"To be returned GLC (the Technical Department). I have given orders that this be submitted to me. Communication with the Reich Marshal is reserved to the Chiefs of Departments and myself.
What did you do when you heard that eighteen Norwegians were shot because they were trying to escape to go to England?
A. I had nothing to do with that question and was unable to do anything, but I was to concern myself with the question that was put to me under the sabotage plan -- and to issue instructions for the necessary counter measures to all places where German airplanes were located. We had many airplane casualties that were not explained at that time; for example, the death of Minister Todt, and many others; and here for the first time we received a communication from Norway about this bomb. Shortly thereafter we received a second one from the Mainland. These were about bombs that reacted to air pressure. That is, they could be set for five hundred meters. Then when the airplane had reached five hundred meters altitude, the bomb exploded and everyone in the airplane was killed. From this letter I could not see at all what other individual acts of sabotage had actually been committed in Norway, nor could I see what these individual persons had done.
The entire problem did not fall within my sphere, as I had been absent from Norway for quite a while and had nothing to do with the troops stationed there. Moreover the report on the matter was in the hands of my superior.
Q. You regarded an attempt to escape as being a heroic thing, didn't you?
A. No, but that did not concern me.
Q. Well, you concerned yourself with other things that didn't concern you. Wernigerode Factory, which you said didn't make any thing that you used and which wasn't under you, you gave them advice about how to cut the rations.
A. We were concerned with this factory to the extent that it provided the Luftwaffe with molding material; and I had to know whether the deliveries of this material were meeting our demands or not. Thus, technically, I did have some concern with this matter. I request that this matter may be discussed here at noon; and I'd like to make a remark about Wernigerode if I may.
Q. Just a moment. Let's confine ourselves to this. You may make any remarks about Wernigerode you wish.
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A. Yes.
Q. Now, it says here that the males were all sent to a German concentration camp. You said that you didn't know who was going into concentration camps.
DR. BERGOLD: One moment. Your Honors, for the sake of the record I should like to have it made clear what year the defendant gave as the period of his service in Norway. He stated only the months; and I should like the Court to ascertain what the year was, whether 1941 or 1942.
THE WITNESS: 1940 was the year that I was in Norway; and this letter is dated 1942.
MR. DENNEY: There is no contention made that he was in Norway at the time that this letter was written. He obviously from the records was State Secretary and Inspector General and had his office in the Reich Air Ministry where he couldn't very well be if he were commanding an air fleet in Norway.
Q. I am just trying to inquire into his mental processes with regard to receiving this advice from your superior officer with reference to the fact that eighteen people had been murdered in Norway where he had served.
A. I can only repeat that I had nothing to do with this question and had no opportunity of interceding in this matter nor of undertaking anything.
Q. Well, let's get at it directly.
EXAMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Do you approve of it?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you approve of it when you heard about it?
A. I never approved if a person who undertook something for his land was condemned to death. It was my view that even if the law provided the death penalty for members of one's own country, in the event of members of a foreign country the whole question should be postponed until the conclusion of peace.
Q. Then you believe that the Norwegians had a right to try to escape?
A. Of course.
Q. And that they shouldn't have been shot for doing something that they had a right to do?
A. Yes.
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Q. Did you say anything about it?
A. In my circle of close friends we always spoke in this way.
Q. You just kept it among your close friends; you didn't voice any protest?
A. There was no opportunity for us to do so openly.
Q. And this wrong was committed by a force of which you were the leading member?
A. It was committed by a German who was the German Reich Commissioner for Norway, in other words, the man high up in the German Executive.
Q. About as high up as you were?
A. There's no real direct comparison here. In onesense he was higher than I was.
CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. DENNEY:
Q. Did you make any complaint about the male population being sent to a German concentration camp?
A. No, I could only have turned to Goering as my superior and ho had this letter himself. I don't believe there is any army in the world where the subordinate can advise his superior about a matter that this superior already knows, because he has already been informed in writing and can make a complaint himself.
Q. Well, you certainly advised Hitler in March 1943 about what a mess he was making of things over in Russia, didn't you, without any invitation? If I recall, you said you were with him from about 8:30 p.m. until 3:30 in the morning.
A. Yes. That's so; but this was something quite different. That was something that I only did once; but I exceeded my authority, by speaking of matters that affected the life or death of the whole nation. I did not give Hitler instructions but told him what my personal opinion was. Of course, I could not give him instructions of any sort; but I knew that such a thing could only be done once.
Thereafter it was no longer possible for me to have a conference with him about matters that did not fall within my sphere.
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Q Well, you talked out of turn about a war that Germany had started and which was going badly ten months later than this; but at this time you wouldn't even bother to mention to Goering that eighteen people had been murdered and that they were sending men to a German concentration camp; that their families didn't receive any notification about it; that women were being sent to a female forced labor camp and that children not capable of working were being sent to a workers' home, and you can imply from that that those who could work were made to work someplace.
A I can only reiterate that Goering, my superior, had himself received this letter and had sent me the copy of it with a specific military order as to what I was to do. I couldn't normally tell Goering about something he know about already.
Q You said you could go and discuss things with Goering. You remember that order that you said you had him sign; that you told him afterwards that you had talked to Hitler about him without his consent; and that Goering forgot those things. It certainly would seem you could bring to his attention that perhaps all was not as it should be up in Norway. Did you make any inquiry about what was being done in other places?
A Let me say again Goering himself had this letter. Once or twice a month at least Terceven reported to Goering and Hitler. I couldn't come myself with all the problems that come up, no matter how unpleasant they were.
Q You got the letter and the only thing that you concerned yourself with was the bomb?
A That was the order I had received; and I as a soldier had to carry out that order.
MR. DENNEY: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Before he starts, Mr. Denney, I have some photostats here in German of Exhibit No. 133 which is of no use to me.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, I turn first to the Exhibit No. 908, Exhibit No I believe, 132. This is the Frank letter to Sauckel of 21 November 1943. Did this letter ever reach you?
A. No.
DR. BERGOLD: Your Honor, I should like to point out for the record that from the paragraph after No. 12 the Exhibit proves that Frank's letter to Sauckel is a letter of complaint and that this needed a different treatment. I come now to Exhibit No. 133, NOKW 352, This is concerned with the address made by Sauckel on the occasion of the Gauleiter congress on 5 and 6 February 1943. I would like to ask, is Mr. Denney in a position to give us the original again or does the Secretary General have it? If I cannot have it now, I can postpone this until tomorrow.
MR. DENNEY: I do not have it now, Your Honor.
MR. BERGHOLD: I would be grateful if I could have it for tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the copy I just gave you, which was the photostatic copy?
MR. DENNEY: He is asking for the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Wasn't it the photostatic copy, too?
DR. BERGOLD: I wanted the original to show it to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Why if you have the photostatic copy is not that sufficient?
DR. BERGOLD: No, that is not sufficient because it is a matter here of certain notations and marks he made and we need to know the color of that letter.
THE PRESIDENT: Will the Secretary General at the opening of court tomorrow morning bring with him Exhibit No. 133. That will not be the original, will it?
MR. DENNEY: I think we can relieve the Secretary General of the burden because he already has his photostatic copy and we will undertake 2217a to produce the original at 9:30 in the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the original document.
DR. BERGOLD: I thank Mr. Denney and the Court.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, I come now to Exhibit No. 49, NOKW 287. This is the document that was submitted to you yesterday by the prosecutor regarding the "workday". I show it to you again, witness, and I will ask you to answer the question whether this document has anything to do with the length of the work day in the Luftwaffe industry or of any special branch.
A. No. Is that NOKW 287?
Q. Exhibit No. 49 from the Book 2-C of the Prosecution. This is the passage regarding which Mr. Denney spoke at some length, the passage dealing with the length of the working day. Witness, is this document with the work day in the Luftwaffe industry?
A. No, it is concerned with the protection of industry. At the top just under the address it says "re: protection of industry," and I just read through it and it is perfectly clear that only the protection of industry was here concerned for which a 84 hour week had been ordered. From the beginning of the war the personal pronunciation is used, but that again is the ministerial style. The phrase "from me" means "from the GL" and the indication for "Udet" means my predecessor. The industry work at that time was 48 or 54 hours a week, in 1942.
Q. Witness, why did these protection of industry require 84 hours a week? Was that the real period of work?
A. No, that was no real period of work but the period of preparation for work was here included.
To a certain extent these people were on guard 84 hours a week, including Sunday, of twelve hours a day. On that there were always two shifts, with one taking relieving the other. In the factory they had their living quarters, in other words, a large number of these people were living there, and they stood guard exactly as they do in a military guard. For two hours they pulled guard there and then for four 2218a hours they could rest, so that the 84 hours mentioned here were of no excessive demand.
This is not 84 hours work at the machines. The fire service was included here also, which always had to stand by.
Q. Witness, did you order this work day, and, if you did, how could you have done so?
A. As I said, this industry protection was ordered by my predecessor at the beginning of the war. In 1941 I took that over and continued that arrangement. The directive was not an independent one but was one within the general regulations for the industry as a whole, issued by the competent authorities; so as many of these persons were to be conscripted into the army, a new reserve was required to finally bring the number up to a basic total of, namely, 2500 to 3000 men. I mention in conclusion that these men also carried out Security Service, that is, if work was not being done, guards went through the factory and where secret manufacturing was being carried on they placed a special guard, even during the day, so that espionage or sabotage would not be possible.
Q. Witness, I come now to Exhibit No. 143, NOKW 195. This is a conference with Goering on 28 October 1943, which my esteemed colleague of the prosecution put to you, yesterday in which Goering made the proposal that army units should capture men in Holland. Do you know whether this measure was carried out?
A. I never heard that and so far as I know we never received any allotment of Dutchmen, nor do I believe that the local officers would have obeyed such an order from Goering.
DR BERGOLD: Your Honor, on this point I should like to refer the Court to the regulation of the IMT, because the time is so short I have not been able to find the passage, but from Steinbauer's dissenting opening plea for Seyss-Inquart I discovered that it was proved before the IMT that it was only in the autumn of 1944 that the Wehrmacht forcibly removed persons from Holland, in connection with the Anglo-American invasion Moreover, this document which I just got today is so large that I must reserve for 2219a myself the right to return to it tomorrow.
Now I come to Exhibit No. 135, NOKW 364. This refers to the assignment of three hundred Americans
Q. Witness, Lange says here, "This morning representatives of the firms Dernier-Oberpfaffenhofen told me that 300 Americans who were to be employed there had refused to work." Witness, what do the German words "Die eingesetz werdenrsollten"-- who were to be employed"-- mean? Does that mean that they were already working or does it mean at that moment it was being planned that they should be employed?
A. That means that it was being planned to use them.
DR. BERGOLD: Your Honors, the phrase "werden sollen" means in German that something now is planned for the future. It does not refer to an already completed fact.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, on 20 June you resigned; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Where were you on the 19, 20th, and 21st of June 1944?
A. On the 19th of June I was in the Reich Air Ministry, but the Jaegerstab did not meet there but in Tempelhof. I was not in Tempelhof. Then on this day Speer telephoned me and told me that we were to meet Hitler on the 20th. Then the next morning I flew to Salzburg and the meeting between Hitler, Goering and Speer took place. We went by car to Obersalzburg. On the 21st I was in Berchtesgaden.
Q. Witness-
A. On the 22nd I was in Berchtesgaden. On the 23rd I was also in Berchtesgaden. On the 24th I was in Austria. I was in Austria also on the 25th.
Q. Witness-
A. It was only on the 27th that I returned to Berlin.
Q. Witness, before you resigned your office, did you find out that it was intended to use American prisoners of war for work?
A. No, never. That would have struck me because in all regulations in this matter basically and in principle all Americans and British were excepted. That was always emphasized.
Q. Witness, in the opinion of the Prosecution, you put your initials "MI" on this report. Does that mean that you read this report?
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A. No, I never read the verbatim record of anything during these years. For office reasons they were put on my desk every morning when they came in. I then put my initials on them, and my secretary then knew that the report could be passed on or could be filed.
Q. Thank you. Witness, I come now to NOKW-418, Exhibit No.136. This concerns your statements to General Gablenz and General Reinecke regarding the punishment of Frenchmen. Likewise, with the Reichsfuehrer SS, you should get in touch with him about this matter. Was this directive ever implemented on your part?
A. No, I can remember that Gablenz frequently after I had exploded, pointed out to me as my friend what I was doing, laughed at my behavior and said, "Today you blew up again," and then when I was surprised at that he told me the details.
DR. BERGOLD: Unfortunately, a small part of this document is lacking in my copy, which the Prosecution gave me. I have it only up to page 360, and I shall be obliged if I could have the appendix, so that I can return to it tomorrow. This is the passage in which Poles and Dutchmen are discussed, but it is unfortunately missing from my copy.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, in Document NOKW-407, Exhibit 137, there is mention of an explosion in France in the Arado Plant. Can you tell me what this is all about?
A. Yes. I remember the case. This was a hydroplane, an Air-sea rescue plane which was to save crews that had bailed out into the sea. Just before it was about to take off, one of the cylinders exploded. It was a bomb with a time fuse. It was clearly a case of sabotage, sabotage being the worst thing that a pilot can confront.
There wore cases of sabotage in the first world war also, but, God be praised, they were infrequent, and in the first years of this war there were only very few cases of sabotage. Now, around this time, the number of sabotage cases increased, and it was particularly unpleasant in the question of those mines that have been described previously which made airplanes explode in midair. I believe that no pi 2222a lot in the world is not filled with great bitterness when he hears of such a mean, dastardly action.
A flier has other and better ways of losing his life, more normal ways.
Q Witness, I come now to NOKW-406, Exhibit 138. This is the affair in France in which you ordered Gablenz to call up Toennes. Do you still recall who this man Toennes was?
A I cannot remember the name myself, but he must have been in the so-called liaison office in Paris, where there was a certain liaison with the French aircraft industry which was working toward cooperation between Germany and France.
Q Witness, you spoke of the new Heinkel Works in the East. Do you know where that was to be cuilt? Was it ever put into operation?
A The reason why it was to be located there was to escape from the combing area of the most, and I recall that it was to be fuilt somewhere in the area of Kielce in Poland, where the conditions were for some reason favorable. The GL was not in charge of picking the location. That was a matter that the factory took care of. The construction was started. However, as far as I know, it was not concluded because the area of Kielce was full of partisans. There were a few Germans from the factory who were sent to that area ahead of time, and they were killed. Consequently, the factory had no desire to go to that area and gave up the whole plan.
Q Witness, I came to NOKW-408.
THE PRESIDENT: Which we shall take up at 9:30 in the morning.