Letters and reports on the German occupation of Austria in March 1938 and its background, including the role of the Austrian Nazi party since 1933

[Seal]
The Gauleiter
Salzburg, 22 Aug. 1939
Chiemsee
586
812-PS
As far as Globus is concerned you are fully aware of his species which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the 11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.
With the best regards and
HEIL HITLER!
Yours
2 enclosures. [signed] Friedl Rainer
Copy.
Salzburg, 6 July 1989
To the Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel Vienna 1
Parliament
Dear Party Member Buerckel!
Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I flew to Berlin to report to Hitler's deputy, Hess, about the events which led to our taking over the government. We did this because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Hitler's own, was that the liberation depended more on Austrian matters of state rather than the party. To be more exact. Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading roie.
This conception does not, however, correspond to the true proportions of powers and to the conditions of leadership which were completely clear until 12 March 1938. At that time I gave a short report in Klausner's behalf to the deputy of Hitler and also submitted a short summary of the developments since 1934. I made no single copy of this. I did not take part in further actions of this kind since they seemed to me to be too much connected with personal feelings. I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no position existed in the party from which one might have presented oneself to the public; and that there was no man who had the guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German public. He who wanted
587
8l2—PS
to direct correctly the political battle of the Austrian nazism had to forego public fame. Leopold did not want to forego that and made such decisive political mistakes that his recall became necessary. The person of Klausner never longed for fame and was therefore not suitable to appear gloriously after the taking over of power. The two powers behind Klausner—I consider the dynamic part of Globocnik and the political part of myself—were bound from the beginning, as collaborators of Klausner's, to put him to the fore.
We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference of his person, but that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the party.
If I should be asked to describe—without personal interest— the role of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.
Heil Hitler!
Rainer e.h.
1 Enclosure
588
812-PS
COPY.
Report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria since the beginning of the last stage of battle until the seizure of power on the 11th March 1938.
In 1933 the Party fought a parliamentary battle. By the seizure of power in the Reich it gained considerably in numbers. It started to try to enforce new elections in order to gain admission into the government. By these means it should have taken over the government. The enemies recognized this fact, and the Government Dollfuss preceded, while tolerating the reds, to force the NSDAP from its legal plane in order to render it innocuous. In this the government used legal tricks, thereby practically doing away progressively with the democratic constitution. The first attempts of the government were answered by the Party with an increase of pressure; and the government's breaches of constitution were answered by arbitrary acts with the assumption that it might thus be able to overthrow the government. This assumption was wrong; at that time the government had the backing of all anti-German foreign countries, and it felt sufficiently strong to prohibit the NSDAP, and confession of adherence to the NSDAP, and subsequently to treat as high treason the confession in favor of the "Anschluss".
Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, and the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the "Alt-Reich"; and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.
There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. New leaderships were forming in the mine Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer Reinthaller (already appointed Landesbauernfuehrer [leader of the country's farmers] by Hess).
693256—¿6—38
589
812-PS
812-PS
He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the N.S.D.A.P. legal status again, thus permitting its political activities. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed engineer Neubacher.
The first attempt to create a legal political organization which was to negotiate with the Government while a secret illegal organization existed, did not succeed; it brought about quarrels in almost all Gaus and ended with pressure of the illegal branch against the policy of appeasement of Reinthaller, and with the latter's retirement as Landesleiter [country leader]. The successor, Neubacher, head of the illegal organization, was not recognized by all the Gaus, because meanwhile the former Gauleader of Lower Austria, Captain Leopold, was released; and he claimed the country leadership because of his seniority in the party. In Carinthia at about that time, Klausner with his collaborators Globoenik, Rainer, Longhin and Pawlowski had reconstructed and readied the Gau Carinthia. The Gau Carinthia kept away from the quarrels of the leaders, and arbitrated the differences between Leopold and Neubacher, and finally effected a solution in such a way that Neubacher and his adherents recognized Leopold as the country leader; and Leopold appointed Neubacher to be his deputy. The points of friction between those two groups were not yet eliminated. Those differences did not remain concealed from the police; and the police got hold of a polemic by the group of Leopold against the group of Neubacher, on the strength of this material they arrested Leopold and Neubacher.
At that time the success of the calm attitude of the Gau Carinthia was crowned by the fact that after these arrests the representatives of all the Gaus came to Carinthia to offer Klausner the country leadership. By order of Klausner Dr. Rainer reported at these conferences the political referendum and developed the political conception as adopted by the Gau Carinthia on the basis of which, as a matter of fact, an agreement was reached. In July 1935 Klausner became the head of the movement without, however adopting the title of country leader because he considered it wrong as long as the country leader Leopold was imprisoned, but he looked upon himself as the speaker of the college of Gauleaders. With the consent of the representatives of all the Gaus, Klausner at that time appointed Globoenik as co-worker for the organizational part, and Rainer as eo-wo.rker for the political part of his task.
590
812-PS
In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria. In Spring of 1936 Schattenfroh was arrested; he had named party member Hinter-leitner of Linz as his successor as managerial country leader. In March Klausner was arrested in connection with the arrest of about 60 leading Nazis, whereas Dr. Rainer was released. Hin-terleitner again followed those directives which were set down at the conferences at Carinthia in the Spring of 1935; and in May 1936 he appointed Rainer, Globocnik and engineer Hiedler to the country leadership in the following spheres of influence:
Rainer to be chief of the political staff; Hiedler as chief of the organization; and Globocnik as liaison officer with the Reich and as organizer of all the auxiliary bases outside of Austria.
The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer. These said that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.
Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connection with Dr. Wächter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's support-of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the "Styrian Heimatschutz" and became a party member when the entire "Styrian Heimatschutz"
591
was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Fuehrer as being a trusted person.
At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleiter was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the "Obersalzburg" where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler.
Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen. [Gruppenfuehrer] Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was giv^i full authority by the Fuehrer for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr. Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kalten-brunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-In-quart. '
Regarding internal conditions, it was clear that full recognition of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart. He was also in permanent contact with Capt. Leopold, and there were never any serious conflicts between them. But he also acknowledged the correctness of Dr. Rainer's political interpretations, and the actual leadership of Dr. Rainer in all political actions. The situation was much the same with Glaise-Horstenau who was wholeheartedly for Rainer and Globocnik but always carefully guarded the legal party position of Leopold.
Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as "Staatsrat" (councillor of state) in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the Chancellor
592
812-PS
Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called "satisfactory action". Through all this a new and stronger political position was won in the Austrian system. The National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the political field and became a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into internal Austrian political developments. This complicated political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing pressure from the Reich, led to the talks between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppen-fuehrer Keppler presented the concrete political demands of the fighting underground movement, which he estimated according to his personal experiences and the information he received. The results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand, as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis of the "system apparatus" (Schuschnigg government) at a time when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.
Another result of the agreement was the appointment by the Fuehrer of Leopold as a member of the Staff of Hess. After a long, persona] talk with Klausner, the Fuehrer appointed him as leader of the Austrian National Socialists, upon recommendation of Keppler. The relationship between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows: Seyss-Inquart acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere. Seyss-Inquart also acknowledged the free political initiative of the party leader of Austria.
The "Landesleitung" received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10
a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards,
593
812-PS
Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the "Landesleitung" from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer. On the 10th March all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all units leaders. During the night of the 10th to 11th, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the party freedom of action and that he would back it in everything it did. Rainer then gave the final instruction for Friday, the 11th of March, and explained that three situations might develop within the following days:
1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great demonstration must be held.
2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.
3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.
On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a. m. the "Landesleitung" had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.
594
812-PS
812-PS
In regard to Rainer's proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political, "Front" men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were prepared.
Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00 p. m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at 3:00 p. m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30, Seyss-Inquart 'phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered "No." Rainer informed the "Reichskanzlei" through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p. m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00 p. m. At 5:00 p. m., Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.
595
8l2-PS
Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the "Gruppenfuehrer" Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00 p. m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p. m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.
Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p. m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8 :30 p. m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight "gaus" of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party. * * *
The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the part on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer.
6.7.1939 Rainer e. h.
596