That was the last time I saw him. That was about a month later. I was ordered to see him because he wanted to give me the mission, that I should build high altitude and fast bombers and put them in the first line of production. These now were more important than transport planes. I had availed myself of that opportunity on that day and had prepared myself in writing in order to tell him my opinion about the general situation. That discussion took place in the evening. I had dinner with him alone. That was shortly before 9:00 o'clock; and it lasted until 3:15 a.m. Then in contradiction with all other discussions I had with him I was the one who was speaking all the time.
Q What did you tell him at the time?
A. Do you rant me to answer that in a few words or shall I go into detail?
Q As we say, choose your golden way; go between the two.
A Well, I did not want to talk about that for the period of six or seven hours which it lasted at the time. I told him first of all the truth about Stalingrad; and I told him that the question of leaving an army was a serious military mistake, although according to military and strategical points of view it had to withdraw, something which had been suggested both by myself and by the army. It was a mistake; and it did end with the loss of 350,000 men on the German side. However, our withdrawal in time would have saved the greatest part of these soldiers. I told him that, after all, the Russians were not as anxious to attack as that, that in the winter they would have dared to attack a German army which was in a difficult position. I told him then that that point was now the last point in the fate of the war. I told him that I had tried to roach him before the Russian campaign. However, I had been unable to do so because it had been forbidden. I said that the time was now five minutes past twelve. We use that expression in Germany when something is done with. I told him in that by that I meant that the war was lost.
I apologized for not considering his nerves. There was no tine for that. I thought it my duty to tell him my sincere opinion; as a field marshal I thought myself entitled to such an action.
1961-A I knew that he did not want to hear it.
However, I wished that he would hear me in spite of that. He could do with me whatever he wanted afterwards. I remembered, however, that he himself before the war had used strong words against the bad advisers of William II (Wilhelm). They had not approached him because of their cowardice and had not told him the truth. In no case would I wish to be similar to such a person in my own conscience, even if such blame could be put on me. He told me then, "Yes, you can say today whatever you wish to say."
I told him then that he was not any longer in a position to attack in the East; that these attacks which had already been developed he should stop; that he could only defend himself; and I was of the direct opinion that instead of building great fortification works in France and Norway, that during the whole of the spring, summer, and autumn, with respect to the Dnjepr position at the time, it was, I should say, 800 kilometers behind the Russian front, that he fortify that position with every means, which was to be of concrete, etc., in a great depth, between two-hundred and three-hundred kilometers depth; and in that way with strong fortification and good shelter for the soldiers, equipped with good equipment and food and ammunition, and that then he should take the troops back to that position for the winter, and that he should give up the whole territory between the fortification where they were then, out of which he would not get anything at all, nor oil, coal, or ore. By doing that he would shorten the length of the Russian front, and in such a way that the maintenance of those soldiers on the line would be much easier. Apart from that he should takemore care of the Eastern forces, and I am quite sure that on the whole Eastern front of twothousand kilometers, about ten million German soldiers, not one million was fighting, then he would have to take measures to change that. That was the only point he carried out later on, but unfortunately only towards the end of that year the result was that the fighting infantry units on the whole Eastern front amounted to 265,000 men of the Army. It was impossible to hold that front with such a small number as such.
I furthermore suggested to him that a greater personal change should occur, namely, he himself should give up command over the Army, and to take in 1962-A his place a capable General.
That thus he took before the German people that responsibility, which he could not bear. He was no soldier in that respect, because he die not learn that. I suggested to him to dissolve my own armies, my own branch of an independent Wehrmacht unit, and to put the Luftwaffe entirely under the Wehrmacht, for there was no longer a strategic Luftwaffe.
What I had to say now was special on the Army, and that this was certainly in a personal nature, namely, to remove the Reichsmarshal Goering from the Luftwaffe, and give him a different task. I said at an opportune moment that the Foreign Ministry also be eliminated from that position.
Q Would you give the name?
A Von Rib entrop, I suggested to him that the Fieldmarshal Teuffel be put in charge of the units at the front, and I gave as a reason that Keitel is too lenient towards you, and he does not 'now how to get his ideas through with you. However, you must have somebody who would force you to observe correct military measures. I told him then that the most important task in my opinion was the home defense of Germany, the air home defense of Germany, and to consider that in the first place; and also the fighter production should be placed in the first place, in Armaments. I showed him these figures of the English, the American and the Russian Armaments explicitly, and I showed him how these Armaments would have their effect over Germany, and also at what time this would happen. I reported to him that many false reports were made to him, and I gave him an exact instance. I reproached him that he over-estimated himself, and his allies, and that he under-estimated the Russians, and Stalin's personality, and that that led to the Stalingrad collapse, and he must realize that if the attack were discontinued in the East, and if he would be able to hold the Dnjepr position, and if the air defense would be able to prepare a military preparation for peace, if the enemy would see that this crushing of Germany from the air, was no longer possible and if the Russians would see that they would not be able to cross the Dnjepr without the most serious losses that then there would be willingness on the other side to come to peace terms which, he, however, should start right away.
It might be possible to get off cheaply, however, only if they would act immediately.
Then I also discussed the peace question, and I told him he might make a real peace with France without taking land away, and I am sure that France would still be able to consider that. The same applied to Belgium, and also Holland, as well as Norway. A peace with these countries would then make the greater countries of the Western territories more inclined to conclude peace with Germany which would be more advantageous for Germany. Those were matters of my opinion, and I did wish to touch on the important points, but I don't wish to touch upon all the other points. We listened to me and interrupted me only once, briskly, namely, upon the question whether he would be able to attack early in 1943 in the East, or not and I remember exactly that I told him more than twenty times, "You cannot attack any more" and first he said in a quiet way, then got more excited and more excited until he was very cross, and banged his fist on the table, and "I must attack there." I told him at the end, "I know I am very rude, but I shall not mention this question of attack any more and I want you to be convinced I shall not change my opinion."
Then he waited for a short while, I began to speak of something else, and then suddenly he said, "What would you say, Milch, if I would only make a short attack in order to be able to push through the Russian preparations before they start developing." I answered, "I regard that as a defensive measure, because a soldier carries out his defense by attacking in turn," He then took a deep breath and said, "Then we agree on that point." I said, "No, I don't think we do. If you are successful you will continue to advance. I would say after 48 hours, no matter what would have been achieved, "All troops retreat." Think of 1916 When the same error was made, when we did not succeed with a surprise attack we got obstinately stuck.
Q Witness, did you ever propose to make alterations in the cabinet and an entire change of the government system in Germany?
A Yes, I did mention that here before.
Q We shall come back to that Speer question. However, this is an anti-question to that.
A I'll have to mention that on 27 February I had spoken to Speer that now a war cabinet must be set up consisting of four or five personalities, namely of the best people we had and that this cabinet, under Hitler presidency would have full authority so that the dictatorship question would cease. We thought of people who were not with the government at that time but were outside the government. I told Hitler about that. He did not answer. He said he would think everything I told him over and told me if he wanted me he would send for me. May I add, so as not to give a wrong impression that I told him that I myself would be out of the question for the Luftwaffe, or for any other higher office. Otherwise, I would not be able to talk so frankly.
Q Witness, what influence did develop after Stalingrad with respect to the relationship between Hitler and Goering?
THE PRESIDENT: May I, before you go on, ask for the date of this conference with Hitler again?
THE WITNESS: It was on 5 March 1943.
After I returned I spoke with the people who were nearest to me about that matter, and a few witnesses have made statements to that effect. I made exact records about that. But I have lost them, however. I cannot forget the whole matter because it was something extraordinary for me to talk to the highest man of the Reich in such a way. I had had several open discussions with him, but never in such a critical form.
Regarding the question of how the relationship developed later on I have to say the following: It became worse and worse from time to time. It was due to a struggle which I had about the German air defense which also contradicted Hitler's idea of waging war, for this was the specific field of the Luftwaffe, and I as inspector general of the Luftwaffe in that capacity was forced to make suggestions. I did not give in to that matter, and I repeatedly brought it to that person's attention, in contrast with political proposals or proposals in the field of the army and navy, which were outside of my field of tasks and which I could bring to somebody's attention only if Hitler gave me his permission or if he wished me to.
Q With respect to this conference, did you inform him of the fact you wanted to have Goering gone?
A Yes, I did. I told Goering about that. I did not want to stab him in the back.
Q How, then, did your relationship with Goering become?
A I do not believe that this single incident had any influence on our relationship, which was bad anyway. Goering was not the kind of a man who would hold it against me. He had a certain understanding of the circumstances. There were things about me he was much more annoyed about.
Q Witness, shortly before the end I would like to ask you a few minor questions. Did you have to see about the civilian air raid precautions?
A Yes, the civilian air raid precautions were immediately put under my charge after the French campaign. The question was to build pill boxes for the German population.
Very few things had been done during peace time in this direction and one apparently had no idea whatsoever about the war of bombs and their 1966a effects, because the great heavy bombs were only created in almost all countries during the war.
In spite of that, air raid shelters to a great extent had been planned by us; that is, the Air Armament Ministry, which a very conscientious man was in charge of. He never got tired of repeatedly bringing his requireTodt's death I put them before Speer, those responsible for construction Hitler himself decided regarding this question.
Then we went ever to making small air raid shelters by protecting cellars.
Q. Witness, did you ever have any discussions with Hitler with reference to the cement question?
A. Yes, there was a conference in 1944 with Hitler, during which discussion we talked about the question of distribution of raw materials for construction purposes. That was early in 1944. I am trying to find the exact date I have it here. I proposed to Hitler at the time to put at the disposal of the city population larger amounts of concrete. He, further fortification in the West and North. I pointed out to him that for his new Fuehrer's Headquarters, which was to be built in Waldenburg in Silesia, he needed 28,000 tons of cement, and that had to be granted and agreed upon by Central Planning. That was exactly the amount needed for the entire civilian population, for their protection against air raids. I told him that this was a misproportion for which he could not take the responsibility. I asked kin on the basis of the comparison of these two figures to make a special agreement for the protection of civilians. He refused that rudely.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, with whom was this last conversation? It isn't quite clear.
DR. BERGOLD: Hitler.
THE DEFENDANT: There was a question of the Judge?
1967 (a)
DR. BERGOLD: Well, I have already answered the question. I said Hitler.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that is it.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. When was it that the enemy air raids were becoming felt by the German aircraft production?
A. That was toward the middle of the year 1943, when the Americans started the heavy daylight raids against the German Luftwaffe industry as their main target. July, in particular, was the break which was very weak, when we had been able to produce over 1,000 fighters. Within the next few months, however, the entire amount of planes for the front was 2,600, and 1,050 of them were fighters, and the production was being increased steadily. If these air-raids had not started, then toward the end of September the output would have increased to over 2,000 fighters, because the preparations had already been made a long time in advance. However, due to those air raids, we always remained on the same level. Everything that increased was barely sufficient to cover the losses which were occurring during the air raids, and that was the critical moment, in my opinion, particularly with respect to air defense.
Q. Are you through, witness?
A. Yes, I am through with that statement.
Q. What did you do about that danger?
A. We had already previously started to transfer our industry to a certain extent. We moved into many civilian factories. Most of them were small so that we could produce only parts there, and then put them together in one central factory. Of the 12,000,000 square meters around that time, July of August 1943, we had already transferred 4,000,000 by the same means. We, of course, increased, the speed. Of course, in various places we had to go somewhere else because our old factory was no longer there; although all workers were still working in the ruins, both summer and winter. I was in a factory and, although it was 15 degrees below, there was no roof, nothing, and the attack had started two days before, the Assembly Line was working again, when I arrived there the first fuselage came out of that factory.
That was an achievement of which I am still touched very deeply when I think of this. However, that is how our young boys were.
In spite of that fact, it was quite clear to me that the whole procedure of manufacturing could not possibly be kept up for a longer period of time, that it was a little bit more than twelve o'clock, because the destruction by the American bembers was extremely great. We called that "Work made to measure."
Q. Witness, with respect to transfer, did you then transfer, or did you plan to transfer the factories underground?
A. No, I did not do that. I was repeatedly urged to do so. However, I knew exactly that if I should never get the construction because it was not only the workers that were lacking; neither the cement nor the machines that purpose did we have. I knew from my struggle with reference to the civilian air raid precautions what everything was like. We could not increase the ridiculous amount of 28,000 tons. In our case we did not need thousands tons, but we needed hundreds of thousands of tons and millions of tons of material if we really wanted to achieve something.
That is why I declared to Goering and Hitler that these projects could not possibly be filled and that it was, therefore, useless to spend material and energy on that.
Q. That also applies to overground factories?
A. Yes, it does, to an even greater extent than to the underground factories. In the underground factories you have to distinguish between various things. There were caves in Germany, namely, the potash mines. That is the town near Helmstedt that the witness Vorwald mentioned. I don't know if they ever started working or operating. However, nature had already formed them and had them ready for us. No construction work of any kind was necessary there. Of course, these things would have been taken up without much ado.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you, that is sufficient. May it please Your Honor I think it is time.
THE PRESIDENT: Until Monday Morning at 9:30.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal is recessed until 0930 hours Monday morning.
Official transcript of tho American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Erhard Milch, defendant, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 March 1947, 0930 hours, Justice Toms, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. The Military Tribunal is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the courtroom.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please this Tribunal.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, the last time you were giving us a description of the suggestions you made with Hitler with regard to achieving a change. What was the impression you had afterwards as to whether he was going to follow your suggestions or not?
A. A that time I first of all hoped that he would somehow react to my suggestion, because in the assignment regarding Stalingrad it had been given by me too late, and I saw indications that at that time he was having confidence in me, and that he had confidence in my military ability, but during that week and month I waited for something to happen, but nothing did. In the Spring of 1943, after my conference, now attacks were ordered by him on the Eastern front. He was not making a defense for a possible defense of tho country, he was going to try to advance towards the Caucasus. As a result the German Army became stagnant on the Eastern front inspite of local success, and without results. It was only in November 1943 that he followed one of my suggestions, namely, to ascertain how many men were fighting in the East, as I said last Friday, and I need not repeat it. The attack was kind of catastrophic, but inspite of that no principal changes were made after that. In the other suggestions, both political, military, and those regarding the personnel, were not followed. Through that I lost my last hope, namely, we had a final basis favorable to Germany that could be established, regarding the bringing to an end this war through political means, in other words, peace negotiations, which might have had certain prospects of negotiations.
Q. That is enough, witness. Now I shall have to put to you this question. Why, after you recognized the fact did you remain with, or continue your activity at all. What were the arguments which made you place your service at their disposal at all?
A. The main reason was that I was responsible to my people, and, even if all the plans failed to materialize, I, nevertheless, was still having one last hope at least, that a proper air defense could be arranged for Germany in order to protect our home country, and the people against the worst destruction of their homes, and places of culture. That was the main reason for me.
Q. What then are the steps that you took in order to achieve your last final aim for final negotiations?
A. After 1941 I concurrently forced a strangle, I would like to say, with Goering and with Hitler in order to achieve a tight air defense, which I considered necessary as my last hope, that was towards the foundation of the Jaegerstab.
Q. Could you tell us about your earlier efforts before this formation of the Jaegerstab in more detail, though not to go into too many details.
A. I can refer to the suggestions I made at the time, and describe to you every point of view in the timing of same. The first suggestion was the case on 4 January -- I beg your pardon, now, on 26 March 1941 with Goering. I was making a report to him to the effect that the situation which was still undergoing an impression of an attack against England would continue to develop, and that we would have to expect a very serious setback through the British. I attached particular importance to what I regarded at that time the protection of our home country, that is to say, the civilian population, which was not sufficient. Immediately after that conference I went on an air defense inspection which lasted for several weeks and in every town, hansiatic-towns, and in every "Hansa" town in the north I inspected construction work which was going on on the spot, that.
is to say, air raid shelters which were being constructed by the Todt's Ministry. I was making particular effort for the strengthening of this protection work. Fortunately, on 8 May, again in 1941, I made a similar personal report to Hitler, who was not saying anything as to commenting at that time. On the 7th and on the 20th of June, both days, I reported to Goering, after previously having handed him a detailed memorandum amounting to three typewritten pages, which was very long indeed for any memorandum sent to Goering, and I had pictured for him both the point of view of the organization, as well as the tactical points of view ingreat detail.
I had suggested a unified command for the air defense, and demanded that need, as it had been the case up to that point; that of a division into two wester air fleets, and an independent command given for Germany. Likewise, I suggested to him a production program for fighters, and a training program for fighter pilots, and also the importance of night fighters. In either instance nothing happened, consequently, and then I went to see Goering twice during June, on the 23rd and on the 26th, that is to say, very shortly after the attack against Russian. In July I went to him three times, on the 4th, the 17th and 18th.
Thence again, once together with the technical people that was Udet, his general, and one of our best fighter pilots amongst them, Galland, and also with the others, Ihlefeld and Schnell, those were amongst the best fighter pilots at the time. Then they were, of course, slightly with me, with my own people, which they had the insight into the seriousness of the air battle with the British. Since neither Goering nor Hitler showed any interest or any reaction, I tried in August to get Fieldmarshal Keitel and to interest him in this question, hoping that he would try to place his influence upon Hitler. This was on the 14th and 16th of August. On the 20th of August, I talked to Goering in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, and informed him of my efforts, and asked him to follow it up in the same sense with Hitler. In September I went to see Goering five times, which is on September 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th and the 18th, that is September 1941, and again sometimes together with representatives from industries, who were to explain to Goering that in case of destruction of a town, production would cease.
On 20th of October I went to him with new documentary evidence, and figures regarding pending air armament on the part of the enemy. At that time I scored a minor success, and Goering together with me and in the presence of Udet, and Jeschonek, Jeschonek being Goering's chief of Staff, went to Hitler on 31 October 1941. However, we were turned down, but in order to give Goering my peace offer, we went to see him the following day, 1 November, and with Udet, and I had General Vorwald, who had been a witness in this trial, and another one of our best fighter pilots with me named Desau, when on 19 November 1941 I took over the task of the FL I made it a condition that the program will include the air defense in its consideration, a completely different extent then up to them. At that point at that time a monthly production amou ting to 200 fighters is only to bring that view to a memory and it is continued.
I think I had better make it shorter. 17 and 18 December, went to see Goering, once again with the Chief of the General Staff. In Janurary, three visits to Goering, together with Gallant and, on another occasion, with Joschonek. 24 January, went to see Hitler with Goering and Chief of Staff. Once again Hitler turned us down. Four days later, 28 January, made a visit to Hitler accidently. It was that day that Gallant received the Diamond Needle of the Knight's Cross, and I had to go along on Goering's behalf. Once again both of us turned the conversation to air defense, but with out success. The 24th, incidentally, was January 1942.
In February detailed conferences with our Chief of Staff on two occassions. Chief of Staff had joined Hitler's point of view to the effect that attack should be in the foreground and not defense.
In March, three visits to Goering. On one occasion Minister Speer was there. Then follows a big meeting of the Chiefs of Fleets with Goering, where, once again, I touched upon this subject.
In May I am taking Goering over our experimental stations at Rochlin, where I show him new fighters and new fighter armament, showthem again the following day, this time to the Chief of Staff. During that month there were two further conferences dealing with defense with Goering, and there is one in June.
In July there are in all four -- No, I beg your pardon, in July there are two with Goering, and in August we once again are together with Hitler on the 10th.