In the meantime, through this inspection at Rechlin, I had aroused Goering's interest, and he too was now trying to act in favor of this program, but Hitler turned it down. The following day I visited Goering in order to revive his interest, which had been broken, and his resistance.
In August we once again discussed the matter together with Gallant, and we arranged that we would act on our own initiative independently as far as we could and against orders which had been given. A few days afterwards I gave the order to the Training Section, which was under my jurisdiction, the order once again to give priority to fighter pilot training. I ought to mention in this connection that in the beginning of the war the air force had only two training **** stations for fighter pilots, and one of those was dissolved after the beginning of the war.
In September I went back to Hitler on the same subject. Between the 11th and the 14th of October -- that is to say, during four days -I was together with Goering every day with regard to this fighter problem.
On 7 November Goering sent me the general commanding the bombers, who was making the request that all new fighter planes should be employed in the first place as fighter-bombers. That is to say, not for defense purposes, but for attack. This goes on through 1943, and I do not want to go into detail.
On 4 February Hitler is making the demand to me that transport planes should have priority and not fighters. This was just after Stalingrad, when the lack of transport aircraft was becoming apparent. A few days later, during February, Hitler is calling me on the telephone personally and now demands amphibious transport planes, since the evacuation of the Caucasus in the direction of the Krim would now have priority through using the sea route.
On 5 March -- that is just a few days afterwards - in a visit to Hitler, the order was given to the effect that high altitude bombers would now have priority; that is, no longer bombers, but most certainly not fighter planes. On 13 March Hitler is giving the order that the bombing war against Britain should now once again be accelerated and intensified. Two days later I pay another visit to Goering and report to him that this order can not be carried out, and this continues back and forth with regard to that program which was an impossibility and that the situation, more than before, made defense essential. This goes on through April.
There is another visit to Goering, and on 8 May Hitler sent for me and demanded new types of bombs. Subsequently, on 25 May, I made another attack on Goering, demanding that from now on new fighters, which had passed the initial tests excellently, should now have a priority on the program in a big way.
Toward the end of June 1943 I talked to Hitler's air adjutant, Colonel von Below, whom I called before me together with a number of well-known pilots, and I convinced him of the necessity of a defense in the air. This occurred several times afterwards, and Below supported me well, but he, too, was just as unsuccessful as I had been.
On 3 July 1943, the main subject during a conference Goering had with the chiefs of the air fleets was defense. Gradually my continuous reminders became too much for Goering. Particularly he did not like the fact that in front of all the others I would press matters like that, and there was a very serious argument between him and me, during which he said to me that my repeated written reports regarding defense, which I had made in my capacity as Inspector General, had not been in read by him at all.
He said, verbatim, "Don't you kid yourself that I am reading the nonsense you are putting down on paper for me," whereupon I stated that in that case it was quite useless for me to carry out tours of inspection as Inspector General, and he thought, as far as he was concerned, it was useless.
This goes on throughout July. I no longer have any hope that Goering will help, no more than I have hope that the General Staff will help me, or the Chief of Staff will help me, and on 15 July I informed Minister Goebbels, who was playing a very important part with Hitler at that time, calling him to Rechlin and showing him our experiments. He promised that he would support me with Hitler, but that had no success either.
On 20 July 1943 I call all Ministers and State Secretaries of the German Reich and all Gauleiters to Rechlin to show them the means air defense had at its disposal. These people, of course, were particularly interested, especially the Gauleiters, in the defense of their home country, and I made a very frank speech before them, told them about our efforts of the past, and asked them to press Hitler at every opportunity.
On 23 July I went first to Goering and then with him to Hitler in order to make another attempt. Hitler would not listen to a thing. The following day, in order to obscure the impression he had from this conference with Hitler, I succeeded in getting Goering to come to Rechlin, and once, to discuss everything with him in practice.
Now, on 28 July, at last, an order arrived to the effect that now air defense would have priority. How I thought at last my efforts had been crowned with success, but as early as a week later the air armament program once again occupied seventh place, since in the meantime some sort of serious events had occurred at the fronts, end one day after air defense had priority, I was ordered to appear before Hitler in regard to some other problem.
For the first time he was extremely unpleasant to me. He had never treated me badly before. This was the first time.
Now, in spite of this, and two days after the priority order had arrived, I had a previously prepared program for the conversion to fighters, which I had started, and night fighters had been included on that occasion. About that time the monthly output of fighters had risen above 1,000. I could see that there were certain technical difficulties regarding materials, pre-fabricated materials, for instance, and I arranged with Speer that we should meet our department heads once a week in order to step up production of fighters. Those regular weekly meetings commenced on 3 August.
After Jeschoneck's death I immediately talked to the new chief of the staff, Korten, and informed him. He concurred in my views. He had a very excellent relationship with Hitler, but in spite of that not even he succeeded in bringing about any changes.
Now, this goes on currently, and in October, 1943, Goering once again was prepared to do everything for fighters, but he could no longer score successes with Hitler. I, once again, tried in November to get Himmler interested, whom I met by accident when Hitler was making a speech to junior officers, which we had always been ordered to attend, and Himmler promised to support me. He had a good position and great influence with Hitler, but I didn't notice any success on his part.
At the end of November, we displayed new fighter types to Hitler at Insterburg, these jot planes, and Hitler was very much impressed but stated that bombers and transport planes had priority. In 1944 too this goes on without any changes occurring.
How, I could see that according to the time and the situation of this war great efforts on everyone's part in favor of defense would have been too late, and I come to the decision that now I would out my ties, I would cut loose, and this decision was arrived at by me at the end of January. I talked about this with my immediate collaborators, to whom I talked about it at various times.
Q. Witness, just one question, I would like to interrupt and ask, can you clear up for us the question why Goering, who, after all was an expert, did not agree to your proposals and why he did not succeed in convincing Hitler?
A. Goering knew Hitler's opinions accurately, I would say, attack, not defense. Suggestions which he made cautiously regarding defense had been turned down by Hitler. Goering was always under the impression that Hitler's ideas came from God, and that he couldn't make mistakes so that would be the right road. In 1941 and '42 no larger air destruction had happened in Germany, and he must have closed his eyes to possible future developments. When towards the end of 1943 he was really convinced that air defense ought to be pushed into the foreground by him too, he had lost his influence on Hitler.
The Stalingrad affair was the changing point for Goering too. At that time he had favored supplies being flown in by air, and Hitler was taking umbrage over this, and after that period he was excluding him more and more and treating him worse. On one occasion Goering was becoming rather energetic before Hitler with regard to this defense question in my presence, but Hitler yelled at him in an almost indescribable fashion so Goering shut up. He thought that it was his duty, his duty and his faith that he should remain silent before Hitler.
If I may carry on at this point, I would say that in order to carry out my decision to bail out, I came to an agreement with Speer to the effect that air armament with its small factories would now be transferred to his ministry too. Since Goering would not have agreed to this at all, we wanted to found a fighter staff, a Jaegerstab, which was to take over the production now and which would facilitate this transfer to Speer. On the 23rd of February the idea was born to form a fighter staff, and during the subsequent days I talked it over with Speer, who was sick at the time, and on the 2nd of March, 1944, the first meeting of the Jaegers tab took place.
May I add that this was not an independent authority and that consequently this staff did not have any executive powers or any powers to give orders. It was composed of people from the various ministries, the bulk of which came from the Armament Ministry. We, the G. L. supplied the second biggest portion, and then there were representatives from the Railway Ministry, Post Ministry, and various others, who joined. Only considerations were taking place in this staff. Recommendations were made. The actual execution as far as ** every department was concerned was a matter for its own ministry, and, of course, independent members of the fighter staff, therefore, once they had returned to their ministry would there have to draft corresponding orders or obtain such orders from the higher sources, from the higher people concerned.
In other words, the Armament Ministry could accept or turn down these proposals, just as could all other ministries, and carry them out or refrain from carrying them out. As far as the Air Ministry was concerned, I was the responsible person.
On the 4th of March we obtained Goering's agreement and on the 5th Hitler's agreement. Apart from these meetings of the fighter staff my own conferences in my offices continued with my technical departments.
I can add very briefly what my other efforts regarding defense were when this transfer was taking place. On one occasion on the 19th of April I went to see Goering and on the 23rd of May I went to see Hitler, but Hitler merely gave the order on that day that this new jet fighter, which was the only one which had prospects for effect at that time, was not to be employed as a fighter, but only as a blitz bomber. This aircraft hadn't at all been designed for such a purpose. Conversion became necessary which, as far as the use of that aircraft was concerned at that limit of the war, out us back six months.
At that point I became abundantly aware of the fact that no defense of Germany would materialize. Subsequently I retired on the 20th of June. Perhaps I should go into this in detail, but there is one more thing I can say, that at my retirement Hitler demanded from Speer that the four engine bomber made by Heinkel would have first priority of air arr.ar.ient. Here again there was only the idea, nothing but the idea of attack, not defense.
If I can summarize it very briefly then there were fifty-four visits of mine to Goering during those years of dealing with defense. I went to see Hitler sixteen times. Fifteen men from the air force not belonging to my department, aside from the conference which I had with Goering, were consulted by me during conferences and inspections lasting for days when I tried to convince them, and likewise apart from that large figure which I previously mentioned of ministers, gauleiters, state secretaries, there were thriteen individual actions on my part in connection with important people in order to convince them of the necessity of defense so that they too would represent my view before Hitler.
Altogether this amounted to exactly ninety-nine acts according to my notes.
Q. Witness, you have just testified that you had founded the Jaegerstab in order to gradually leave your post. Did that further have any other purpose, for instance, the removal of existing difficulties outside of your own department?
A. Yes. Air armament was part of the entire armament program. Of course, it had very small, very negligible powers. Hitler was favoring army and naval rearmament very strongly and demanding those. Speer's ministry for years had had to carry out far-reaching interference and intervention into all problems which were important for my industry. As a result experts and other workers had been taken away from us quite simply everywhere. The armament inspectors and defense construction commanders, both of whom were under Speer, of course, succeeded in carrying this through. It was merely by accident that I learned of this in individual cases. For instance, quite accidentally one of the industrialists came to see me. We raised objections but we could not alter the situation, something which I touched upon the other day in here. Now I was wanting to use the Jaegerstab in order to transfer part of this responsibility for air armament to Speer and his ministry so that such intervention, which was particularly noticeable in the material sector, could no longer be carried out.
The man who had a task approximately like my own in Speer's ministry was Mr. Sauer. Sauer was a very clever man, very able, very energetic, and since he was always sent for reports to Hitler personally, he knew Hitler and his intentions intimately, and he knew therefore that Hitler wasn't so keen on air armament, and from that he drew the conclusion which led to these interventions in our sphere. I was very anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would assume his part of the responsibility.
There was a struggle about this after with Speer until it finally came about that Sauer joined the Jaegerstab.
I was very anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would assume his part of the responsibility. There was a struggle about this, even with Speer, and it was finally achieved that Saur joined the Fighter Staff, but I wasn't going to found the Jaegerstab at all without him. And it turned out, eventually, that, very energetically, Saur now tackled this new task and he did in fact succeed to some extent, in bringing Hitler at least to a standstill. But Hitler's views and Hitler's orders, he could not change either. Apart from that, of course, it was necessary, if I were to transfer armament work to Speer, the final armament, this would have to reach Saur's hands eventually, so that it was equally essential that Saur should be included right from the start.
Q Did you give him the smaller or larger responsibility within the Jaegerstab?
A Let me answer it like this: I gave him as much freedom of action as possible, since he was going to take it over later, and it was his nature, that, if he touched something, he would look after it very energetically, and I was happy to see that ho was going ahead so emphatically.
Q Witness, you have made notes about everything you did during the war. Can you tell this High Tribunal how or whether, in the Jaegerstab too, you were gradually getting out? Can you tell us how many meetings during individual months you participated in?
A In March, I participated in 15 meetings. Of course they were taking place daily, and I joined two trips. In April, I participated only in eight meetings, and one journey. In May, I attended five meetings and two journeys. In June, I joined two meetings only, and again, two journeys. And, in July, I didn't attend any meeting at all, neither a meeting nor a journey. I took more active interest in the journeys, totalling seven, in order to go out into the provinces and show that the handing over of my task to Saur was taking place with my agreement. There are figures, March 15, then eight, then two.
Q You mean the meetings?
A Yes; that applies to meetings. In other words, I participated in a total of 30 conferences.
Q But there was one more on the 1st of August 1944, wasn't there?
A That was after my retirement. It was a meeting when Speer was in the chair in which the Fighter Staff was now finally discontinuing. its work since the tasks of fighter staffs were now being transferred to the spheres of ordinary armament, under Speer, which organization it was joined with. It was a purely formal meeting of handing over, and I deliberately took part, so as not to create the impression that I was leaving reluctantly or that I was being angry about anything, since, of course, the exact opposite was the case.
Q Witness, the prosecution submitted a document, NOKW-359, Exhibit No. 75, notes, or rather, shorthand notes made of a Jaegerstab meeting, 27 June 1944. Did you attend this meeting on the 27th of June 1944, witness? I should like to ask the Secretary General to obtain photostat copy of this document, NOKW-359, and have it brought to the courtroom.
A I was not present on the 27th of June.
THE PRESIDENT: That's Exhibit 75?
DR. BERGOLD: 75. It's in Document Book 4, page 161 of the English copy.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q So that, witness, according to your notes, you were (imprisoned)?
A No; I wasn't. I took very accurate notes about that.
Q All right, I shall come to this in detail when we get to the point. But, in the meantime, will you answer the question please, what did the Jaegerstab have to do with the construction work of the air armament?
A The Jaegerstab merely had to lay down the part of the country where this construction was to take place, and what sizes of manufac ture were demanded, because that depended upon the article which was to be manufactured.
If I was making wings for aircraft, then these wings had certain sizes, and certain sizes also applicable to the moving belt. Consequently it was up to 1986-A the Jaegerstab to lay down the measures of these factories' halls.
Otherwise, the Jaegerstab had nothing to do with such building work.
Q But, there is frequent mention of building work in Jaegerstab meetings, subterranean building work and work on the ground. What is this due to?
A. We had to know whether building was going on at all and we had to know the dates when we could move into these buildings with our armament work, and, apart from that, there were clear cut orders to the effect from Goering, regarding those caves, tunnels, and such-like, and also from Hitler, regarding surface concrete construction work.
Q Witness, there have been statements contained in affidavits to the effect that such building work was being carried out and that these orders had been given by Hitler and Goering because the Jaegerstab had demanded them.
A May I give you the following explanation? The requests originated from the end of 1943. I had discussed the possibilities of such building work in great detail with Speer, since Speer was a building minister at the same time, and he had an excellent picture of these problems. He convinced me very rapidly that this building work couldn't be carried out during war tire at all, since there was a shortage of materials and of labor. And, likewise, there wasn't time enough to carry out such building work. We were -- both of us -- aware of the fact that it would be better to use building workers and cement for the protection of the civilian population, whose martyrdom had in the meantime reached the stage of the insufferable. Consequently, in the most severe manner possible, I opposed such building, because I considered them a useless effort, which wouldn't get us anywhere. Consequently I was never in the least interested in such building work during that period, and particularly because of that question I had clashed with Goering and Hitler at that time.
Q That was something I was just going to ask you. What did you do in order to put your deviating opinion on record, and to stop orders which you considered nonsensical?
A I said the same things which I've just said here, namely -but at that time, they didn't get anywhere.
Q Witness, I shall come back to this meeting of the 24th of June, once again. The 24th -- oh, no! I mean the 27th of June, 1944, and I shall put to you the point that on page 26 of this document which I have read, your name appears on one occasion, and it states: "Milch: would you describe the whole situation briefly to the General Staff." You're saying that to a certain Mr. Krause. "--so that you are actually listed in the record?"
A That is most certainly an error. During that stage I wasn't there at all. I wasn't in the place where the Jaegerstab met.
Q Can you describe where you were in those days?
A Yes; in the morning I was in my ministry, the Jaegerstab was having its meetings at Tempelhof. There I was carrying out the handing over of a completely different part of my work, and at midday I left to some place outside Berlin.
DR. BERGOLD: I should like to put this part of the minutes before this High Tribunal, and with reference to this passage where Milch is speaking, I should like to draw your attention to it.
Q. Witness, was it your habit that when you were present during such meetings, you would only speak once? Were you otherwise sitting there silently?
A. I am awfully sorry but I did not do that. Otherwise I would not be sitting in this place now. Might I add also with reference to this subject, that seven days previous I completely disappeared from the whole matter. This conference before Hitler with Goering on the 20th of June resulted in the order that I would leave my post as a practical matter on the 20th of June, both as State Secretary as well as GL. After that moment I did not practical work at all and a transition stage for the Jaegerstab was not essential since for some time the business there had been handled by Saur. After this date I only had a conference, a GL conference, with my own people when I said goodbye to them. That was just after the 20th. I have got it here. It was on the 30th of June. And of course Verwald, who ought to have represented me but was not there because he was sick, and his deputy, had the work handed over to them by me insofar as this work was a question for the GL, and I had completed that on June 30. On that day I merely made a short farewell speech in order to take leave of my old collaborators.
Q. Witness, I want to ask you once again with solemn reference to your oath, can you say with the greatest possible certainty that on that 27th of June 1944 you were not present?
A. That I can say with absolute certainty because I know exactly what I was doing during that morning when I was in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: In the English document book this appears on page 161 of Document Bock 4, and the passage that you are referring to - the quotation from Milch - does not appear. Why do you bring it up? It isn't in the English document book at all.
DR. BERGOLD: Your Honors, that is something I was just coming to because through this I was going to show how unreliable these records - these minutes - of those meetings are. If a man is described es present and sneaking during a meeting by the stenographer - the court re porter - although he isn't present, then it shows how little documentary value can be attached to such document.
THE WITNESS: I might add something to this. There have been frequent complaints from individual gentlemen to the effect that they were being quoted as speakers present.
Q. (By Dr. Bergold) Would you repeat that, witness?
A. There have been frequent complaints from gentlemen that they had been listed as present and speakers in the records but that they had not spoken at all, or that they had not been there at all, and also gentlemen had been present who had spoken who were equally complaining that their words had been attributed to someone else. That happened quite often. There used to be only one stenographer taking notes.
DR. BERGOLD: Your Honors, the reason why I am referring to the German minutes of this affair is because that is the decisive one. The English translation, of course, is not authentic. The German record is authentic.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are merely attacking the veracity, the credibility, of the whole system of taking the minutes.
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, quite, the entire system.
Q. (By Dr. Bergold) Witness, let us return to this building work. Is it not correct to say that now after this Hitler and Goering order had not been abolished in spite of your attempts, that the Jaegerstab was now responsible for supervision over such buildings or the supervision of the carrying out of such orders respectively?
A. No, no, that was not the job of the Jaegerstab. For that Hitler had appointed the OT, contrary to the previous procedure, according to which OT was the only building outside Germany - OT being Organization Todt - and Speer's refusal with reference to this building work had linked to it that Hitler had by-passed Speer and had taken over the carrying-out of such building through OT himself. Speer too had been comparatively removed from such building work. There was considerable anger between Speer and Hitler due to this question at the time.
Q Witness, did the Jaegerstab have anything to do with workers?
A If you mean building workers, no.
Q I mean generally speaking, for the moment.
A I see. Well, you have to draw a clear dividing line. Those were completely different conceptions for us, armament workers and building workers. Armament workers came precisely through existing channels; in other words, requests made to Sauckel by the industries and fulfillment of such requests or non-fulfillment of such requests by Sauckel. News about this first of all went to Speer's ministry through the armament inspectorates, and secondly, there were statistics and reports monthly from industry to air force. Building workers, on the other hand, did not concern any one of us at all, not even statistically speaking; that is, insofar as the CL was concerned, and his representatives on the Jaegerstab. This was entirely a problem for Todt's organization. We knew absolutely nothing about this problem as far as we were concerned.
Q Witness, did the Jaegerstab include a member of the CBA, the Plenipotentiary for Labor, Sauckel, on its board?
A I cannot at this moment recollect that accurately, but I believe not. As far as I know, these questions were only being dealt with in the sphere of speer's ministry. That was Mr. Schmelter, who has been a witness in this trial, and who on his part used to hear our requests and used to take our requests to his ministry to help them as far as he could.
Q In order to help in labor problems did Schmelter have to go to Sauckel on his part?
A Yes, quite decidely. He, on his own initiative, could not distribute workers because he did not have any workers reserves of any kind.
Q I shall now put before you the plan of the Jaegerstab which has been submitted as Exhibit 70, NOKW 261, which is contained in Document Book IV, on page 1 of the document book of the prosecution - Exhibit 70, NOKW 261, Document Book 4, page 1.
Witness, is this an absolutely accurate plan and are the names listed on the right-hand side all leading and permanent members of the Jaegerstab?
A. With reference to this let me say that only the right-hand column belongs under Jaegerstab. Where it says afterwards, responsible department groups and leading departments, we are concerned with the very sources in the other ministries which on their own part were dealing with recommendations by the Jaegerstab to carry them out or not, as the case might have been, and then further to the left we have the higher bureaucratic sources in these departments which have the work to do, but outside the sphere of the Jaegerstab.
Heads of the Jaegerstab, Speer and Milch, that is correct. That is correct, and as long as Speer was sick, Saur, of course, was his deputy, since I myself could not represent him as I did not give orders to Speer's ministry. I could only give orders to the organization of the GL. Pauli, Supplies - Pauli, that is correct.
Q. Was he a permanent member?
A. I would assume so. I did not call these men in. Everybody sent his own men from his own ministry so that personally I only appointed members from the air force side, whereas Saur and Speer had to appoint their own people, and this man, Pauli, came from Speer's ministry, of course.
Construction, Schlem; he too came from Spear's ministry. Road and Transport, Nagel; also Speer's ministry. Quota System end Raw Materials, Stoffregen; once again comes from Speer's ministry. Labor Allocation, Schmelter; he too came from the armament ministry. Allocation of Output, Birkenholz; those were additional PX supplies and such as compensations for extra work. That again is Speer's ministry. Transfers, Speh; he too comes from Speer's ministry. You can see that in the third column going from left to right. Then there are additional supplies, semi-completed materials. That nan was called Schaf. He too comes from Speer's ministry. Fighter Deputy for Production, Lange; he came from Saur's office in Speer's ministry.
Q. Just one moment, please. I would like to stop you for a moment. Wasn't it to be expected that such a man who had part responsibility for fighters should have come from your ministry?
A. This is not a question of technical developments of fighter types. This is merely a question of mass production. In other words, it was a production expert who was qualified as an expert on motor car production, for instance.
Then follows representatives for Production and Fighter Repairs. He, too, comes from Saur's department in Speer's ministry. Then follows planning of many factory sites. Dr. Wegener, too, comes from Speer. Immediate Measures and Aircraft Matters, I think it says.
Lucht -- he, too, comes from Speer's ministry ...
Q Just one moment. But these people were being used for special purposes in the Fighter Production program; that they should come from Speer's ministry -- is that evidence to the effect that there had been this transfer already?
A Yes; without question. First of all, regarding the change-over; and secondly, Air Armament, of course, had even previously had not anything to do with these questions and was depending on the organization of the Armament Ministry in any case. Then comes the question of Mining Operations -Gabel is the name; and this was construction work demanded by Goering -Subterranean work -- and he belongs to the Ministry. Then comes the question of Rail and Water Transportation: Pueckel. He belongs to the Traffic Ministry. He is a railway representative. Then comes Signal System; he belongs to the Postal Ministry (Zerbel). Then follows Medical Expert Advice Dr. Poschmann. He, I think, belonged to the General Commissioner for Hygiene. That was Brandt, who, as far as I know, came directly under Hitler. That is the doctor, Brandt; not Himmler's man.
Then follows Special Subterranean Construction: Kammler. He came under the Reichsfuhrer SS Himmler.
Q Just one moment. Was he a permanent member of the Jaegerstab?
A I can only recollect having seen him once, rather briefly. He might have been there more often but I only attended a minor portion of all these conferences, of course.
Q Was he a leading member?
A No; certainly not. He was a liaison man from Himmler who somehow -I don't know how or through whom -- was being brought into these tasks, presumably by a direct order from Hitler.