BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, this question has been discussed after all and you said that you had received information that this deportation of foreign workers would be admissible. Could you tell me now what you knew already before, prior to that moment concerning this question.
A. I know that after the first war, the question of deportation of Belgium workers had been examined by a committee of the German Reichstag. I know that this parliamentary committee examined personalities like Hindenburg, Ludendorff, I think Mackensen and others; and that many questions were discussed, including that of Belgian civilian workers. As far as I can recall, that committee was presided over by a man who had been given the Nobel prize, Professor schuecking; I think that was his name. However, I was very interested in it, in this, and closely followed it because Hindenburg whom I worshipped, was put before a court; and as far as I can recall, no sentence was passed upon that score, and nobody had been reproached that international law had been-violated, because the Hague Convention and. also the first Geneva Conference believed that -- I am not very well informed, but I think that was so.
Q. Witness, I now pass on to the 42nd meeting of the 23rd of June 1943; this is document book III-A; it is the fourth document. A discussion arose there concerning the fact that for the coal mining industry the output of Soviet Russian workers should be increased by a bonus system, and that meant one mark, perhaps, a person, and per day. What can you tell us about this question?
A. Similar bonus-systems existed for German workers. The value of the bonus was not financial; one mark was roughly the wages for one hour, but that mark was not given as a piece of money, out in a sort of ration card; that ration card might be good for say twenty cigarettes, or perhaps ten cigars or fifteen cigars, I don't know; or, perhaps a visit to the cinema; or, a certain quantity of food, etc.;
that is to say, the man concerned could obtain something which was given him additionally, and he couldn't have obtained the same things just with money, at least as far as food and luxury goods were concerned. That was quite an inducement for the workers, because even a man with one million marks in his pocket could not buy anything beyond what was prescribed in his ration card.
Q. Thank you. I now pass on to the 53rd meeting, the meeting of the 16th of February, 1944, and I want to speak of several points of that meeting. This is the next document after the document which we just referred to. Witness, in this conference you speak of the following: It is quite impossible to exploit each foreign worker, each foreigner completely, otherwise it would have to be by piece work, and it is impossible to do anything against foreigners who do not do their work, but if the trusty starts to tackle a prisoner of war and gives him a beating, then we get hell:
the man is thrown into the prison. Witness, how can you, how could you explain this passage, and did you issue any directives to treat foreigners in this manner?
A The last portion of the question I can answer with a definite no. I was a bit excited, particularly on that occasion, because a case of that sort had occurred; somebody had been beaten by somebody else; the man was sent to prison, but it had not been taken into consideration, I thought, that the man who hit had been strongly provoked. I know that there on that day I spoke particularly strongly, and all my remarks were of a fairly violent nature; I do not wish to make excuses for that today after so many years. When I read it now, when I read it just now, I, myself, could not understand how I could possibly have said these things, oven when I say that a few days before I had been bombed out, and that the night before that half of my parents had been wiped out by bombs, which I must say affected me. But 1 was much more indignant about the over-all situation in which we found ourselves; I could see the collection drastically in front of my eyes; I knew that one's work had lost all sense, but I could not say so or show it, and I had to walk into defeat with open eyes. Other things which might have affected me that day I no longer recall; certain days I was particularly excitable, and that might have been the climax of those days; that is how it looks to me now.
Q Witness.
A May I add that I can't recall a large number cf things I said there, and some of it came back to me later, I know in a small way, when I saw the evidence and what was told about various things.
Q Witness, you said you had not issued any directive to that effect, but in this document there are a few lines that say during an occurrence in which a Frenchman had told the trusty, the manager, and the manager that he would be the first to hang, that you said to your engineer, that if you don't smack the man like that, then I will punish you; I will protect you if you do a thing like that, but didn't you after all issue a certain sort of directive at that occasion?
AAs far as I can still recall the case of the Frenchman saying something, saying so, all I said in reply I would have given him hell if he told me so. How I could have said the other things I cannot recall now.
Q In the same connection you said then that you had ordered two Russian officers to be shot; did you ever issue such an order?
A No, never.
Q And how do you explain these minutes then?
A. Hero I am convinced that the records are wrong. First of all, the passage is hardly suitable in this context. Apart from that, I must have said something else, because if you read the next sentence you will see that. I can hardly at all recall it, and a few weeks ago I did not recall anything at all that somebody told me that Hitler once had had such a measure carried out, and perhaps somewhere else I described that case, but I cannot imagine that it would have happened in the Central Planning Board; it might have taken place within the framework of the GL perhaps.
Q. But how could you explain that they have been entered into the minutes of the Central Planning Board?
A. Perhaps there was a stenographer stuck in the office who took down the minutes of GL meeting as well as the Central Planning Board meeting. I, myself, thought it once because I remembered darkly and dimly that I told somebody, "Omit Hitler's name here completely"; that was somewhere, I know, but I could not swear to it now where and when it happened.
Q. On this occasion you said at the end, after you had reported this, you will certainly get the hell out, somebody who will interfere on the part, or for the benefit of prisoners of war.
A. Yes, that it seems to me is true; that the text must have been quite different.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Did I understand then that the witness says he did make this statement, but not at the Central Planning Board meeting; is that the result of the discussion?
Just that and no further.
DR. BERGOLD: No, that is not quite correct; the witness has as far as I understood him said he referred to that incident not in this form, in another form, nor did he refer to it at the General Planning Board, but in the GL meeting. He said the form cannot be correct. Witness, please correct me if I am wrong here.
A. No, that is quite correct; that is my assumption, which I have now reached when I saw the evidence; I know that on some occasion or another I said 1950A and I talked of Hitler, that Hitler had done this thing and that; I thereupon said, don't mention the name of Hitler here at all.
DR. BERGOLD: May I interrupt; that is not the point: your Honors wish to know what you testified to regarding the question whether you had spoken of the case at all and in what manner.
A. I said that my memory is very weak on the point, which is becoming a little clearer of late. I am still thinking of wether I didn't say all this in these GL meetings.
Q. In this form, or in another form?
A. No, no, in a different form, in the form that Hitler had ordered this or that, and that Hitler had these people shot and we were indignant, as they were prisoners of war. In that sense it is quite obvious that I said, "There will be trouble; somebody will look after this."
THE PRESIDENT: We will take a recess now.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Witness, you say, with reference to these Russians, that you do not remember their exact statement. However, you must know very clearly if you gave such an order or not, because the shooting of two prisoners is something that cannot be forgotten.
A That is quite correct. I certainly did not issue such an order. Neither did I have the right nor the possibility to give such an order. However, I never gave anybody the idea to do that. On the contrary, I know that I was very indignant about that, and I know exactly if I had done such a thing, then I would never have been able to forget it, because anyway that would have been the first murder I would have had on my conscience.
Q Witness, you know the case Sagan, don't you? What was your opinion about that case?
A We were not clearly informed about that. I only learned of the full truth when I was in British captivity. However, I know that at the time I was very indignant about that also. I was afraid that counter measures would be taken against it. In our eyes -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, we don't identify this incident. What is it you call it, "Sigon incident"?
DR. BERGOLD: Sagan. Sagan is that famous case which played a certain part before the International Military Tribunal where British Air Corps officers escaped from a camp and then upon Hitler's order, for the larger part, were shot. Mr. Denney shortly asked the witness Foerster about it, not so long ago.
THE PRESIDENT: We didn't identify it by that name. We understand now. Go ahead, witness.
A (Cont'd.) I wanted to add to this that we all were very indignant about that case and that, for quite a few of us and even for myself, cut the last bonds between me and those who had given such orders.
Q Witness, were you indignant about this order for personal reasons also?
A Yes. My heir was in British captivity in Canada. He was also shot down as a pilot. I thought it over, what I would say, if the other party had committed such a crime. I know also that one of our young people whom we had there whom I liked very much, a certain Oberleutnant V. Werra, tried several times to escape and he actually succeeded in escaping from Canadian captivity and to reach Germany. I might add that we old airmen from the last war were very pleased about that as he was a young man who succeeded in doing so, because I believe for every prisoner of war, it is a flash of light in the sky to be able to escape, and if a young man is able to do so, then he does so for his fatherland, and he shows that he is a "tough guy". I think one can appreciate that in other nations just as well even if they are fighting against somebody. I know from the World War I, when I had my own fighter group, that very often we invited shotdown British airmen. We did not keep them prisoners, however, as long as they were with us, they could move around freely and we got on together. I even permitted one of these young people to fly one of our planes because he was very interested in the technical aspects of it, and he gave us his word of honor that he would not escape and he actually kept his word of honor. That is hour we airmen used to treat the prisoners of war. I may add that the other party did the same.
Q Thank you. Witness, I shall now come back to two points of tho 54th meeting. This is the first document in Document Book No. 3-A. Witness, during that meeting Sauckel mentioned that only a very small percentage of those sent to Germany came on a voluntary basis. The statements have been mentioned repeatedly in this trial and may I ask you to state your opinion on that?
A I might say that I do not remember having ever heard these words from Sauckel.
It is possible that I was not there at the moment when he said that. However, it is possible that I overheard that remark, because during those 1954-A long meetings, we had discussions amongst each other.
We were also interested in ether questions and one did not pay any attention then. During these long meetings there was at least one meeting or two, when our concentration was not quite what it should have been. Had I heard it, I would have believed Sauckel just as little as I believed in all the acrobatic figures ho gave us, because Sauckel had stated the contrary previously. I know exactly it was not so long ago, namely that he declared in a meeting how well his system functioned and how he brought all these laborers on a voluntary basis.
Q Witness, in this meeting you also discussed or spoke of what should happen if, in Franco, the invasion of the allied forces would take place. You proposed that, in order to prevent the revolution of the partisans, these people should be sent to Germany. Won't you make a statement as to that?
A We spoke of those age groups of prisoners of war who were free, but particularly the young ago groups, which, on the basis of an agreement between the two governments, namely, Germany and Vichy, had been agreed upon by France for Germany. I realized that this is a historical fact from many wars that the French youth is nationally inflamed, and, at that moment, when an allied army would be on French soil again, it would start the fight against tho invader as partisans.
We were very well informed about the weapons that were dropped every night. We knew the approximate figure of those things that had been sent over because, among these people who had been sent over there were also agents, German agents, so that all those light arms which they sent over would have been sufficient for a whole army in French territory. It would have been the duty of the German occupational forces to be able to seize these weapons in time. Possession of weapons was under penalty of death, exactly as it applies to the Germans here in Germany. This is the normal procedure for an occupational force for zone security. However, the treatment of the French on one hand was too mild, too soft; on tho other hand, however, too hard. So that the Frenchmen did not know what the German wanted to do and I always followed measures which were dictated by my conscience. Such a procedure had to be right between hard and soft. If that would have been tho case, I'm sure that a partisan army would not have been able to resist in France, and I thought that our military officers were blind that they could see all that. However, later on, or a few months later, experience proved that such a partisan army existed, and that these partisan armies committed so many cruelties and inhumane crimes that I am sure that they contributed to the victory of the allies by doing so. At least, seen from our part, namely that they contributed to Germany's defeat.
Q Witness, I shall now leave the meetings of the Central Planning Board and come to single questions in that connection. What do you know about the use of British and American prisoners of war?
A. According to my knowledge, they went into the respective camps and they were not being used for labor. I never saw such a prisoner of war any place.
Q. Witness, did you ever know the Fuehrer records of Speer? Were they ever shown to you?
A. Only certain excerpts of them, if they ever were connected with the air armaments, but that was very seldom and I did not know them in their bulk.
Q. Do you know the Fuehrer record of the 29th of September 1942, in which Speer laid down that the Fuehrer's attention was drawn by him to the fact that armament production is not possible in the concentration camps?
A. No, I did not know that.
Q. Within the frame of the Central Planning Board you also spoke of the fact that the parcel post traffic in France should be confiscated in order to induce the French to go to work. What did you mean by that?
A. I mean under control. It was said that the whole black market went through these parcel pests. That black market was already at the time forbidden by us and I proposed that this parcel post traffic be controlled, and if there should be any black market goods, they should be confiscated. I don't think the record of what I said is accurate because in that parcel post traffic there were many goods for Germany, the date of arrival for which was important for the armament. At that time we asked for many spare parts fer the industry, or for the armament, and we carried that out through parcel post mail.
Q Witness, suddenly you're speaking here of the fact that in special manufacturers or in one special factory, eighty per cent of foreign laborers were employed. What was that all about?
A For the time being I can't answer that. I think that is a parts manufacturer.
Q You spoke about transportation machines?
A Yes. There were transportation machines, namely, Junkers 52. That was the Junkers factory.
Q Why was there such a high percentage of foreign laborers there?
A That was not a war machine. In other words, it was not a weapon; and as far as we could, we told our industry that these foreign laborers be used for the manufacture of such equipment, if that should be possible.
Q Within the framework of the Central Planning Board, did you succeed in increasing the Luftwaffe production, the air production?
A Excuse me. Do you mean within the framework of the Central Planning Board?
Q Yes.
A You mean that I got more material? Yes, to a certain extent. If it bad gone according to the Fuehrer's orders concerning priority and urgency then the Luftwaffe would have been on position number 7, seventh on the list. However, due to the fact that I was on an equivalent basis with Speer and I worked on the same basis with him, Speer being clever enough to realize the necessity of air armament. I always received more material than I would have been allowed to have according to the Fuehrer's orders.
I always received more material than I would have been allowed to have according to the Fuehrer's orders. However, I did not mention all that during these sessions and meetings. Later on, however, I briefed my chief as to how to appear. Speer then later on considered the necessity of the whole matter and agreed with me and insisted that we got more.
Q Did you within the framework of the Luftwaffe have to look after your satellites as well and provide them with air equipment?
A Well, our satellites were not exactly strong; and the famous Italian industry could not even produce two hundred planes a month, including transport and similar planes. Rumania had hardly any production; Bulgaria none at all. We had to help them. In Hungary a new industry was being developed which had been strongly supported by us. However, unfortunately the ambition of those small countries was that they wanted to build all types themselves.
Q That is enough, Witness, in the framework of your collaboration with your allies, did you influence the labor question there?
A No.
Q Before I turn over to the Jaegerstab, I should like to discuss a special case here. What orders did you have toward the middle of January 1943? What orders did you receive from Hitler?
A On the 15th January 1943, in the evening I was called up by the Fuehrer, saying that I should go to see. Hitler the next day for a special mission. As far as I ***** I believe that the General Bodenschatz called me up from the Fuehrer's headquarters. The following morning I reported to Goering, who happened to be in Berlin at that time. Goering knew that the question of food for Stalingrad was involved. Stalingrad had been encircled for months, and the whole Sixth German Army was in it. On the 16th, in the morning, I flew to Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia; and then Hitler either in the afternoon or in the evening gave me the order that I should proceed to Saratow immediately by air in order to supervise Stalingrad's food supplies from there.
Q Witness, make it a little more short, please.
A.Yes. Later on I tried to carry out this mission. When I received the mission, the last airfield had been lost through the Russian attack. We looked for certain places which were rather difficult to find there in those mountainous areas; and within the next few days we succeeded in carrying our plans out and sending a certain amount of food. However, it was too late. The resisting force of the party had broken down; the people were starving; they had no more vehicles or horses at all. They could not get the food from the landing places for the planes because they were too weak to do so. They could not carry the containers so that the increase of supply for Stalingrad ended before it even started. What there was near the end of the month in February could not be kept up.
Q Did you have a serious accident then?
A Yes. At that moment when I wanted to fly in to Stalingrad, before I hit the airfield, I was hit by a railroad engine; and I was seriously injured.
Q Then you went back to Hitler?
A Yes, I carried out the mission first. Then when Stalingrad had fallen, I flew back, reported to Hitler that I could not complete my mission. He told me, however, that it was not I who had not carried out the mission but that it was his fault. He said he gave me the orders too late; he wanted to give the orders to me much earlier; but they had, however, talked him out of it.
Q Witness, during that occasion, did you tell Hitler your opinion about the war and the general situation of the war?
A That was on the 4th of February when I reported back to Hitler. Hitler on that particular day was very crushed due to the loss of Stalingrad. It was not possible to have a quiet talk with him. He did not receive me at first with my chief of staff, namely, General of the Tank Corps Modell, who had a corps within that fortress. We both were under the impression that day that we would not be able to speak to him.
However, he told me in a few words, "Now, go right ahead to your GL task, manufacturing and the first line. Now we will have transport planes, transport planes, and more transport planes." He was talking about Stalingrad. He thought that had he had more transport planes he would have been able to keep Stalingrad.
1960-A With respect to Stalingrad I had a long discussion with him on the 5th of March.