Only a few people fell ill from "A", and only a very small number died. Vaccine-B was considerably worse, and there were many illnesses and many died, and Vaccine-C was no good at all. People died like flies in that group. The whole thing has cost a few thousand lives. The man at the task can console himself if he had not vaccinated at all they would have died anyhow, but it is a higher power I have nothing to do with. I selected the various vaccines on the basis of laboratory results, that Vaccine-C which was so promising according to animal experiments would be a complete failure on human beings nobody could predict. I am not responsible for the deaths That is how the thing looks in theory, but how about practice? A theatre of war is not a laboratory where every guinea pig has his number. Fleeing masses of people rush back and forth. The statements which individuals make when they are accepted into hospitals are more than questionable. They don't have their shot record any more. You are forced to rely on oral information. We have experienced here that in the third month of the trial typhoid and typhus and the vaccines are confused, although it has been repeatedly pointed out and although the interpreters are no doubt above average in intelligence. One can imagine what happened, questioning patients about their vaccination, especially if they were asked what type of vaccines were used, whether lice or lung vaccine or egg vaccines. No doubt say in the Wehrmacht, the different vaccines are recorded on the paper of the soldier. One need only to issue an order that the nature of the vaccines be recorded correctly. Of course such an order is given, but how is it carried out? In a different section I looked at the record book of soldiers of the German Wehrmacht for record of vaccinations, and I looked at the papers of captured allied soldiers for vaccination entries, when I could get a hold of such papers.
I can only assure you if one wants to sot up medical statistics of such material, that is a hopeless task. The epidemiological evaluation is a useful procedure in times of peace with a more or loss resident population. Under war conditions, the comparative evaluation of various vaccines is practically impossible. If that were not so, then we would not have had the dispute lasting for decades among experts about typhus and cholera vaccines and that is quite an advantageous construction for this trial and is shown by tho following fact. The material of typhus vaccinations was considered by various experts in Germany; for tho Army by tho Institute at Kraeew and tho Luftwaffo also sent their material there and did not sot up its own institute, for the civilian population if Germany. Gildemoister collected this material for tho Robert Koch Institute; Otto in Frankfort collected this material. We have heard from-Mrugowsky that he collected such material for the Academy for tho General Government, and it was Budecke who collected this material at the Warsaw Institute. Up to 1945 not a single mo of these authorities was in any position to make even a preliminary report about the value of the various vaccines, net to mention making any publication. In all world literature, up to today, with tho exception of the work of Ding, I do not knew a single successful publication on this subject. It may of course be, since I have been in custody for two years, that something has been published in tho meantime.
These practical difficulties of epidemiological evaluation of vaccine procedures has boon long known. The German health leader, Conti, faced the decision of whether he was simply to take the part of his untested vaccines, produced in largo quantities and use them or whether ho wanted to ask tho Government for approval, in view of the groat urgency of tho problem, to obtain an answer through human experiments.
State Secretary Conti took this way. He decided that a number of people,determined by tho state, were to risk their lives and in part to sacrifice their lives in order to obtain this answer on which depended the lives of thousands of others. The state authorities at tho time took tho responsibility for this, as in all states it takes tho responsibility in war time for hundreds of thousands of human lives being sacrificed for much, less important aims. The results have justified intellectually Mr. Conti's decision.
Purely intellectually I said. The Duchenwald experiments had four main results. First of all they showed that belief in the protective effect of Weigl vaccine was a mistake, although this belief seemed to be based on long observation. Secondly, they showed that tho useful vaccines did not protect from infection out almost certainly from death, under tho conditions, of the Buchenwald experiments. Third, they showed that the objection of the biological experts of the egg yolk vaccines to the lice vaccines were unjustified, but egg yolk, rabbit lungs, and lice intestines wore of equal value. We learned this only through the Buchenwald experiments. This led the way open to mass production of typhus vaccines.
The Buchenwald experiments showed in time that several vaccines wore useless. First, the procedure according to Otto and Wehlrab, the procedure according to Pox, the procedure of Rickettsia prowazoki, and Rickettsia muring, that is vaccine from egg cultures.
Secondly tho vaccines of the Behring works which were produced according to Otto procedure, but with ether concentrations. finally the Ipson vaccine from mouse liver. The vaccine cf the Behring works were in actual use at that time in thousands of doses. They always represented a trend to health. Without those experiments the vaccine, which were recognized as useless, would have been produced in large quantities, because they all had one thing in common, that their technical production was much simpler and much cheaper that that of tho useful vaccines. In any case, one thing is certain, that tho victims of this typhus Buchewald test did not suffer in vain and did not die in vain. There was only one choico, bigger sacrifice of human lives of persons determined for that purpose or to let things run their course, to endanger the lives of innumerable human beings who would be selected not by tho Reich Criminal Police office but by blind fate.
How many people were sacrificed we can figure out today; how many people were saved by these experiments, we can of course not prove. The individual who owes his life to thoso experiments does not know it and he perhaps is one of tho accusers of the doctors, who assumed this difficult task.
Q. Witness Bernhard Schmidt on 19 February here stated that in his opinion human being experiments wore no good whatever in the investigation of typhus vaccines; what do you hold on this question?
A. Bernhardt Schmidt's testimony is clear proof to me what sort of nonsense a witness can say when he is under the pressure of four and if afraid he will express himself to publicity and to the public eye by his testimony.
I really don't think you have to be a specialist hygionist, but I think every layman will see immediately what an enormous advantage it would be if human being experiments were available for testing tho efficacy of vaccines, whether it be typhus vaccines or any other. And, then the numerous human being experiments would not have boon made, which were made throughout tho world, if they had been so nonsensical as Schmidt here stated. Effort would have been spared, many lives would have been saved, if it were not that the fundamental ethical principles stood in opposition to this and made them the exception rather than the rule. Schmidt's testimony was so senseless that I even detected tho prosecutor, Mr. McHaney, smiling.
Q. Can you give us numbers by which we can have some standard to which we can measure tho extent of typhus infection?
A. Of course, I do not have the Documents here that I would have if I had freedom. What I collected during the war was either taken into custody or burned. There is a number in Halder's diary for February, 1942 only for the Army; ten thousand cases of typhus and 1,300 fatalities, but that is just tho beginning of tho catastrophy. Then I remember another number the year of 1944, at that time I concluded a summary in order to justify tho extent of the need for DDT preparations. On the basis of the Documents that I had in 1944, I ascertain that there were 80,000 to 90,000 cases of typhus during that period, but I do not know for certain which circle of persons is concerned. German Wehrmacht was included in tho number; Prisoners of War were certainly not included, because the number of cases among them was always kept secret from me.
The terrible catastrophe in Russia among the Russian Prisoners of War in 1940 and 1941 in the winter was to a large extent a typhus catastrophe. In December of 1940, I was in a field hospital for typhus victims in the cast - a typhus hospital for Prisoners of War; in this one hospital, which take care of only a very limited area there were hundreds of Russians sick with typhus, just on this one visit. At another place I was told that even among the German guards, there wore 140 cases of typhus. That was just tho beginning, because I made this observation in December of 1941.
In the German home country, delousing measures in the o st provided some protection; however, by the end of tho war, as far as I know, there were 16,000 cases of typhus among tho civilian population, to whom it was the least dangerous of all. The really large numbers in concentration camps and in the camps of foreign workers and in the prisons. I never ascertained or never found cut, because those statistics were never published. Despite the protest of tho medical service they wore kept secret from us on orders cf the police. Tho so camps were really the main source of infection and most fatalities took place there. The witness from the camp at Natzwoiler assorted that in his camp alone there were more than a thousand cases. Tho 1944 epidemic in Belsen in 1945 was to a large extent a typhus catastrophy. That can clearly be seen from the Belsen trial.
In the summer of 1942 I spoke with the Director of the Health Service and the Governor General. There were known 150,00,0 cases of typhus, despite a very inadequate information service and the peak had not been reached by any means. Though I cannot give any precise figures I do know that the responsible officers were affected by the numbers. After the war of 1914-1918) and the lessons that had been taught us, we believed in Germany that we had no need to further fear typhus and we could effectively dispose of typhus by the methods which had been developed so far and we thought that the resettlement in the years 1939 and 1940 seemed to corroborate that view, at that time 500,000 persons were transferred from a typhus area, and we had only nine cases of typhus and no single death, then came entirely different conditions, winter warfare in Russia, and no one had counted on this catastrophic development which I have already described. I hoard often enough the desperate complaint on the part cf doctors in the East and that they did not have enough vaccine, and then there was the difficulty of delousing. In 1943 we were able to develop useful DDT preparations, which despite war conditions, we introduced. Then hardly ha.d we progressed so far but production difficulties arose, destruction of raw material and of manufacturing cantors by bombing attacks and the destruction of our transports on the way. No one can imagine today with what bitter disappointment this effort to combat epidemics was beset.
Q So far as your documentation is concerned, and with your experience during the first world war, how could this catastrophic development have been anticipated by any one working with this documentation and with this experience?
A The document statistics had made it possible to see as early as 1940-1941 that this development was going to take place here as follows: On the one hand there were the experiences in the Galician camps in Austria, the Galician evacuees, where in a few weeks thirty thousand people fell ill of typhus; and then there was the terrible typhus outbreak among the Serbian and Albanian refugees, where there were 210,000 fatalities.
Since these 210,000 fatalities are proved it must be that the number of actual cases was estimated much too low, because that would be a fatality of seventy per-cent and the fatality is never more than thirty. Since the year 1915 the number of people who fell sick of Typhus in Russia before the war amounted to 40,000 annually. This number rose during the winter of 1910-1919 to 1,700,000, In the year 1920 it rose to 3,000,000 and the Ukrainanians and Turkestans are not included in this number, nor the Siberians. In Russia in 1910-1920 it was 15 million, and Tarrasewitch, the Russian Hygienist, said it was 25 million. These numbers were known to every hygienist and can be found in any hygienic text book. It must be said in addition, that even under the most favorable conditions, the fatalities from typhus are at least five per-cent of those infected and under unfavorable circumstances thirty per-cent. Now, despite the improvement in the health service in Russia, after the Russian Revolution, nevertheless in 1936, 42,000 cases of typhus occurred. Those were the last official statistics that we received from Russia. Mrugowsky has already mentioned the fact that Napolean's catastrophe in 1812 was a typhus catastrophe, be in the Luftwaffe, as early as 1941, before the typhus catastrophe began, we saw the reports of the Gorman doctors on the typhus catastrophe in Napolean's campaign. This was passed from hand to hand and could not have been issued publicly because that would have been construed as defeatism.
Q And despite the fact that you know all of these things you protested at first to Gildemeister against these experiments, and then after you came back from Buchenwald and had a talk with Conti, you had another show down with Gildemeister. Then again despite the fact that you knew these facts and despite the knowledge of the importance of the results at Buchenwald you made a formal protest.
A The fact cannot be disputed, I put the ethical, consideration in the foreground in this whole matter, although I saw, of course, how strong the arguments were that the other persons had, namely those who actually did the experiments.
Q Now there are two entries in Ding's diary that seem to contradict your attitude at certain times, first of all the entry on page 38 of document book 12, that you received a Bucharest vaccine from Professor Ruge, which was made available by you. The Prosecutor commented on this on page 1180 of the German record. He said: "From this we can deduce that Professor Rose was impressed by what he saw on 17 March, and now by providing vaccines which were to be tested, he contributed to the criminal conspiracy."
AA large number of vaccines were sent to the medical inspectorate during the course of the war, including; typhus vaccines. They were sent in from doctors outside who wanted to bring our attention to something new. The inspectorate could do nothing with these vaccines either. They simply sent them on to me. After all of these years it is difficult to remember all of the details a.s to just what vaccines did reach my hands, because I couldn't do anything with these vaccines either. I simply had a desk at my disposal and no laboratory facilities. In my civilian laboratory no work on typhus was being done. If they were vaccines which were already known, I stated that the vaccines could be used without any misgiving's, and if they were new vaccines that I did not know about, then depending; on the size of the sample, I sent this sample on to one or several typhus research men and asked them to concern themselves with this problem and I concerned myself about the matter no further because I had done what was expected of me as the specialist. I can remember one specific shipment of Ruge from Bucharest. That was not a vaccine from the institute Contaguiesenn, as Ding stated in his diary, but that was a vaccine from the Frankfurt institute, which was sent to the inspectorate, because the reactions were too severe. Ruge even assorted that this vaccine contained live virus because the reaction to it was so severe.
It could be seen from the label that this was a Frankfurt vaccine which with many people had been vaccinated. In 1939 I gave myself three injections of this vaccine. That was a double dose and nothing Unusual happened so I sent it to Frankfurt and a perfectly normal report was sent back and then the vaccine was used. Whether over and above that Professor Ruge sent a second shipment to me or to the medical inspectorate which then Ruge sent to me, with the best will in the world, I can neither affirm nor deny today.
A. (continued) I can only say for certain one thing. I sent no such sample to Dr. Ding because I had no connections with Ding and I did not think of him as one of the research men to whom I sent such samples, nor did I issue any order that this Bucharest vaccine or any other vaccine should be tested on human beings. This diary entry strikes me as very peculiar. It is stated - 29-8-42 - now Ding twice reported on the testing of this vaccine, once at the Consulting Conference in 1943 and then in 1943 in the "Zeitschrift fuer Hygiene and Infektionskrankheiten" (Journal for Infectious Diseases and Hygiene). This is Mrugowsky Document No. 9, pages 81 to 85. Both times Ding had occasion to express his thanks for the support he had received. If he had carried out this testing on my suggestion, then he would have been obligated, according to scientific custom, to state that that was so. However, he did not do this in either case. His publication is available to the Tribunal. And, finally, it was at this sane conference at which he reported on this vaccine that we had our squabble and that would have been the greatest excuse he could have found to say, "I don't understand you, Dr. Rose. Send me vaccine to be tested and then all of a sudden you protest." He might have said that he didn't have presence of mind to do this. But, we heard from the witness Kogon that Ding concerned himself about this natter for days on end and dumb as he was, if he thought about it long enough, this argument would have occurred to him. I can only explain this entry by the fact he received the vaccine from a third source which knew simply it had gone through my hands. All this based on assumption that I really did have the vaccine in my possession which I really do not know. Or it could be that Ding found out with correspondence with Ruge that Ruge had sent me this Bucharest vaccine and also this is based on assumption. That he really did this I do not know. From the documents it can be seen that there was frequently correspondence between Ding and Ruge because both the witness Kogon mentioned Ruge as one of Ding's correspondents on page 1193 of the German record and in Document 484, which is Balachowsky's affidavit, on page 72 of the German Document Book.
Here the people are listed with whom Ding corresponded and Huge is mentioned among them. But neither Kogon nor Balachowsky's names are given among those who had contact or connections with Ding. At any rate I never transmitted mail between Ding and Ruge. That the two men had connections I did not know until the beginning of this trial.
Q. Well, according to Ding in the periodical for Hygiene Ding says in Mrugowsky Document No. 9, and from what he said at the consulting conference, this Bucharest vaccine turned out to be useful and was used by the German Luftwaffe.
A. I saw no report on the testing of this vaccine which I should have had to see if he had wanted it to be tested. According to Ding's diary the reports on the testing of this vaccine were sent on 20 November 1942 to Berlin and on page 39 of the German Document Book XII it says that on 18 February 1943 - in other words a Quarter of a year later - there was a directive on the part of the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe in which the typhus vaccines are listed which are permissible in the Luftwaffe.
Q. Mr. President, the directive that Dr. Rose just mentioned I have in Rose Document Book II. This is Rose Document No. 26 which I put in as Rose Exhibit No. 19. This is the instructions for troop doctors from the Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe and is on page 55 and 56 of Document Book Rose II, dated 18 February 1943. I have put in the original of this as evidence and inclosed in my document book a copy of it. Please continue, Professor.
A. In elucidation of this document let me draw your attention to the date - 16 February 1943 - page 55 of the document book. Under number 7 you find there the directive regarding typhus vaccines. From "a" to "j" ten different vaccines are listed, vaccines both from Germany and foreign institutes. The Bucharest vaccine is not among these ten. Had I known at that tine that this vaccine had been tested and proved valuable in Bucharest, then, of course, I should have recommended, its use just as I recommended the use of Pasteur vaccines from Paris and Tunis.
Moreover, this directive clearly shows that the Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe, who was advised by me, did not. allow itself to be motivated in his views by what had been used in Buchenwald. In this directive a number of vaccines are permitted which were not tested in Buchenwald at all; that is, if one can assume that Ding's diary is correct, which I do not know. Other vaccines which Ding, according to his diary, did test have here been permitted before Ding did test them. In the third group is the -Bucharest vaccine which Ding tested and found useful and it was not permitted for use in the Luftwaffe because the Luftwaffe didn't know the results of the testing.
Q. What other types of vaccines went through your hands during the war?
A. It is, of course, very difficult for me to recall all that went. First of all, vaccines from great institutes - OKH in Cracow, BehringWerke, Robert Koch Institute, Pasteur Institute in Tunis and Paris, and an Italian institute, Ipsen - Copenhagen Institute. Then I almost forgot the biggest thing that went through my hands during the war. That was the 5,000 doses from Weigl Institute at Lemburg at the time that this institute was still in Russian hands, in the Winter of 1939-1940. And particularly in the case of this vaccine I must be particularly happy that none had hit on the idea of testing it in Buchenwald because I turned this vaccine over to the Robert Koch Institute and it was carried on for a long time under my name because I had paid for it and it took a long while before the money was made available to repay me. Consequently this went under the name of Rose vaccine and if Ding had known about this then there would have been been vaccines mentioned in his diary and that would have been a little too many. God be praised nobody hit on that idea.
Q. When listing the vaccines that went through you hands during the war, you mentioned also the Copenhagen vaccine. Ding's Diary says about this vaccine, specifically on page 53 of Document Book 12, that it was tested on your incentive and the witness Kogon said the same thing on the basis of statements that he alleges Ding made to him. The prosecutor then construed this incentive on your part as a concrete proposal on your part which lead to the death of six persons. The remark of the prosecutor is on page 1330 and 1331 of the German record. Now, what did you have to do with this Copenhagen vaccine?
A. The situation, as I remember it, was as follows. Our needs for typhus vaccine could not be covered no matter what efforts wore made. Therefore, all sorts of offices were in search of new production methods. In this connection Professor Schreiber called my up about this one day -- I can't remember exactly when, but it was at a time when he was already the deputy for the combatting of epidemics and consequently concerned himself with such general questions as this. This was in September of 1943 as we have found out later. Schreiber said that of all the vaccine institutes that were under German influence by now the Copenhagen Institute had not participated at all in the production of vaccine so far, although it was one of the best institutes there were. He would like to have this Institute undertake the production of typhus vaccines. The political mood in Denmark, because of the behavior of the German Wehrmacht there, was most inauspicious. Consequently, there was no point in sending a German medical officer there. Therefore, Schreiber asked me whether I would not want to carry on these negotiations as Vice President of the Robert Koch Institute; the prospects would then be somewhat better. Moreover, he knew that I had previously worked in that Institute and knew the local setup, which was a great advantage in conducting such negotiations, I stated my willingness. I got leave from the Luftwaffe, asked for Gildemeister's permission to speak in the name of the Robert Koch Institute and then flew, via Luftansa, to Copenhagen. This, as we found out later, was on the 23rd of September 1943. Then I visited the director of the Institute, Dr. Oerskov whom I knew personally from before the War.
I asked him if he could and would produce typhus vaccine. Gerskov rejected this request because, as he said, it Was impossible to prevent peoples' falling ill from typhus if you undertook such production and such an occurrence would arouse had blood in Denmark, which Was completely free of typhus. Oerskov's misgivings were brought about because typhus was unknown in Denmark, and nationalistic elements would thus find out that the Institute was producing vaccine for the German government, because there was no need for typhus vaccine in Denmark, since there was no typhus in Denmark; and he was afraid of repercussions from such nationalistic elements; and he, as director of the Institute, had to think not only of the danger to typhus but of the tasks as a whole that the Institute had. I finally had to admit that this was so. Then I was shown Dr. Ipsen's department where he was producing a vaccine from murine virus, not from rickettsia prowazek, which is a lice virus. He explained to me the details of his technique but they are set forth in my report on this trip.
Q. Mr. President, regarding this Copenhagen trip of Dr. Rose I asked a few questions of the director of this Copenhagen Institute. The answers are Rose Document 46, a supplementary Rose document, which I believe the Tribunal has just received. This is Rose Exhibit #20. Regarding the external form of this document, Mr. President, I regret that it does not have the introductory formula requested by the Tribunal, but it has been certified and also certified by the american Embassy. I have also the original document here and it is also specifically stated here that Dr. Oerskov certifies the correctness of the copy. I believe, therefore, that there can be no question about accepting this document in evidence.
MR. HARDY: Your Honor, I haven't received a copy yet. I would like to see a copy of the English.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you exhibit a copy to counsel for the prosecution?
MR. HARDY: No objections, Your Honor.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, the interpreters have no copy either. Might I perhaps show the original to the interpreters for a moment?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now recess. You can have the document before the interpreters in the morning.
The Tribunal will now recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 22 April 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Karl Brandt, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 22 April 1947, 0930, Justice Beals presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal 1.
Military Tribunal 1 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you ascertain if the defendants are all present in court.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: The Secretary-General will note for the record the presence of all the defendants in court.
Counsel may proceed.
GERHARD ROSE - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) DR. FRITZ (Counsel for the Defendant Rose): Yesterday I discussed with the Defendant Rose his trip to Copenhagen and was about to put in Rose Document 46 among supplementary documents which will be Rose Exhibit No. 20. I quote:
"STATENS SERUMINSTITUT, Kobenhavn, S.
4 March 1947 "In answer to questions asked us about the visit of Professor Rose, I can say the following:
to l) Did Prof. Rose, when he visited the Institute at the end of September 1943, request that the Copenhagen Institute take up the production of the typhus vaccine from Rickettsia Prowazeki in order to help overcome the great shortage of typhus vaccine?
Yes.
to 2) Was this request refused by Director Oerskov for valid reasons?
Yes.
to 3) Was R. then taken visit Dr. Ipsen's section?
I do not remember this, but it is apparent from Dr. Ipsen's experiment records that Professor Rose actually was in Dr. Ipsen's laboratory on 24 September and probably discussed these problems with him. Unfortunately Dr. Ipsen is at present in America on a study trip and will not return before June or July. It is, however, apparent from our records that if Professor Rose ever received samples of our vaccine it could only have been a small quantity, and neither I nor Dr. Ipsen's colleagues have ever heard anything of the possible effects of cur vaccine.
Through the Danish Red Cross we sent our vaccine to Danish as well as Norwegian prisoner-of-war camps, but so that the vaccine was given only to Danish or Norwegian colleagues. We heard from Danish colleagues that the effect of these vaccinations was good.
I can add that I am grateful to Professor Rose, because he probably helped to prevent our Institute's being compelled to take over the production of typhus vaccine. It is entirely unpredictable what calamities might have arisen if we had been forced to take up the production of this vaccine.
signed J. Orskov Dr. med.
J. Orskov" That is certified by a notary public and the American Legation.
BY DR. FRITZ (Counsel for the Defendant Rose):
Q Professor, what did you do now after this failure when you returned to Berlin?
A I informed Professor Schreiber briefly by phone, and then sent him an extensive written report. This report was in two parts, the first part described the negotiations, the failure, and the reasons why the institute was not willing to undertake producing this vaccine, and my statement that I held these grounds to he substantial.
Then, the second part, which I had written separately as an annex, stated what I had heard from Dr. Ipson accidentally regarding his new murine vaccine. This annex I had typed in several copies and I sent it to the various typhus specialists whom I considered important in Germany in order to inform them also of what I had found cut in Copenhagen. A fragment of this report has been found and you can see in that what I proposed.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, we were able to find this report on Rose's official trip to Copenhagen, and I put it in as Rose Document 22, this is in Rose Document Dock No. 2, pages 15 to 19. This is Rose Exhibit 21 -- the Document number is 22, the Exhibit No. is 21. As the Defendant Rose has just described, he sent this report of the tour to about six different offices that were concerned with typhus in Germany, including the Behring berks in Marburg, and from them, I have received this communication of Rose which I should like to read.
DR. FRITZ:
"Oberstarzt Prof. Rose 29 September 1942 (place: unknown) "To: Behring - Works Marburg/Lahn "I take the liberty of sending herewith for your information a file memo regarding reports by Dr. Ipsen on his experience in the production of typhus vaccine.
"signed: Rose "Oberstarzt of the Reserve" It is certified by the Mayor of Marbach.
Then there is annexed to this letter the report of the trip and I should like you to explain briefly the contents of this report.
MR. HARDY: Your Honors, this document is certified to be a true copy by the Burgomeister. Might I inquire where the original document is located?
DR. FRITZ: The original is in the files of the Behring-Works. It could be obtained. It is certified by the Mayor of Marbach, near Marburg.
MR. HARDY: Inasmuch as the original or a photostatic copy thereof could be obtained, your Honors, I object to its introduction into evidence in this form.
THE PRESIDENT: On what grounds do you base your objection, counsel?
MR. HARDY: This is merely a copy which is herein certified and it is customary most original Germany documents introduced here in this trial have either certified photostatic copies or the original German document.
DR. FRITZ: If I recall correctly, Mr. President, the Tribunal rules that the certification should be made either by a German Notary Public or a Mayor and this document has been certified by a Mayor.
MR. HARDY: That applied, as I recall, only to affidavits wherein they were certifying the signature of affiants or taking oath of an affiant.