Q Witness, were you indignant about this order for personal reasons also?
A Yes. My heir was in British captivity in Canada. He was also shot down as a pilot. I thought it over, what I would say, if the other party had committed such a crime. I know also that one of our young people whom we had there whom I liked very much, a certain Oberleutnant V. Werra, tried several times to escape and he actually succeeded in escaping from Canadian captivity and to reach Germany. I might add that we old airmen from the last war were very pleased about that as he was a young man who succeeded in doing so, because I believe for every prisoner of war, it is a flash of light in the sky to be able to escape, and if a young man is able to do so, then he does so for his fatherland, and he shows that he is a "tough guy". I think one can appreciate that in other nations just as well even if they are fighting against somebody. I know from the World War I, when I had my own fighter group, that very often we invited shotdown British airmen. We did not keep them prisoners, however, as long as they were with us, they could move around freely and we got on together. I even permitted one of these young people to fly one of our planes because he was very interested in the technical aspects of it, and he gave us his word of honor that he would not escape and he actually kept his word of honor. That is hour we airmen used to treat the prisoners of war. I may add that the other party did the same.
Q Thank you. Witness, I shall now come back to two points of tho 54th meeting. This is the first document in Document Book No. 3-A. Witness, during that meeting Sauckel mentioned that only a very small percentage of those sent to Germany came on a voluntary basis. The statements have been mentioned repeatedly in this trial and may I ask you to state your opinion on that?
A I might say that I do not remember having ever heard these words from Sauckel.
It is possible that I was not there at the moment when he said that. However, it is possible that I overheard that remark, because during those 1954-A long meetings, we had discussions amongst each other.
We were also interested in ether questions and one did not pay any attention then. During these long meetings there was at least one meeting or two, when our concentration was not quite what it should have been. Had I heard it, I would have believed Sauckel just as little as I believed in all the acrobatic figures ho gave us, because Sauckel had stated the contrary previously. I know exactly it was not so long ago, namely that he declared in a meeting how well his system functioned and how he brought all these laborers on a voluntary basis.
Q Witness, in this meeting you also discussed or spoke of what should happen if, in Franco, the invasion of the allied forces would take place. You proposed that, in order to prevent the revolution of the partisans, these people should be sent to Germany. Won't you make a statement as to that?
A We spoke of those age groups of prisoners of war who were free, but particularly the young ago groups, which, on the basis of an agreement between the two governments, namely, Germany and Vichy, had been agreed upon by France for Germany. I realized that this is a historical fact from many wars that the French youth is nationally inflamed, and, at that moment, when an allied army would be on French soil again, it would start the fight against tho invader as partisans.
We were very well informed about the weapons that were dropped every night. We knew the approximate figure of those things that had been sent over because, among these people who had been sent over there were also agents, German agents, so that all those light arms which they sent over would have been sufficient for a whole army in French territory. It would have been the duty of the German occupational forces to be able to seize these weapons in time. Possession of weapons was under penalty of death, exactly as it applies to the Germans here in Germany. This is the normal procedure for an occupational force for zone security. However, the treatment of the French on one hand was too mild, too soft; on tho other hand, however, too hard. So that the Frenchmen did not know what the German wanted to do and I always followed measures which were dictated by my conscience. Such a procedure had to be right between hard and soft. If that would have been tho case, I'm sure that a partisan army would not have been able to resist in France, and I thought that our military officers were blind that they could see all that. However, later on, or a few months later, experience proved that such a partisan army existed, and that these partisan armies committed so many cruelties and inhumane crimes that I am sure that they contributed to the victory of the allies by doing so. At least, seen from our part, namely that they contributed to Germany's defeat.
Q Witness, I shall now leave the meetings of the Central Planning Board and come to single questions in that connection. What do you know about the use of British and American prisoners of war?
A. According to my knowledge, they went into the respective camps and they were not being used for labor. I never saw such a prisoner of war any place.
Q. Witness, did you ever know the Fuehrer records of Speer? Were they ever shown to you?
A. Only certain excerpts of them, if they ever were connected with the air armaments, but that was very seldom and I did not know them in their bulk.
Q. Do you know the Fuehrer record of the 29th of September 1942, in which Speer laid down that the Fuehrer's attention was drawn by him to the fact that armament production is not possible in the concentration camps?
A. No, I did not know that.
Q. Within the frame of the Central Planning Board you also spoke of the fact that the parcel post traffic in France should be confiscated in order to induce the French to go to work. What did you mean by that?
A. I mean under control. It was said that the whole black market went through these parcel pests. That black market was already at the time forbidden by us and I proposed that this parcel post traffic be controlled, and if there should be any black market goods, they should be confiscated. I don't think the record of what I said is accurate because in that parcel post traffic there were many goods for Germany, the date of arrival for which was important for the armament. At that time we asked for many spare parts fer the industry, or for the armament, and we carried that out through parcel post mail.
Q Witness, suddenly you're speaking here of the fact that in special manufacturers or in one special factory, eighty per cent of foreign laborers were employed. What was that all about?
A For the time being I can't answer that. I think that is a parts manufacturer.
Q You spoke about transportation machines?
A Yes. There were transportation machines, namely, Junkers 52. That was the Junkers factory.
Q Why was there such a high percentage of foreign laborers there?
A That was not a war machine. In other words, it was not a weapon; and as far as we could, we told our industry that these foreign laborers be used for the manufacture of such equipment, if that should be possible.
Q Within the framework of the Central Planning Board, did you succeed in increasing the Luftwaffe production, the air production?
A Excuse me. Do you mean within the framework of the Central Planning Board?
Q Yes.
A You mean that I got more material? Yes, to a certain extent. If it bad gone according to the Fuehrer's orders concerning priority and urgency then the Luftwaffe would have been on position number 7, seventh on the list. However, due to the fact that I was on an equivalent basis with Speer and I worked on the same basis with him, Speer being clever enough to realize the necessity of air armament. I always received more material than I would have been allowed to have according to the Fuehrer's orders.
I always received more material than I would have been allowed to have according to the Fuehrer's orders. However, I did not mention all that during these sessions and meetings. Later on, however, I briefed my chief as to how to appear. Speer then later on considered the necessity of the whole matter and agreed with me and insisted that we got more.
Q Did you within the framework of the Luftwaffe have to look after your satellites as well and provide them with air equipment?
A Well, our satellites were not exactly strong; and the famous Italian industry could not even produce two hundred planes a month, including transport and similar planes. Rumania had hardly any production; Bulgaria none at all. We had to help them. In Hungary a new industry was being developed which had been strongly supported by us. However, unfortunately the ambition of those small countries was that they wanted to build all types themselves.
Q That is enough, Witness, in the framework of your collaboration with your allies, did you influence the labor question there?
A No.
Q Before I turn over to the Jaegerstab, I should like to discuss a special case here. What orders did you have toward the middle of January 1943? What orders did you receive from Hitler?
A On the 15th January 1943, in the evening I was called up by the Fuehrer, saying that I should go to see. Hitler the next day for a special mission. As far as I ***** I believe that the General Bodenschatz called me up from the Fuehrer's headquarters. The following morning I reported to Goering, who happened to be in Berlin at that time. Goering knew that the question of food for Stalingrad was involved. Stalingrad had been encircled for months, and the whole Sixth German Army was in it. On the 16th, in the morning, I flew to Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia; and then Hitler either in the afternoon or in the evening gave me the order that I should proceed to Saratow immediately by air in order to supervise Stalingrad's food supplies from there.
Q Witness, make it a little more short, please.
A.Yes. Later on I tried to carry out this mission. When I received the mission, the last airfield had been lost through the Russian attack. We looked for certain places which were rather difficult to find there in those mountainous areas; and within the next few days we succeeded in carrying our plans out and sending a certain amount of food. However, it was too late. The resisting force of the party had broken down; the people were starving; they had no more vehicles or horses at all. They could not get the food from the landing places for the planes because they were too weak to do so. They could not carry the containers so that the increase of supply for Stalingrad ended before it even started. What there was near the end of the month in February could not be kept up.
Q Did you have a serious accident then?
A Yes. At that moment when I wanted to fly in to Stalingrad, before I hit the airfield, I was hit by a railroad engine; and I was seriously injured.
Q Then you went back to Hitler?
A Yes, I carried out the mission first. Then when Stalingrad had fallen, I flew back, reported to Hitler that I could not complete my mission. He told me, however, that it was not I who had not carried out the mission but that it was his fault. He said he gave me the orders too late; he wanted to give the orders to me much earlier; but they had, however, talked him out of it.
Q Witness, during that occasion, did you tell Hitler your opinion about the war and the general situation of the war?
A That was on the 4th of February when I reported back to Hitler. Hitler on that particular day was very crushed due to the loss of Stalingrad. It was not possible to have a quiet talk with him. He did not receive me at first with my chief of staff, namely, General of the Tank Corps Modell, who had a corps within that fortress. We both were under the impression that day that we would not be able to speak to him.
However, he told me in a few words, "Now, go right ahead to your GL task, manufacturing and the first line. Now we will have transport planes, transport planes, and more transport planes." He was talking about Stalingrad. He thought that had he had more transport planes he would have been able to keep Stalingrad.
1960-A With respect to Stalingrad I had a long discussion with him on the 5th of March.
That was the last time I saw him. That was about a month later. I was ordered to see him because he wanted to give me the mission, that I should build high altitude and fast bombers and put them in the first line of production. These now were more important than transport planes. I had availed myself of that opportunity on that day and had prepared myself in writing in order to tell him my opinion about the general situation. That discussion took place in the evening. I had dinner with him alone. That was shortly before 9:00 o'clock; and it lasted until 3:15 a.m. Then in contradiction with all other discussions I had with him I was the one who was speaking all the time.
Q What did you tell him at the time?
A. Do you rant me to answer that in a few words or shall I go into detail?
Q As we say, choose your golden way; go between the two.
A Well, I did not want to talk about that for the period of six or seven hours which it lasted at the time. I told him first of all the truth about Stalingrad; and I told him that the question of leaving an army was a serious military mistake, although according to military and strategical points of view it had to withdraw, something which had been suggested both by myself and by the army. It was a mistake; and it did end with the loss of 350,000 men on the German side. However, our withdrawal in time would have saved the greatest part of these soldiers. I told him that, after all, the Russians were not as anxious to attack as that, that in the winter they would have dared to attack a German army which was in a difficult position. I told him then that that point was now the last point in the fate of the war. I told him that I had tried to roach him before the Russian campaign. However, I had been unable to do so because it had been forbidden. I said that the time was now five minutes past twelve. We use that expression in Germany when something is done with. I told him in that by that I meant that the war was lost.
I apologized for not considering his nerves. There was no tine for that. I thought it my duty to tell him my sincere opinion; as a field marshal I thought myself entitled to such an action.
1961-A I knew that he did not want to hear it.
However, I wished that he would hear me in spite of that. He could do with me whatever he wanted afterwards. I remembered, however, that he himself before the war had used strong words against the bad advisers of William II (Wilhelm). They had not approached him because of their cowardice and had not told him the truth. In no case would I wish to be similar to such a person in my own conscience, even if such blame could be put on me. He told me then, "Yes, you can say today whatever you wish to say."
I told him then that he was not any longer in a position to attack in the East; that these attacks which had already been developed he should stop; that he could only defend himself; and I was of the direct opinion that instead of building great fortification works in France and Norway, that during the whole of the spring, summer, and autumn, with respect to the Dnjepr position at the time, it was, I should say, 800 kilometers behind the Russian front, that he fortify that position with every means, which was to be of concrete, etc., in a great depth, between two-hundred and three-hundred kilometers depth; and in that way with strong fortification and good shelter for the soldiers, equipped with good equipment and food and ammunition, and that then he should take the troops back to that position for the winter, and that he should give up the whole territory between the fortification where they were then, out of which he would not get anything at all, nor oil, coal, or ore. By doing that he would shorten the length of the Russian front, and in such a way that the maintenance of those soldiers on the line would be much easier. Apart from that he should takemore care of the Eastern forces, and I am quite sure that on the whole Eastern front of twothousand kilometers, about ten million German soldiers, not one million was fighting, then he would have to take measures to change that. That was the only point he carried out later on, but unfortunately only towards the end of that year the result was that the fighting infantry units on the whole Eastern front amounted to 265,000 men of the Army. It was impossible to hold that front with such a small number as such.
I furthermore suggested to him that a greater personal change should occur, namely, he himself should give up command over the Army, and to take in 1962-A his place a capable General.
That thus he took before the German people that responsibility, which he could not bear. He was no soldier in that respect, because he die not learn that. I suggested to him to dissolve my own armies, my own branch of an independent Wehrmacht unit, and to put the Luftwaffe entirely under the Wehrmacht, for there was no longer a strategic Luftwaffe.
What I had to say now was special on the Army, and that this was certainly in a personal nature, namely, to remove the Reichsmarshal Goering from the Luftwaffe, and give him a different task. I said at an opportune moment that the Foreign Ministry also be eliminated from that position.
Q Would you give the name?
A Von Rib entrop, I suggested to him that the Fieldmarshal Teuffel be put in charge of the units at the front, and I gave as a reason that Keitel is too lenient towards you, and he does not 'now how to get his ideas through with you. However, you must have somebody who would force you to observe correct military measures. I told him then that the most important task in my opinion was the home defense of Germany, the air home defense of Germany, and to consider that in the first place; and also the fighter production should be placed in the first place, in Armaments. I showed him these figures of the English, the American and the Russian Armaments explicitly, and I showed him how these Armaments would have their effect over Germany, and also at what time this would happen. I reported to him that many false reports were made to him, and I gave him an exact instance. I reproached him that he over-estimated himself, and his allies, and that he under-estimated the Russians, and Stalin's personality, and that that led to the Stalingrad collapse, and he must realize that if the attack were discontinued in the East, and if he would be able to hold the Dnjepr position, and if the air defense would be able to prepare a military preparation for peace, if the enemy would see that this crushing of Germany from the air, was no longer possible and if the Russians would see that they would not be able to cross the Dnjepr without the most serious losses that then there would be willingness on the other side to come to peace terms which, he, however, should start right away.
It might be possible to get off cheaply, however, only if they would act immediately.
Then I also discussed the peace question, and I told him he might make a real peace with France without taking land away, and I am sure that France would still be able to consider that. The same applied to Belgium, and also Holland, as well as Norway. A peace with these countries would then make the greater countries of the Western territories more inclined to conclude peace with Germany which would be more advantageous for Germany. Those were matters of my opinion, and I did wish to touch on the important points, but I don't wish to touch upon all the other points. We listened to me and interrupted me only once, briskly, namely, upon the question whether he would be able to attack early in 1943 in the East, or not and I remember exactly that I told him more than twenty times, "You cannot attack any more" and first he said in a quiet way, then got more excited and more excited until he was very cross, and banged his fist on the table, and "I must attack there." I told him at the end, "I know I am very rude, but I shall not mention this question of attack any more and I want you to be convinced I shall not change my opinion."
Then he waited for a short while, I began to speak of something else, and then suddenly he said, "What would you say, Milch, if I would only make a short attack in order to be able to push through the Russian preparations before they start developing." I answered, "I regard that as a defensive measure, because a soldier carries out his defense by attacking in turn," He then took a deep breath and said, "Then we agree on that point." I said, "No, I don't think we do. If you are successful you will continue to advance. I would say after 48 hours, no matter what would have been achieved, "All troops retreat." Think of 1916 When the same error was made, when we did not succeed with a surprise attack we got obstinately stuck.
Q Witness, did you ever propose to make alterations in the cabinet and an entire change of the government system in Germany?
A Yes, I did mention that here before.
Q We shall come back to that Speer question. However, this is an anti-question to that.
A I'll have to mention that on 27 February I had spoken to Speer that now a war cabinet must be set up consisting of four or five personalities, namely of the best people we had and that this cabinet, under Hitler presidency would have full authority so that the dictatorship question would cease. We thought of people who were not with the government at that time but were outside the government. I told Hitler about that. He did not answer. He said he would think everything I told him over and told me if he wanted me he would send for me. May I add, so as not to give a wrong impression that I told him that I myself would be out of the question for the Luftwaffe, or for any other higher office. Otherwise, I would not be able to talk so frankly.
Q Witness, what influence did develop after Stalingrad with respect to the relationship between Hitler and Goering?
THE PRESIDENT: May I, before you go on, ask for the date of this conference with Hitler again?
THE WITNESS: It was on 5 March 1943.
After I returned I spoke with the people who were nearest to me about that matter, and a few witnesses have made statements to that effect. I made exact records about that. But I have lost them, however. I cannot forget the whole matter because it was something extraordinary for me to talk to the highest man of the Reich in such a way. I had had several open discussions with him, but never in such a critical form.
Regarding the question of how the relationship developed later on I have to say the following: It became worse and worse from time to time. It was due to a struggle which I had about the German air defense which also contradicted Hitler's idea of waging war, for this was the specific field of the Luftwaffe, and I as inspector general of the Luftwaffe in that capacity was forced to make suggestions. I did not give in to that matter, and I repeatedly brought it to that person's attention, in contrast with political proposals or proposals in the field of the army and navy, which were outside of my field of tasks and which I could bring to somebody's attention only if Hitler gave me his permission or if he wished me to.
Q With respect to this conference, did you inform him of the fact you wanted to have Goering gone?
A Yes, I did. I told Goering about that. I did not want to stab him in the back.
Q How, then, did your relationship with Goering become?
A I do not believe that this single incident had any influence on our relationship, which was bad anyway. Goering was not the kind of a man who would hold it against me. He had a certain understanding of the circumstances. There were things about me he was much more annoyed about.
Q Witness, shortly before the end I would like to ask you a few minor questions. Did you have to see about the civilian air raid precautions?
A Yes, the civilian air raid precautions were immediately put under my charge after the French campaign. The question was to build pill boxes for the German population.
Very few things had been done during peace time in this direction and one apparently had no idea whatsoever about the war of bombs and their 1966a effects, because the great heavy bombs were only created in almost all countries during the war.