In spite of that, air raid shelters to a great extent had been planned by us; that is, the Air Armament Ministry, which a very conscientious man was in charge of. He never got tired of repeatedly bringing his requireTodt's death I put them before Speer, those responsible for construction Hitler himself decided regarding this question.
Then we went ever to making small air raid shelters by protecting cellars.
Q. Witness, did you ever have any discussions with Hitler with reference to the cement question?
A. Yes, there was a conference in 1944 with Hitler, during which discussion we talked about the question of distribution of raw materials for construction purposes. That was early in 1944. I am trying to find the exact date I have it here. I proposed to Hitler at the time to put at the disposal of the city population larger amounts of concrete. He, further fortification in the West and North. I pointed out to him that for his new Fuehrer's Headquarters, which was to be built in Waldenburg in Silesia, he needed 28,000 tons of cement, and that had to be granted and agreed upon by Central Planning. That was exactly the amount needed for the entire civilian population, for their protection against air raids. I told him that this was a misproportion for which he could not take the responsibility. I asked kin on the basis of the comparison of these two figures to make a special agreement for the protection of civilians. He refused that rudely.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, with whom was this last conversation? It isn't quite clear.
DR. BERGOLD: Hitler.
THE DEFENDANT: There was a question of the Judge?
1967 (a)
DR. BERGOLD: Well, I have already answered the question. I said Hitler.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that is it.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. When was it that the enemy air raids were becoming felt by the German aircraft production?
A. That was toward the middle of the year 1943, when the Americans started the heavy daylight raids against the German Luftwaffe industry as their main target. July, in particular, was the break which was very weak, when we had been able to produce over 1,000 fighters. Within the next few months, however, the entire amount of planes for the front was 2,600, and 1,050 of them were fighters, and the production was being increased steadily. If these air-raids had not started, then toward the end of September the output would have increased to over 2,000 fighters, because the preparations had already been made a long time in advance. However, due to those air raids, we always remained on the same level. Everything that increased was barely sufficient to cover the losses which were occurring during the air raids, and that was the critical moment, in my opinion, particularly with respect to air defense.
Q. Are you through, witness?
A. Yes, I am through with that statement.
Q. What did you do about that danger?
A. We had already previously started to transfer our industry to a certain extent. We moved into many civilian factories. Most of them were small so that we could produce only parts there, and then put them together in one central factory. Of the 12,000,000 square meters around that time, July of August 1943, we had already transferred 4,000,000 by the same means. We, of course, increased, the speed. Of course, in various places we had to go somewhere else because our old factory was no longer there; although all workers were still working in the ruins, both summer and winter. I was in a factory and, although it was 15 degrees below, there was no roof, nothing, and the attack had started two days before, the Assembly Line was working again, when I arrived there the first fuselage came out of that factory.
That was an achievement of which I am still touched very deeply when I think of this. However, that is how our young boys were.
In spite of that fact, it was quite clear to me that the whole procedure of manufacturing could not possibly be kept up for a longer period of time, that it was a little bit more than twelve o'clock, because the destruction by the American bembers was extremely great. We called that "Work made to measure."
Q. Witness, with respect to transfer, did you then transfer, or did you plan to transfer the factories underground?
A. No, I did not do that. I was repeatedly urged to do so. However, I knew exactly that if I should never get the construction because it was not only the workers that were lacking; neither the cement nor the machines that purpose did we have. I knew from my struggle with reference to the civilian air raid precautions what everything was like. We could not increase the ridiculous amount of 28,000 tons. In our case we did not need thousands tons, but we needed hundreds of thousands of tons and millions of tons of material if we really wanted to achieve something.
That is why I declared to Goering and Hitler that these projects could not possibly be filled and that it was, therefore, useless to spend material and energy on that.
Q. That also applies to overground factories?
A. Yes, it does, to an even greater extent than to the underground factories. In the underground factories you have to distinguish between various things. There were caves in Germany, namely, the potash mines. That is the town near Helmstedt that the witness Vorwald mentioned. I don't know if they ever started working or operating. However, nature had already formed them and had them ready for us. No construction work of any kind was necessary there. Of course, these things would have been taken up without much ado.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you, that is sufficient. May it please Your Honor I think it is time.
THE PRESIDENT: Until Monday Morning at 9:30.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal is recessed until 0930 hours Monday morning.
Official transcript of tho American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Erhard Milch, defendant, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 March 1947, 0930 hours, Justice Toms, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. The Military Tribunal is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the courtroom.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please this Tribunal.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, the last time you were giving us a description of the suggestions you made with Hitler with regard to achieving a change. What was the impression you had afterwards as to whether he was going to follow your suggestions or not?
A. A that time I first of all hoped that he would somehow react to my suggestion, because in the assignment regarding Stalingrad it had been given by me too late, and I saw indications that at that time he was having confidence in me, and that he had confidence in my military ability, but during that week and month I waited for something to happen, but nothing did. In the Spring of 1943, after my conference, now attacks were ordered by him on the Eastern front. He was not making a defense for a possible defense of tho country, he was going to try to advance towards the Caucasus. As a result the German Army became stagnant on the Eastern front inspite of local success, and without results. It was only in November 1943 that he followed one of my suggestions, namely, to ascertain how many men were fighting in the East, as I said last Friday, and I need not repeat it. The attack was kind of catastrophic, but inspite of that no principal changes were made after that. In the other suggestions, both political, military, and those regarding the personnel, were not followed. Through that I lost my last hope, namely, we had a final basis favorable to Germany that could be established, regarding the bringing to an end this war through political means, in other words, peace negotiations, which might have had certain prospects of negotiations.
Q. That is enough, witness. Now I shall have to put to you this question. Why, after you recognized the fact did you remain with, or continue your activity at all. What were the arguments which made you place your service at their disposal at all?
A. The main reason was that I was responsible to my people, and, even if all the plans failed to materialize, I, nevertheless, was still having one last hope at least, that a proper air defense could be arranged for Germany in order to protect our home country, and the people against the worst destruction of their homes, and places of culture. That was the main reason for me.
Q. What then are the steps that you took in order to achieve your last final aim for final negotiations?
A. After 1941 I concurrently forced a strangle, I would like to say, with Goering and with Hitler in order to achieve a tight air defense, which I considered necessary as my last hope, that was towards the foundation of the Jaegerstab.
Q. Could you tell us about your earlier efforts before this formation of the Jaegerstab in more detail, though not to go into too many details.
A. I can refer to the suggestions I made at the time, and describe to you every point of view in the timing of same. The first suggestion was the case on 4 January -- I beg your pardon, now, on 26 March 1941 with Goering. I was making a report to him to the effect that the situation which was still undergoing an impression of an attack against England would continue to develop, and that we would have to expect a very serious setback through the British. I attached particular importance to what I regarded at that time the protection of our home country, that is to say, the civilian population, which was not sufficient. Immediately after that conference I went on an air defense inspection which lasted for several weeks and in every town, hansiatic-towns, and in every "Hansa" town in the north I inspected construction work which was going on on the spot, that.
is to say, air raid shelters which were being constructed by the Todt's Ministry. I was making particular effort for the strengthening of this protection work. Fortunately, on 8 May, again in 1941, I made a similar personal report to Hitler, who was not saying anything as to commenting at that time. On the 7th and on the 20th of June, both days, I reported to Goering, after previously having handed him a detailed memorandum amounting to three typewritten pages, which was very long indeed for any memorandum sent to Goering, and I had pictured for him both the point of view of the organization, as well as the tactical points of view ingreat detail.
I had suggested a unified command for the air defense, and demanded that need, as it had been the case up to that point; that of a division into two wester air fleets, and an independent command given for Germany. Likewise, I suggested to him a production program for fighters, and a training program for fighter pilots, and also the importance of night fighters. In either instance nothing happened, consequently, and then I went to see Goering twice during June, on the 23rd and on the 26th, that is to say, very shortly after the attack against Russian. In July I went to him three times, on the 4th, the 17th and 18th.
Thence again, once together with the technical people that was Udet, his general, and one of our best fighter pilots amongst them, Galland, and also with the others, Ihlefeld and Schnell, those were amongst the best fighter pilots at the time. Then they were, of course, slightly with me, with my own people, which they had the insight into the seriousness of the air battle with the British. Since neither Goering nor Hitler showed any interest or any reaction, I tried in August to get Fieldmarshal Keitel and to interest him in this question, hoping that he would try to place his influence upon Hitler. This was on the 14th and 16th of August. On the 20th of August, I talked to Goering in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, and informed him of my efforts, and asked him to follow it up in the same sense with Hitler. In September I went to see Goering five times, which is on September 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th and the 18th, that is September 1941, and again sometimes together with representatives from industries, who were to explain to Goering that in case of destruction of a town, production would cease.
On 20th of October I went to him with new documentary evidence, and figures regarding pending air armament on the part of the enemy. At that time I scored a minor success, and Goering together with me and in the presence of Udet, and Jeschonek, Jeschonek being Goering's chief of Staff, went to Hitler on 31 October 1941. However, we were turned down, but in order to give Goering my peace offer, we went to see him the following day, 1 November, and with Udet, and I had General Vorwald, who had been a witness in this trial, and another one of our best fighter pilots with me named Desau, when on 19 November 1941 I took over the task of the FL I made it a condition that the program will include the air defense in its consideration, a completely different extent then up to them. At that point at that time a monthly production amou ting to 200 fighters is only to bring that view to a memory and it is continued.
I think I had better make it shorter. 17 and 18 December, went to see Goering, once again with the Chief of the General Staff. In Janurary, three visits to Goering, together with Gallant and, on another occasion, with Joschonek. 24 January, went to see Hitler with Goering and Chief of Staff. Once again Hitler turned us down. Four days later, 28 January, made a visit to Hitler accidently. It was that day that Gallant received the Diamond Needle of the Knight's Cross, and I had to go along on Goering's behalf. Once again both of us turned the conversation to air defense, but with out success. The 24th, incidentally, was January 1942.
In February detailed conferences with our Chief of Staff on two occassions. Chief of Staff had joined Hitler's point of view to the effect that attack should be in the foreground and not defense.
In March, three visits to Goering. On one occasion Minister Speer was there. Then follows a big meeting of the Chiefs of Fleets with Goering, where, once again, I touched upon this subject.
In May I am taking Goering over our experimental stations at Rochlin, where I show him new fighters and new fighter armament, showthem again the following day, this time to the Chief of Staff. During that month there were two further conferences dealing with defense with Goering, and there is one in June.
In July there are in all four -- No, I beg your pardon, in July there are two with Goering, and in August we once again are together with Hitler on the 10th.
In the meantime, through this inspection at Rechlin, I had aroused Goering's interest, and he too was now trying to act in favor of this program, but Hitler turned it down. The following day I visited Goering in order to revive his interest, which had been broken, and his resistance.
In August we once again discussed the matter together with Gallant, and we arranged that we would act on our own initiative independently as far as we could and against orders which had been given. A few days afterwards I gave the order to the Training Section, which was under my jurisdiction, the order once again to give priority to fighter pilot training. I ought to mention in this connection that in the beginning of the war the air force had only two training **** stations for fighter pilots, and one of those was dissolved after the beginning of the war.
In September I went back to Hitler on the same subject. Between the 11th and the 14th of October -- that is to say, during four days -I was together with Goering every day with regard to this fighter problem.
On 7 November Goering sent me the general commanding the bombers, who was making the request that all new fighter planes should be employed in the first place as fighter-bombers. That is to say, not for defense purposes, but for attack. This goes on through 1943, and I do not want to go into detail.
On 4 February Hitler is making the demand to me that transport planes should have priority and not fighters. This was just after Stalingrad, when the lack of transport aircraft was becoming apparent. A few days later, during February, Hitler is calling me on the telephone personally and now demands amphibious transport planes, since the evacuation of the Caucasus in the direction of the Krim would now have priority through using the sea route.
On 5 March -- that is just a few days afterwards - in a visit to Hitler, the order was given to the effect that high altitude bombers would now have priority; that is, no longer bombers, but most certainly not fighter planes. On 13 March Hitler is giving the order that the bombing war against Britain should now once again be accelerated and intensified. Two days later I pay another visit to Goering and report to him that this order can not be carried out, and this continues back and forth with regard to that program which was an impossibility and that the situation, more than before, made defense essential. This goes on through April.
There is another visit to Goering, and on 8 May Hitler sent for me and demanded new types of bombs. Subsequently, on 25 May, I made another attack on Goering, demanding that from now on new fighters, which had passed the initial tests excellently, should now have a priority on the program in a big way.
Toward the end of June 1943 I talked to Hitler's air adjutant, Colonel von Below, whom I called before me together with a number of well-known pilots, and I convinced him of the necessity of a defense in the air. This occurred several times afterwards, and Below supported me well, but he, too, was just as unsuccessful as I had been.
On 3 July 1943, the main subject during a conference Goering had with the chiefs of the air fleets was defense. Gradually my continuous reminders became too much for Goering. Particularly he did not like the fact that in front of all the others I would press matters like that, and there was a very serious argument between him and me, during which he said to me that my repeated written reports regarding defense, which I had made in my capacity as Inspector General, had not been in read by him at all.
He said, verbatim, "Don't you kid yourself that I am reading the nonsense you are putting down on paper for me," whereupon I stated that in that case it was quite useless for me to carry out tours of inspection as Inspector General, and he thought, as far as he was concerned, it was useless.
This goes on throughout July. I no longer have any hope that Goering will help, no more than I have hope that the General Staff will help me, or the Chief of Staff will help me, and on 15 July I informed Minister Goebbels, who was playing a very important part with Hitler at that time, calling him to Rechlin and showing him our experiments. He promised that he would support me with Hitler, but that had no success either.
On 20 July 1943 I call all Ministers and State Secretaries of the German Reich and all Gauleiters to Rechlin to show them the means air defense had at its disposal. These people, of course, were particularly interested, especially the Gauleiters, in the defense of their home country, and I made a very frank speech before them, told them about our efforts of the past, and asked them to press Hitler at every opportunity.
On 23 July I went first to Goering and then with him to Hitler in order to make another attempt. Hitler would not listen to a thing. The following day, in order to obscure the impression he had from this conference with Hitler, I succeeded in getting Goering to come to Rechlin, and once, to discuss everything with him in practice.
Now, on 28 July, at last, an order arrived to the effect that now air defense would have priority. How I thought at last my efforts had been crowned with success, but as early as a week later the air armament program once again occupied seventh place, since in the meantime some sort of serious events had occurred at the fronts, end one day after air defense had priority, I was ordered to appear before Hitler in regard to some other problem.
For the first time he was extremely unpleasant to me. He had never treated me badly before. This was the first time.
Now, in spite of this, and two days after the priority order had arrived, I had a previously prepared program for the conversion to fighters, which I had started, and night fighters had been included on that occasion. About that time the monthly output of fighters had risen above 1,000. I could see that there were certain technical difficulties regarding materials, pre-fabricated materials, for instance, and I arranged with Speer that we should meet our department heads once a week in order to step up production of fighters. Those regular weekly meetings commenced on 3 August.
After Jeschoneck's death I immediately talked to the new chief of the staff, Korten, and informed him. He concurred in my views. He had a very excellent relationship with Hitler, but in spite of that not even he succeeded in bringing about any changes.
Now, this goes on currently, and in October, 1943, Goering once again was prepared to do everything for fighters, but he could no longer score successes with Hitler. I, once again, tried in November to get Himmler interested, whom I met by accident when Hitler was making a speech to junior officers, which we had always been ordered to attend, and Himmler promised to support me. He had a good position and great influence with Hitler, but I didn't notice any success on his part.
At the end of November, we displayed new fighter types to Hitler at Insterburg, these jot planes, and Hitler was very much impressed but stated that bombers and transport planes had priority. In 1944 too this goes on without any changes occurring.
How, I could see that according to the time and the situation of this war great efforts on everyone's part in favor of defense would have been too late, and I come to the decision that now I would out my ties, I would cut loose, and this decision was arrived at by me at the end of January. I talked about this with my immediate collaborators, to whom I talked about it at various times.
Q. Witness, just one question, I would like to interrupt and ask, can you clear up for us the question why Goering, who, after all was an expert, did not agree to your proposals and why he did not succeed in convincing Hitler?
A. Goering knew Hitler's opinions accurately, I would say, attack, not defense. Suggestions which he made cautiously regarding defense had been turned down by Hitler. Goering was always under the impression that Hitler's ideas came from God, and that he couldn't make mistakes so that would be the right road. In 1941 and '42 no larger air destruction had happened in Germany, and he must have closed his eyes to possible future developments. When towards the end of 1943 he was really convinced that air defense ought to be pushed into the foreground by him too, he had lost his influence on Hitler.
The Stalingrad affair was the changing point for Goering too. At that time he had favored supplies being flown in by air, and Hitler was taking umbrage over this, and after that period he was excluding him more and more and treating him worse. On one occasion Goering was becoming rather energetic before Hitler with regard to this defense question in my presence, but Hitler yelled at him in an almost indescribable fashion so Goering shut up. He thought that it was his duty, his duty and his faith that he should remain silent before Hitler.
If I may carry on at this point, I would say that in order to carry out my decision to bail out, I came to an agreement with Speer to the effect that air armament with its small factories would now be transferred to his ministry too. Since Goering would not have agreed to this at all, we wanted to found a fighter staff, a Jaegerstab, which was to take over the production now and which would facilitate this transfer to Speer. On the 23rd of February the idea was born to form a fighter staff, and during the subsequent days I talked it over with Speer, who was sick at the time, and on the 2nd of March, 1944, the first meeting of the Jaegers tab took place.
May I add that this was not an independent authority and that consequently this staff did not have any executive powers or any powers to give orders. It was composed of people from the various ministries, the bulk of which came from the Armament Ministry. We, the G. L. supplied the second biggest portion, and then there were representatives from the Railway Ministry, Post Ministry, and various others, who joined. Only considerations were taking place in this staff. Recommendations were made. The actual execution as far as ** every department was concerned was a matter for its own ministry, and, of course, independent members of the fighter staff, therefore, once they had returned to their ministry would there have to draft corresponding orders or obtain such orders from the higher sources, from the higher people concerned.
In other words, the Armament Ministry could accept or turn down these proposals, just as could all other ministries, and carry them out or refrain from carrying them out. As far as the Air Ministry was concerned, I was the responsible person.
On the 4th of March we obtained Goering's agreement and on the 5th Hitler's agreement. Apart from these meetings of the fighter staff my own conferences in my offices continued with my technical departments.
I can add very briefly what my other efforts regarding defense were when this transfer was taking place. On one occasion on the 19th of April I went to see Goering and on the 23rd of May I went to see Hitler, but Hitler merely gave the order on that day that this new jet fighter, which was the only one which had prospects for effect at that time, was not to be employed as a fighter, but only as a blitz bomber. This aircraft hadn't at all been designed for such a purpose. Conversion became necessary which, as far as the use of that aircraft was concerned at that limit of the war, out us back six months.
At that point I became abundantly aware of the fact that no defense of Germany would materialize. Subsequently I retired on the 20th of June. Perhaps I should go into this in detail, but there is one more thing I can say, that at my retirement Hitler demanded from Speer that the four engine bomber made by Heinkel would have first priority of air arr.ar.ient. Here again there was only the idea, nothing but the idea of attack, not defense.
If I can summarize it very briefly then there were fifty-four visits of mine to Goering during those years of dealing with defense. I went to see Hitler sixteen times. Fifteen men from the air force not belonging to my department, aside from the conference which I had with Goering, were consulted by me during conferences and inspections lasting for days when I tried to convince them, and likewise apart from that large figure which I previously mentioned of ministers, gauleiters, state secretaries, there were thriteen individual actions on my part in connection with important people in order to convince them of the necessity of defense so that they too would represent my view before Hitler.
Altogether this amounted to exactly ninety-nine acts according to my notes.
Q. Witness, you have just testified that you had founded the Jaegerstab in order to gradually leave your post. Did that further have any other purpose, for instance, the removal of existing difficulties outside of your own department?
A. Yes. Air armament was part of the entire armament program. Of course, it had very small, very negligible powers. Hitler was favoring army and naval rearmament very strongly and demanding those. Speer's ministry for years had had to carry out far-reaching interference and intervention into all problems which were important for my industry. As a result experts and other workers had been taken away from us quite simply everywhere. The armament inspectors and defense construction commanders, both of whom were under Speer, of course, succeeded in carrying this through. It was merely by accident that I learned of this in individual cases. For instance, quite accidentally one of the industrialists came to see me. We raised objections but we could not alter the situation, something which I touched upon the other day in here. Now I was wanting to use the Jaegerstab in order to transfer part of this responsibility for air armament to Speer and his ministry so that such intervention, which was particularly noticeable in the material sector, could no longer be carried out.
The man who had a task approximately like my own in Speer's ministry was Mr. Sauer. Sauer was a very clever man, very able, very energetic, and since he was always sent for reports to Hitler personally, he knew Hitler and his intentions intimately, and he knew therefore that Hitler wasn't so keen on air armament, and from that he drew the conclusion which led to these interventions in our sphere. I was very anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would assume his part of the responsibility.
There was a struggle about this after with Speer until it finally came about that Sauer joined the Jaegerstab.
I was very anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would assume his part of the responsibility. There was a struggle about this, even with Speer, and it was finally achieved that Saur joined the Fighter Staff, but I wasn't going to found the Jaegerstab at all without him. And it turned out, eventually, that, very energetically, Saur now tackled this new task and he did in fact succeed to some extent, in bringing Hitler at least to a standstill. But Hitler's views and Hitler's orders, he could not change either. Apart from that, of course, it was necessary, if I were to transfer armament work to Speer, the final armament, this would have to reach Saur's hands eventually, so that it was equally essential that Saur should be included right from the start.
Q Did you give him the smaller or larger responsibility within the Jaegerstab?
A Let me answer it like this: I gave him as much freedom of action as possible, since he was going to take it over later, and it was his nature, that, if he touched something, he would look after it very energetically, and I was happy to see that ho was going ahead so emphatically.
Q Witness, you have made notes about everything you did during the war. Can you tell this High Tribunal how or whether, in the Jaegerstab too, you were gradually getting out? Can you tell us how many meetings during individual months you participated in?
A In March, I participated in 15 meetings. Of course they were taking place daily, and I joined two trips. In April, I participated only in eight meetings, and one journey. In May, I attended five meetings and two journeys. In June, I joined two meetings only, and again, two journeys. And, in July, I didn't attend any meeting at all, neither a meeting nor a journey. I took more active interest in the journeys, totalling seven, in order to go out into the provinces and show that the handing over of my task to Saur was taking place with my agreement. There are figures, March 15, then eight, then two.