On the other hand, however, I was convinced that the SS had not written to me because the SS did not know our competent agencies, and that the officers did not know the competent officers or agencies of the SS. I knew nothing about their organizations and branches, and apart from that Himmler if he ever wrote anything, or said something, he only addressed himself to Goering, or maybe sometimes to me. To Himmler I was just a small man. However, Hippke did not exist at all for him.
Q Witness, did you at any time give orders about medical experiments, or of any other kind, fur Rechlin, or for technical things -
A No.
Q (continuing -- or medical things?
A No, never. That the Benzinger who has been mentioned hero repeatedly was actually unknown to me. However, Rechlin for me amounted to a material for me of ninety-nine percent research. I never saw at all what Benzinger had figured himself, and I never visited his factory which he was supposed to have out there. I made out one thing in reference to low pressure chambers, it was absolutely unknown to mo that we had a mobile pressure chamber, which had been at the disposal of the DVL. That was outside my interest, or anything about that matter.
Q Witness, how far were you interested in those high altitude experiments in question as GL?
A We were interested in the real altitude tests as 1 know it exactly, because I want to state this figure as 13,500 meters, and we added 500 meters in order to get a square figure. However, we knew that this last 500 meters which I had mentioned, we were not too interested in that. We were only interested in the first place in cabin planes, too, after a certain test had been carried out on 388-cabinsuit, whether it did not succeed or fail, because a person could not move properly the way those suits were, due to low pressure up there in the air is felt much more than here on the ground.
Q Witness, were you in charge of the DVL?
A No.
Q Did you have certain powers with reference to disciplinary powers in reference to the DVD?
A No.
Q Did you assign the personnel of the DVL?
A No. I know many things about the DVL, exactly, because up to 1933 my position as director of the German Lufthansa I was present, as already I was part of the Board of the DVL. It was an incorporated association, and had a certain board, which consisted of many industrialists, which at that tine consisted of Professor Junkers, Professor Dornier, Professor Heinkel, and Mr. Heinkel and several other gentlemen and myself. There was also somebody from the German School for Traffic. The money for the flying tests of the DVL carried out material tests for at least ninety-nine percent cane from the Transportation Ministry. That was the purchase. They bought service, and the German Association for Aviation delivered then research notarial, or results. That was the only connection which we had with then, namely, that they bought. However, a registered incorporated association is not in a subsidiary position for an organization in Germany. When I came to the Ministry later on as Secretary of State, I automatically moved out of the Board of DVL, because I represented the government, and that would have interfered with the freedom of the facts.
Q Witness, how was the research work, or how was it organized within the framework of DVL.
Was it under the RLM?
A. When I took over my position as Chief CL, I started a chain organization, a basic chain organization. During that occasion I also created a special department called "Research" which was under the Ministrial Director Baeumker.
Q. Baeumker?
A. Baeumker, and I just dissolved that immediately because it was there without reason to exist. The Rt-H could not possibly give orders for research, neither for us nor for outer persons in Germany. A great number of research institutes were working, which most of them belonged to some university, or to Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, or to some other free organization. For instance, for the Luftwaffe over twenty such institutes worked, and then we had one of them, namely, one of the most important ones at Adlershof. During the conference of the Deputy of the Reichsmarshal for these questions, or with delegates, rather, I agreed to create a research committee of the Reichsmarshal, and these were not under the Reichsmarshal, but they wore free collaborators. This committee consisted of four persons, the president being Professor Prandtl in Goettingen, the most famous streamline expert in Germany, and also Professor Seewald from the technical high school in Aachen, and also Professor Georgii from the technical high school in Darmstadt. Then associated not to be a professor but as principal, Beeumker for the economical question of this research committee. The professors were not in a position, for instance, to give a special report. These things were too far from them. However, these people had to be compensated for cash expenditures, and Baeumker was one who was supposed to take care of that. Baeumker was not a scientist, nor was he a technician either. He was just a clerk, an administrative clerk.
Baeumker preferred then to take care of the research of the Jews into Bavaria, of which he took very good care of the administrative part.
Q Witness, just a minute here. This chart as it appears on the wall, is it right?
AAs far as facts are concerned with Foerster, Foerster was under my orders, and Hippke was under the first order, that is correct. Everything else on this map is wrong. The lefthand side was all directed by Hippke. I don't know it very well, despite the fact I notice the organization at that time was entirely different; and that on. the right hand side, it is nothing but pure fancy without even showing a trace of correctness. I know the righthand side very wall, the people named there are entirely of different tasks, it had nothing to do with research work, and even up there, the way these "brown" offices are drawn up are certainly wrong.
Q Witness, Rascher referred to you as the third witness. Can we not draw a conclusion that you did know him?
A I don't know him, and the first thing I over heard about that man, that was during my examination hero in Nuernberg in 1945. At that time I had asserted I did not know or met him, and did not know his name. Then much later I found out that he had been shot by the SS, namely, I found that out a very short while ago, and the only way I found out any thing about him and of his misdeeds was through those records here, and then I can remember very well that such a criminal of his vanity would have gladly played with my name, so to say, as names were not protected from such things in Germany.
Q Thank you. That is enough. Were you in charge of the Sea-rescue service?
A No. It was under the Quartermaster General.
Q Witness, the last question on this. You heard Herr Becker-Freyseng testify here that Kalk on 11 September called you up by telephone, and asked you in reference to Rascher's film, and what was going on. What could you understand from this question of Kalk's asking you that; wasn't Kalk an expert, and asking you that question?
A. It was on 11 September at about four o'clock. I saw from these records here that Kalk participated in the showing of the film. I can imagine -- this is an assumption though -- that he suddenly heard that the man who had a film was there. Later on he referred to him as the competent adjutant of Hippke and was convinced that this film came from Hippke. That is the only thing I can imagine in this whole connection Kalk was my personal physician. He was with me often. However, for the main thing, he was chief physician of two great hospitals in Berlin. Ho was a civilian doctor and only in officer of the reserve during the war.
Furthermore, in the Medical Inspectorate ho was being used as a consulting internist with Hippke, and in that capacity he went on trips quite often. He was one of our most favored German internists, and he is an expert on all fields with reference to liver diseases and also others.
Q. Thank you; that is enough.
A. That is the reason I did not see him for weeks and weeks. When we were together, we never discussed medical questions. He was a very good pilot, however, and I always put one of my personal planes at his disposal. We discussed only things in connection with flying, in which he was vory deeply interested. However, he knew exactly want my opinion was of the general situation and of my attitude toward my superiors.
Q. Thank you; that is enough. Witness, a very few concluding questions, I am afraid, however, that I shall not be able to get through today. Witness, can you tell me how often in the period 1939 to 1945 you went to see Hitler, Goering, Himmler, or any other SS leaders?
A. Yes, I am in a. position to do so on the basis of the notes that I made daily. I shall give you just a general idea of the whole thing now. I drew up a plan for the years 1939 -- or rather, from 1939 no 1945, which was the time when I was captured. That is six and a half years, approximately at least.
I went to see Hitler 48 times altogether; namely, in general discussion, that is, where other people were also present -- soldiers or officials, etc, 19 times; when I was Inspector General for the Air Forces, eight times;
as Air Ordnance Master General 12 times; when I was in the Central Planning Board, nine times. It occurred often that I discussed two or three tasks at the same time. However, here I have only mentioned the main things.
With Goering I was there at the same time 153 times from 1935 until 1945 -- six and a half years. That is approximately 20 times a year. Also, in general discussion, namely, where other people wore present, 78 times; as Inspector General, 39 times; as GL, 35 times, and with reference to Central planning Board questions, once.
I was with Himmler once in 1939, once in 1940, twice in 1941, namely, with reference to personnel questions. Then in 1942 I did not so him at all. In 1943 I saw him once when he was at Speer's, and once I discussed the general situation with him. That was the question of home defense. Then I met him in 1944 once at Hitler's headquarters. Altogether, this is seven times in those six and a half years.
With reference to all three of these personalities here, Hitler, Goering, and Himmler, I saw them more often than I have said, during official matters, receptions, etc., or during burials or during special banquets. However, I wrote down all these cases in which I had spoken with those men, whether personally or officially.
With reference to the other SS leaders, I met Wolf during the war three times, Heydrich, twice. Both times there were personnel questions regarding my proteges. Daluege, four times, of which three times occurred within a period of three days, one after the other. The question was that the police ham taken over the executive powers of the civilian air raid precautions, the alarm question and the order in air raid shelters, etc, which were before at the Air Ministry. However, it had. been turned over to the police in 1940. It was an agreement which Goering had reached with Himmler without asking us for our consent or advice.
Then in 1943 I met Heydrich's successor, Kaltenbrunner, twice, and here, also, I noted personnel questions concerning the men in my Ministry. That is altogether four persons concerned, and I saw them only six -- twelve times in those six and a half years.
The reason was that I saw these people very seldom.
Q. Witness, I shall come back now to your curriculum vitae. On what occasion was there a final breach between you and Goering?
A. That is a question which is a little difficult to answer because the relationship was a continuous action. From 1937 on the relationship was sinking. In 1941 it looked a little bettor when I was ordered to take over the office of the GL. This lasted for a few months, and then it become worse. After Stalingrad it deteriorated much faster. Then shortly after the formation of the Jaegerstab I received evidence that my wish to withdraw from the Armament was also Goering's wish with reference to me, without his knowing my intentions. In March 1944 he asked Saur for all questions of the Luftwaffe, and not all the questions which were in direct connection with Saur, namely, production, but also questions of development. That facilitated my withdrawal on 20 June.
I may add that Saur could not possibly change this if the Reich Marshal ordered him. He then had to carry it out.
Then there were considerably difficulties with Goering in 1944, or rather, already in 1943. I forgot to say that. That was on the occasion when we showed our equipment in Insterburg, where I was treated in such a way that I could not help but excuse myself with Goering and took off immediately in my plane. A little while later he spoke to mo about it. Then we had several differences.
The reason with me was air defense or no air defense, and I had reproached him of being too soft toward Hitler and that, on the other hand, ho did not permit us to be harsher in our dealings with him. That for me was always the reason. It had. not boon in the personal field. We were strangers to each other. However, I did not mind it, and I did not wish to belong to the closer inner circle of Goering.
During the whole spring of 1944 there was considerable tension, and, of course, I did not act correctly at all times, and I was a little bit too harsh towards him.
Then, on 18 April he called no to Obersalzberg. We had a discussion which lasted for two hours and in which on his only Bodenschatz took part. I was not to take anybody along. He started reproaching no. Then, as we happened to be alone, so to say, I answered the sane way. For instance, he asked me if it were true that I used frank words about him. I said, Yes, that that could be quite possible, and I wished ho would tell no more in detail what it was all about. He gave no a piece of paper on which he had many instances written down from those examples. I could see that my telephones were being monitored. That was the proof, and I reproached him for that. Then I told him that in reality I was harsher than I had actually said over the telephone, and I also told him ay opinion.
THE PRESIDENT: At that point, we will adjourn until tomorrow naming at 9:30.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is recessed until 0930 hours tomorrow morning.
(At 1630 hours, 17 March 1947 a recess was taken until 0930 hours, 18 March 1947.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Erhard Milch, defendant, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 18 March, 1947, 0930 hours, Justice Toms, Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. The Military Tribunal is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the courtroom.
ERHARD MILCH - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, yesterday the last question raised here was the conference of the 18th of April, 1944, during which your relation with Goering deteriorated in a decisive way. Will you please continue explaining to us this development?
A. I rejected Goering's reproaches, and I even made my own reproaches to him, and especially I discussed the question that he did not sponsor the air defense in a sufficiently strong manner and that now he could already see the results. We also discussed the question that he, as the President of the Reich Chamber was responsible for the maintenance of the constitution. The discussion lasted for quite some time and I think that this was the final point in our relations.
Q. Is it correct, or rather did you have any knowledge of the fact that at Pentecoto, 1944, even before you were officially to resign when at that time Goering handed over the whole air armament as a whole to Mr. Sauer.
A. Yes, indeed. That was on the 29th of May, Whit Monday. Goering did not wish that I took part in this conference, and as he expressed it he handed over the whole of the air armament to Herr Sauer This was reported to me by my exports who attended this conference, but I consider that a quite nor mal stop in this whole chain of events.
Q. Witness, on the 20th of June, 1944, what happened then?
A. At that particular day I had been summoned to Hitler, and Goering summoned me before the conference with Hitler, and ho told me that the armament was now as a whole and had to be under Speer's supervision as a whole, and that my resignation as G.L. was meant by this new development. He then went together with me to Hitler's. Speer also was present, and now Hitler issued the directive that Speer should take over also the whole of the air armament, and in his presence Goering reported that I, in my capacity as G.L. was resigning and also as Staatssekretaer, that in order not to create the impression of a dispute in public he asked me to continue to remain inspector general of the Luftwaffe.
Q. Witness, then, did you receive a new task with Speer himself?
A. During his talks Hitler had mentioned the fact that I, after all, could help Speer, and that it was possible too that Speer had not quite recovered his health, because, after all, he had been ill for several months, and he asked me also to get a survey of the whole armament ministry. There is nothing more in detail which was mentioned with regard to this fact but Speer may have asked to keep this somehow loose connection with me because in some direction I had to be protected and I could not get this protection from Goering any longer.
Q. In the framework of Speer's organization did you exert an actual task?
A. No, because I had reached an agreement with Speer that I should not work in any capacity in his offices because Speer himself had recovered his health and in this proposal of Hitler's he only saw a pressure on himself because Hitler thus could say, "If you don't do what I want you to do, then I'll have you replaced", and that was not my intention at all.
Q. Witness, when were you removed from your post as Inspector General then?
A. That was during the first days of January 1945. The letter was dated as of the 7th of January. It was received at my offices on January 15. But there was no conference with Goering during all these months.
Q. Witness, what knowledge did you receive of the fact whether, and in what manner, Hitler wanted to take action against you yourself?
A. That was in ---. The 1st of October I had a severe accident, that is, in October 1944, and I was sick until spring of 1945. About this time Speer wanted to use me in order to have the railway station and railway installations which had been damaged by air raids, in order to have these installations repaired, whole life in Germany was paralyzed by these damages. There were no longer communications between the West and the center of the Reich, and the organization of the railways was not up to the task to have these damages repaired and removed. Thereupon, Speer asked Hitler whether he would agree that I take over these repairs.
Hitler then declared "No". He didn't want that. He would take an action against me. That was quite enough material. The post was Mr. Kaltenbrunner, that is, evidence against me, and Mr. Kaltenbrunner had reported to Hitler. Speer, as my friend, succeeded in getting the thing put off because he requested that he himself could look into the matter. Hitler agreed to that and it was found out, after a lot of hemming and hawing from the side of the Gestapo, that in reality there was no evidence at all against me. Speer reported that to Hitler and Hitler answered, "I'm not interested in that. This man has to be removed." But now, in April 1945, when already at that period Berlin was being encircled, I left Berlin on the 26th in the early morning and then I never heard anything about it. There was no disciplinary action against me and a few days later I was captured.
DR. BERGOLD: I have an objection against the translation. The word "vanish", "disappear", it has a double sense in German and that is the sense of having somebody removed, to do away with somebody, rather, make his disappear. The sense here was to have him killed by court action. In that I saw the answer.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: It's very confusing now. Who said this, and---?
DR. BERGOLD: Hitler said this.
A. (continuing) This was the answer to the 5th of March 1943, where during the night I had told him my opinion quite frankly.
Q. Witness, why didn't you try to get out of the Hitler regime earlier, at an earlier moment?
A. When for the first time I saw that this regime, this system, was not a lucky one for Germany, as I had supposed in the first years after 1933 - at that time we were already in the war - I was a soldier and I had fought for my country as a soldier. At that time I didn't think it anything criminal either, that Hitler's intention didn't seem criminal to me and the events in the beginning, after all, made it appear that he was right.
His successes in Poland, in Norway, and also in France, strengthened 2062A his position very strongly with the German people and only after I heard that he was intending new to attack Russia, and to get Germany into a different war, then I thought that was a crime against the German people because such a war could only end with Germany's defeat.
Even for a soldier in Germany it was impossible to resign during the war. After all, he would never have gotten his discharge either. Hitler would only let go the people he wanted to get rid of himself, and after all, I didn't feel myself responsible only to Hitler, but first of all I felt responsible towards my people, and at that time I was still hoping to save at least the German home country from the destructions by air raids. This hope I maintained until the end of 1943. Then I lost this hope and then I started to think by which means I could get out of it. I could not resign. My demand to be used at the front was rejected. Thus I had only one way and that was the way to take over the part of the work which was now the most important and hand it over to Speer and therefore we created this Fighter Staff, and then my resignation, on the 20th of June, came about. There was no other possibility which I saw and during the two years I have been in prison now I often thought it over, what else I could have done, but up until today I have not found a way, which in that period of time and under that government could have given the responsibility to a field marshal to resign. After all, it was quite a miracle that even in this manner I succeeded in resigning. I think that most of the others didn't even have that opportunity.
Q. Witness, just a minute ago you stated that in the beginning you did not think that what Hitler was doing was a crime. You explained to us, however, that you continuously made efforts to preserve the peace. Didn't you think that war was a crime, or did you think that Hitler's reasons for the war were pertinent?
A. I thought even until 1938, yes, until the spring of '39, I strongly believed that Hitler would try to prevent a war in any event. I considered him a bluffer, but however, a man who was clever enough to go on right until the end, and he was too clever to be brought into a bad situation.
However, I observed the whole negotiations concerning the Polish Corrdier, and I considered that the same kind of bluff. Afterward I believed that Poland actually had made this attack on the Gleiwitz Radio Station and also the murdering of tens of thousands of Germans in Brombe and in the other locations. On seeing these conditions I did not consider it a crime that Germany should defend herself against these occurrences.
Q. Witness, you explained to us that during the first period Hitler was a man who was quite accessible to reasonable advice. Later on, in his general nature and in his general countenance, did you see a change?
A. Yes, the change--as I see it now from this moment -- occurred slowly after the annexation of Austria, after the Anschluss. Even the Sudetenland action already exceeded what the Hitler of prior days had considered right. Even stronger the change could be seen when Prague was occupied. During the war the great successes, according to my opinion, changed Hitler completely. Now he was no longer the man who could be influenced by others; he was quite self-confident. He would not brook any opposition and he lost more and more the confidence in his fellow workers, and especially concerning his generals. He considered himself quite a strategist and the successes, after all, were brought about by the military leaders themselves, but he considered that he himself had gained these successes. While, during the first years, he would never accept any flatteries, he was now very accessible to them.
I know that even at the beginning of the war he accepted drugs, and I think he received an inoculation every day, and my doctor told me once that there was strychnine in those inoculations and also hormones, and this doctor, who was a specialist in his field, told me that cannot end well.
A man is changed by these shots, not only in his physical condition, but also in his mental capacity and morally. And he seemed to have deteriorated more and more as time went on and thus, Hitler, who now had been influenced by Stalingrad and had received a special shock, a shock where he actually separated -- at least as his inner feelings were concerned -- he separated from Goering, whom he had appointed his own deputy and his own successor, and from that moment on one could not get along with Hitler anymore. He became an autocrat more and more. Even the slightest objection was shouted down by him.
Thus, in about the year of 1943, and even stronger in 1944, and especially after the attempt on his life, he changed in a way that he was just the contrary of what he was before, and marched in the opposite direction. On one occasion he had written that a war could never be conducted so long that the actual substance of the people would be endangered. At such a moment the chief of the state tried to stop, whatever be the cost, because the substance of the people and the blood of the people was the only thing that was worth saving.
Until 1945 he kept up the lost war in spite of the fact that the substance and the blood of the people had been attacked in a very strong way for a long time already, and thus I could quote quite a number of examples concerning the complete change this man underwent. I did not consider him a normal human being any longer. He was not insane in the sense that one could say he was really insane, but he did not think straight any longer, and his logic was rather unclear.
Q. Witness, a few days ago you told us that in March 1943, during a conference, you had proposed to Hitler to appoint a war cabinet -
A. Yes.
Q. -- and thus to end the dictatorship. Did you continue your efforts in this direction?
A. Yes, ten days later I discussed the matter with Goering, but Goering rejected it in a very harsh manner, and he was not at all ready to head such a movement.
At that time there was nobody else in Germany, however, who would have had the right to head the movement, because at that time his relations with Hitler were all right, and they only deteriorated in the course of the year, and after all, he was the successor who had been appointed by the Reichstag. Then, on the 24th of October -
Q. Of what year?
A. That is 1943, I first approached two gentlemen who were especially near to Goering and who belonged to his close circle of collaborators; that is, the Chief of the General Staff, Korten, with whom I had quite close relations myself. Korten had been, prior to this for long years -- Korten had been my Chief of General Staff, and I also approached a personal friend of Goering's, the General Loerzer. I proposed to them that now there should be a change in the conduct of the German Reich, and in my eyes, as a soldier of course, this was to be done by adequate report and adequate pressure exerted on Hitler.
I did not think of an attempt on Hitler's life at all, or anything of the kind. I reported it to Goering that the war was lost, that steps should have to be taken in order to bring about a peace now, and in contrast with March of the same year, there was no longer time to build up a defensive front on both sides and bring our troops into it, because there was no good defense position to conduct these negotiations.
Goering actually went to Hitler with these proposals, and on the 28th of October, that is four days later, he ordered me to Karinhall, and his word showed clearly that Hitler had rejected his proposal in a very harsh manner. Now Goering reproached me very strongly by telling me that I had influenced him and given him these crazy ideas, and he would not think of letting himself be put into such a problem again.
On the 16th of November, 1943, I discussed once again with the adjutant of the Luftwaffe and went to Hitler with him; that is, he was Hitler's adjutant, and I had a personal confidence in him, and he had quite a good position with Hitler too, because he was an irreproachable man.
I discussed with this adjutant the questions, but already saw from this conference with the adjutant that there was no hope in this field.
Then I gave up my efforts, and then from January onward I tried to get out of my positions.
Q. Witness, after you received the Knight's Cross in 1940, did you receive any distinctions from Hitler, any decorations?
A. Yes, I did, 1940 -- I received the promotion to a Field Marshal, and that was also in 1940. After 1940 I did not receive anything which I considered a distinction as a soldier, because the bonus I received in 1942, yes, I will refer to that later, I couldn't sec any distinction in that as a soldier.
Q. Will you now talk of this bonus which you received? Give us some detail about it.
A. Hitler sent his adjutant -- that was on my 50th birthday and the adjutant brought a picture of Hitler, that is, a photograph, with a dedication, and then he brought me a letter in which he congratulated me, and furthermore there was a check in the amount of 250,000 marks. Hitler wrote in his letter that he knew I was leading a very modest life and he would like to give me the possibility of leading a little bit happier life this way.
I thanked Hitler, and I told him that I accepted the money, because after all, I could not reject it, as a compensation for the fact that I had earned a little less than this amount in my State position than I would have earned if I had remained with the Lufthansa, because my wages in the Lufthansa were twice as high, and even later on, three times as high as the money I got from the State, and therefore I did not consider that as exceeding my merits.
Q. Witness, did the Air Ministry not offer you a bonus, also?
A. That was not a bonus but the president of the Air Ministry told me that the industry wanted to give me a present in the value of 50,000 marks, and I told him that I rejected this present. This, to me, looked like bribing. He immediately withdrew the offer, especially as he knew that never in my life had I accepted a present from the industry.
Q. Witness, -
A. That is, as long as I was in official position--in government position.
Q. Witness, you spoke of bribery now, but was the Air Ministry under your supervision?
A. No. It was not under my supervision; but, after all, they received orders from us. That is, we gave them orders to produce things for us, and during the first period as GL, I took quite a number of steps against individual officials or engineers who were in official positions with the GL because they had accepted presents from the industry, and I had all of them condemned for bribery. Therefore, my own way, the way I had to follow was quite clear to me.
Q. Was it possible for you to remove directors of industry, or to appoint them?
A. No; after all, either there were limited companies or GMBH, or shareholder companies, and they had their own organizations, their own administration. The shareholders appointed the board of directors and the board of directors decided who was to be the general manager, and we never interfered with that.
Q. Did you have a financial share in any of the enterprises cf the Air Industry?
A. No, never.
Q. The agreements with the Air Ministry, therefore, were always free agreements between government and industry, were they?
A. They were agreements--contracts which the industry could accept or reject or for which they could propose changes.