Q. But, did you hear any complaints about it?
A. No.
Q. Witness, you know the regulations of the Geneva Convention, don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Concerning the employment of prisoners of war, did you have any doubts whether it was permissibly or not?
A. Yes. This question approached me from the very moment, or when we took over the office, and I know that I discussed this point with Field Marshal Milch, and he told me at that time and advised me that the assignment of Russian POW's was done on the orders of Hitler, and in spite of that the Field Marshal told me why the chief of the planning office, that is General von Gablenz, brought the matter to the O.K.W. and had it checked over again and the matter was confirmed. These prisoners were not employed in the manufacture of Armaments and ammunition, weapons and ammunition, but as I said before in my example from Obertraubling, they were employed at the production of a transport plane.
Q. Witness, is it correct that the G.L. had already also of course carried out the plans for the air armament?
A. Yes. There was an agreement with the Vichy Government, and this agreement provided for an air armament program which showed a proportion of five to one, at least nominally, in favor of Germany and France and provided for a production of aircraft, but in reality this program was only executed in the proportion of one to one, but there also no war aircraft were produced but only the TU-52, for instance, which is decidedly a transport plane, and the TU-104.
Q. Witness, the agreements with the French firm were they on a voluntary basis or was the French firm caused to have these agreements?
A. They were agreements on a voluntary basis, yes. They were, for instance, that the general manager, Vernier, of the Gnome et Rhone firm in Paris came to Berlin once to see Field Marshall Milch and to discuss the product which was produced at his plant.
Q Witness, do you know that some of these French plants, did they take orders away from you and without asking the G. L. ?
A Yes, We were very sorry to see that, but Sauckel recruited in these factories in which we had already work executed for the Luftwaffe, and this work was done by the Frenchmen, but he still recruited French workers in order to bring them to Germany. We had that through our liaison office, the liaison office of the G. L. at Paris, but we did not succeed in having these measures stopped, and the result was a decrease in the output at the French works.
Q Witness, as a result of that did the G/ L/ introduce a blockage of these firms, had it closed and turned them into the Speer teams which were protected factories?
A Yes, this expression "protected factories" originates from the Luftwaffe, and later on it was adopted by Speer for the production which was under his orders.
Q That means that in the Luftwaffe you really introduced before Speer these so-called protected factories?
A Yes.
Q Witness, you just spoke of a liaison office of the G. L. at Paris. I would be interested to know whether Milch could give orders to the military commanders or the civilian agencies in the occupied territories if possible. Why was this liaison office?
A No, this liaison staff was only a technical matter. It was for the French work. This liaison office included the construction inspectorates of the Luftwaffe in these works.
Q Therefore, he had no authority to issue orders to these agencies
A No.
Q Did the G. L. or Milch have any authority to punish the workers in the air armament?
A No.
Q And over the prisoners of war?
A No.
Q Witness, is it correct to say that the planning office, the socalled office A, did have difficulties with Speer concerning the labor question?
A Difficulties were constantly arising.
Q Witness, do you have any knowledge or information in general concerning the treatment of the foreign workers in Poland, or in Russia, did you receive any information on that, or concerning France?
A No.
Q Do you know anything on the secret orders which were ordered byHimmler or his subordinate agencies?
A No.
Q Do you know anything about the reports of Rosenberg on the mistreatment of foreign workers?
A No.
Q Did Milch ever tell you that he had received such reports?
A No.
Q Witness, shortly after, on the 4th of November, 1941, after you had turned over the C office to Udet on the 7th of November, 1941, who had a discussion with Goering on the utilization of Russian prisoners of war, were you present at this meeting or did you hear about this meeting?
A No.
Q This meeting, was that within the framework of R. L.
A I didn't hear anything about this meeting, but if it is a question of assignment of P. O. W's then I could only imagine that Goering, in his capacity of plenipotentiary for the four-year plan, made a speech.
Q You mentioned before, Witness, if I understood you correctly, that you had Ukrainian workers in your household?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Now, the directives from the labor front concerning the treatment of the Ukrainian house personnel, for instance, when they have their free time, when they are not allowed to go to the cinema, when they have follows, did you know about this directive when you employed this maid?
A No.
Q A while ago you already told us that this maid could go out and could go and visit some friends?
A Yes.
Q Did you also know whether she was allowed to go to the movies?
A We didn't prohibit and we didn't forbid her to go to the movies.
Q But you didn't hear whether she went to the movies or not?
A No.
Q Would it have been possible to the G. L. to prevent your employment of foreign workers or .P O. W.'s?
A No, that was impossible, because otherwise we would have even still less workers than we already had.
Q That is a technical question. If theoretically the G. L. would have refused their employment what would have happened?
A Everybody would have said, "Well, the G. L. has already enough of that, enough workers.
Q Witness, did you have any knowledge that also inmates of concentration camps were employed?
A That is in the air armament? Yes, I had knowledge that at Heinkel Oranienburg the employment of concentration camp inmates took place.
Q Did the G. L. request these people, or how did it come about that they were employed?
A No, they were not requested by the G. L., but during a conference it was seen, a conference with the director of Oranienburg Heinkel, it was seen he had the possibility of getting these people.
Q Did you know that Goering and Himmler had discussed and reached an agreement concerning the employment of the concentration camp inmates?
A No.
Q But Himmler sent a report, an important report, on the employment of concentration camp inmates in the air armament. Did you or the F. L. have any knowledge of this report?
A No.
Q You know, that is I think you know, do you know that Sauckel had an agreement with the German Labor Front concerning the care after the camps of the foreign workers?
A No, I have no knowledge of that, but I suppose so because the German Labor Front after all also took care of the other camp.
Q And why did it happen, in order to have a strong authority over the workers, or rather, why?
AAccording to my opinion that was only a care measure.
Q. Witness, did you have any knowledge that in the Air Armament foreigners had been hanged or shot or beaten or mistreated?
A. No, I have no of that.
Q. Did you have any knowledge of the fact that POW's had been shot in the Air Armament?
A. Yes, there was one case of which I had knowledge, and that was the case -- if I remember -- the case in Obertraubling near Regensburg in the same plant which I mentioned before. At that plant, I think it was in February, '44, during the night the engineer on duty rang up -- I think he was of the OKL, and he said that the Fuehrer had ordered that two Russians who had tried to escape from Obertraubling, that these two Russians were to be shot, and had been shot. And I remember that I received this report in the morning and that I passed it on to the Field Marshal Milch right away as a special occurrence.
I myself was rather excited about it because this had not been reported to me directly by the construction inspectorate which I had in Obertraubling, but I received the report from the OKL -- Supreme Command of the Luftwaffe -and the Field Marshal himself was rather aroused especially because -- and I remember that he said that it is the right of the prisoner of war to escape; they cannot be shot for that. There will be difficulties about that.
Q. Witness, you just said you had construction inspectorates. Does that concern the buildings or is that rather the construction of aircraft?
A. No, that is the construction of aircraft. That is an agency perhaps to receive the constructed aircraft or tho parts of the aircraft, and they have to check the technical efficiency of these parts and have to admit them or reject them and to certify to the plant that the work is good and that this plane can be accepted.
Q. And this construction inspectorate should have reported this escape right away on its own initiative?
A. Yes, because this construction inspectorate, which was locally in the different plants of the aircraft industry, this inspectorate might be said to be a liaison organ between my own office and this plant, and they had directives, my orders, which I had issued to report on all happenings in this plant which could have an effect on the production according to the program; that is, for instance, if the raw material distribution stopped, and in that case it had to be reported right away that it was caused by the fact that they had no aluminum or no iron in order to enable me to take the necessary steps right away, the steps with the competent authorities in order to fill this gap.
Q. Witness, do you know that in 1934 there was another escape of prisoners of war and these prisoners of war tried to escape with an aircraft?
A. Yes, that happened in France. I think that a British pilot actually escaped in an ME 109.
Q. Do you know anything of the escape from Prenzlau in the Uckermark?
A. Yes, also this case succeeded. In this case the escape succeeded also.
Q. You mean that the prisoners of war escaped?
A. Yes.
Q. This shooting of the two Russian officers, was that the only case which you know, a case in which prisoners of war had been shot or hanged?
A. Yes, the only case. By the way, I remember that in the report it was said that Hitler had wanted to hang these people formerly in the assemblage hall, but then he only insisted upon their being shot.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we take our recess, Dr. Bergold?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(Recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal Number II is again in session.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed) BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, I shall now come back to those Russian officers. Is it a fact and is it correct that in connection with the flight of these Russian officers the GL was reproached by Hitler?
A. Yes, considerably so.
Q. Witness, can you tell me anything about the fact that Mr. Milch had suggested the shooting of these Russian prisoners to the Fuehrer?
A. I already mentioned before that the report concerning the shooting came from the OKL. It was mentioned there that the Fuehrer had already ordered to have them shot. In other words, there was no possibility whatsoever for the Fieldmarshal Milch to do anything about it.
Q. When you reported to Milch, did. you have the impression that he knew about it already or were you under the impression that was the first time that he was being informed of that matter?
A. No, I was under the impression that I was the first one who reported this matter to him.
Q. Witness, these foreign laborers, how were they treated by the GL in general? Was the GL interested in abusing them or exploiting them?
A. The GL was interested in an increase of output. Consequently, they had to see to it that these foreign laborers were given more food and better treatment.
Q. Witness, how were the working hours within the air armament industry?
A. Approximately eight to nine hours a day.
Q. Isn't it correct that later on longer working hours were ordered namely, up to fourteen hours?
A. Yes, namely, then the Jaegerstab took over.
Q. What was Milch's opinion and the position that he took toward these working hours?
A. He was against it because during previous trials to increase the working hours, it had been proved that generally speaking there would be a big decrease of output if the working hours were extended to a greater amount.
Q. Who then insisted on issuing a fourteen hour working period in the Jaegerstab?
A. Mr. Sauer was the man who did that.
Q. If the air armament industry required or requested workers through the working offices, the labor offices, and if they received orders, did the GL contrive to get foreign labor?
A. No. On the contrary, they were always interested in getting as many skilled workers as possible and mostly Germans.
Q. Were foreign laborers actually asked for?
A. No.
Q. Do you know of any steps of Mr. Milch to receive German laborers?
A. Yes, he tried that repeatedly.
Q. What efforts were made? How did he try to get those German workers?
A. I do not quite know how to answer this question of yours.
Q. By what means did he try to get these laborers, these German laborers, or at least try to keep them?
A. With his confidences and conversations with Speer and with his request to Goering.
Q. Do you know-- and I want to ask you precisely now--that he freed people who had to go the the Wehrmacht and that he kept them in the air armament industry?
A. Yes. I do remember that now. We tried several times to keep German skilled workers from the OKW; in other words, to free them from there and to get them back to our armament staff. Many actions like that were started, for engineers, constructors, as well as for skilled workers.
Q. Can you remember figures? Were these figures rather high or low?
A. Yes, I do. I remember that the number 40,000 was mentioned once and also the number of 60,000.
Q. Witness, what was the air armament situation towards the end of 1941 compared with the enemy armament status?
A. Towards the end of 1941 what we found was desperate. If I may go into details and state here figures, in the field of bombers there were no bombers whatsoever. There were hardly any new types of bombers. The destroyers, also the ME-110, were rather limited; and the ME-210 was not ready. On the contrary, all of the tests which were carried out led to new accidents. The plane tipped. In other words, it could not be used for the front. The new four-engine bomber which had been asked for a long time before was not being developed but was the HE-177.
In the field of engines an increase of output for the fighters was necessary, for the ME-109 and the Focke Wulf 190. Both engines, the DB-605, and the GMBH-01, were only used at the front towards the earlier part of 1942 but unfortunately with many mistakes. The troop and its confidence could only be satisfied or restored with special new actions. That is as far as the development field was concerned. Productively at the time when we took ever the armament, 760 to 800 planes were finished per month. That was towards the end of 1941. Amongst them there were only 200 fighters per month. It was clearly to be seen that this situation had to be eliminated as soon as possible if catastrophe were not to take place. The figures which we knew in particular concerning the efforts of the enemy countries in the production of four-engine bombers were a signal for us, particularly in the field of defense. In other words, concerning fighters and night fighters, considerable efforts were to be made by us in order to increase both planes and numbers. That was the situation as we found it towards the end of 1941 after the death of Udet.
Q. In other words, is this correct, that the enemy armament staff was very well known to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, these figures that were then known, were they believed by the majority of higher officials, in other words, Goering or Hitler?
A. No, they were never believed. I remember I can recall a conference in the office of Goering, that conference probably took Place in January 1943, or early in January. In other words, one year a ter I had taken over that office, that the Field Marshal and myself went to tell Goering about the technical development and the position of supply. The conference as planned was held for several hours, and took place at Goering's working office. Apart from this, Major Giesing was present there, who was at that time technical expert of Goering. After we had presented the case to him, the Field Marshal, namely Milch, went on to tell him that it was known to us concerning the output of the production of the enemy, and he had a special folder with him, and he went to Goering, where Goering was sitting, and started speaking. Hardly had Goering heard anything about the figures which Milch presented to him, then he said, word for word, "Well, Milch, are you also among the defeatists? Do you believe in those fantastic figures, for only these people can only cook the water? Leave me alone from all that stuff," and that is how we were dismissed.
Q. Did Milch insist on a higher output of fighters during the conference?
A. Yes, we tried to do that ever since the beginning when we took over the office. To eliminate that last remark I can say that in November 1941, the General Staff, in other words, both Hitler and Goering had released a figure of three-hundred sixty fighters in a month for 1942, and had asked for such a figure.
This figure seemed, to us much too low, knowing the figures which the enemy could produce, and that is how the Field Marshal, namely Milch, at that time told me immediately, if this general staff does not want to have them we will produce immediately double the amount of fighters and we shall put it in : our program, and next year there must be fifteen-hundred planes, and in 1943 have to reach the figure of threethousand per month, three-thousand fighter planes.
Q. Is that correct, that Milch the Armament Industry based itself on a defensive armament?
A. Yes. According to my opinion he was right, he recognized the situation correctly.
Q. When Milch took over the GL, did he create a new organization? When did that happen?
A. The new organization was necessary, and with respect to the divisions, particularly, that division interest in technique to direct them in one single track. First of all the organization had to be very clear in order to draw the lines between the responsibilities. That is why the branching of my office differed in contract with that before, which had been taken up in the following way: that the development of supply and testing were treated separately, and they only could come to me. I was the head.
Q. This position of the GL, did they increase the output, and did they try to reach a better quality or quantity, or, did Milch consider a means to enslave more rigidly these foreign laborers?
A. What Milch's consideration to do was to increase the output and to increase the output of material for the fighting front.
Q. Witness, before you have testified here that within the actual air armament there was also a factory of special ammunitions, which you said before was very secret. Do you know for what these special factories of foreign workers or prisoners of war were used?
A. No, that was absolutely forbidden. There was a special secret production of ammunitions which was only known to and produced by the Germans, and even these Germans were selected specially for the task.
Q. Witness, within the framework of the GL, were political, or the prisoners of war being forced to work in ammunition factories?
A. No.
Q. Did the GL have anything to do with the normal ammunition?
A. No, they were only under the Ministry of Armament.
Q. Were they ever forced by the G1 to load bombers?
A. No. The GL had nothing to do either with loading the bombers, or planes.
Q. Do you know that Russian prisoners of war were used on ack-ack guns, or anti-aircraft guns?
A. Yes, I do, and in my position which I took up later on as head of the Luftgeu, I had the ack-ack under my orders, and on every battery there were ten to twenty Russians, volunteers we called them.
Q. Do you know what Milch's attitude was concerning this use of prisoners of war on tho ack-ack or anti-aircraft guns?
A. I know that the Fieldmarshal, namely Milch, reported to me concerning this matter when these Russian volunteers, or aids, were used on the ack-ack; to some extent they were namely withdrawn from their work in the Armament, and thus we lost a certain number of workers.
Q. What was Milch's attitude?
A. He was against the use of those prisoners on the ack-ack.
Q. Can you tell me if ever he said anything concerning these POWs, that they were shooting at their own people. What did he say about that?
A. He was against this whole business.
Q. Can you remember if he ever used an expression at the time, "That is a dirty trick to get these prisoners shooting at their own people."
A. I remember he was very cross when this decision was made .
Q. He himself, in other words, did not order it?
A. No.
Q. Was the ach-ach at all under his command?
A. No.
Q. Did you have anything to do with the Central Planning as such?
A. No, in my position as chief of the technical division, no. However, I know from various things that Milch told me concerning those conferences of the Central Planning Board, I only know of the questions regarding the raw-material.
Q. According to Milch's conversations, as you recollect, what was the task of the Central Planning Board?
A. Distribution of raw materials, namely, according to Hitler's figures concerning urgency steps, the relative production of raw material was distributed to the various branches of the service.
Q. Do you know anything with respect to how the Central Planning Board had to do with, or dealt with the workers?
A. No. I only heard about raw material, that is all.
Q. Do you know about the fact if the Central Planning Board was in charge of the Armament and War Economy?
A. No, I did hot know that.
Q. Did the Planning Board ever carry out such a task?
A. No, as far as I know concerning this matter, the Planning Board only took care of the distribution of raw material.
Q. Witness, did Milch once make admission of the fact that these Russian prisoners of war could not possibly be forced to work in industry by giving them more food, but they should be used in the agriculture for a little while?
A Yes, I do remenber that.
Q What was the purpose of it all?
A For their work out in the country they were to rest, and to regain strength. At that time they had decided to send people to agriculture, and later on we were to receive them back.
Q Do you know that in the industry there was a so-called Workers Protection Organization?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell me what that was for?
A The Werkschutz had a similar task, namely, the guarding of the whole place where the factory was at, and also the guiding of incoming people, and also the guarding of secret factories. Apart from that the air-raid precaution, and that of fire guarding.
Q Did it have the task of guarding the camps of foreign workers or PW camps?
A No.
Q Do you know anything about the fact that very often a better use of shirkers or slackers was striven for?
A I know this statement from many GL conferences we had. By that they meant those German workers or laborers who were not willing to work and thus jumped from one factory to another and did not want to work.
Q Do you know anything about the fact that Milch, GL, saw to it that those shirkers and slackers were sent to concentration camps to be educated by Himmler?
A No.
Q Did the GL ever do anything against these slackers?
A No. That was not its task either.
Q Did you ever hear that Milch ever sent foreign laborers or German workers to concentration camps?
A No.
Q Did he have the power to do that?
A No.
Q How would Milch have had to ask for this to happen -- through what channels ?
A He would have had to go through Goering.
Q Is it not correct that the channel downwards would have gone through you? I mean concerning the armament industry, if something had been ordered.
A If such an order had been given, then it would have had to go through me in order to go outside, because I was the man who was in charge of correspondence with the industry, liaison with the industry.
Q Such an order never went through you, did it?
A No.
Q Do you think that Milch would have gone over your head and issued such an order?
A No, not at all.
Q Is it correct that within the RLM and the GL Milch was known for following the regular channels accurately?
A Yes, he always used those channels when I was there.
Q Was the industry directly under Milch.
A No, it was not under Milch.
Q Was it under you?
A No, it was not under me either. Concerning the industry, we had contracts with the industry which were actually based on a voluntary basis. We could not give them any orders.
Q What do you know concerning sabotage and espionage in German industry within the last years of the war? Was it very frequent, or not too frequent?
A It occurred very seldom. I believe that it increased toward the end, but I myself know of only two cases.
Q Is it correct that when such sabotage took place, Hitler and Goering held the GL and its official clerks responsible for that?
A Yes.
Q Do yon know that Milch, when such sabotage was reported, very often saw to it that these sabotage cases were not considered sabotage cases?
A Yes. During the construction of planes many things happened which were actually slight mistakes and not sabotage, but omissions, for instance. If some sort of a tool remains on a fuselage or a wing, this can not be considered sabotage. It would be sabotage only when they used a special apparatus in order to destroy the steering mechanism of those planes, but I don't think that that ever happened.
Q Were these acts of sabotage ever reported?
A The persons concerned were very careful about that and did rather announce less than more. However, during their later investigations, they did show that they were omissions rather than sabotage.
Q Can you tell me about the general attitude of Milch; I mean, after a few years passed by, was he very much excited about the heavy airraids, etc.?
A These heavy airraids on our industrial works and later on the heavy airraids on our cities showed him that he had been right in his opinion when he took over the office. He had made a statement -- and that statement was correct -- and it greatly disappointed him that his proposals had not been realized. In other words, that from an aggressive war they had jumped to a defensive war. It actually gave him much to think about, just as it made us all nervous. From day to day the factories were being destroyed more and more, and the transportation facilities for material were more and more difficult.
Q Tell me, witness, is it correct that Milch was during such moods -that he used very strong words?
A Yes, he was known for that, but, as we knew him, we knew exactly that we should not take him too seriously in his remarks. As far as I am concerned, I had a very similar temperament myself, and I acted accordingly. We said many things that we did not carry out later on.
Q Did that occur much more frequently after his accident in Stalingrad?
A Yes. After that accident in Stalingrad, there was an increase of those expressions of indignation. However, we got along fine, always at all times.
Q Concerning these outbursts, did they come through in a greater circle of collaborators and did they lead to an acute sentiment toward the foreign laborers or PW's?
A No, I don't think so.
Q Can you judge Milch's character? Is he a kind hearted man or a hard hearted man?
A Generally speaking, a kind hearted man. He is, in a way, like a tack that is very soft.
Q Do you know anything about the fact that Milch before the Russian campaign had warned that this Russian campaign should not be carried out?
A Yes, he told me that once. That was once when I went to visit him in his home. He visited Goering and tried to see Hitler in order to give an oral report on this matter. At that time, as he told me, he said that the whole enterprise would end with the collapse of Germany, so to say, and he wanted to warn Hitler. Goering, however, did not permit him to visit Hitler or look up Hitler.
Q Do you know that Milch after Stalingrad had a conference with Hitler and explained to him that the war was lost and that Hitler should conclude a peace?
A Yes, I do. He told me about that too. That was after his mission at Stalingrad was finished. That was only in March, 1943. The whole conference last for one hour. During that conference, he told Hitler all the truth about Stalingrad and tried to explain to Hitler that if the war were to continue in the same manner, it would be lost for Germany. He allegedly proposed to Hitler to cease the attacks in the Hast and to roll back the front to the Dnieper and to go into a built-out defense position and fortified position. Furthermore, ho told him to dismiss Field Marshal Keitel and to use a special commander in chief of the Hast and in the West, and, due to the increased attacks or air raids, to go over to a defensive position in the air and to increase the production of fighters which were necessary for that, and to forget about bombers.
I know that Field Marshal Milch at that time was very much depressed. He came back very much depressed after that conference with Hitler. He personally did not believe that Hitler would draw the necessary conclusions from this report. As it actually happened later on, Hitler did not draw the necessary conclusions.
Q Do you know that he said that Ribbentrop should be dismissed, or that he tried to get him released?
A Yes, he tried; he did.
Q Do you know that he proposed to conclude peace with France?
A Yes. He tried that repeatedly.
Q Do you remember that later on, when there was very great damage, he was sorry that Hitler had not followed his suggestion?
A Yes
Q Do you know that he mentioned at that time that the old boundaries with France should be used and that no territorial demands should be made on France.
A Yes.