Therefore, there remained only cases which were not questions of male, but where I had negations or talks with someone. And, again one must distinguish between whether I was there alone or whether there was someone with me. In most cases I did not go to such talks alone. Generally there was an expert on the subject needed and, in the second place, it was practical for me to have my adjutant with me because telephone calls were received, etc., so that, in general, the person who went with me usually informed the Chief of Staff afterwards even if I did not so so and even if I participated alone. If they were more or less important matters then I absolutely had to inform the Chief of Staff, because in my absence he had to know what was going on, what could happen, or what had been discussed. Otherwise, it would not have been possible to carry on business of our office, since in my absence the people always appreached my Chief of Staff personally or by telephone.
Q. When the two Chiefs of Staff who will appear here as witnesses must be able to tell us what you desired on the one hand, and on the other hand what you learned of?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. It may be necessary to explain a few terms important for the questioning of your competency and your authority. A little while ago you spoke of the relationship between superiors and subordinates in deviation from the term "authority" to issue orders. Since your responsibility is dependent on this point I should like to know whether terms like, direction, management, etc., whether they are anywhere set down and regulated authority?
A. That can be best seen as I am to give a concrete example established by document. In the Document Book on page 45 and 46, the Army Medical Inspector is presented.
Q. I might point out that this is document HA 28A, exhibit #2, Document Book I, page 44.
A. The test speaks for itself. It says, under #6 "The Army Medical Inspector is the Head of the Medical Section of the War Time Army. He is the superior of the entire medical personnel of the War Time Army in medical matter and he is the superior officer of all medical units of the War Time Army."
A footnote has been omitted here which is contained in the War Medical Decree which explains what is meant by medical personnel. It says "medical personnel include medical officers, non-commissioned officers, officials of the Medical Service, pharmacists, dentists, officials of the Administrative Service, special leaders in the Medical Service, and volunteer nurses." This shows clearly that this is a superior and I must add that under #11 the following is stated: "By means of inspection he convinced himself of the execution of his orders and of the state of health of the Field and Reserve Army."
In regard to the right of inspections it was not said that he needs to ask anyone about it before hand or even to inform any one.
Q. Then that is a clear case of the relationship of superior and subordinate as well as the total power to issue orders?
A. And, another one which we do not have a copy here is made equally clear - the case of the Army physician, the Army Corps and Divisional doctors of the Army. In other branches of the Wehrmacht it was the same. It said that they are superiors of their medical personnel in question of medical service and they are troop superiors to medical chiefs under their command. Now I should like to say in this case we have a clear relationship in the Army Air Force and the Navy. The Medical Chiefs are superiors of all the medical personnel and if in the Army one speaks of a superior this automatically and of necessity includes the power to issue orders.
When in military regulations we find something about instructions about who being a superior - this is always a very luke warm and weak and unclear matter. And, if one calls a high medical officer the head of an agency and entrusted direction of it to him without making him a superior and without giving him unlimited authority, this is a very weak uncompromising solution which everyone who understands these matters will recognize as weakness and that is the relationship as one looks at instruction of Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service in contrast to regulations of Army Medical Inspector or Chief of the Medical Service of the Air Force and Navy.
That is what I wanted to clear up.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I should like to submit to the Tribunal Document HA 50, which is in my 3rd document took and therefore is not yet available. This is a copy from the War Medical Decree, pages 4 to 6, and deals with the problems of which Professor Handloser has just spoken. I may submit this document now, as Exhibit 6a. Document Book 3 will be handed in tomorrow.
Q. Aside from the medical units or medical agencies, were there also institutes under you or your agencies as Army Medical Inspector or Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service?
A. Yes, there were such institutes; there were 7 of them. I should like to distinguish between the 4 which existed during peace time, that is, the Military Medical Academy, the Medical Training Section in Berlin and the Main Medical Camp in Berlin, -- 3 then. During the war there were added the Typhus Research Institute in Krakow and Lemburg, the Surgical Special Hospital in Brussels, the Central Archives for War Medicine in Berlin, and the Army Mountain Medical School in St. Johann. These institutes were directly under the Army Medical Inspector.
Q. Will you please describe the official relationship which you, as Army Medical Inspector, had with these institutes?
A. They were military organization headed by a commanding officer. That is to say, primarily the commanding officer is responsible for what happens in his military institute; he again is under and is thereby responsible to the Army Medical Inspector, who, of course, since the Institute is directly subordinate to him, on the whole bears the responsibility for it. That was the case with the Academy and that was the case with the other institutes. But I consider it necessary to give an example of what these institutes were like. I shall take the Military Medical Academy and say briefly what it was and what the supervision within the Academy was.
The Military Medical Academy, which we shall mention frequently, is an organization dating from 1795. Its name at that time was the Friedrich Wilhelm Institute, because the King, Friedrich Wilhelm II, had founded it. After 100 years of existence, in 1895, it changed its name to Kaiser Wilhelm Academy and when it was re-established after the first World War, it was given the name Military Medical Academy.
It had always had 2 tasks, in the first place to give the new recruits for the career of medical officer, additional training and in addition, in its own scientific institutes, to help the students; and on the other hand, to carry on such research as was directly connected with military medicine. At the head of the academy there was always an especially proved commanding officer. The picture of the academy in the lower fields was that under this commanding officer there were 3 training groups, headed again by a Generalarzt or an Oberstarzt. In 2 of these groups there were the students, in Group A, those before the physikum, the first medical examination, and in Group B, those in their clinical semesters. The third group, Training Group C, was the scientific group with the scientific institutes. The last director was Generalarzt Schreiber, who has frequently been mentioned.
In these institutes, military medical research was carried on. The medical officers in these training groups, I am thinking, for example, of Stabsarzt Dohmen, who has also been mentioned frequently, were primarily under the commanding officer of the training group and he in turn was under the commanding officer of the Academy and the commanding officer of the Academy was under the Army Medical Inspector. The organization in other institutes was built up on the same principle; whether it was St. Johann or the Central Archives, it was all the same; only the hospital in Brussels was different, which was purely a hospital and to which was attached a special scientific research department.
Q. You were Army Physician (Heeresarzt) and Army Medical Inspector and until you become Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service your functions were separate. What was the reason for joining the functions of Army Physician and Army Medical Inspector? I will, in a moment, point out what is important for my case so that the Prosecution does not think that I am bringing the Army Physician into the case unnecessarily. Army Physician and Medical Inspector were two functions which up until then had required all the services of one man, a high military doctor.
They were united and a sphere of work was created from which I must assume, without explanation, that it was too much for one person and would perhaps not give you the opportunity to do justice to the responsibility which you had in this high position. Will you please explain this and tell us how it was possible to fill these 2 positions and later 3 positions responsibly?
A. In 1939 I was in Poland. In 1940 I was in France. I was an Armee Arzt (Army Physician). Thus from two sectors, from two theaters of war, I was able to form a judgment about the management of the medical service and of course I also talked to their comrades about it. I was in the first World War, too, and I was able to see that our Supreme Medical Commander, that was von Gernin, as full Medical Chief and Generalstabsarzt of the Army, was in the field, at headquarters, and not at home. He arranged it at that time so that he was in charge of matters in the field himself and that at home he had a representative, who was a Generalarzt, but he himself was in charge of the direction of all matters at home and in the field. In the recent World War the Army Medical Inspector, Waldmann, was in Berlin, and a Heeresarzt was appointed for the Field Army. That was certainly not due to the desire of the Army Medical Inspectorate and my predecessor. That was connected with the military organization and with the point of view that in the field one cannot have any ministerial people with ministerial habits. My predecessor, Professor Waldmann, during the campaign in Poland and during the campaign in France, he was not in Berlin wither; but he had the feeling, just as everyone else did, that the primary thing and the mephasis, -- the first concern -was with the troops in the field.
If they were not cared for properly, if things did not run right at the front, then no amount of work at home did any good. My army in Poland, as well as my army in France, in spite of the brief duration of the campaigns, he visited my armies repeatedly.
Now when I became his successor, I was immediately confronted with the question in Berlin, if there is a change now and it was known that Generalstabsarzt Ott in the very near future would give up his position, it was said, "Now or Never." This obvious mistake in organization must be done away with and therefore from my own experience, as well as on the basis of the fact that from the first World war and from the preceding campaigns in 1939 and 1940, came that decision that Generaloberst Froom, who was Commander of the Reserve Army and the Commander in Chief of the army Von Brauchitsch, that I should suggest to them that the two organizations should be united. First, this was to be a simplification, secondly, time was to be saved and third, every possibility for friction, which of course existed between the field armies and the home army, was to be removed.
Q Then, in your opinion and in the opinion of the army medical officers, you presented the necessity. What is important here, however, is that you say how you created the safeguards, the order to safeguard the responsibility of such a high officer as the Army Medical Inspector. Please clarify your responsibility.
A The extent of the duty alone, from the point of view of area alone, had become so great as the war expanded that no one in charge, even the Heeresarzt could be everywhere. The Army Medical Inspector at home could not do that, everything had to be built upon the basis of the decentralization and on the selection of the best people as supports for the execution of the duties on the principle that the best men should be put in the best places. This was done at home by the selection of the Wehrkreis physicians and by the promotion and support of their authority and that was done in the field by the selection of army physicians.
When the area became substantially greater and the difficulty be came substantially greater, the military agencies, on their own initiative, since they were in the same position, created a new agency between the high command of the army and the various armies - the so-called army group commands, since it could not at first be achieved that army group physicians should be assigned to these army group commands.
Conditions later showed the High Command of the Army that this had to be done later and so at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, army group physicians, with the rank of Generalarzt or Generalstabsarzt were created, who were above the physicians of the various armies as connecting link to the Heeresarzt and the Army Medical Inspectors. That is a typical example of the fact that the expanded duties and the expanded area required a new safeguard for the execution of control and supervision and advise.
I should only like to add to clarify the matter, that the Wehrkreis physicians at home, I believe with one or two exceptions, and there were nineteen of them, that they were all even older than I and that a considerable proportion of them had formerly been my superiors as Wehrkreis physicians or as army group physicians in peace time and that in the field, they were of the same are as I with very few exceptions. They were men with the rank of a Generalarzt or Generalstabsarzt, who had reached this rank only on the basis of long experience and special achievement. These were not men whom one had to watch or control. These were men who guaranteed that they would do their utmost and their best and that they had the necessary experience and the necessary ability.
Q In connection with this policy of putting the best men in the most difficult posts, there had to be added, I should like to say, the legislative activities; you had to issue instructions, directives, orders, etc.; was that organized in that way?
A. Do you mean these Army Camp Physicians?
Q All physicians from your point of view?
A. Yes, of course that was done.
Q This is what I should like to learn; were numerous instructions, directives and orders issued by you?
A Yes, of course.
Q I mention this because unfortunately we have no documents in the Prosecution's Document books bearing your signature. If such orders had not corresponded to the rules demanded of an orderly command, I am convinced that we would have seen them here. I should also like to ask you if you know of any significant, or were there any significant violations reported to you in connection with inadmissability, or the execution of the military medical point of view or the ethical point of view?
A No.
Q I am not merely speaking of the front, the doctors at the front; I am speaking of at home too?
A Yes.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, now I want to come to the question of the consulting specialists, on the functions of these consulting specialists, but Generalartz Gutzeit has testified about this as a witness, so I believe I can dispense with this matter; but in this connection I should like to present two documents to the Tribunal. In the first place an excerpt from the War Medical Decree, No. 222, 226, and 235. This deals with the group of consulting physicians in the Army.
THE PRESIDENT: In what Document Book are these documents contained.
DR. NELTE: You will find these documents in Book No. 1, Page 36. It is document HA 19, and will be Exhibit No. 7, if the Tribunal accepts this document as an exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it counsel's intention to read the document into the record or simply have it offered in evidence?
DR. NELTE: I merely want to submit it. In the examination of the witness Gutzeit the contents were already presented. It is only the legal regulation of the position which the consulting physicians had.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: And the next document on the same point I submit a statement of the defendant Professor Handloser on the establishment of the consulting physicians. I shall not read this either. I only offer it as an exhibit.
It is in the Document Book No. 1, Page 32. It is document HA 18. I ask that you accept this statement of the defendant as Exhibit No. 8.
THE PRESIDENT: In the Document Book I do not find Document HA 18 listed in the index. It is in the book, but not indexed.
DR. NELTE: The section which produced these documents left this document out, but only in the index. In the document book itself, on Page 32, you will find the document.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the Document Book. I have it. I was calling attention to the fact it was omitted from the index.
There being no objections the documents will be admitted.
The Tribunal will now recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 11 February 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Before proceeding with the evidence, counsel, the Tribunal desires to read a statement, an amendment to Rules of Procedure for Military Tribunal I, 10 February 1947.
"In all cases where persons are detained in the Nurnberg jail and who have been approved by Military Tribunal as witnesses for the defense, it is hereby ordered that after the date of such approval by Military Tribunal the following procedure shall be followed in the interview or interrogation of such witness or witnesses by either counsel for Prosecution or Defense:
1. Counsel desiring to interview such witness shall petition the Tribunal in writing, stating in general the scope and subject matter of such interview.
2. The Tribunal shall thereupon appoint an impartial commissioner to represent Tribunal at such interview to the end that it shall be orderly, proper, and judicial in character and within the scope of the petition filed and to the further end that there shall be no attempt to harrass, intimidate, or improperly influence the witness in giving his answer.
3. Whenever such a witness is being interviewed or interrogated in the presence of such commissioner by counsel for either side, counsel for the other side shall not be entitled to be present.
4. If in the course of such interview it shall appear to such commissioner that the proper scope of such interview, as set forth in the petition therefor, is being exceeded by the counsel conducting such interview or that it is in any other manner being improperly conducted, said commissioner shall on behalf of the Tribunal stop said interview.
5. In such event said commissioner shall report in writing to the Tribunal the substantial and significant facts in relation to such interview and his reasons for having stopped the same.
6. Counsel conducting such interview may, if he so desires, promptly bring before the Tribunal in writing, after giving notice to opposing counsel, his objections, if any, to the action of the commissioner, whereupon the presiding judge of the Tribunal shall either confirm the action of the commissioner or direct the interview of the witness to proceed with such directions or limitations as he may order.
7. In any appeal to the Tribunal from such act of the commissioner, counsel so appealing shall state the name of the witness, the name of the defendant whom he represents, and the title of the cause in which he is acting as counsel.
8. The above procedure shall not be interpreted as in effect in cases, a) where the witness or prospective witness has been procured by the Prosecution but has not been approved by the Tribunal as a witness for the defense, or b) where the witness for the defense has been procured as such by the defense and voluntarily appears without being confined in the Nurnberg jail."
The Tribunal understands that this procedure has been previously discussed with counsel for the Prosecution and with counsel for the Defense and has been found satisfactory to both counsels.
I will file this original with the Secretary General to be noted in the record. Translations will be furnished defense counsel.
I will also file with the Secretary General the doctor's statement that the defendant Oberheuser should be excused on account of illness.
Counsel may proceed with examination of the witness.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, with reference to the ruling of the high Tribunal which was just read, I should like to ask that defense counsel be permitted to make a statement after having read this ruling. The translation was not such that we can at the moment survey the far reaching effects of that ruling. I hope that the high Tribunal will permit us to present eventual considerations which would be in the interest of the proceedings, if such suggestion can be made.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for defense may make any presentation to the Tribunal that they may desire in connection with this ruling. Anything they may present will be considered by the Tribunal.
DR. NELTE: I thank you very much.
SIEGFRIED HANDLOSER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Witness, when ending the morning session you were speaking about the relationship of the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Service to the Waffen-SS.
Would you please continue that part of your statement?
A. I was saying before that the ruling regarding personnel in the Waffen-SS was most in reference to distribution of personnel to other parts of the Armed Forces. With reference to the settlement regarding material the matter was such; the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Services had a central agency. This control agency was at the main medical office. This department had the task to cover the entire need of medical equipment for the Armed Forces and order it from a central agency and distribute it according to the strength of the respective Wehrmacht branch.
In the case of the Waffen SS difficulties resulted in that connection. It was because only a small part of the Waffen SS was subordinated to the Wehrmacht, while other parts, and that includes the police which belonged to the Reich Physician SS, had nothing whatever to do with the Wehrmacht. Whereas it was possible with the Army, Navy and Air Force to control their needs exactly and establish it, such a procedure was not possible in the case of the SS, that is the Reichsarzt SS. The Reichsarzt SS not only had to cover needs for the Waffen SS but also for other parts of the SS, including the police. At no time, not even 1944, was it possible to exercise an exact control and an exact distribution in connection with the SS. The SS quite clearly refused any such interference and even in the year of 1944 rejected making reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Offices about the state of their equipment. They gave as the reason that the Reichsfuehrer SS had an authority from the Fuehrer, according to which his equipment and his orders were only a matter for the Reichsfuehrer SS to decide. In this manner there was no control exercised with reference to the Waffen SS and there was no such task in connection with material distribution and steering of such distribution.
I now come to the Navy.
Q. Before you continue, I should like to speak, Mr. President, about the relationship of the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Services to the Waffen SS and in that connection I should like to submit two affidavits. One affidavit made by the co-defendant, Professor Dr. Mrugowsky, which is Document HA 17 in Document Book 2, page 28, and furthermore the affidavit of the defendant Dr. Genzken as Document HA 16 in Document Book 2, page 27. Both these affidavits are dealing with the relationship of the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical services to the Waffen SS and I think it is necessary to submit these affidavits in that connection since this will simplify the procedure and will confine it to the complexes and thereby the proceedings will be shortened. I ask for permission to offer these affidavits as Exhibits 5 and 6 to the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Which affidavit does counsel offer as Exhibit 5?
DR. NELTE: HA 17, Document Book No. 2, page 28. Exhibit 6 will be Document HA 16 in Document Book No. 2, page 27.
MR. MC HANEY: If the Tribunal please, it seems to the prosecution that instead of shortening the case of the defendant Handloser, it is apt to prolong it considerably by this procedure of bringing in all of the evidence while the witness Handloser is on the stand and calling for his comment on each affidavit and other document which is going in. Now we have here two affidavits, one from Mrugowsky and one from Genzken, concerning the relationship of the Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht to the Waffen SS. I don't understand the order of proof in bringing these documents, which are quite unrelated to the testimony of this witness, into the proceeding while he is testifying. I don't have any particular objection to the admissibility of the documents themselves. It is more a question of order of proof. I think we would get along much faster if he would proceed to interrogate the witness, release him for cross-examination, and then put in his other documents.
DR. NELTE: I believe that Mr. McHaney is right and that it is a question of the expediency of the submission of evidence. I think it would be more expedient if a certain complex of questions is concluded while submitting evidence. I don't think it is advisable to let the defendant speak first and the submit affidavits when submitting documents. I think that the Tribunal will gain a much better picture about this certain complex of questions when it at the same time takes judicial notice of the documents rather than after the examination of the defendant is concluded. I think this is a question of expediency and I think that the procedure as I adopt it is in accordance with expediency.
MR. MC HANEY: I would ask the Tribunal to request Dr. Nelte to state whether or not he now plans to read these affidavits into the record during the course of the interrogation of this witness and, further, whether he intends to direct any questions to the witness Handloser, based upon matters which are stated in these affidavits.
DR. NELTE: I merely wanted to submit and present these affidavits and should like to emphasize the most essential points and then leave it to the prosecution to put any questions they may desire in connection with that document.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for defendant may proceed according to the plan which he has outlined, for the present at least.
BY DR. NELTE:
Exhibit 5 is an affidavit of the co-defendant, Professor Mrugowsky. It refers to the chart which he himself handed to the prosecution and which was submitted to the High Tribunal. He says:
"In the pamphlet known as 'Basic Facts about the German State Health System' which was submitted to the Tribunal by the prosecution it appears as if the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service, Professor Handloser, had directed and supervised the Medical Service of the Waffen SS.
"I have to state the following: Basically and generally, the Medical Service of the Waffen SS was not subordinate to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service. There was only limited supervision by him, which extended only to the Medical Service of the front divisions of the Waffen SS when in action with the Wehrmacht. The Waffen SS trained and obtained the necessary medical personnel independently. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service did not have any authority over the medical personnel. Only units of the Waffen SS in actual combat service were subordinated to the Wehrmacht. Therefore, this subordination was only temporary and within the framework of the consequent necessities.
"As soon as the units of the Waffen SS were withdrawn from the combat area, the temporary subordination and supervision ceased, just as it did when wounded or sick SS men were transferred to rear echelons. The Waffen SS saw to it that its men were sent to its own hospitals. The Waffen SS was independent in establishing new units, as far as medical supplies were concerned, just as in the case of personnel. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service did not have any authority over this.
"The connections of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service to the Medical Service of the Waffen SS were therefore very limited. There was no official connection with the medical research institutes of the Waffen SS and the SS. 2838 "The Institute for Typhus and Virus Research at Buchenwald, which was subordinated to me, did not have any official connection with the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service or the Army Medical Inspectorate.
It was neither subordinated to, nor was there any supervision by, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service."
Dr. Genzken in Exhibit 6, confirmed this statement in its entirety as being correct and true.
Now Professor, I ask you to continue describing the relationship of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service to the various branches of the armed forces.
A I now come to the Navy. The Navy was an armed unit with special tasks and they always led a special existence. Even in peace time there were only limited connections between the Army and Navy. As closed as the Navy always was, it continued to be that way toward the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service. It strictly observed its jurisdiction and whenever it was possible, they rejected, through their Supreme Commander, any interferrance or insight of the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Service, giving the reason that he was only there for the purpose of coordinating mutual tasks, but not in order to interfere with the special tasks and special sphere of the Navy.
Concerning the number of medical officers, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service was fully aware that he could not decree the number of medical officers who were in the Navy.
The Navy during this war, in addition to their tasks at sea, that is within the so-called floating units, had a number of tasks on land, which it had to take over; to that one has to count the anti-air-craft system of the entire western coast starting from Norway down to Spain.
The needs of the Navy on medical equipment materially differed to such an extent from the equipment that was needed by the Army that even here a coordination was hardly possible; that meant that the possibility of exercising influence by the chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service on the Navy remained very small.
I now come to the Air Force.....
Q I should like to interrupt you here. You are speaking about the actual facts, which made it impossible to coordinate mutual tasks of the Navy and the other Armed Forces Branches, but I do think the High Tribunal will be interested in knowing whether on the basis of that decree of 1942, you had the authority to assume that authority whenever the occasion arose.
The prosecution maintains on the basis of that decree of 1942 you had the obligation to assume authority and exercise control and had you not done so, under circumstances, one could say that you neglected to be aware of your tasks and exercise supervisory powers in such a manner as your responsibilities should have required.
Now, will you say something about how the authority has to be interpreted on the basis of that decree; the first thing, of course, is the authority to issue orders?
A The Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service, on the basis of the decree of 1942, did not in any passage receive the authority to issue orders and it was not expressed in any passage; just as little was it expressed that he had the authority or the duty to exercise supervisory functions. On the other hand, I interpreted the decree of 1942 as it was thought and that was on the basis of its formulation that in the field of coordination and adjustment of personnel and equipment, I had the duty to do everything possible for the purpose of salvaging in order to make a just coordination; that is for the purpose of saving material and equipment. That did not present any difficulties with the Army, Navy and Air Force and I concluded that the introductionary words of the decree of 1942; namely, the leading of personnel and material direction into the various branches of the armed forces had to be interpreted in such a way as I did.
The armed forces branches would never have given the right to the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Service to exercise any control in their medical service or any supervision. This was never expressed. It was never said that this decree could be interpreted as an authority to issue orders.
In addition, I should like to state quite basically that it was not at all intended to completely leave out the various medical services of the armed forces branches or to interfere in their independant rights. That actually never took place. Just as little as it was never intended to create such a situation when introducing the Commissioner General and thereby cut down the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces.
Q. Did you at any time inspect an institute of the Navy; and you know there was such an institute in Tuebingen?
A In Tuebingen there was the Medical Academy of the Navy. I never inspected it; I never was even there.
Q Now, will you please continue and speak about the relationship of the Chief of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces with the Luftwaffe?
A The Air Force was a young army. At the head of the Air Force was Goering.
The Air Force when it was first created could, with right, exploit everything that was available and Goering did everything to further that. In connection with the Luftwaffe, we granted that right to the Luftwaffe and by saying we, I mean the Army. There was no one in the Army who was not of the opinion that the Air Force had to be equipped better than the army in every sphere. In peace tine and during the building up of the Luftwaffe, that was quite understandable, but after the Army had to bear the main burden during the war and that quite obviously appeared to be possible; that this difference in equipment could not be maintained. Therefore, it was quite clear to the Air Force that a Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Service could have not other task, that he interfered with the medical equipment of the Air Force in favor of the Army. It is quite understandable that the Air Force defended itself against that procedure as well and as long as it could, but because of the events in the winter of 1941 and 1942 the relationship of the position of the various armies had become so obvious and the Air Force was in a position to transfer about one hundred of their medical officers to the army. That made it clear that further interference with the Luftwaffe would be possible. As Chief of the Medical Services of the Armed Forces, I handled this matter in such a way and we came to some agreement in that connection.