Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the Matter of the United States of the American against Erhard Milch, defendant, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 24 February 1947, 0930-0945 hours, Justice Toms presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
Military Tribunal II is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, this morning there is one witness at our disposal for examination now, General-Admiral Schniewindt. As far as General Westhof is concerned I must do without him because he does not know anything with respect to what I wanted to examine him. It is for me very difficult to clarify this. The only witness General von Grawitz is in Yugoslavia and all of the people who are in charge of the PWs of the OKW -- I tried to get them over there by Weshof declared that he only joined in March. He told me the name of another witness who is sick in Garmisch whereupon on Saturday I immediately sent my assistant Dr. Milch to Garmisch in order to get an affidavit from him. Further, the witness Dosch and the witness Engl have arrived but I couldn't examine them so far. Therefore, I propose that after the examination of General Schniewindt the Tribunal take a recess until 1:30 this afternoon which would enable me to examine these two gentlemen shortly, and furthermore I suggest that the witness Brandt be brought in this afternoon. He has now declared himself ready to be examined today. I also spoke with Dr. Kauffmann, his defense counsel. He will also be here and he agrees with it. It will be necessary that your Honor discuss the matter with the gentlemen from Court I so that Brandt will be released downstairs and can be used this afternoon.
That is Case I upstairs. That's all we have for today.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you get the affidavit from the witness in Garmisch?
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DR. BERGOLD: No. My assistant went there. He will be back today.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you perhaps examine the witness Brandt after you have finished with Schniewindt?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, but, of course, we have to have the permission of the President in Case No. 1.
MR. PRESIDENT: Well, I will arrange with Judge Beals of Tribunal I and we will take Mr. Brandt whenever he can be released. That will depend upon Judge Beals' determination. Are you ready now for the witness Schniewindt?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will bring into the Courtroom Admiral General Schniewindt.
OTTO SCHNIEWINDT took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: Raise your right hand and repeat after me. I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, will you please state to this Tribunal your full name?
A. Otto Schniewindt.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, please warn the witness to withhold his answers as you usually do.
DR. BERGOLD: Yes. Witness, I ask you to speak slowly in order to enable the translator to follow you and I will ask you every time that I ask you a question to make a short interval before you answer in order to enable the translators to finish with the translation of your answer.
Witness, when were you born?
A. On the 14th of December, 1887.
Q. What was your position and your rank you last held in the German 1307 (a) Wehrmacht?
A. From the Summer of 1944 I was in the Leader Reserve Fuehrer Reserve -- and prior to that I was Troop Leader.
Q. And your rank?
A. Admiral General -- General Admiral.
Q. Witness, do you remember that during a conference in the Fuehrer's headquarters on the 23 May 1939 you were present?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Witness -- may it please the Tribunal, I am referring to Exhibit No. 3, Document No. L-79, from the Document Book No. 1-A of the prosecution. The so-called Schmundt matter. Witness, first of all I want to ask you could you or can you now state whether Field Marshal Goering, at that time he was Field Marshal, whether he attended this conference?
A. I must state he was there then I would have said the three Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht branches -- if you ask me was Field Marshal Goering there then I stop for a little while and I can't swear to it.
Q. That is, you cannot say with certainty?
A. No, not with certainty. In any case the whole purpose was to give Hitler's opinion to the leaders of the several branches of the Wehrmacht.
Q. Go into details. Witness, could you give me a general view of your discussion on this conference and the purpose Hitler called this conference?
A. That is a question which I did not concern myself with very much in 1939 and which last year when I was here as a witness, I already discussed with other members of this conference; neither did I discuss the whole idea nor can I draw up exactly what the purpose of this conference was. Some of the ideas were discussed there and their ways and their tendencies by the whole thing was so unclear that at the time together with Grossadmiral Raeder, after the conference I asked myself 1308 (a) What was the purpose of this whole thing together with Grossadmiral Raeder.
I was of the opinion that the idea of the whole was that Hitler had to introduce all the military leaders into the political situation -- that there was a certain tension in there and the tension was to be expected and that everybody had to be ready, militarily, that is, and things would be necessary to be kept under strictest control with regard to the military and political matters within the next few months. He, Hitler, that is, intended to create a special I don't know what he called it -- but it was a student committee, a special conference for studies of various questions. That particular committee was to examine all military questions and issue all of the necessary decrees to the Wehrmacht parts or branches in order to be ready for any event. Fleet Admiral Raeder and I agreed at the time that the latter in the first place was to be considered the sense of the whole speech held by Hitler. At the time he wanted to have this committee in his hand and hold it there and he knew, he was clear about it, that this would be an institute which would enable the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht to understand the situation because after all, this could become a control office, so to speak.
That, in a few words, was the tendency. Hitler at the time, of course, endeavored, with respect to this institute, to make it as realistic as possible for the commanders of the Wehrmacht, namely--in my opinion and in Reader's opinion-that severe tensions were to be reproduced, so to speak, in order to convince these leaders of the Wehrmacht of the necessity of such an institution. Of course, at the same time, we spoke of the powers of the various nations--that is, we also spoke of the military power of various nations in Europe at the time, with which there could be friction some time, or where friction could be expected.
Hitler then, in a more or less expert way, gave his decisions on the power of various military units and the power of arms of other nations. However, how precise these statements of Hitler were at that time, I am in no position to say today. In any case, it was a speech which took place within a period of one and a half to two hours, and it was a concept of the whole situation as Hitler imagined it at the time, or as he wanted to suggest it to the military leaders.
Q. Witness, did you gain the impression that the aggression against European countries was already announced by this conference?
A. No, under no circumstances.
Q. Witness, I now come to some details of this question.
According to the Schmundt minutes, Hitler, on the occasion of listing the results of the first World War on warfare, is supposed to have said, under point 4, the following:
"If the Army, together with the Luftwaffe and the Navy, has taken the most important positions, then the industrial production is no longer thrown into the battles of the Army, but is of benefit to the Airforce and the Navy.
Witness, can you remember that Hitler explained his views in that manner at that time, or does the possibility exist that this point of view came up later?
A. Today, of course, I cannot remember which sentence was used, or which words were used, or if such an idea was expressed in this way or in some other way. If this idea was expressed at that time--that is, in May 1310 (a) 1939--I did not know it, and I do not believe it either, because I do not see any logical connection between what at that time was the general idea of the leadership, and the sentence you just read to me.
There is no connection between the two.
However, this problem played a very important part. Approximately after the completion of the war against Poland, in other words, I believe around the time of the Western offensive--it could have been before, prior to that, but it also could have been after that--at that time, for a commander-inchief of the Navy it was very clear that one hope that Hitler had after completion of the war against Poland was to be able to conclude a peace with the Western Powers. After that-namely, when this hope could not be fulfilled--that is why, at the time, Rear Admiral Raeder did not miss one single opportunity, with the Ober Commander of the Wehrmacht or with Hitler himself, in order to make suggestions to them that under all circumstances more rearmament capacity should be obtained in reenforcing the submarine weapons or U-boat weapons. If I tried to remember when these discussions took place, I would like to say it was around March 1940 and autumn 1940. At that time Hitler told Rear Admiral Raeder that if the Army fulfills its duties-namely, to bring the Western campaign to a successful conclusion--then the time would come where greater parts of the armament capacity could be transferred to the Navy and, as far as I can remember, also to the Luftwaffe, namely, the Junker 88 program.
Q. Thank you. Witness, a little further on in the same document Hitler speaks under number 1--it is the next number, after four:
"1. In order to judge the weapons and their effect correctly, for instance:
"(a) The battleship or aircraft carrier, which is the more effective individually or as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy."
Witness, at that time were such views already expressed or do you have clues that these views were expressed only at a later time?
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A. Of course, the evaluation of single weapons or weapon groups took place with regard to Great Britain. In particular, that the idea or the chain of ideas that aircraft carriers were the best protection for convoys was discussed, I do not remember. That is a problem with which England, in the first place, had to concern herself; and I am sure England did that when she had to make up her mind to postpone the building of battleships, which was taking place at the time, and to replace it with the building of aircraft carriers and to increase this whole production. England probably had to do that during the first months of the war, or at least make up its mind to it.
As far as we know, and what we learned in Germany, it is a fact that the construction of battleships was slowed down approximately early, or towards the middle of 1940.
Q. Thank you. I now pass over to another point -and I inform the interpreters that it is the last section but five, and it starts, "secrecy is the most important requisite for success."
"Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan."
Can you remember that at that time Japan was mentioned at all?
A. No, I don't believe that. Japan at that time, early in 1939, did not play any part whatsoever.
Q. Hitler then continues:
"The break-through in the Maginot Line is still a possibility for Italy and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible."
During this conference, had the subject been mentioned that Italy--and I think it is the prolongation of the Maginot Line--that Italy should break through the extended Maginot Line; or was Italy not mentioned at all in that connection?
A. That this idea was discussed at all, I do not remember. I do not remember it, and I don't believe it true either.
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Q. I now go over to another point; it is the last section but one. "Working; Principles.
"1. No one must be admitted who is not concerned.
"2. No one must know more than it is necessary for him to know.
"3. When must the person concerned know at the latest? No one must know of the matter earlier than it is necessary for him to know of it."
Witness, is it correct that these principles made up the contents of the so-called Basic Fuehrer-Order No. 1 ?
A. Yes, and I believe that it was even verbally that way.
Q. Can you remember that this basic Fuehrer Order, even at that time in May 1939 existed in that form and was reported to us?
A. I do not believe that. It was usual in every military discussion, although the same applied to discussions that were not military, concerning secrecy, that of course at the end or at the beginning of a discussion somebody pointed out that the things that were being discussed were to be kept secret. And that, of course, was probably the case when Hitler made this speech. However I think that the formulation which you just read to me is so sharp, let us say, and so striking compared with secret order No. 1 that in January or February 1940 I would have remembered if this consolidation with the written order would have been so sharp with the oral statements made at that time. I would have remembered that at the time, and of course I would have remembered this today, too.
Q. Witness, you know that the Fuehrer order in the form you see it now was only issued in January 1940,
A. January or February, 1940.
Q. Now a last question, witness, it is stated at the end of the document. At the request of Field Marshal Goering the Fuehrer decrees that: a, the various services shall determine what construction is to be undertaken; b, there shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program; c, the armament programs are to be considered with regard to 1943 or 1944. Can you remember that Goering made such a request at that time?
A. I cannot remember such a request made by Goering. However, I know that early in 1933 the navy, namely, under Rear Admiral Raeder, put such a request to the Fuehrer. I believe that this request by Raeder was in connection with his idea of the whole thing. With his impression concerning the increase of tension it could he that which was also in connection with the final conclusion of the Czechoslovakia question.
At that time Rear Admiral Raeder suggested Hitler to stop the homogenous building up of the navy, or at least he brought this subject to a discussion, that to build *** for the navy could he carried out in a shorter time. In other words this request was an expression used by Gross Admiral Raeder, that he was worried about the future. At that time Gross Admiral 1314 a Raeder received the following answer from Hitler:
No, don't you worry. The construction of the navy will take place in a homogenous way as we had planned it. And there was a certain construction sector around the middle of 1944 or 1945.
DR. BERGOLD: No further questions, Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DENNEY:
Q. Witness, were you at the Fuehrer conference that preceded the invasion of Poland sometime in August 1939?
A. I participated in this conference also.
Q. And that was the first time that you ever heard or believed that Germany was going to invade Poland about August 22, 1939; is that right?
A. If you ask me the question in this way I cannot give you a clear answer. I also have to state here that the unchangeable belief that an attack was planned on Poland was not discussed during this conference or a speech held by Hitler. As far as I know, Hitler painted, let us say, a very dark picture of the increasing tension between Germany and Poland and that ho had made up his mind at a certain point when the tensions would increase, then to make the decision, as he said at the time, to counter this Polish violation and forceful acts of Poland near the German border and to bring this problem to a final conclusion.
Q. When did you find out that he was going to attack Poland? You just said that you didn't find it out in the August meeting down at Obersalzburg. When did you find out? The night before they went in?
A. Even during this speech, I believe on the 23rd or 24th of August. At the time everybody agreed that even this time Hitler would succeed in getting out of this problem or jam and find some sort of political solution as he did with Czechoslovakia.
Q. You didn't have any idea that they were getting ready for war?
A. Oh, yes, indeed. Of course I did. After all, we also knew with Czechoslovakia that the military units and the political units always endeavored or were afraid that maybe things won't develop as well as the political leadership things, and that is why we prepared ourselves for a war.
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Q. Well, then, you were getting ready for war, weren't you? In case things didn't work out with the politicians, why then you would have to go to war -- you and the Luftwaffe and the army.
A. Well, naturally, it was decisive in case of war that the political leadership -- the political leadership was the decisive factor. Should a war break out, not the army or the navy were the ones who decide on the war, but the political leadership.
Q. Well, if the political leadership -- and that was Hitler -- decided that you go to war, you were going to support him were you not?
A. If I agreed with him I do not know. However, an order of the political leadership has to be followed by the Wehrmacht.
Q. Yes. I don't care whether you agreed with him or not, but if he did give the order for you to go to war, you would go to war, wouldn't you?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. And you were ready for war?
A. With the insufficient means we had at our disposal, a preparation had to he taken. That the Wehrmacht never was ready for a war, I believe, has already been discussed and clearly shown in the first great trials of last year.
Q. Well, if we look at 1945, they probably weren't ready. But they had reasonable success starting in 1939, You couldn't say that your campaign starting with Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, France -- you wouldn't say that these were a total loss, would you?
A. Not at all. However, I am of the opinion that this was not due to the increasing of the German power or of the German Wehrmacht, but rather to the fact that the military status of these countries, first of all in the west, was of such a low level, which level had not been anticipated by the German Wehrmacht, and which surprised all the commanders in chief of the Luftwaffe, the navy, and the Wehrmacht.
Q. In other words, if you had known they were as weak as you say they are you wouldn't have had to do so much to get ready.
A. If we had known that, of course, that is correct. But one doesn't know those things in general.
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