DRAFT [rubber stamp]
9 April Berlin, 27 April 1938
War Economic Staff File No. 11 b W Wi la No. 923/38 Top Secret 2 copies 2nd copy
Ref: 610/38 Top Secret L IV a of 9 April 1938 Subj: Attitude of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) toward the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.
TOP SECRET [rubber stamp]
To L, through Lt. Col. Hinnemann on 27 April. Registered 21
April 1938 Bl.
The interpretation, which the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy has given the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 4 February 1938 in his letter "GB No. 649/38 top secret of 31 March 1938" toward the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, does not in any way correspond to the necessities of total warfare.
The demands which warfare has to make of economy are decisive for the mobilization preparations. The achievements of the economy, however, reach their full importance only then when these mobilization preparations are being directed along similar lines. These lines must be in accordance with the requirements of national defense. They form one of the most important provisions for the supply of the armed forces and therewith for the fighting ability of the units.
It must therefore be requested that you agree with the opinion in the planned conversation with General Field Marshal Goering that the Plenipotentiary General be dependent on the directives
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issued in the general name of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) in all questions of minor importance in this field the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) has the right to make decisions in case of arguments, without having the point of the argument brought before the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor for his decision. The working side by side of the branches of the armed forces dealing with the preparations for the economic mobilization and the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy prevents almost in all fields a clear picture about the potential de guerre.
In order to justify the necessity of the right of directive the following details are pointed out:
1. The dependence of the armament sector on the remaining sector of economy, and thereby the whole mobilization preparation require, that directives about the extent and speed of the mobilization preparations be issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
2. The armament industry adjusts its size to the requirements of the Armed Forces. Therefore, in the interests of national defense it must remain the right of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to decide to what extent industries will be declared armament industries. After the past experiences however, the debtors [Aussenstellen] of the Reich Economic Ministry often oppose such a declaration of armament industries.
3. The Armed Economic Order [Wehrwirtschaftsordnung], which is to regulate the cooperation between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Plenipotentiary General on the basis of the national defense law, has been completed in draught form by the Armed Forces as far as this is possible without the cooperation of the Plenipotentiary General. The Plenipotentiary General in his part has refused his cooperation in this fundamental plan for the time being. Although a clear determination of the authority of the civilian and military authorities in the war economic field urgently needs to be settled, the further continuation of working on the plan has become impossible through the attitude of the Plenipotentiary General at present.
4. The distribution of the total population (requirements of the Armed Forces and mobilization of labor) must be decided from the standpoint of warfare. Only the -Supreme Command of the Armed Forces can determine if the operational situation requires an increased use of men at the front or in the war economy. The use of human labor, in wartime must therefore be placed under the control of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in peacetime already.
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5. The food economy is also decisive for the fighting ability of the units and occasionally of decisive importance for military operations.
An exact knowledge of the food situation and cooperation in measures in the food economy on the part of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces are therefore required already in peacetime.
Previously it has not been possible to receive a report on the war food situation from the Plenipotentiary General or even only reasonably dependable reports on the necessary food requirements of the civilian population in wartime. As long as no right of directive exists it will be impossible to receive these reports.
6. The use of raw materials decisively influences the supply situation of the Armed Forces in wartime.
7. The usual equipment is only to be secured by the order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, because the equipment of the units and thereby their fighting preparedness depends on this. For this the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) must be able to assemble the installations for industrial economy to the extent it appears necessary to the interest of the country's defense.
8. In the field of transport facilities, uniformity is essential. During one of the transport actions carried out recently, the in-. dividual officers of the Plenipotentiary General discussed this from completely various viewpoints and from a different one than was taken during the usual war economic-inspection procedure, so that the result is hardly of use. The directory law of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) could have avoided this:
9. In the court of a mobilization at the present time in the Reich, there is a shortage of approximately 40,000 trucks. With the mobilization, the Armed Forces will therefore either not receive the necessary trucks, or parts of the war economy will collapse, since the necessary transports cannot be driven. In the interest of her supplies, the Armed forces must therefore request that the management make possible the procurement of the trucks lacking through tax reductions and release of raw material.
The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) must use its influence to expedite the procurement of the trucks lacking.
The war economy which is subordinated to the Plenipotentiary General represents the war economic stage of the armaments industry. If this stage fails, the striking power of the Armed Forces becomes questionable.
The undertaking Otto has brought numerous proofs that the
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EC-270
lack of uniformity in the direction of economy will lead to severe disturbances.
The greatest part of all points of friction and difficulties can be eliminated, as soon as it has been clearly decided that the Plenipotentiary General in all questions of provisions for the Armed Forces must conform to the orders of the OKW.
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Memorandum arguing that the plenipotentiary (Funk) be made subject to the directives of the OKW in order to ensure readiness for "the necessities of total war," including decisions on armaments, labor, food, raw materials, transportation
Authors
Date: 27 April 1938
Literal Title: Subj: Attitude of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) toward the Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.
Defendants: Walther Funk, Hermann Wilhelm Goering
Total Pages: 4
Language of Text: English
Source of Text: Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.)
Evidence Code: EC-270
Citations: IMT (page 9084), IMT (page 9086)
HLSL Item No.: 452841
Notes:For Funk's view of his position, see document EC 271.