equipment incomplete) .. 8 Inf div. 1 Light division. 1 Cavalry division. 2 Mountain brigades. 1 Armored division.
2. Russia (Occupation troops) .. 9 Light divisions (security divisions)
In all .. 8 Inf divisions. ' 1 Cavalry division. 10 Light divisions. 2 Mountain divisions. 1 Armored division.
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B. Air force:
1. Home area.................... i Fighter squadrons.
2 Combat squadrons.
. 1 Transport squadron.
2. Russia (employed
with Air Fleet 4)............. 2 Fighter squadrons
2 Combat squadrons.
1 Battle squadrons.
2 Reconnaissance squad.
In all: ................ 6 Fighter squadrons.
' 4 Combat squadrons.
1 Battle squadron.
2 Reconnaissance squadrons.
1 Transport squadron.
C. Airborne and parachutist formations: None.
Sweden to date 1.11.43
A. Land forces:
12-14 Inf divisions.
6- 8 Cyclist brigades. '
3- 4 Armored brigades.
1 Mot brigade.
Corps and army units and. frontier and coast guard formations. At the moment it may be assumed that the number of men under arms is 400,000.
B. Air force:
In all: 700 Front-line aircraft.
76 Reconnaissance aircraft.
225 Fighters. , .
12 Torpedo aircraft, of which approx. 482 modern types.
Finland to date 1.11.43 A. Land forces: .
(all formations in the area of operations)
14 Inf div (of which 3 inf divisions as reserve behind the front).
2 Inf brigades.
1 Armored division.
1 Cavalry brigade.
. 3 Coastal defense brigades.
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Corps and army units, in addition, navy, air arm, (replacement) [Ersatz] army, Home Air Defense, and building units to a total strength of approx. 450,000. .
According to report, it is proposed to form 1 new infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades.
B. Air forces:
7 Fighter squadrons.
4 Combat squadrons.
4 Other (reconnaissance and transport) squadrons.
Position with respect to Personnel on 1.10.1943
1. In the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) on 1.8............ 9,860,000
of whom: Waffen SS ......'.................... 402,000
Navy................................ 711,000
Air Arm ........................ 2,007,000
Replacement Army .......................... 2,185,000
Field Army1 ............................... 4,555,000
2. United Kingdom (subject to occupational deferment) and temporarily rejected...................... 5,726,000
Year-classes 1894-192.$.
[note in pencil : including 18-50 year olds] of whom 348,000 year-class 1914-45
3. Unfit for service ....................,........... 2,931,000
Year classes 1S94-1926
4. Available replacements2 : Year-class
1894-1899...... 18,000
1900-1922...... 6,000
1923 .... 1,000
1924 .... 3,000
' 1925...... 45,000
1926s....468,000
- . . 541,000
... * * * sit /. * ' sj* - * *
5. Aliens working in Reich territory (to date 15.8.43)
Men .............................................. 3,586,000
Women ............................................ 1,678,000
' : 5,264,000
: 6......
6. Persons fit for work 1877-1927....................... 57,500,000
1 Field Army as per strength du" 1:8.43; no newer reports available. -Year class 1884-1893 [Landstur.m] at present still being called up.
* Year class 1926 at the moment in the RAD (Reichs Labour Service).
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This figure represents the sum total of these year-classes (population acc. to the Census figures for 1939). According to the Balance-Sheet of forces of the Reichs Statistical Office the number of occupied German nationals (that is, without the Armed Forces, P.O.W. and aliens) on the 31.5.43:
Men .......................................... 15,462,000
Women .......................................... 14,274,000
29,736,000
To II
Armed Forces Operations Staff/ORG (II)
FUEHRER'S G.H.Q. Nov. 3d 1943
3 copies — copy
Men fit for service in the war supply industries (munitions industry)
Men liable for military service suitable and fit for service are to be found now in any number (excepting on the Reich railways and to some extent in agriculture) only in the war supply industries (including mining and building) and in particular in the munitions industry. The view continually being put forward by the munitions industry that any deduction of these young men liable for service would be bound to prejudice production is not shared by G.H.Q. Armed Forces in view of German labor which has flowed into the munitions industry since the beginning of the year of the basis of the Duty to Report and close down order throughout industry, of the Russian POW allocated by G.H.Q. Armed Forces (especially for mining), and the appreciable allocation being made at the present moment of Italian internees and free Italian labor, a,s well as other measures by the GBA (PlenF potentiary—General for Labor Supply—Arbeitseinsatz) and the Minister for munitions aimed at supplying supplementary labor.
The war supply industries (including mining and building) according to the figures for 1.10.43 included in all 2,950,000 men liable for service temporarily deferred. Of these—
year-classes ......—........ 06-13 ................... 783,000
year-classes ...............14 & later............... 203,000
According to the report of the GBA the total number of workers which it was found possible to allocate for the production of munitions from the 1.1.-30.9.43 was 2,200,000 workers including
770,000 metal workers.
These allocations replaced 300,000 men called up from munitions for service with the colors and wastage and in addition re-
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inforced the personnel of the most important munitions concerns by—
650,000 workers
The Fuehrer has now ordered that—
210,000 men liable for military service of the year-classes 01-22. be transferred from industrial war supply (including mining and building) in three monthly contingents of 70,000 men as from November '43. '
However whereas the transfers to the Armed Forces effected up to the present could be more than compensated, the transfers now ordered will be covered, in addition to the current allocations of the GBA by approx. 500,000 Italian military internees who have now become available and in addition by free Italian labor to be recruited by the GBA and estimated by this body as numbering approx. 3,000,000 workers, so that no decline in production need be anticipated.
The early and complete call-up of all young men liable for military service in the front line still employed in industrial war supply should be demanded for psychological reasons as well. A large number of letters from official bodies, and in particular from the mass of the people, show clearly that the forthcoming call-up of the Landsturm (young-classes 84-93) is not understood while there are still so many young men. liable for military service, working at home under temporary deferment.
To VI
FUEHRER'S GHQ, 4.11.1943
4 copies — copy
Contribution by Op M (Operations Navy) to lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.
Position of the Navy in the beginning of November 1943 Submarine war:
The U-boat weapon is being employed in force in all the seas. Conditions much more difficult than before owing to comprehensive air reconnaissance (extension of range of reconnaissance as a result of the occupation of the Azores), excellent enemy detector apparatus, and exceptionally strong escort of convoys. The aircraft is today the chief enemy of the U-boat.
In spite of this by sticking stubbornly to the task and making fullest use of the U-boat weapon further successes have been gained. Increasing successes also recently in the fight against enemy aircraft and destroyers. Sinkages figures correspond to
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the difficulty of the position! Since 1.1.1943 sunk by U-boats only after careful counting far above 3,000,000 BRT plus a large number of destroyers, cruisers, and escort vessels. To this figure may 'be added in the merchant fleet and tonnage war as a whole the successes gained;by the surface tactical forces, the air arm and mines. This gives us since 1.1.1943 a total figure of almost 5,000,000 BRT British-American merchant tonnage sunk (without Russia).
In the war at sea the main task of the Navy in all the seas under our control: protection of own communications by sea, injury to enemy fleets, supply shipping, military transport, and supply formations, defense against landing operations. All these tasks set extraordinarily high demands on the tactical and security formations of the Navy.
Position in the individual theaters of war Baltic -Naval supremacy completely in our hands. Importance of Baltic for ore-traffic from Sweden. Lively own supply traffic to Finland, Finnish Gulf via Baltic entrances. Interference by British air mine warfare especially in the Kattegat, the Sound and the Belts and in the Western Baltic. Own loss up to the present very low thanks to active mine-clearing. Russians confined to inner part of Gulf of Finland by dense minefields. Attempts to break out so far always thwarted. In the inner Gulf of Finland recently several affrays with Russian trawler formations, all in our favor.
Importance of Baltic as training arm for the naval tactical forces and the submarine weapon.
North Sea
Deutsche Bucht (German Bight) and Skagerrak blocked by strong mine-wall. ' Own task: protection of lively coastal traffic, continuous patrol of shipping lanes, intensive mine detection, trawling and outpost activities. By means of continuous energetic air activity combined with mine-laying and raids by enemy speed-boats the enemy is endeavoring to stop our communications by sea. Up to the present we have always succeeded in maintaining communications without undue loss on our side. Good results in particular against enemy speed-boats.
Norway
Very busy own rations and supply traffic along the long stretch of coast under the protection of screening forces and numerous strong coastal batteries. Routes in the skerries protected by their natural position and mine-blocks. Our own escort move-
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ments interfered with by enemy air arms and speed-boats which hide in the skerries. Successes obtained by the enemy in attack so far very slight. In the Polar region attacks by Russian aircraft and submarines. Our own losses slight but enemy losses high.
Arctic
The presence of our own combat group of battleships and destroyers in Northern Waters is of considerable strategic influence. Since January of this year large-scale enemy supplies going to Russia via the Arctic have not been observed (Supply diverted to the far longer and more difficult route to the Persian Gulf and via Iran). U-boats employed against individual enemy movements in the Arctic. We have now to see whether the despatch of supplies to Russia by the Arctic route begin again in the period of darkness now setting in.
Channel
In spite of strong enemy superiority in the air and the lively activity of his light naval tactical forces combined with intensified mine-laying, German supplying and rationing traffic continues to be carried on practically on schedule. At the same time full employment of our own screening tactical units (mine detector, outpost, trawling and escort boats). Lively and successful offensive employment of our own speed-boats against British convoyed traffic and for mine-laying. Conditions difficult owing to British superiority on sea and in the air. Warfare in the Channel area shows increasing signs of enemy threat of landing operation. Strong coastal defense on one side.
Biscay Atlantic Coast
Air raids on our own ports have left U-boat defense unaffected. Main task for Navy:
Keeping the seaways open and maintenance of escort for U-boats coming in and going out. In addition, countermeasures, against British mine laying, against strong British air observation and the appearance of light enemy naval tactical forces.
Mediterranean
A very strong enemy naval fighting force (3 British, 1 French, 5 Italian battleships, 13 cruisers, 55 destroyers) is unopposed on our side by any fighting forces with the exception of U-boats and S-boats. A few Italian destroyers and torpedo boats are being commissioned. Our own U-boats are being employed against very busy British supply traffic. Numerous successes. For the rest, the task of the Navy is to carry out and protect our own supply
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traffic for. the combatant troops in the Ligurian and Tyrrhenia Seas and in the Adriatic. Increasing activity on the part of the enemy tactical air and light naval forces. Transfer of our own supply to small ships and coastal traffic. The necessary freight tonnage and screening forces are being made ready.
Aegean »
Support of the island garrisons by protective formations of the German Navy. Carrying out supply and rationing overseas. Strong enemy activity with submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and tactical air forces.
Black Sea ^
All suitable fighting forces (U-boats, S- and R-boats, "MFP") employed to defend the Crimea. Own slight forces fully employed. Good success. So far activity of the Russian Black Sea Fleet slight. Up to the present rationing and supply traffic maintained in accordance with plan in spite of enemy air and submarine activity.
Distribution:
Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff...........1st copy
Op.H. (Army) ....................................2d copy
Op.L. (Air) .....................................3d copy
Op.M. (Navy) ....................................4th copy
III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory
When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterize directly by the aphorism from Fontaine:
Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing.
In particular however our confidence is built up on a series of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which leaves its mark upon the general attitude of the German people and makes our Armed Forces a definitely reliable instrument in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also enables our brave troops to achieve feats in defense and in retreat ac-
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cording to plan such perhaps as the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopia any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.
As against this the moral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means form a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily, and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery of our Italian ally. Where they have met German forces in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the West which their Russian allies have been demanding for over 2 years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.
Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents— whether in the North or West, in Italy or in the Balkans—will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.
My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires, and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his thought animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.
That no command is free of errors has often been said by the Fuehrer himself, moreover the history of war—to use an aphorism of Schlieffen's—consists in general only of a series of errors
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and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.
What matters ultimately is constant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now, I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.
Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from Clausewitz which is not very generally known has been found true: "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."
It behooves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faintheartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.
How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed, and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is thaft we shall never cease to fight for through the history of the' world there run, like an bronze law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led, and at the head of .Europe—Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.
At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,
—that our trust and faith in the Fuehrer is boundless.
—that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people. —that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.
—that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute.
—that we do not cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall.
—that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.
—that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.
!>74
The Operations and Tactical Plans ranged in the order of their
happening
1. Campaign against Poland; defense in the West.
2. Plan of attack against the West; attempt to realize this during the winter.
3. Spring campaign against Norway.
4. Summer campaign against the West.
5. Intention to land in England.
6. Attempt to win the Spanish position and take Gibraltar.
7. Decision to intervene in North Africa, Rommel's counterattack up to the Egyptian frontier.
8. Realization of the necessity of a campaign against Soviet Russia. (Discussion with Molotov in Berlin.)
9. Italy's surprise campaign against Greece.
10. The German campaign planned against Greece.
11. The overthrow in Yugoslavia and the campaign in the Balr kans and its consequences; delay-of the campaign in the East.
12. Rommel's retreat to Cyrenaica.
13. The Eastern campaign 1941 and the winter position 1941/42. Finland's entry into the war. The culminating point of the attack.
14. Japan's entry into the war.
15. The idea of occupying Iceland and the Azores.
16. The Russian Spring offensive; the German counter-attack.
17. The German summer offensive: The Crimea—the Don—the Volga—the Caucasus. The intention of taking Leningrad is not realized.
18. Rommel's offensive up to El Alamein.
19. Counterstroke by Western Powers. Landing in North Africa.
20. The German counterstroke in France. Occupation of the
whole country. Occupation of the Mediterranean littoral, occupation of Tunisia. .
21. The winter battle in Russia. The collapse of the confederates.
22. The loss of Tripolitania, attempt to hold Tunisia.
23. The loss of the entire African position.
24. The beginning of the landing in Europe (Sicily).
25. The summer offensive of the Soviet Army.
26. The treachery of Italy.
27. The landing on the Continent. '