AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom will take their seats. The Guards will close the doors.
Military Tribunal No. III is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Secretary General will take note of the absense of Dr. Schlegelberger, one of the defendants, who is absent at his own request, and with the permission of the Tribunal.
You may proceed Dr. Schilf.
DR. SCHILF: Before we continue, I have a request to elicit; two terms, which probably in the morning session were not translated quite clearly. The term which dealt with currency "Aufwertung", is re-valuation, and the second term "Legitimitaet legimitaoy, I would suggest to leave it in the German, "Legitimitaet", and to chose the translation from the German text which the translator considers correct.
BY DR. SCHILF:
May I ask you, Professor, to continue. You have been interrupted by the recess.
A May it please the Tribunal, I did attempt to explain the particular situation, of the development of German Constitutional Law; and first I had stressed that in Germany, such as on the continent in general, legal authority distinguished clearly between moral consideration and legal consideration.
Mow, I ask to be permitted to speak about another point which concerns only Germany, at least to that extent. It is easy to forget that German people for 33 years has never had really normal conditions. If one looks at that from the human point of view, it means that about 50 groups of German people, that is more than two-thirds 50 age-groups of people have never seen normal conditions; that is, all the people who were born after 1914, and those who, before 1914, did not have conscientious experiences. For all these people life -and that was the normal thing for them -- was a continuous change from open to latent crisis. One was always exposed to danger and always with a longing for stable conditions.
The consequence is that for most Germans an order which deserves that name, is something hard to imagine; to the German people order means something transitory; has become to mean something transitory, something unstable, something upon which one cannot depend, and doubtlessly it did not contribute to the stabilization of legal thought.
That, beginning with the time of the Weimar Republic the machinery of legislation was running incredibly fast. I would, indeed, desire for the judgment of the bench to see the maize of decrees and laws published and showered upon the German people since 1919. Most of those were laws or paragraphs of short existence. We had real inflation of legislation, as fan as I know, in history without example at any other period. And, that was not only so during the Weimar era, it became worse indeed during the period of the Third Reich before Hitler came. He turned with strong criticism against that positive manufacturing of laws. In his opinion, the sound sentiment of the people should only find its inclination in laws. But when he was in power that machinery, if possible, then was in higher gear.
I believe that I do not have to discredit it to my own inefficiency but I have to believe that no German jurist can say anything else of himself, but, none of us were in a position to know all the headlines of all the laws and decrees that have been passed. With things as they were, one has to understand that a large portion of the German nation, many jurists amongst them, became tired and apathetic toward authority, and skeptical. And, on the other hand it could not be avoided that many more positive natures revolted, wanted to take action wanted to do something about it, wanted to come to a decision, to a clarification, to a simplification, to find a way to see through all that.
If one maintained that in our area, at least one can say that for Europe, the political disease of phantasism, doctrinism, has broken out, that tolerance becomes more and more rare, that technical questions of law were handed out with elimination of allegance.
Then, one can easily obtain a picture of the chaotic conditions; small wonder that our State, to see to it that laws once decreed have to be carried out by the authorities; that that state demanded particularly emphasis because otherwise not even the minimum of order could be guaranteed which was at all possible. Particularly because the entire situation, the entire atmosphere was so unstable. The essence that order is an order "had to become the last refuge of those actually in power.
And, now, a last part of it. Inflicted against this background all that we find in the Constitution which, on paper, perhaps structurally is the most symmetrical, the most logical democratic Constitution of the world, with a tremendous carefully thought out system of checks and balances, safety valves in order to assure that the individual citizen would be the one to have its full advantage. But that Constitution that was worked through some elaborately, and I say it openly that my determination to study constitutional law, was not based on that Constitution, but this Constitution at the same time was so complicated in its structure, its structural power and in legislative procedure.
With the permission of the Tribunal I shall try to explain that life itself demanded to have these matters simplified - rather less Art but more efficacy. With that I believe, in all brevity, to have said something of that which is absolutely necessary to know if one wants to understand the essence of the Weimar Constitution and its development which, long before Hitler, had led to a situation which does not permit to recognize any longer the situation of 1919.
To come to the situation itself I am indeed fortunate because the concept which is the dissenting factor of the entire European and also the German development of constitutions -- this concept, if I am instructed correctly, is quite the most important in constitutional thought for any American also. It is the question "Who is entitled to promulgate the rules and standards by which the authorities are authorized to intercede into the private sphere of the individual citizen, into his life, his health, his honor, his property" -- that which, in constitutional law, we call the contents of the clause concerning property and freedom and rights. Those standards have to be set by definite individuals. The question is -- who they can be, who they are who are entitled to do that and through what procedure. It has been tried time and again to characterize constitutions in a few words - to characterize their value, their content. There are different ways to do that. There have been times when the most essential thing was as to how a more efficient government could be established. Since the eighteenth century European states struggled for a way to guarantee the liberties of the citizen, and that is the question. In order to be understood correctly and to come quickly to this point, to describe the development before Hitler, I may ask the Tribunal to follow me now in explaining this chart.
On this chart the Tribunal will find a systematic picture of the imperative acts of the State according to their contents; that is, with out consideration of procedure.
Ail imperative acts of the State are either standards, according to their contents, rules, or decisions in individual cases; that is to say, either the State commands as to how certain individuals are to behave in the future if -- and often they didn't know that for sure -- if a case of that particular nature should arise. The criminal legislator, for instance, sets the standards for punishment with the hope that they should never have to be applied. He does not wish that a case should occur. Here, however, we are concerned with the fact that life itself has created a situation among 2, 3 or 4 individuals which the State has to clarify and that is done because otherwise the setting of standards would have no meaning by measure of these standards. These acts of setting standards are sub-divided in two groups which are principally different. The one is authorizations to agencies of the State for interference into the sphere of certain individuals. In German I call it "authorization for interference" -(Eingriffs-ermaechtigungen). I do not know whether the translation got that out correctly but it is clear, isn't it? That is confronted on the other hand by all other standards and it is concerning norms, concerning concessions, and so on. These authorizations for interference -and that brings us to the decisive point -- are subdivided again in two groups. The modern State, and that is not only the case in Germany, knows first of all, the general relation between the citizens and the authority of the State, and apart from that, for certain groups a particularly close relation -- for the civil servants and the soldiers, in order to give you only two examples. The citizen, of course, is interested in that first point. Here we have common criminal law -- civil law -- law of procedure before either Criminal or Civil courts, to name only the most important. These are the standards which one has to know in a State in order to know how much legally guaranteed liberties the individual has. And now in Germany the question of language has developed, which one has to know, in order to prevent misunderstandings.
All these principles arc legal principles, legal norms, but these are concerning the citizen. The laws which he does not like, concerning taxation, military service, and so on, they are called Law in a narrower sense, or statute law in a substantive sense. German constitutional law developed for about 70 and 80 years that distinction between law in the material sense and law in the procedural sense. These two I shall have to explain. Here we have the first -- legal maxims in a material sense. They are norms which determine generally in the normal system of subordination, other authorities for interference. Decisions in individual cases are made either in litigations or in other cases. Those, then, are acts of the State, of jurisdiction in the objective sense. Hay I point out to the Tribunal that in German we also use the word Rechtssprechung (jurisdiction) in a two-fold sense -- sometimes as a function, sometimes as to action of all authorities, called Courts. Now we have Courts, that is, authorities, who are called Courts; they administer the law; they have jurisdiction. But occasionally they also do this -- acts of administration. In this connection the local court judge is also the surrogate court judge; that is, he appoints a guardian -- that is an act of administration. In the German Language now, for these acts, if one wants to specify it, the expression "judgment" has been chosen and "disposition" is what the other acts are called, or regulations, or rulings.
To continue our trend of thought, to clarify conditions, the 3 acts which I have marked with a cross are important. It is clear that the individual citizen, the man in the street, is not basically interested in all that. He usually doesn't know anything about it and he doesn't want to know anything about it. That is something for the jurists.
However, this is important for him. He is terribly afraid of the whole thing, but especially of bad judgments and bad regulations or rulings. Then he demands -- and this brings me to the roots of the French revolution -- he demands of his Constitution that it make provision to assure that bad judgments and bad regulations do not occur, and if so, that a possibility exists to eliminate them. The struggles about constitutions in Europe since the 18th century, beginning in France and extending further and further, have been fought particularly about this question: How can one prevent bad judgments or bad regulations or rulings from coming into effect? Per se, this is a very simple question. One only has to consider how bad judgments or bad regulations or rulings could come about. That is, either the judges or the administrative officials are incapable or corrupt, or both. Against that there is only one remedy, a thorough method of selection, and a killing of the corruption in its beginning.
The second possibility -- and this brings us one step closer-is this. The laws can be bad according to which judges and administrative officials make their decisions. If there is a capable judge, for instance, a person of high integrity, what can he do it the laws are bad? The consequence is that the people, the individual citizen, is finally compelled to worry about these complicated structures called laws.
European development has led to the fact that, concerning the first question -- good judges, not corrupt judges -- a good contribution was made with the establishment of the principle of the independence of judges, that is we say, of those before whom the individual citizen is brought. We called these courts here in Germany the ordinary courts, not to mean that the other courts would be disorderly or would have to be extraordinary, but that is a custom of language which has just been brought about.
However, much more than that is the contribution made by modern constitutions of Europe to the second problem. The people themselves take care of legislation, either the citizens, who have the right of suffrage or referendum or plebiscite, or their representatives.
In the most radical case , only the people make laws. In the beginning it was different, the people just participated in legislation; they were co-participants. Now, for the creation of morals in the state, we have two ways: the old way, which remains the same; and the new way, of the people's law, that is, the participation of the people in the creation of the law, the legislative method.
In German we call a law which was brought about by the legislative party a law in the formal sense, formellen Sinn. And the basic thought for all, which is to be found in all European constitutions, is this. If the Government wants to, let us say, increase taxation, then that means it wants some acts of legislation which authorize the authorities, or the various agencies, to interfere in property. The Government, therefore, wants a law in the material sense; therefore fore it must have a. law in the procedural sense or in the formal sense, through legislation. That is what we call the principle of the necessity of the law, the fact that a law is required. Where this is brought about, we have a division of power. And if it were brought about -- and it has never actually been carried out -- then this is the way it would have to come about. The legislative body would have to make all substantive laws, but it would do nothing but just that; both would not be the case.
Parliaments, time and again, are given the privilege or the right to come to resolutions or decisions which have different content. For example, decisions on budget. These decisions on budget are not acts of legislation in the sense of setting standards. In German constitutional law it is infinitely prohibited to include into the budgets acts of legislation or standards in that sense. The Parliament has a part in the forming of the cabinet. That is one thing. The otherand this is what we need is the following. It may happen that the government is authorized to enact legislation in connection with the Court No. 3 Case No. 3 constitution itself or in later laws passed by the parliament.
In German one calls these Akte der Norm Setzung, acts setting norms or standards by the executive -- that is, the government, -- which have a legal maxim as content. These are called legal decrees; "legal" on account of their content, and "decrees" on account of the method.
This institution, which we find in. every European state, was the starting-off point for the the further development and the paving of the way of the orders by Hitler, because in the Weimar Constitution there is a law for the government to decree laws, the utilization of which led to the fact that since the middle of 1930 the normal legislative body in Germany was really the government. That is the famous provision of Article 48, Section 2. As a rule, legal decrees on the basis of this article are called dictatorial decrees, but also, apart from that, during the Weimar era, much authority was received for the government to issue decrees. In countless laws the Reichstag empowered the government, in order to carry out a law, or in some cases in order to amend a law or repeal a law, to issue legal decrees.
However, not only in the Reich do we find this institution or this instrument of legal decrees, but also in the German States, the German Laender. In the constitution one always finds a law for emergency decrees, Notverordnungs Recht, and the legislatures of the various states frequently authorize the government to issue decrees in regard to substantive law.
A law of the Reichstag of the 13th October 1923, which is called Enabling Law, Ermaechtigungsgesetz, signed by Reich President Ebert, conferred upon the Reich Government the power, among other things , to issue decrees in regard to substantive law, even deviating from the legal principles of the Constitution of the Reich. This law is particularly important. It was published in the first years of the Weimar Constitution under Reich President Ebert, and it cleared the way for a development which the founders of this law to this day probably regret deeply.
May I refer the High Tribunal to the following:
Several months ago, in Munich, a book was published. The History of the Weimar Constitution. The author is Professor Willibald Apelt, now at the University of Munich. used to be together at the University of Leipzig, and I also had the honor to lecture for him in addition to my lectures when he became the Minister of Interior in Saxony; that is, the Police Minister.
He was one of tho most outspoken democrats we had in Germany. This book is just one account with Hitler. It treats altogether of the Weimar constitution, and therefore it is particularly important to note that Apelt considers this law the beginning of all the evil in this development and states explicitly that this law cleared the way to that other Enabling Law of 24 March, 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you give me the date of the law to which you refer again?
THE WITNESS: Yes. The 13th of October 1923. 13 October 1923, in the Reich Gesetzblatt, Reich Legal Gazette of 1923, Volume 1 on page 943. Since the middle of 1930 one did no more work with enabling law decrees, but one used Article 48, Section 2. Earlier already that had been applied. If I am informed correctly then under Ebert alone 136 decrees of that kind were passed, that is to say, until 1935 when Hindenburg became president. At first a little loss use was made of this means. It was reactivated again when the economic crisis of 1929 was nearing Europe. Conditions in Germany deteriorated from week to week, and under Bruening whole bundles of emergency decrees, of dictatorial decrees were passed. In 1932 we had progressed so far in that direction that the Reichstag was practically excluded as a legislative body, and the Reich President, together with the Reich Government, the Reich Cabinet because on the basis of Article 50 they had to work together, was really the normal source of legislation. From then on until Hitler's acts of legislation there is indeed only a short stop, and if Hitler himself would not have set out to give the whole matter a triumphant, dictatorial aspect, if he would have been satisfied with an enabling act like that of 1923, if he had not had laws enacted by the government but decrees, the entire enabling act would not have caused so much rumpus as it did.
Q.- Professor, May I ask you to explain briefly to tho Tribunal who Reich President Ebert was, because we have to assume that the name alone does not give a plain indication,. If this is the case, then I beg to be excused if I said -- what I mean was that Ebert was a Social Democrat -A.- We had two Reich Presidents.
The first, Friedrich Ebert, who came from the Social Democratic party of Germany, not elected by the people but by the National Assembly, and then the second, who was elected by the people.
Q.- And my second and other request is to quote to the Tribunal Article 48, Section 2, of the Weimar Constitution.
A.- Article 46, Section 2. Concerning the so-called dictatorial powers of the President -- and with the permission of the Tribunal I shall formulate these sentences linguistically so that they arc easily translated -- "The Reich President may take those measures which are necessary to reestablish public security and order if in the area of the German Reich public Security and order are considerably disturbed or endangered. If required, he may also intervene with the aid of the armed forces. For that purpose he is authorized temporarily to invalidate in whole or in part the basic laws which are laid down in the articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 153. May I add, these seven basic laws are the so-called liberal principles, basic liberties, the same which we find for instance in the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights.
Q.- Professor, we are now concerned with an attempt to explain the Hitler decree to the Tribunal. After all we have heard from you now tho development which has led to it that the government may enact legislation, that development started already as early as 1923, and according to the information we have from you was again stipulated in 1930 at the time of a different government. I think it will be necessary to explain to the Tribunal that this development led up to the Hitler decree, went through various stages of development, and I may ask you still to describe this to us, because in tho course of this case it has become necessary that this development be shown as clearly as possible.
A.- May I ask if the Tribunal can see this chart, at first this one?
THE PRESIDENT: We see it with difficulty.
THE WITNESS: That is what I was afraid of. I have already said that the Weimar Constitution on paper, that is to say as it was conceived by its authors, was constructed in a very even, very logical manner, along democratic principles. During the Weimar era, according to the Constitution, the principle prevailed that no official, no agency, could come into action unless it was elected by the people, be it directly or indirectly. I have shown this here in a graph. If you will follow me, and. take this black heavy line on the bottom, as representing the voters, that is the men and women in Germany who had the right to vote, suffrage, then you see how this group superimposes the Reich Government above itself by election. And by Reich Government I mean all the members that are on the top, all the individual bodies such as the Reichstag President and cabinet. And this government elected by the people also establishes the official machinery, which also comes above the people, Here you find, for instance, the treasury, a very popular authority which has the honor to be indirectly established by the people.
The Reich consisted of quite a number of various territories: Laender - I only put in two here. Again it is the mass of the voters, that is those who have the right to vote, to elect the members of the Reichstag. But only those who live in the area which is represented by a Landtag - the Landtag appoints a government and that government establishes the various government agencies. We have the same here for the provinces, for the counties, and I should have also put in the various towns. This also the principle graph of communal administration at the same time.
TEE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreis, pardon me a moment. Since your discussion is going into a. printed record which will be read and which should be made as easily understandable as possible, I think at this stage it would be well to let the record show that the Secretary-General is directed to mark the first chart to which you referred as Chart 1 and the chart to which you are now referring as Chart 2 so that the reader of the transcript will know which exhibit or which chart you're talking about. Go ahead, please.
THE WITNESS: May I ask now for help to remove this?
(The chart 2 is removed and another chart is placed on the board.)
THE PRESIDENT: And the chart which is about to be discussed I assume will be marked Chart 3. You may proceed.
THE WITNESS: May I ask the Tribunal whether the judges have a small copy before them?
THE PRESIDENT: Is the one at which I am pointing the next one which you will discuss? That will be Chart 3, Mr. Secretary, and the further one will be Chart 4. (Copies of Charts 3 and 4 are distributed to the Tribunal.)
THE WITNESS: The Tribunal will remember Chart 2 which we had just now. That shows the structure of the German organization. Now, however, I should show the details only for the appointment of the Reich officials and I am afraid now you will come to the conclusion that it was not quite so simple. May I explain. This graph is to show how the German people, that is to say, all the voters for the German Reichstag, appointed and recalled the various officials.
In order to show how democratic the franchise was that the German Reich had, I have shown here at the bottom of the chart the German people, and in the correct relations above it, the total of constituents.
In Germany we had two-thirds of the population as constituents - voters for the Reichstag. These voters, that is the symbol on the bottom, are to be considered at times as a solid block. In other cases, in territorial sub-divisions, as one solid block we find them here. The people of the Reich in its entirety elect the Reichstag and the Reich President. We have, therefore, two supreme bearers of sovereignty directly elected by the people. The Reichstag is elected for four years; the president for seven years. Elections take place at different times. Therefore, it is quite easy to determine from these elections, as they follow each other, how the opinion of the people may change.
The decisive element is, however, that right on the top we have a dualism. I shall come back to that later. These two bodies in a very definite co-relation constitute the Reich Cabinet. The German Reich Cabinet - and that also I have to explain briefly - appears in three different forms: once in the person of the Reich Chancellor. The Reich Chancellor determines policy. Nobody can influence him there. Then we see the Reich Government represented by the individual ministers, and then again as a group. This is the way appointment comes about. The Reich President, according to Article 53 of the Constitution, appoints the Chancellor, the man in whom he has confidence. He furthermore appoints the Reich ministers, but that he can only do upon suggestion or nomination by the Chancellor, so that the actual forming of the Cabinet depends upon an agreement between the President and the Chancellor. That is as far as the Constitution goes. But I said before the lunch recess that according to Article 53 of the Constitution, there follows the famous Article 54, which is called the Article of the Parliamentary Principle. According to the Constitution, the Reich Chancel lor and each individual minister has to ask the Reich President for his release if the Reichstag by explicit decision expresses its non-confidence to this approval of him.
In German constitutional law we have no votes of confidence. As long as the confidence is not definitely withdrawn, we make believe it still exists. I ask to be forgiven here. I do not know what I have explained last is correctly translated - resignation by force - this is the way it happened.
The Reichstag makes a decision. They no longer have any confidence in a person and he has to resign. It is clear, I hope, what I mean. Now, because the Reichstag, according to Article 54, is in a position to request the Chancellor or any minister to resign because the Reich President is forced to release him, it is more practical if the Reich President appoints the Cabinet only after he is reasonably sure that the Reichstag will not say in its first meeting, "We do not agree." That is why for mere practical considerations the Reichstag has a rather strong influence in the forming of the government, that is, the Cabinet.
In Germany we do not have the principle that the ministers have to be members of the Parliament. The Reich President may stand quite outside the Parliament and may also appoint people quite outside the Parliament. But Reichstag and President, not only when the Cabinet is formed, are connected with the government, but also with the Cabinet in its daily work. Here I drew something like a safety pin and draw a countersigning. That is the article which I have mentioned repeatedly, 50, on Rights, which on the basis of the Weimar Constitution were in the hands of the Reich President and on account of this compulsion of obtaining counter-signatures were also rights of the government.
The Cabinet assumed responsibility by countersigning to the Reichstag, and the Reichstag could react rather disagreeably, the cabinet if the Reich president and Reichstag were of different opinions was put before the decision. If the cabinet took the opinion of the Reichstag, then the Reich president either had to give in or change the cabinet; of the cabinet went along with the president, then nothing else was left than to risk the vote of lack of confidence; a vote essential of the Reichtag could come, therefore to a struggle of that kind, and in German practice and legal sides, the cabinet which went with the president against the Reichstag was called a fighting government (Kampfregierung); not the other way around. In the long run it showed that the Reich president when the chancellor wont with him, it was stronger than the Reichstag. That also I may be permitted to describe briefly. If the Reichstag did not agree with the president, was not satisfied with the president's decisions, he could not do anything because the constitution in Article 43 reserved the right for the Reochstag to demand of the people of the Reich the resignation or the dismissal of the president. That in practice never occurred, and for a very simple reason. If the Reichstag would have come to a decision of that kind, and the people would not have gone along, then that president was automatically re-elected for another seven years, and too, the Reichstag was dissolved, and that would mean suicide on the part of the Reichstag, the president. However, he is in much better a position; if he is in agreement with the chancellor, he can dissolve the Reichstag himself. That pertains to the famous red folder. If, therefore, the president and the cabinet neither arc in agreement, and there is a threat of censore on the part of the Reichstag, when the president can turn over to the Reichtchancellor the statement of the indifference, the Reich chancellor, as president present in the session, and when it comes to the last, he just shows that red folder and that settles it. Now, the Tribunal will certainly understand why in discussing Article 48, Section 11, I did not even read Section 111, because there it is expressed that the Reich president of every dictatorial measure has to notify the Reichstag, and if the Reichstag wants it withdrawn, and the demands are met of the president, the president has to repeal his measures.
If he, to be more accurate, if he and the cabinet don't wish to do that, they have the possibility of dissolving the Reichstag, and that brings me back to what I pointed out before. May be one cannot understand why the Reichstag permitted itself to be dispossessed, as far as legislation is concerned. It would have had to be made entirely different to be in a position to oppose due to the fact that the major change could not depend upon them. The Reichstag in every demand of repeal risked its own life. That much for the three units on top, but the Tribunal will see that on the side another box, the Reichsrat, Reich Counsel. This organ was designated as a subsidiary organ and played an important role in the administration of the Reich, as a Reich organ, but one that is appointed by the Leander. For that purpose I have sub-divided the block of voters into the individual laender -- Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Wuerttemberg, Baden, etc., The proportions are approximately those of the population of these states, (Laender.) You can see, gentlemen of the Tribunal, that Prussia alone took a much greater part than all the others did together. Now, it is true that each Laender had to send at least one member of the government into the Reichsrat, and beyond 700,000, or what minimum additional 350,000, the laender had the right to appoint a second one, and then after 700,000 a third one. Only Prussia is in a worse condition. First, the smaller ones get the necessary votes. Prussia does not get the full number, and stipulates that Prussia could only have two-fifths of the members vote in the Reichstag; and that at the end of the Weimar area amounted to twenty-six votes for Prussia. That is why I put down twenty-six votes. Prussia forty votes of the other Laender. This disadvantage with regard to Prussia is called the anti-Prussian clause. But in addition to the fact that Prussia only got less than half the voters are split up again in the Prussian provinces. These provinces elect their own governments, provincial governments, and now each province may send one representative to the Reichsrat. In the Prussian government then there were thirteen provinces, independent provinces.
I think that is sufficient without any further details at this moment.
Then, we have the provisional Reich Economic Council. It never became a permanent council, and never played any important role. We can do without it, but here I see that we are not quite correct, -- if I may point out to the judges where it says "R", it should be "G" for government, and where the letter "L" is, it should be "P" for parliament; it is the diet of individual states. I believe the Tribunal will agree with me if I say that this was a very complicated machinery, and a very wellbalanced one. But much worse than that, so much worse that I hardly dare to bother you with it, was the situation with regard to procedure of legislation with which I have to deal now.
THE PRESIDENT: The record will show that you are now turning your attention from Chart No. 3 to the chart which will be marked Chart No. 4; is that not correct?
A Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And may I ask you one statement for the purpose of the record. Your Chart 3 relates to what period of time? Will you state that so that the record may be clear.
A Chart No. 3 refers, just as Chart No. 4 to the duration of the Weimar Constitution. If you look at this chart, it looks almost like a railroad marshalling yard, for any layman, almost impossible to decipher, but it cannot be any different because the Reich constitution really established a technical mass release in order to provide legislation with security ties, road blocks, and similar matters. May I first explain the picture itself. The Tribunal finds at the top the Reichstag in the center, and here, opposite the bottom the people of the Reich. I don't know whether people of the Reich really would be the best word -- nation would be a better word; at any rate, the constituents of the electorate. The dividing line in the middle separates from each other (a) normal procedure, and (b) a special procedure, which was only started very frequently in a few cases, a few times, but never carried through.
And here where we are confronted with a normal procedure we find indicated by this thick line, the ordinary procedure of legislation; and here the complications.
THE PRESIDENT: The time for our recess has arrived. We will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)