Q I now go on to case 44, the case of the Czech at Rottweil. The witness Eckert again discusses this case in the affidavit aforementioned defense affidavit, This is a trial against a young Czech which took place at Rottweil on the Neckar, when you were presiding Judge, Do you remember this case in detail?
A This is the case of a young man who for inexplicable reasons in his papers had made himself one year older than he actually was. He had committed a number of thefts, and if he had actually been over 18 years old, would have been sentenced to a considerable term in a penitentiary. During the trial I myself assumed that the defendant was younger than he had stated to the court, I interrupted the session, and through a police teletype, I inquired in the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, at a parson, what the dates of birth of the defendant were.
It then became apparent that the defendant was one year younger, and he had lied to the court, therefore he was sentenced only to a prison term, and at the end of the session I told him that with his wrong statement he had almost gotten himself into the penitentiary.
Thus in this case, I was, after all, able to determine the age of a young defendant more certainly than he himself.
Q May I go on to Case 45? In 1944 you tried a case against a Frenchman, Sartre in Ravensburg, because of plundering. The defense counsel was Dieterlin in Ravensburg. Please describe this case, because it seems to me to be typical for plunder. Do you still remember the details?
A The defendant, Sartre, and a defendant were French workmen; both had already previous convictions in France for theft. After an air raid on a workers' colony they robbed the rabbit hutches of the workers, but the workers found them and beat them up. They were indicted for plundering. Since a death sentence was to be expected, they had a defense counsel assigned to them who was appointed by the court. During the trial, however, it was shown that the colony which was seriously damaged by the air raid, was not an unprotected territory or otherwise the defendants could not have been beaten up by the inhabitants of that workers' colony.
Both of them were therefore sentenced because of attempted serious theft to 6 months' imprisonment.
Q I now come to the next case, the Esterle case, No. 46. This is a prosecution case, on page 2061 of the transcript it has already been discussed. Moreover, as can be seen from my list, prosecutions' documents were submitted concerning this case, namely Exhibits 212 and 216. Hereafter I shall offer to the Tribunal as Cuhorst's Exhibit No. 15, Cuhorst Document No. 16, - that is the judgment against Christian Esterle of 21 December, 1942. Witness, I submit the document to you. Please comment on it.
A Christian Gottlob Esterle, Case No. 51 on the death sentence list, as is correctly stated in the list, was sentenced by the Special Court of Stuttgart on the 21st of December, 1962, -- and while I was presiding Judge, -- to death for crimes against the war economy.
Esterle was a trained tailor, and in the spring of '39, under very favorable circumstances, he took over a Jewish textile store. Three years later, with a large profit, he sold his store and home for the so-called "facon value" (good-will) of the firm, that is the value of the firm as such, he had to receive 6,0000 Reichsmarks, whereas he had paid to the Jewish firm which were valued at around 90,000 marks, the defendant carried out typical fraudulent deals which are neatly described in this sentence itself.
The defendant had to defense counsel, namely the lawyers, Wacker of Stuttgart and Dr. Klett also of Stuttgart. The trial lasted for a very long time, and went far into. The prosecution asked for a death sentence, and the court passed it accordingly because this was one of the most serious cases of fraud which the special court had sentenced.
The defendant, Esterle, made a plea for reopening of the case, which was forwarded to me by the penal chamber for information. In the plea for the re-opening of the case he pointed out that the two defense counsel had told him the following?
One of them had told him that he was a good friend of the Judge who wrote the opinion; the other one had told him that he had belonged to the same student fraternity as the presiding judge, and he, the defendant, did not have to say very much during the trial, and certainly not much would happen to him.
When I found out about this through official channels, I had my legal dark interrogate the defendant extensively at the Secretariat of the Court, and he repeated to the legal clerk his statements regarding the defense counsel which were so exact that he could not have made them up.
Q I am going on to the next case, may I?
AAnother peculiarity of that case was the fact that when they confiscated the property of the defendant, Esterle, the two defense counsel together possessed themselves of a secret account of, so far as I know, 15000 Reichsmarks, and asked to be paid this as fees for administering his property.
I reported these facts to the General Public Prosecutor, as was my duty; and this meant that a disciplinary proceeding was instituted against the two defense counsel, which let to a complete break between me and the witness Dr. Klett, who, up to that time, had been very close to my family.
Q. In view of the fact that Esterle was a broker, did Dr. Klett tell you, "Why should we lawyers earn less than brokers?" Do you recall that?
A. I remember it, yes, namely, that the defense counsel of Esterle told me that, whereupon I answered that in my opinion that attitude did not seem to be quite in accordance with the professional honor of a lawyer.
Q. Do you recall whether Dr. Klett was appointed as defense counsel by the Court, whether he received his fee from the State Treasury and whether, in spite of that, he wanted to get a private fee?
A. No, both defense counsel were chosen by the defendant, and had already been paid their fees.
THE PRESIDENT: Concerning this case, you said that the defendant took over the Jewish textile store under extremely favorable circumstances. Did the evidence show what those circumstances were?
THE WITNESS: The opinion says the following about it:
In March of 1939, he took over the Jewish textile whole-sale frim of Feldmann and Tanne, under very favorable circumstances.
THE PRESIDENT: I am simply asking you if the evidence disclosed what the favorable circumstances were. You said he paid nothing. How did he get the property?
THE WITNESS: He took over the house and the business. As far as I know, the house was estimated at a value of 120;000 Reichsmarks; it had a mortgage of 110,000 Reichsmarks.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not concerned with that; no, I am not concerned with that. He paid nothing. How did he get the property? Was it given to him by the Jews?
THE WITNESS: He made some kind of a contract of sale with the Jew and paid 10,000 marks for the house and took over the mortgages. For the supplies of the store he paid an amount which we are no longer able to determine. On the other hand; for the value of the firm--in Germany we use the French word "facon" value--he paid nothing.
DR. BRIEGER: In America you speak about "good-will."
THE PRESIDENT: Well; we will ask the question this way. Did the evidence disclose that this was a fair and voluntary transaction between him and the Jew?
THE WITNESS: No, the evidence did not show anything as to that, but, from its own knowledge of the facts, the Court assumed that the conditions which the defendant had to meet when he took over this Jewish firm were very favorable for him.
THE PRESIDENT: And correspondingly unfavorable for the Jew?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there evidence of duress in the case, or wasn't there?
THE WITNESS: No, there was no evidence to that effect, but the whold affair, speaking as a judge in civil affairs, did not please me. Therefore, in the opinion, at that time, in 1942, we expressed that with absolute clarity.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there ever any prosecution against him on account of this Aryanization of the Jew's property?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Than would you at this time, for the benefit of the Tribunal; answer the question which was asked you by your attorney as to your understanding of the meaning of the word "Aryanization"? Now I will ask you a leading question in that connection. By the employment of that term, is it fair to say that it meant the acquisition by means of duress of Jewish properties by so-called Aryans?
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I comprised, this word, those people who enriched themselves excessively on the occasion of the handing over of Jewish stores to other owners. There were also others who acquired Jewish property and Jewish firms, who concluded absolutely docent contracts. However, in many cases there was an enrichment which seemed to me to be excessive.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, others besides yourself have used the term "Aryanization". I am asking you what you understand that term to have meant. It related to property, did it not?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is, the acquisition, as in this case--the Wolf case--of Jewish businesses by non-Jewish businessmen, and that is the indecent acquisition in cases.
THE PRESIDENT: Indecent acquisition? That answers my question, thank you.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q. May I now go into the next case, case 47? This is the Hepting case, In this trial here several witnesses have testified that while you were presiding judge, witness, witnesses occasionally were not treated very politely by you. I now submit the opinion and the judgment in the Hepting case to you, and would like to ask you whether you remember anything to that offset. Later I shall offer this judgment to the Tribunal as Cuhorst Exhibit No. 16, document No. 20. It is the judgment against Karl Hepting and participants, of 25 November 1943.
A. I have the judgment of the Special Court of Stuttgart in from of me, of 23 to 25 November 1943, against Karl Hepting and participants, because of offenses against the war economy and other crimes. I was presiding judge.
During this trial a number of witnesses tried to incriminate the defendant as much as possible in order to achieve that a penitentiary sentence was pronounced against the defendant so that he would have to give up his business.
During the trial there were, therefore, very violent clashes with witnesses. And these witnesses, because they had an interest in incriminating the defendant Hepting, were treated very badly by the prosecutor, as well as by the defense counsel, as well is by me. The defendant Hepting himself was merely sentenced imprisonment of a term of one year and eight months, and the one year and one month in detention pending trial were credited to this term.
During the trial there was an official present of the Reich Criminal Police Office, who was clumsy enough, after the end of the session, in the corridor of the court building, to tell the defense counsel that he would see to it that this sentence was quashed. The result was a violent, written protest of the entire court against such police interference. The Reich Ministry of Justice--in this case it was Ministerial Counsellor Franke--let themselves be convinced that a nullity plea in the Hepting case would be without any point, since the witnesses who had. testified against Hepting were very doubtful characters.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you a question, returning to the matter of the Law Against Poles, during the last two minutes that we have?
THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Can you tell me what, if any, Special Courts, after the war, sat in the territory described as the Territory of the Firmer Polish State? Do you know?
A. There were Special Courts which belonged to the Reich Administration of Justice that functioned in the so-called Incorporated Eastern Territories; that is, predominantly in the former Polish Provinces. The Government General, on its part, had its own Special Courts in the remainder of the Polish Territory which, however, had nothing to do with the Administration of Justice of the Reich.
Q. Did the district judges sit in that territory also?
A. In the Incorporated Eastern Territories, district courts and district courts of appeal were established; for example, the District Court of Appeal of Posnan was again established, the District Court of Litzmannstadt (Lodz), and so forth.
Q. Now the Satute also provides that the State Prosecutor may institute proceedings under the Law Against Poles before the Special Court. Did the State Prosecutor, as such, or under that title, operate in the Occupied Eastern Territories?
A. Your Honor, I cannot toll you that, because I did not work in those fields.
Q. All right. Now, one more question. The first four sections of the Law Against Poles and Jews define certain acts which are made punishable. I am not speaking of procedure, but of substantive crimes. Now, if a Pole resided, on the 1st of September 1939, within what is called the Territory of the Former Polish State, but thereafter committed a crime or violated a provision of any one of the first four sections of the Law Against Poles, and if that crime was committed in the Altreich, could he be prosecuted in the appropriate Special Court in the Altreich?
A. Yes; if the offense was committed in the Altreich, the Special Court was competent. Of course, under other circumstances the Penal Chamber might have been competent too; as for anybody residing in the Altreich.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that clears up what seems to have been unclear in your farmer testimony, and it seems to be clear also under the provisions of the Statute.
We will recess now until tomorrow morning at 9:30.
(At 1630 hours, 2 September 1947, a recess was taken until 0930 hours, 3 September 1947).
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal III in the matter of the United States of America against Josef Altstoetter, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 3 September 1947, 0930-1630, The Honorable James T. Brand, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal III. Military Tribunal III is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if the defendants arc all present?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the defendant Rothaug, excused at his own request.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Rothaug has been excused temporarily. Let the proper notation be made.
You may proceed, Dr. Brieger.
DR. BRIEGER: May I continue with the examination of my client, Herr Cuhorst?
HERMANN CUHORST (Resumed) DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q As far as I can remember, the last case I discussed was case 47 or 46. Did you finish commenting on that matter, witness?
A Yes, and I have also finished with case 47.
Q Oh, you have also finished commenting on case 47, have you?
A Yes.
Q Well, I shall now discuss case 48. The prosecution without giving further details, left open the possibility that verdicts by the Special Court at Stuttgart, with Cuhorst as presiding judge, sanctioned the prosecution persons on religious grounds.
I shall offer an exhibit in my document book I-B, that is, the judgment against Herzer and other persons. This is Cuhorst Exhibit No. 17, NG-21, judgment against Herzer and others, of the 28th of August 1942. Herzer was a clergyman.
Witness, I shall hand you the judgment and I ask you to comment in detail; in particular, will you please state whether it was of importance, when the judgment was pronounced, that Herzer was a clergyman?
A I have before me the judgment passed by the Special Court at Stuttgart of the 28th of August 1942. I was the presiding judge. Public Prosecutor Dr. Rimelin was the prosecutor. The indictment was filed against three clergymen for various sexual offenses, As concerns the facts of the case, the judgment speaks for itself. I point out that in passing the sentence, particularly with reference to they younger clergymen, all extenuating circumstances were taken into account as far as possible. As concerns the main defendant, Herzer, the Special Court, on account of his advanced ago, refused to sentence him to safety custody as a habitual criminal. Concerning the younger clergymen, the court found that from the sexual point of view they were not up to the standards of their profession.
Further, the judgment states that the Bishop's office had taken steps against these incidents, but these incidents which the Bishop had condemned had not been prevented by the Bishop's office.
There was a nullity plea made by the Chief Reich Prosecutor, with the Reich Supreme Court, and the judgment was revoked. This case was retired by another Special Court.
Q I am now going over to the next case.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know what the verdict was on the second trial by the other Court?
THE WITNESS: I merely heard, Your Honor, that the sentences -- in particular, the sentences for the younger clergymen -- were supposed to have been much heavier, but I do not possess any exact knowledge.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q witness, can you, without difficulty and immediately, find in that judgment the one passage which I have marked, and where it says something like this: The superiors of the accused clergymen had severely disapproved of the behavior of those clergymen?
I attach importance to that passage in the judgment because I intend to revert to it later on.
A The judgment is fairly extensive, and I cannot find that passage just now. At what page is it?
Q I think I can refer to it when I come to present my documents.
I now come to case 50; that is the Grassmann case. Witness, I am handing you Cuhorst Exhibit No. 18, NG No. 17, judgment against Charlotte and Alfred Grassmann, of the 11th of May 1944. Please, at the hand of the judgment, give us a detailed account of this case and toll us why the death sentence was passed.
A I have here the judgment passed by the Special Court at Stuttgart, dated 11 May 1944. I was the presiding judge at that trial. The defendant Charlotte Grassmann, nee Pilz, born on the 12th of March 1907, at Berlin, was sentenced to death as a public enemy, a dangerous habitual criminal, for fraud, falsifying documents, theft, and other offenses. The defendant was the wife of an engineer. She had previously served a rather long prison term for fraud; she was a dangerous swindler. The judgment shows that the life of two men and the honor of the family of a lawyer were on her conscience. She was the most cunning criminal I ever met.
The trial lasted three days. A number of facts were never considered at all when it came to passing judgment, because otherwise the trial would have become too extensive. Everything else can be seen from the 33 pages of the opinion. The defendant, as a habitual criminal and as a public enemy, was sentenced to death. According to the jurisdiction of the time, and in view of the nature and the extent of her crimes, a different sentence was not possible. When you read the judgment it seems to you that you arc reading the story of a four-flusher.
Q Witness, please tell us something about the fact that in your view Charlotte who was sentenced to death had driven several men to their deaths, that is to say, that those men, out of desperation, committed suicide.
A Yes. In 1936 a half-Jew from Munich, whose name was Bruno Vierling, had a liaison with the defendant. The defendant completely ruined Vierling, and therefore he stole a large amount of money from his father. When Vierling had been financially ruined, the Grassmann woman stopped her affair with him, and Vierling committed suicide by shooting himself on the 18th of April 1938 in Munich. A similar thing happened in the case of a Court Referendar, Kammerzell. All that can be seen from the judgment.
Q Witness, before I pass on to the next case, provided the Tribunal agrees, I should like to give you an opportunity to add something to the case 25, the Stiegler case. Please comment on that case again.
A In that case I didn't give an answer to a question which was put to me. Willi Stiegler, who was sentenced to death on the 30th of March 1943 for a crime against the war economy, committed large-scale blackmarketing offenses with soap powder. The witness Diessem described Stiegler as just a small man. I remember that he wrote a letter to his wife in which something like this was said: He hoped that that year he would manage to earn half a million, and the following year a whole million.
That alone indicated the extent of the punishable offenses which Stiegler committed and that extent was much greater than one would have thought from the testimony by the witness Diessem.
Q Witness, I am now passing on the case 51. In various documents of the prosecution the phrase occurs that you had been in favor of as many death senences as possible. In that connection, the case of Klinger and Lieble--no, Klinger and Bueche, is interesting. The witness Eckert, in our document book, volume II, has also testified on that case.
Would you please tell us something about that case?
A The Klinger-Bueche case was the last big trial at which I was the presiding judge. It was held in November 1944. A fairly big offense had been committed against the war economy, and it had happened in the textile industry. The prosecution, according to the indictment, intended to ask for the death sentence. After proceedings, which was lasted for two days, the Court informed the prosecution unofficially that a request for such a severe penalty was not justified. All the same, the prosecutor asked for the death sentence for both defendants. The defendant Klinger was sentenced to a prison term, and the defendant Bueche was sentenced to a penitentiary term.
Q I am now passing on to case 52.
THE PRESIDENT: Might I ask you to give me the spelling on one of those defendants, the one with the long name? We can't read the mimeographed copy.
DR. BRIEGER: May I spell it in English?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.
DR. BRIDGER: B-U-E-C-H-E. Next name, Klinger, K-L-I-N-G-E-r.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, I have got it, thank you.
DR. BRIEGER: Your Honor, you are welcome.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q May I now pass on to the next case? In the group of those cases where the death sentence had been asked for but where, in your judgment, you did not arrive at the death sentence-- I believe that the Frey case also belongs to that group. I will therefore show you Cuhorst Exhibit 19, NG-41, an affidavit by Christine Frey of the 10th of June 1947.
Witness, please tell us something about that case at hand of this affidavit.
A The affidavit by the former Chritine Frey shows that the prosecution, on the 9th of May, 1940, for arson and other offenses, had asked for the death sentence in her case. The Court made an inspection on the spot and refrained from passing the death sentence. Frau Frey is at liberty today.
The trial was held in the town hall of a small village near Ulm on the Danube.
Q May I pass on to the next case, case 53? A witness has discussed the Gruber case. Do you remember that case? Was your verdict revoked, witness?
AA student by the name of Gruber had written a very improper letter to the finance Office. He was indicted for an offense against the Malicious Acts Law. The prosecution asked for a prison term of ten months. The Court passed a prison sentence of six weeks. I myself was the presiding judge at that trial. The Reich Supreme Court quashed the sentence and returned the matter to another Special Court. I do not know the result of the second trial.
Q Now I come to case 54. In that case your sentence was revoked, and therefore I attach importance to your commenting on that case. I am speaking of the Guter case, and this is a case to which many witnesses have already referred. Those witnesses said that that case was a sensational one because of your personal attitude. Please tell us something about the crux of that matter.
A The defendant Outer was a juvenile thief. He had stolen three small field post packets. The prosecution asked for a sentence of three years in the penitentiary. The Special Court passed a prison term of 18 months. I was the presiding judge. The Reich Supreme Court Cancelled the judgment and returned the case to the Special Court at Stuttgart. At the second trial, again, a lenghty controversy arose as to whether the defendant was to be sentenced was to be sentenced to a term in the penitentiary or in a prison.
At that time the defendant had been in detention pending trial for more than a year.
The Special Court passed a minimum penitentiary sentence of one year and one month. A fortnight after the second trial the defendant was discharged.
After that case had occurred, the Reich Supreme Court began referring those cases, where the judgment passed by the Special Court at Stuttgart had been revoked, to other Special Courts.
Q Witness, as you have just said, that was a case where field post packages had been stolen. I think it is important to ask you, as far as you are able to do that off hand, to make some comparisons between this case and the case with which you dealt yesterday, another case where field post packages were stolen. I am referring to case 23, the case of Michael Schmidt. Thy was the death sentence passed in the case of Michael Schmidt, whereas here only prison term was pronounced?
A The defendant Cuter was an immature person. He had stolen field post packages only three times, and he had stolen them from his own firm. Those packages did not contain letters, and it was comparatively easy to make good the damage done. Even the prosecution never considered asking for the death sentence.
In the case of the defendant Schmidt we dealt with an adult, who had had several previous convictions, who had stolen at least sixty post packages and the letters belonging to them.
Q From that I am inclined to draw the conclusion, Witness, that at least in these two cases you considered not merely the offense as such, but also the character of the offender. Was that the way you dealt with cases as a rule, end was that the way your associate judges also dealt with cases?
A The evaluation of the character of the offender is one of the most important tasks of every judge.
Q I am now passing on to case 55, the Handschuh case. On 2 November 1942 you tried that case. The case is also entered on the list of death sentences, and the date is 29 May 1943. Is that the same case? In other words, are those two cases identical? Why was that case tried twice? Please comment on that matter.
A The defendant, Alois Handschuh, was tried on 2 November 1942 in Allen and I was the presiding judge. Handschuh had many previous convictions for repeated offenses as a thief. He had spent half his life in the penitentiary. He committed several burglaries while exploiting the blackout, and several of those burglaries were committed in vicarages in the country. The Prosecution asked for the death sentence, but only a prison sentence was passed. The Reich Supreme Court, after a nullity plea had been made, quashed the sentence and the case was tried for a second time on Saturday, 29 May 1943, in Stuttgart. I was not the presiding judge at that trial, but I asked my deputy to act as presiding judge, because on account of an inner disinclination I did not want to be in charge of two retrials of my own cases. The Supreme Court, however, in its decision had tied down the Special Court at Stuttgart to such an extent that at the second trial Handschuh had to be sentenced to death. That second trial, at which I was not the presiding judge, is to be found on the list of the witness Eberhard Schwarz, and the number is 76 on that list.
Q Witness, I am now passing on to case 56. In Document Book No. 2 I shall introduce an affidavit by Dr. Hartmann.
I have the document here. I am going to hand it to you. The exhibit number is 20 and the NG number is 45. This is an affidavit by Dr. Karl Hartmann of 13 April 1947. Witness, as the Prosecution in the indictment and in oral statements made here has charged you more or less definitely with having cooperated closely with Party authorities, and consequently having arrived at fake trials and at fake judgments, I attach importance to your discussing this case.
A. The physician Dr. Karl Hartmann, a general practitioner from Friedrichshafen on Lake Constance, was having a personal quarrel with the Kreisleiter. On account of misconduct, on the part of his wife, with the Kreisleiter, he had been divorced. The Kreisleiter persecuted Dr. Hartmann, and the doctor made very careless remarks. One day an indictment was filed against Dr. Hartmann for an offense against the malicious Acts Law. The Special Court at its own initiative got hold of the files dealing with the divorce proceedings and clarified the background of the Hartmann proceedings by doing so. Hartmann was acquitted. Approximately one year later in connection with some other matters another indictment was filed against Hartmann. At the second trial I asked Dr. Bohn, District Court Director, to preside. He had attended the first trial and he know the facts. At the second trial took Dr. Hartmann was acquitted because his innocence was proved.
Q. Case 57. In a document which I shall introduce later, a case Hermann is discussed. As this case has peculiarities which affect you personally, I ask you to comment on the case.
A. The Hermann case I recall very well on account of some special circumstances connected with it. Hermann was a young man of not yet quite 19 years of age. He had committed several serious crimes of robbery and assault at night. The Prosecution intended we ask for the death sentence. The trial at which I was the presiding judge was held at Schwaebischgmuend. At the trial the Court received the impression as if the defendant had some mental defects.
The Court decided to ask a psychiatrist to examine him. As in Schwaebischgmuend such a physician was not available, I myself rang up the nearest asylum and, together with the defense counsel, the public prosecutor, and the defendant, during the noon recess, in my official car, I went to the asylum, which was 20 kilometers away. It was situated at Coeppingen. There the defendant was examined by the chief physician of the asylum, who declared that his responsibility was reduced, and when the trial was continued after the noon recess at Schwaebischgmuend the Prosecution asked for only a prison sentence, and he was sentenced to a prison term. Without having the defendant Hermann unguarded, without any special protection, I myself took the defendant Hermann from Gmuend to Goeppingen and back.
Q. Case 58, Do you remember a murder case, the Mueller case? It is supposed to have been tried at the town hall of Michelfeld, in the district of Schwaebisch Hall, when you were the presiding judge. Please, witness, tell us something about the peculiarities of that case.
A. The defendant Mueller had stabbed or shot to death a noncommissioned officer who was supervising a detachment of prisoners of war. The case was a borderline case, on the borderline of manslaughter and murder. As the local conditions were of importance, the trial with myself as presiding judge was held in the place where the offense had been committed, and an inspection on the spot showed that one could not be absolutely certain that murder had been committed. The prosecution asked for the death sentence, which was mandatory for murder. The Court, however, passed a prison sentence for manslaughter. Without having gone to the spot, that result in favor of the defendant would hardly have been arrived at.
Q. Case 59, Reichart, bears a certain similarity to Case 56; any way, it is supposed to be somewhat similar.
How was that?
A. The defendant Reighert, an engineer from the neighborhood of Goeppingen in Wurttemberg, had been sentenced once before to a short prison term for an offense against the Malicious Acts Law. Soon after, he was again indicted. A trial was held at Goeppingen. Shortly before the trial opened a representative from the Kreisleitung of the Party came to the judges' chamber, apparently to make us take an unfavorable view of the defendant. I immediately removed the man from the judges' chamber and told him that case would be discussed in open court and not in the judges' chamber. The defendant Reichert for a second time was sentenced to a short prison term. I do not remember for what time he was sent to prison.
Q. Case 60; the Rupp case for rape. I believe that for some special reason you still remember that case. Please just give us a brief account of that case as far as you are still able to do so.