"If we try to determine the aim and method of clinical experiments, the following deductions can be made:
"The most important thing appears to be the examination of the method of operation of local application to the wounds of sulfonamides, but the operative treatment of the wound must not be forgotten in any way. It remains the basis of our procedure with practical chemotherapy as well, because necroses of the wound area do considerably restrict the effect of sulfonamides. The great danger of chemotherapy is that it may lead physicians who are not very careful to negligence when carrying out the operative treatment of the wounds, because considerable hope is placed in chemotherapy.
"In the experiment, similar series can be created, that is research work can be done exactly as Kirschner requested in his controversy with Schreuss. At the sick bed, the opinion of the specialist decides the procedure.
"Secondly, the effect of a general introduction into the body of a drug would have to be examined. The effects of a local application will probably be inferior. Perhaps general applications for brain wounds has a certain importance, as there is no blood liquor level for sulfonamides.
"Then the doses was discussed, it was decided to make it depend on the concentration of the drug in the blood (5 to 10 milligrams - in serious cases 20 milligrams), and on its excretion in the urine. This may be necessary in a scientific experiment. This criterion can, however, not be applied in practical war work. We must lock for simpler doses indicators.
"As usual with sulfonamides, we shall not continuously apply it locally, but now and then for several days on end. We shall powder the drug into the wound by means of a powder blower or a powder castor after the wound has been examined, and repeat this at the next change of dressing.
On the days between the changes of dressing the drug is to be administered orally. The parenteral administration cannot be carried out at the height of the war."
As for the remainder of this lecture, I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it and I pass on to page 7 of the document book dealing with the discussion of this lecture and I shall merely refer to statements which come up in the discussion, in this case by Professor Krueger. Professor Krueger was working in Breslau - I beg your pardon, I have to correct myself - it was Berlin, and what he said was this. In connection with this, I should add distinctly that this discussion, as well as the lecture itself given by Professor Tostock, took place before the carrying out of the experiments do by Fischer and Gebhardt, and now I quote Professor Krueger;
"Very favorable opinion of sulfonamide prophylaxis though only on the basis of clinical observations, (brain shots without meningitis, pulmonary gun shot wounds without ompyoma, etc.) (5000 cases)."
Following that, Professor Sauerbruch spoke. Where Professor Krueger praised the effects of sulfonamide, Geheimrat Sauerbruch, on the other hand, was very skeptical of it. I quote:
"Sauerbruch criticizes the primitiveness of the opinions on the healing of wounds. During the World War the same results were hoped for with vuzin, rivanol etc. The remedies veil the surgical work and load to superficiality. We should, however, examine things critically and the task of examination should be put into the hands of surgeons who know general surgery."
On Pages8, Professor Krauspe also had something to say, and I quote from his statement:
"I agree essentially to what Mr. Rostock has said. At the suggestion of our Army physician, Generalstabsarzt Dr. Gunderloch, we carried out extensive treatment with Mesudin among our troops since August of last year, especially on cases of gangrene, and we have made a number of observations where this remedy was administered orally as well as applied locally.
In these cases it also proved to be effective. Nevertheless I should like to say that no final opinion on the effect of these preparations can be made as yet. Although we have heard some enthusiastic opinions concerning this preparation and therapy, in many places where good results were reported, especially by surgeons, we have also heard of other cases when it was applied orally or locally where it completely failed to have any effect. This cannot be seen completely at first sight. The main reason is that in the case of gas edema, we do not have a pure infection with a strain of bacteria, but a mixed infection; whereas those preparations are always based on special germs, for instance, the serum on blackleg bacilli (symptomatic anthrax, bacilli) which are of little importance in cases of gangrenous infections, while the Fraenkel and Novysch vacilli must be considered of primary importance. Moreover by a pure application of those preparations, we met with so little success that we stopped using them immediately, and active surgical treatment was carried out. The important result, as Mr. Restock has told also us, is that surgical operations are the most important in cases of gangrene and will probably remain so."
Then the final speaker in this discussion whom I wish to quote was Professor Gins. You will find this on page 10 of the document book. Professor Gins is a bacteriologist and a professor at the Robert Koch Institute at Berlin. I quote him:
"A short contribution to the problem of chemotherapy based on our chemotherapeutical animal experiments. From what we have seen, for instance from the experiments which took place under my direction, none of the preparations used had any recognizable effect. Neither prontosil nor prontalbin showed anything similar. None of the animals remained alive after marfanil and mesudin had been applied. Similar results were observed with sulfanil and siron, the so-called new sulfonamides which had been put at our disposal by the German Hystier Plants. Of this last group, we can say finally:
no indications of a special effect resulting from a local administration were shown in animal experiments.
"New experiments were finally made with katoxin, which at that time were very hopefully recommended. This is a preparation, the effect of which comes from a combined oligoynamic Silver effect and a protracted oxygen effect. The first experiments conducted by the Katoxin Company itself, appeared very hopeful.
" "Later stests conducted by the work group of the Katoxin Company, here in the academy under my direction, likewise appeared to be very promising and were, in addition, a very interesting contribution to the psychology of animal experiments. In one series of experiments, in which the katoxin preparations was used partly on letters A and partly on letters D, all animals belonging to group A remained alive while all animals of group D died. (Laughter.) -
"Particular attention should be drawn to the fact that such things do happen. It was not possible to find any form of dishonesty in the performance of the experiments. Everything was completely under control. Any suspicion that somebody was not honest can therefore be eliminated. I am only quoting this to prove how careful one must be in order to get sound results. The experiments has shown that katoxin does not act differently to other sulfonamides.
"If we have a suggestion to make, therefore, it is a suggestion somewhat similar to that already made by the clinical physicians: The fact that a guinea pig is not a human being must always be taken into consideration, and if the tests have proved that preparations which affect the tissue will not do any harm, it is worth considering carrying out more intensive experiments with this preparation. From our point of view, we could not generally recomment the application of certain preparations, but we could recommend the application of certain preparations, but we could recommend a clinical test using the same groups and considering what Mr. Rostock has said. If this is done maybe we shall see that sulfonamides, perhaps even katoxin, when applied in certain ways or in certain cases, may now and then be successful.
"I would suggest including katoxin in these tests, on the condition of course, that you do not expect too much of it."
As far as the rest of the report of this conference is concerned I shall ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice and I shall pass on to page 13 of the document, an extract on the Second Conference East (Arbeitstagung-Ost) of the Consulting Physicians, taking place on November 30 to December 30, 1942.
This will be Exhibit Gebhardt No. 7. As far as Professor Warbrand's lecture is concerned...
MR. McHANEY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution has no particular objection to these documents being submitted in evidence and we would agree to have the submitting of them extended into the record but I must object to the reading at great length of these reports. The Prosecution is perfectly willing to concede that German medical experts felt that there were open problems in the field that German medical experts felt that there were open problems in the field of sulfanilamide; that is all I take it that these documents purport to prove and I suggest that we proceed with the examination of the witness. In any event it is not necessary to read these aloud in court if he is going to base his questions on them. The witness now on the stand is perfectly familiar with them and he can direct his questions.
Dr. SEIDL: Mr. President, I did not initially intend to quote too much from Exhibit Gebhardt No. 7. As far as I myself was concerned I was going to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. They were merely a few short statements coming up during the discussion which I proposed to read; they can be found on page 16 of the document book, as well as page 19.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel may read these extracts from the documents but not take up too much time. Document will be admitted into evidence as Gebhard Exhibit No. 7. Counsel should use discretion in reading from the document on account of the time it takes to read it.
DR. SEIDL: Well, then, I shall quote from page 16 of the document book, statements made by Professor Krueger during the discussion, as well as Professor Schulze and Professor Schmidt. The reason I am doing so is because these statements seem to describe the situation at the time rather well. I quote:
"KRUEGER recommends the use of sulfonamides especially for abdominal wounds: he believes that the good results he obtained (of almost 1000 cases with abdominal wounds, including the patients who died in the rear hospitals, 55% were cured) are to be ascribed to the effect of the sulfonamides.
"W. SCHULZE also warmly advocates the treatment with sulfonamides.
" PROF. SCHIMDT rejects the intraperitoneal treatment with sulfonamides. 7 different surgeons cured 50% of the cases without this method, although under conditions which equalled those of peacetime."
Then I pass on to page 19 of the document book and from there I quote statements made by Professors Krueger and Krauss. I quote:
"Krueger recommands the use of sulfonamides also in the case of nes gun shot wounds of the lungs. The mortality of about 100 cases of gun shot wounds of the lungs amounted to 12.6%, including the patients who died later on in general hospitals."
"Professor Krauss has not found any decisive influence on gun shot wounds of the lungs by the use of sulfonamides."
As far as the speech made by Professor Laewen is concerned, which is found on page 20 of the document book, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this. This would then conclude the submission of documents at this stage of the proceedings and I ask permission to be allowed to continue with the examination of Defendant Dr. Gebhardt.
BY DR. SEIDL:
Q. Witness, the Prosecution in the course of their submission of evidence with reference to the sulfonamide experiences, called 4 experimental subjects as witnesses. Before going into the details of these experiments may I ask you to tell me how you stand, in principle, with reference to these special experiments carried out on human beings?
A. May I take the liberty of making an introductory remark? I shall be brief with it and actually I shall only touch upon the important points raised by the Prosecution, which I shall summarize. From there I shall pass on to the very different attitude adopted by me and to the necessity which I consider exists relating to a different type of evidence which should be submitted.
The Prosecution places this experiment right in the center of these proceedings and derives from, it the following 4 points: 1), that a soldier, no matter, be considered a criminal because he came from the SS, or not obeying an order, whether the jurisdiction of the order be recognized or not. 2), that on the other hand where I, as a doctor, have a choice of action, I should be particularly defamed, and the Prosecution was underlining the criminal individual attitude adopted by Defendant Gebhardt and I was being accused that within the framework of this order I had acted negligently, unscientifically, and without achieving any special particular results. It was also considered that the criminal parts of my nature, that is to say, the moral insanity was recognizable in the pitiless carrying out of these experiments and my general attitude. In point 4 the Prosecution goes even one step further. They say, -- and don't forget that they are laymen, and I shall go into the scientific part of what they said in more detail -they said that any value of this work for the wider part of humanity did not exist. The Prosecution denied it.
You all know that the discussions going on abroad at this moment are exactly in reverse; in other words, important doctors, such as, for instance,, the personal physician of His Majesty the King of England, are representing the view that even if we are a criminals and even if the carrying out of these experiments was criminal, then the work would have one last ethical value if the general public were placed in a position to receive the benefits of the results of these experiments. Without passion, just as though judging a doctor's thesis, I shall make every effort to deal with those 4 points put up by the Prosecution. But even now I should like to take the liberty of underlining one basic difference. Even if at present I am not granted any human or scientific value, there is a man speaking here now who has dealt with gangrene infections for 12 years and who, therefore, as far as judging the progress of such disease and the therapeutical effects of such an infection is concerned, has made this a special field and has become a specialist on that subject to a much larger extent than anyone in this room. I should like also to ask the Tribunal to give me a chance of dealing with this soimportant part of the work of German and foreign scientists in detail.
The final exploitation of our work could be facilitated in as far as the haze of semi-medical ideas and wrongly applied medical expressions as well as evidence showing facts in distorted fashion can be rectified by me as an expert, so that any one reading the record years after our death would, be in a position to judge the particular experiment in question, something which up to now is impossible, and I would like to suggest that it may or may not be by design that a haze is being created here, or whether it is merely because of the inefficiency of the laymen that it has happened.
At any rate on this point I am back in the same situation, something which I should like to underline, and where I found myself before, namely, someone is attacking me, a layman who is saying he can pass judgment who has no idea of the progress of an infectious disease, or what death and dying of thousands means; that I should answer this layman, notoon my behalf, but on behalf of the public, and put him in his place. In other words, the fact implicates me legally, and I am well represented by myself since I am assuming responsibility for that. The incredible impression which we have received has been achieved by a minor optical trick. Without knowledge of the contents and procedure, four women deeply mourned by me were brought for demonstration of this Tribunal, and of course that caused the pity of every decent spectator, and then an expert of the size of Professor Alexander added his comment, but I myself was kindly instructed by him th t he did not consider himself the expert of this Tribunal, and therefore did not consider himself above that in this Court Room, but that it was merely the advisable facts which he was presenting, and that as the representative expert of the prosecution he was giving the existence which we saw him give in this Court Room. Furthermore, Professor Alexander was fair and decent enough be state expressly that he was making every effort to restrain himself to his opinions as an expert, but that then he was inspired with a hate against each and every German until the collapse, for which he had every reason. It is important to base one's thought on this. Now, here is my comment, the selection of the four witnesses produced in this case was essential and possible since the 60 experimental persons, mostly through my assistance and collaboration simultaneously with the patients at Hohenlychen were with transported with a car from a Swedish Commission with which they arrived at the German Danish border, so that I made it possible that this evidence could be summarized, and without any secrecy it was possible to hoose the most seriously wounded and present them here in Court. Furthermore, may I point out that it is internationally known to Courts that the fatality in gas gangrene cases lies between 50 to 60 percent, also that you still usually add 20 percent of seriously wounded cases to this, so that you must also consider at least amputations or wounded joints.
May I state in connection with my scientific statement that fatalities in our series of experiments amounted to 5 to 6 percent; and that no permanent damage remained to anyone in this connection. May I add that there was a skilful mixing of cosmetic pictures with functional troubles, something which I as an expert of 20 years standing, wish to point out particularly strongly. As far as my lack of sympathy, and pity is concerned, I should like to say it is rather questionable to say to what extent a medical officer and doctor is in a position to express his pity to a prisoner by means of words. I was medical officer of the American camp at Hersbruck. I should add that there I had an opportunity to deal with open tuberculosis, cancer, and other diseased persons greatly in need of medical treatment. The American medical officer of the camp wasn't in a position to express his sympathy in words either, but in a fair and therapeutical way he has taken care of that emergency. I, as an old doctor, object to the description, of pity and journalistic representation accorded to them, that it is to be shown by word, and is only a pose, and I state it is the therapeutical action taken by the doctor, and finally I shall have to deal with the statement that the results of these experiments had been so negative; and I shall first of all deal with conditions at the front, because I can quite see that people who have never seen emergencies, worries and the dying of soldiers must be unable to pass any kind of judgment in this connection, judgment on a conflict of this type and judgment on what should be done to save thousands, and what should be left undone. When we were captured we had two possibilities, we could commit suicide as cowards and shoot ourselves; or we had the presence to choose the trial to be charged and executed. The majority among us went to Russia, assuming there would be the best understanding to it toward a surrender in a Tolitarian country. And again might I say that deliberately and with all my possibilities of submitting evidence I voluntarily surrendered to the British and American Tribunal, and I should also like to state additionally that one thing which was not taken care of when my reputation was murdered here was that I am an exception in comparison to the other defendants, in as far at lease that in the spring of 1944, as noted already, I was dealt with by a Court of the Polish-British exile government in connection with the sulphamilamide experiments and sentenced to death by it, and that I did not do anything at all to remove either documents or witnesses, but went to the British zone of occupation deliberately, in spite of it.
I think that even the last reference to personal to cowardice and must have been dealt with by my sickness, namely that we carried these as experiments only because we were afraid of our lives and afraid, of going into concentration amps, and that was contradicted.
Q. Witness, we shall have to come to the basic idea behind these experiments, when you were advisory physician to the Waffen SS in the winter of 1941 and 1942 and you went to the Eastern Front, and what were the experiences you gained there?
A. I shall deal with the basic plan of the Russian war very briefly, I shall summarize it generally. I should like to point out to the Tribunal that my actions in 1942, that is to say between the collapse of our front in the winter of 1941 to 1942, were carried out when I myself with two groups of surgeons observed the entire misery of the situation.
All along the Russian front right down to Rostow, the final outcome of ?? action must be traced to the time. I was the first person who was taking objective reports back from Stalingrad. The particular weight of this must be placed on the fact that I was a personal friend of General Paolus, so I certainly had a way to judge the degree, the extent of the German catastrophy.
May I deal with the conception of winter war in the cast? Let this High Tribunal be convinced that both in connection with this affair, as well as an; other experiments carried out by me, far be it from me to criticize any allied power in any way. Even during the war I represented the simple point of view that victory does not grow if you slander the opponent and that ones own failure cannot be excused any more officially if you blame somebody else.
This Russian winter war was such that it put soldiers before tasks which had never existed before and which had never cropped up during the conduct of any war by us. We as soldiers were formed in such a way that no one will ever forget it. Any one who is at any time set in a frozen motor car without any support and without any communications in the middle of this tremendously large country, Russia, surrounded by thousands of frozen men, to anyone to whom this has ever happened will not forget it for the rest of his life and it is unknown to anyone who is not put in this situation.
We found that even in this modern highly technical, time there could be such tremendous harm inflicted by nature that any technical appliances even the most modern machinery is worthless. Turning gainst the Russians would look no more than ridiculous, certainly it showned that the conflict with the emergencies inflicted by this winter would at all times over-rule any individual laws, something which the Russians dealt with in an exemplatory manner. Transport of technical equipment, such as car transports of wounded men, anything that you run in winter conditions such as this cannot be solved with modern vehicles, air-craft or means like that.
If can only be solved by employing masses of civilians and by using thousands of men to transport every barrel of gas, every medical supply, every instrument to the front. This complete sacrifice on the part of the masses, the sacrifice on behalf of the will to win the war, was something that the Russians achieved in the greatest possible manner. It is not up to me to ascertain whether there people were just volunteers who froze to death and whether or not prisoners of war were among them too. I shall not bother to remember such details as that.
One thing is apparently clear, the priviledge of being in his own count on his own soil and the friend of the eastern people, who live there and this completely identifies the young Russian Communists, brought up with two religious conceptions in this unreligious Bolshevik state, made an unconditional sacrifice. I don't want to say that the Russians were sacrificing thousands, but some thousands died in this type of warfare and I am not speaking of soldiers.
If the conduct of the war on German's side was to continue after this type of warfare had broken out, and of course, we know that after this dreadful event of 1942, we should have stopped then, we would have had to act in a similar manner and every man in every camp in the background would have to be used. It is not up to me, however, to be the judge if this is legally correct or not. It any rate, there were two totalitarian people prepared to use their last resources against each other and between them there was th struggle against nature and both these people used the same means to achieve their ends. Every vehicle was shot at, be it marked by a Red Cross or not, and that was the time when something was created and achieved by the Bolsheviks; namely, that there is not only the individual thing and the stupid collective proletarian but there is also the superior individual point of view that of complete suffering and total sacrifice.
Q. Witness, which were the social problems which arose from this research at the front?
A. The decisive outlook was to save people at all costs. Right now I would like to trace a dividing line because the impression created by my report in 1941 and 1942, as brought back by me from Stalingrad in 1942 in the winter campaign in 1941 and 1942, people froze to death out of the Waffen SS, all the old soldiers and reliable stock of volunteers.
Mostly people who were personally known to Himmler and Hitler. This report had an effect so terrifyingly personal, the old guards known to Adolf Hitler since the seizure of power. Twelve to fourteen thousand men were sent in and there returned shortly afterward about one thousand men strong. The feeling prevailed therefore on terrible personal suffering and there was the desire to help and do something to slow down this catastrophy.
I think I am right in saying I was the first surgeon in our sector who came back from these experiences and at that time I had an opportunity to report to both Hitler and Himmler about it in detail. Until that time, as I said yesterday there was the Waffen SS, these small elite divisions, I recommended to make sure of real recovery of these divisions, clinically speaking, by all means. Once again I rushed to the front with my operative instruction staffs and we asked for a time of rest for our badly beaten numbers and we wanted to take care of the men -- men after men -- purely clinically speaking, thus, making one decent division again out of two or three. In that connection, I not only took teachers with me but also subordinates, so that clinically speaking our potential strength could be reallocated. The requisite was, and this is something I emphasized to Himmler again and again, that during these times our losses in the Waffen SS should not be experimented with and the lesson should be drawn from this collapse that the Blitzkrieg war in Russia was over and the Waffen SS with its efficient men and inefficient leaders, particularly in so far as the medical field was concerned, should undergo careful clinical development at that stage.
Q. Did Himmler accept that suggestion of yours?
A. As far as this year of misery of 1942 is concerned, I can reconstruct I think discussions rather efficiently. The discussion in the sense I described continued in January following the Christmas visit paid to Hohenlychen by Himmler.
He was so deeply impressed by the incredible losses among his elite regiments that my power, as a man of experience, was decisive so that he promised me something and after all that is the result of the misery of my participation in these experiments in so far as clinical welfare being brought to the troops from the point of view of the physician, that nothing would happen which would not be done through me or with me. To my recollection, after that I went to Hohenlychen. Until then I was with the army through their special corps. General von Reichenau being a patient of mine and it was after all my task to act as an expert and carry out personal orders. This must have been approximately at the time of Charkow - Poltawa.
Q. You mean in April of 1942?
A. Yes in April of 1942 when I was with the sixth army and I was at the front to such an extent that when the conference took place on May 18 20 I was not there to participate, but then after this conference, in other words during the days of the 23rd, 25th and 26th of May a special courier called mo back to the headquarters and it was there that the decisive discussions regarding the reforming of the Waffen SS took place, which was to act under Himmler. As far as I can remember these discussions had gone on days and weeks before hand. Himmler, in his own particular way, called the important leaders and commanders to come and see him. I only remember for certain that we were together, Gruppenfuehrer Nebe, Reich Medical Officer Grawitz, and I. Nebe at that time was a very important man, because to start with he himself had been fighting in the east and secondly, he was the internationally known intelligence man of the R.S.H.A., the Reichs Main Security Office. Tim basis for these experiments showned three points clearly On the other side it was Himmler who always made the decision.
In dealing with the order given to Grawitz in 1944, I shall come in detail to the draft, which I submitted and I hope the prosecution shall help me by putting this to me.
Anyway the situation at the time was that during the conference it was not medical details, which came up for discussion. Himmler gave us a lecture and stressed all the time military conditions and you must realize that military conditions had changed in so far as the Waffen SS was concerned.
I remind you that as a result of our tremendous defeat in the East, Hitler himself had become supreme commander and in a totalitarian manner he saved all within the military and no other fields and that, in connection with this conception of inter reorganization of his armed forces was something representing a very considerable problem to him. It was no secret that this was the greatest crisis in so far as his confidence in people was concerned, the commanders of the armed forces were exchanged, etc.
Himmler at that time said, and I have no reason to doubt him, that during these weeks conversations between Hitler and Himmler took place to the effect that contrary to its tendency and development, the Waffen SS should become the important part of the armed forces; running, shall we say, a large amount of the army proper, and that he believed that considering all the military political difficulties, this instrument would enable him to remain in power.
Yesterday, I took the liberty of describing briefly how for a few weeks or months Himmler had been a soldier, that he never had acquainted himself with the realities of war. His relations to Hitler were such as in the French Revolution when Robespiere had been the eternal second who only had one concept and that was sacred absolute obedience to his ideal in whom he believed, he skilfully locked after his chance in this case of becoming chief of the biggest section of the armed forces, in which he shortly afterward made good headway, because the Waffen SS received 30-40 divisions, and he became chief of the leading reserve army. He, as a non-military man, led the army group until this farce came to an end.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now be in recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SEIDL:
Q. Witness, when and under what circumstances was the order issued that the effectiveness of sulfonamides was to be tested in an experiment?
A. This order arose from the discussions of a military nature, whose nature and whose observations to a large group of persons I have taken the liberty of describing. The purpose was to avoid all possible injury in the Waffen SS in the future. The two experts, Nebe and Grawitz, opposed my point of view. The purely military assignment given from Hitler directly to Himmler, Nebe brought into the confidence and foreign propaganda. I want to express very carefully here and testify under oath what I know about Nebe. In the absolute conception of authority which I had at that time I had no reason to doubt that these statements were true. Nebe said that there was a crisis of confidence in the troops, first of all because the Allied troops had been given sulfonamide bags -
Q. Witness --
THE PRESIDENT: Will the witness please wait before continuing his evidence until the translator has finished translating the preceding sentence. The conflict of voices is difficult.
WITNESS: I beg your pardon.
BY DR. SEIDL:
Q. You may continue.
A. Himmler's intelligence man, Nebe, brought the attitude from his personal observation that there was a crisis among our wounded men and enlisted men on the one hand and the doctors on the other hand. He used the following two facts in explaining this to Himmler and to us. First of all --
Q. Witness, I believe you must speak a little more slowly. Pause between the sentences.
A. That the Allied troops gave their soldiers sulfonamide bags. This was unknown in the Germany army. Second, that there was a definite propaganda on the radio and the press and hand bills which were dropped, that these miracle drugs which could have protected our wounded men from infection from the beginning, these were discussed in the propaganda.
Q. Witness, these were handbills dropped by the enemy?
A. Yes, which were intended to destroy the morale of the German troops. I stated that I myself did not see this handbill but the intelligence man reported this. On the other hand I was in Spain. Then I know the two possibilities which the Allies had, that the doctors and research were not political, but that the ruthless conduct of the war and a definite war of nerves or Propaganda used the words, sulfonamide, penicillin, and the lag of German science by fifteen years, and so forth, to an extent which no person actually informed about the subject would admit. That was in my opinion the main reason why Himmler asked Grawitz to report on sulfonamides in contrast to me. I mentioned the sulfonamides in my January report as an additional, drug which, for example, had never had any significance in my own clinic, and Grawitz's report at the meeting was not the instigating factor but a purely technical question. Himmler had some possibilities with Switzerland which is not important here, and we received from Switzerland cibazol, which was at that time the best sulfonamide. The report of Grawitz did not have anything to do with our sulfonamide experiments except for the fact it described the problem and the efforts of Dr. Brunner who was an old acquaintance of mine from Saaurbruch and Zurich also had nothing to do with experiments, but, of course, Grawitz used this reference to cibazol from Brunner and he spoke of 109 wounds, 100 of which were healed purely by sulfonamides.
A. (cont'd.) This, of course, made great impression and the bottle neck of transportation from Switzerland, of course, made great difficulty. And, the medical men, technicians, etd., who were concerned had to decide which drag was the most urgent to be introduced. But, there was another unfortunate factor which affected this question - that was the person of one of the speakers who was mentioned in all these meetings, that is Dr. Krueger. Here again I should like to state that Dr. Krueger had as little to do with the actual experiments as any other participant in the meetings, but at every meeting Dr. Krueger spoke of the best results and improvements of thirty to forty percent that were not achieved anywhere else. Unfortunately, Dr. Krueger in peace time was the advising surgeon, the consulting surgeon of the General-SS and Himmler knew him. He was, of course, not called in. We had no knowledge of these discussions but Grawitz quoted him as very important in contrast to my point of view. Then we had another unfortunate factor which made the situation more difficult, the possibility which Rostock had given of blowing sulfonamide into the wounds, which were to my knowledge constructed for the first time in the special apparatus by Surgeon Doctor Schmidt of the Waffen-SS who had served in Russia under Krueger. Grawitz in contrast to my original attitude could bring convincing evidence to Himmler that there was a possibility to use sulfonamide in a preventative way - to prevent infection in the wounds. That is the only question of transport of secondary mortality which was higher than mortality at the front - to solve all questions at one blow. Grawitz was an internist. He came directly from the front without any great evidence of what had been discussed at the meetings. I want to state expressly I do not know whether Grawitz was at the meeting or whether learned from another source. I can only say he know about the problem: that the question of sulfonamide was brought up by Nebe through foreign propaganda; that there was no doubt for Himmler that this was the patent medicine designed to bring him out of his difficulties and that he merely wanted expert opinion from me. The questions to me were very simple. First - am I in position to undertake the responsibility by saying it is senseless to take any great interest in sulfonamide in contrast to the opinion of other countries, the opinion of Grawitz - the Grawitz-Krueger group - because I know the question is settled or can quickly be decided by inquiry.