A Yes; yes, I have.
Q "Certain acts of laying down rules, certain decisions on individual cases, which have received legal force, are valid even when the person giving the order has exceeded his competence or made a mistake in form."
Then I find, at page 12939, n paragraph beginning: "Now, in a state in which the entire power to make final decisions is concentrated in the hands of a single individual, the orders of this one man are absolutely binding on the members of the hierarchy. This individual is their sovereign, their legibus solitus, as it was first formulated, as far as I can see, by French political science with as much logic as elequence."
Have you found that?
A Yes.
Q. The question that I want to ask you is whether you agree with me. It seems to me that from the quotations which I have read, and also from a complete reading of all the material within your discussion which lies within these two excerpts, there is contained the major promise that in any orderly state, constitutional or otherwise, there is an obligation at some point to obey supreme authority. Is that a fair statement, do you think?
A If I understood your question correctly, it is as follows, namely, whether in every state must be a final authority whose orders arc binding. Is that what you meant?
Q That is right; yes, that is right.
A I can only answer that question in the affirmative.
Q So that the obligation of members of the governmental hierarchy to obey, as an obligation in the abstract, exists in a democratic constitutional state as well as in a monocratic state, which I believe is the apt term you used to describe the Hitler state.
Would you say I am correct in that assumption? Just the bare obligation to obey?
A: Well, first, I did use the expression "monocratic" here; that is, I used the expression which is usually used in political science, because "monarchical" has somewhat several meanings. I meant to say that the final authority in such a state is one single man.
Q: Yes.
A: However, in a state, as to the final authority beyond which one may not go backward, whether there is a single man or a directorate, or a parliament, or the people itself,, that is of no importance for the basic question. That is what I mean to express.
Q: And I think that is what I was trying to express, that the obligation to obey is the same. So that the burden which is put upon member of a hierarchy, without regard to the form of the government, to obey or not to obey, is actually measured not by the obligation to obey --- which remains constant -- but by the severity of the results of disobedience. Is that correct?
A: I am sorry; I did not quite understand your question.
Q: Let me try to make it clear. I think we agreed that time obligation to obey is uniform without regard to the form of the state; the obligation to obey.
A: Just so that we do not misunderstand each other, I said here not that in every state, without any consideration to the different forms of government, the duty to obey, toward any order by the government, is uniformly ordered. However, we are speaking here only about the fact that in every state, regardless of whether, in regard to some orders, there is a right to review, in any case there must be one authority toward which such reviewing is not admissible anymore.
Q: I think we are still in agreement. Now let me see if I can make my next question clearer.
Assuming the correctness of what you have just said, the measure of the burden which a member of the hierarchy of a state faces for the disobedience is proportionate to the severity of the punishment in the various states for disobedience.
A I did not understand what you said.
Q I wonder if -- I don't know how to make it any clearer. I feel that I must be at fault. I have agreed with your last statement that eventually there becomes some authority in any form of state which has the power to impose obedience. Now I want to discuss the situation of any member of a governmental hierarchy, in any of the forms of state which you and I have discussed, to obey that authority. And I ask you if I am not correct when I say that the actual difference in degree of burden placed upon a person in any of the forms of state depends not upon the obligation to obey, which remains constant, but upon the power of the authority to inflict punishment for a failure to obey.
A I am afraid that I still do not understand you question. I am very sorry; pardon me.
Q Perhaps you can tell me how you understand it, or tell me what you. do understand of my question, and maybe that will help.
A Yes. I understand, or I feel that between the duty to obey and the sanction of a penalty which is behind it, you are trying to establish a connection.
Q Yes.
A Is that it?
Q Well, we are getting closer together. I think that we are in agreement that in any form of state there is eventually an obligation to obey the ultimate authority, so that there is always an obligation to obey. Now, what I am asking you is this, that what a person under obligation to obey faces is not any difference in degree of obligation to obey, because that is constant, but the severity, a varying severity of penalty for failure to obey, depending upon the character of the state in which he is operation.
A: Well, of course -
Q: That is right?
A: That is a question of a positive, legal, constitutional state.
Q: Now, Dr. Jahrreiss, having been in Germany -- I think I am correct in assuming -- from the end of the last war, the war which I was in, that ended in 1918, up to the beginning of the most recently ended war, do you feel that you knew what the aims of the National Socialist Party -- the Hitler Party aims -- were for other countries in the event the war had had a successful termination? That is, whether there was to be a subjection or not of the races of other countries?
DR. SCHILF: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to raise objection, far this reason: If we should go into purely historical questions and do not limit ourselves to constitutional questions, then we get into an abyss, or into an endless discussion. During the direct examination, insofar as the time before 1933 was concerned, I asked the witness only constitutional and legal questions. If the expert should now answer as to intentions and aims of the Nazi Party during the time from 1918 until 1933, then I am afraid that there would, be no limit to the questions, because matters were regarded from a subjective point of view. The intention of our entire defense, through the appearance of Professor Dr. Jahrreiss, was to show the development of the constitution, of the law of the state, from the time before 1933 until the end.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Deos the Tribunal desire of me to make a further statement of my position, or not?
THE PRESIDENT: I will hear the purpose of your question.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Briefly.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: In the first place I am willing to restrict the question as to the period approximately beginning in 1930 to the end of the war. I think that was implicit. I merely asked the witness if he had lived here prior to that time. In the second place, in addition to the constitutional questions about the German constitution and the effect of the Hitler regime, I believe the witness was asked very definitely as to the effect of extra-territoriality. He discussed the Lotus case. He was asked the effect of whether or not there was a conflict, in his opinion, as to the conflict between international law and these constitutional laws that he discussed. I want to question his opinion on that with specific questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The danger of unduly extended cross-examination is one which need not disturb counsel for the defense, because the Tribunal has discretion to limit cross-examination within reasonable bounds. However, we are of the opinion that counsel should be permitted to ask the question which he has now propounded. The scope, part of which has been highly philosophical, of the direct examination would not permit us to impose very narrow limits to the crossexamination. You may answer.
BY LA FOLLETTE:
Q: May I restate the question, please. I think I can limit it. I merely say that you have lived within Germany from 1918 to 1945.
A: Yes. From 1894 until now.
Q: Do you feel that you know the disclosed aims of the -- I will strike out the word "disclosed." -- the aims of the National Socialist regime towards foreign countries in the treatment of the citizens of foreign countries in the event of a successful termination of the war as that purpose unfolded itself from 1931, we will say, until 1939 in September when war began?
A I don't know whether I understood you correctly. May I repeat your question?
Q Yes, surely.
A You mean whether it is my opinion that the aims of the NSDAP, that is the Nazi Party, as they became apparent since 1930 for the other countries around Germany or foreign peoples would have become dangerous if Germany had won the war.
Q No, I only ask you first, Doctor, do you feel that you know what those aims were. Just, do you feel that you know the aims.
A I do not believe so. First, I would like to say I was not a member of the Party and I also acted in such a way that there was no doubt about it. What I did know about the Party was the public announcements, the public statements that were made, and they were at least in part, not very beautiful, not very nice. But what the real aims would have been in case they could have achieved the, that I did not know. I do not believe that it is the first time in the history of the world that there is a difference between proclamations and real aims to the one side or the other side. I don't know whether I have understood the meaning of your question by answering it this way.
Q Well, I think you have answered it honestly, and I am satisfied with the answer. Now from time to time you have discussed the constitutional conditions within Germany, before 1933 and subsequent to 1933, and of course we discusse the conditions under the Weimar Republic. May I ask you, was there any person comparable to Joseph Goebbels or any propaganda, organization comparable to that which the operated in existence after the establishment of the Weimar Republic until at least the constitutional forms were taken over by the National Socialist party?
AAs far as I knew the task and the position of Goebbel's ministry, as far as I knew then as a scholar from the outside only. Personally I never even saw him, to that entent I can only say that during the Weimar Republic there was no such thing.
Q Thank you. During the days of the Weimar Republic, and I refer to the time after the constitution was established until the period early in 1933 when Hitler and the Nazi Party first obtained ascendency, was there on behalf of the government, the Reich government of Germany a continuous denunciation of the Jew by the political parties who were in control of the Reich government under the Weimar Republic until 1933?
A I understood you to say whether before the seizure of power by Hitler the political parties were enemies of the Jew.
Q These parties which had the majority in the Reichstag and controlled the government.
A No. Until the large or the strong participation of the Nazi Party in the Reichstag, that is, until September 1930 this was not the case, because the national Socialist Party was the only one which in this systermatic manner was an enemy of the Jews. But from September 1930 on when the large landslide toward the Nazi Party occurred and it, too, belonged to the parties who had a large representation, and from then on the picture changed.
Q Yes. Now -- and please understand, Doctor, I ask all questions knowing and accepting in complete good faith your statement that you were not a member of the Party. But naturally, being an extremely intelligent man and living within Germany you did observe things that happened in the political activities of your country. I ask you whether or not in the early days of the Weimar Republic and among the parties which were sustaining it, certainly up until 1930, was there now organized political group or group within a political party comparable to the Sturmabteilung except as that was attached to the National Socialist Party?
A: For me that is probably a question that I cannot answer very exactly. For instance, I do know that there were the Stahlhelm organization, that ther was the Reichsbanner, but since I was in a removed position from all these matters, and moreover I am, if I may say so, a born non-soldier, therefore I cannot say to what extent these organizations can be compared to the SA.
Q: Under Ebert and the Social Democrats and other parties with a declared democratic outlook which supported the Weimar Republic, was there ever a declared purpose of any of those parties or of any of the leaders of those parties t Hininatc opponents, or opposing political parties by wrongful means?
A: I did not hear anything about it.
Q: Doctor, did you ever run across a pamphlet written by Dr. Joseph Goebbels dated Berlin, 1935, entitled "The Nature and Form of National Socialism"? Do you recall any such pamphlet?
A: No.
Q: If the Court please, I would now like to read for my next question to this witness an excerpt from Prosecution Exhibit 415 which was introduced on May 1, 1947, which was Document 2412 PS. That document from which I am reading is admitted in evidence here as part of Pages 12 to 13 only of this pamphlet by Goebbels which I have just mentioned. In this he said: "However we National Socialists never asserted that we represented a democratic point of view. We have declared openly that we use democratic methods only in order to gain the power, and that after assuming the power we would deny to our to adversaries without any consideration the means which were granted us in the times of opposition."
Have you ever heard that statement or a paraphrasing of it in Germany about that time in 1935?
A I can not recall that any more today. At any rate, I do not know that pamphlet. That what is described there as a former statement, even as a statement of the present I may have heard too,- I can not tell you any more today. But I can say if I should have heard heard it, I apparently belonged to those who thought, "He's talking a mouthful." Moreover, and this brings us to the legal question, I stated already yesterday that I personally am of the opinion that a Constitution can not very well be invalidated with the help of one of its own regulations - the regulations contained in the Constitution itself - for that would mean that the Constitution contains a suicide paragraph. But I also said that the prevailing democratic theory during the Weimar era unfortunately, in my opinion, the opposing opinion was that with the help of Article 76 the Weimar Democratic Republic could legally be changed into an absolute monarchy. If this was the case, a party could publicly state that it was aiming at a changing of the Constitution in its fundamental bases. According to this prevailing theory of Anschuetz and the predominant majority of the German legal theories, this was an absolutely legal aim. May I ask whether you have understood me?
Q I have understood you. Now, with regard to the Constitutional statements you have made, and assuming that this was done in a legal way, the implications of the Goebbels statement as to the elimination of those parts of the Constitution which, I think, you described yesterday as being rather comparable to what we call the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution, would be attacked is inherent in the statement which Goebbels made, is it not?
A Certainly.
Q, Wow, Dr. Jahrreiss, are you acquainted with the American, text on International Law by Charles Cheney Hyde?
A It is possible. If you could please show me the book. I have seen so many books in my life time that maybe I can't tell you like this.
Q I will bring it to you in a second. It's described as International Law, chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States, by Charles Cheney Hyde, Hamilton Fish, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University.
A It's H-Y-D-E; yes, of course.
Q Formerly the solicitor for the Department of State of the United States of America; Associate of the Institute of International Law. This is the 1945,edition by Little, Brown and Company; second revised edition; Volume I. I will still hand it to you.
THE PRESIDENT: I have an additional volume here so that each of you might have one for the moment.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I think I have got mine marked, so I will give you the judge's which isn't marked. (Witness is given the book).
THE WITNESS: What page?
BY MR. LA FOLLETTE: It will be on page 16. Now I have mine marked not to hide something but to indicate what I am going to read. If you will turn to page 16, there is a paragraph 5 there. Then right below the paragraph 5 number is a grammatical paragraph which begins, "International Law as the local law of each State -" Do you find that paragraph?
A Yes.
Q If I read slowly and we read together, I think we will get the sense of it. I will start again:
"International Law as the local law of each State is necessarily superior to any Administrative Regulation or Statute or Public Act at variance with it. There can be no conflict on an equal plane. The precise relationship of a recognized rule of International Law to a local Statute in contravention thereof is often times obscured by occurrences which take place before the superiority of the form is ultimately established. A local court may be obliged, on account of the nature and limits of the powers conferred upon it, to enforce the Statute, and even a domestic tribunal of last resort may be compelled to affirm such action.
This merely signifies that no local form is possessed, of jurisdiction to pass upon the propriety of the conduct of the State in enacting the law. It does not imply that that conduct is internationally defensible or that the judges approve of it."
Do you find yourself in agreement or in disagreement with that statement?
A Yes and no, because -- may I explain? I believe that it is a mistake if the question as to how in legal science justice and injustice as well as the hierarchy of the legal sources are divided. This is not separated from the question as to how in the national order in the case of collision or of legal norms the courts or administrative authorities have to act. In our case, I have already pointed out, naturally. International Law can be effective only if the State's legal systems basically are brought into line with it. Since mistakes can occur there must be a means in order to comply with international law. But the very question is how such inconsistency can technically be removed. The method which between International Law and Local Law has become established is the following: if between the law of the State and International Law, a contradiction exists. The State is obliged, if it does not want to become liable, to solve that contradiction. But what has to take place as long as the contradiction exists, as to how the agencies of the State have to act as long as the inconsistency exists, there are several technical possibilities, and the individual State has to decide about this and regulates it.
I can not judge how it is, for example, in the United States, but in the German Reich during the Weimar Republic, it was uncontestably as follows: that in case of such an inconsistency the court or the administrative authority which noticed the inconsistency had to apply the law of the State and it had to he left to the political representation of the Reich abroad - if necessary, to the Reich as a whole, to carry the consequences.
Mr. Prosecutor, I stated this morning that the best method which probably would leave the least possibility, that between international law and the law of the state there would be a collision, would be that the state decides that its agencies have to apply the international law before every law of the state - in preference to every law of the state. I do not know whether there is any state in the entire world where that applies. It would be very nice if that would be the case. Then the point of view of theory and the point of view of practice would both be the same. In Germany, however, it was not the case. May I ask you whether I have thus answered the point of your question?
Q I believe you have, you have stated your opinion, and that is all I wanted; thank you. You see, I am not disposed to quarrel with you; I only want to know what you think. Now, I do want to ask you, Dr. Jahrreiss, a hypothetical question. You may not agree with the hypothesis which I hypothesize or the implications perhaps inherent in them, but just for my own purpose and for orderly procedure I ask you to consider my question and answer it on the basis of the facts which I hypothesize, purely. Let us assume that I was subject to the complete power of an individual we will call "A" to force me to obey his orders implicitly; and, under those circumstances, I saw "A" procuring a strong rope, strong enough to bind a man completely and securely. Secondly, that I saw him preparing a strong wooden frame upon the ground, with iron rings through which he could pass the rope; and, so placed, that they could bind the legs and arms of a man securely. Three - and a wooden block so shaped that a man's neck could be placed on it with his head extended beyond it. And four, that I saw this man "A" sharpening an ax large enough and strong enough to cut through the neck of a man. And suppose at this same time I also saw, standing always in view, from one to six men, each of whom I know that this man "A" has a violent hatred for and has threatened to kill; and each of whom I know that this man "*A" has the power to capture if he chooses.
Now then, let us assume that this man "A" captures one or more of these men that he hates, and that I know he hates; and binds this man with the rope that I saw him prepare, upon the frame that I saw him build; and place his neck on the block that I saw him prepare; and that then "A" hands me the ax which I saw him sharpen and orders me to cut off the head of this captured, bound man. Would you say that under those circumstances I would be guilty or not guilty of the man whose head I severed at the direct order of "A" who had the full power to order me to do so.
A I understand it this way. That guilty or not guilty is to be considered as guilt under criminal laws.
Q On assumed facts, yes.
A I just want to ask you a question. Do you mean it as a legal question or as a question of marality?
Q As a question of law.
A Of law, yes, And according to what criminal law, and in what state?
Q You can name the state; I don't care.
A Well, is that supposed to be a question in Utopia?
Q Let's put it in Germany we will say.
A In Germany?
Q In Germany, yes, after 1933.
A Yes, all right. Here then, we would be faced with terrible problems with which all of us since last year have been torturing ourselves so terribly, and I confess that inspite of having thought about it a great deal, that I have not yet found my way out of the dilemma into which we have been brought. Perhaps I can answer this hypothetical question by saying, by stating first, the points of view which in a conflicting manner make the answer more difficult. Perhaps first of all I should say, so that this should be clear, Mr. Prosecutor, how I, myself would behave.- I don't know. No matter how horrible the whole thing is, I don't believe that I well - the Charter of the International Military Tribunal anticipates that an appeal to higher orders should not be admissible.
It is not my task to criticize those regulations. However, perhaps I amy be allowed to say that this regulation, if it should really be valid law in any state whatsoever, would have very dangerous consequences for order in general. One of the four judges of the IMT, the French judge, Donnedieu De Vabres, in a lecture which he save this last April expressly stated that this regulation brings with it many difficulties for the thought of the discipline imposed by the state, for the idea of the discipline imposed by the state. I have the text of his lecture here. It is a lecture which Prof. Donnedieu De Vabres gave before the Association Des Etudes, Internationales Criminologiques. May I quote a short passage from it? May I read it in French?
INTERPRETER: Yes, you may.
A Since the statute was interpreted this way under the rules imposed by the IMT, it has, in a sense of individualism, gone beyond regulations of international law and domestic law, this regulation is open to the objection that it will endanger the necessary discipline for the preservation of the state. Such a regulation can be applied in the future only with prudence and circumspection. I am quoting this here only in order to demonstrate that if any rules exist at all, a certain harshness is absolutely necessary, unavoidably necessary. I always told my young students who started out on a study of law that they would have to devote themselves to perhaps the most bitter fact in life of man, and that is rule, because by nature man hates the ruler ship, at least if he is subjected ot it, but if this is the case every state basically has to require that its laws are executed, even if the person concerned, for moral or religious reasons, or other reasons, is of a different opinion.
On the other hand, Mr. LaFollette, every state knows that there is some limitation somewhere. For example, the German Reich had a military penal law. In it there was the quoted Article 47. In the jurisdiction of the Reich court, however, this paragraph was applied more and more in a restricting sense because discipline had to be above all.
Now, Mr. Prosecutor, before the IMT I in the expert opinion which I gave, which you were kind enough to quote here, stated expressly and emphatically, I believe, what the limit of humaneness or humanity is, but at the same time I pointed out that this limit is frequently not sharply drawn; and I believe, and this comes closer to your question, that perhaps after all the problems with which we are concerned here can not be done justice to quite, if a case is described quite as drastic as you just said.
Last year during the first four months of the trial I experienced it, and those were the most difficult times of my entire life. I experienced and saw what terrible things happened under Hitler's regime, and I have no way to express my horror and to describe this sufficiently in my language, but I believe that you will agree with me if I say that those are occurrences which are outside of legal discussion entirely, for, Mr. Prosecutor, even about injustice one can, if one is exact, speak with legal reasons only in cases where - excuse me - the injustice is within normal limits.
I myself was criminal judge. One single murder frequently in the court of assises occupied our time for two to three weeks, and it was a terrible thing. Two murders by one person - that was horrifying. If someone had eight to ten murders on his conscience, then he was described as a mass murderer in the press of Europe, and people asked themselves whether this was something that could be handled by means of the penal code at all.
When last year in the courtroom of the big trial I listened to the witness, Hoess, of Auschwitz, when he answered the question of the prosecutor as to how many people he had killed, if I remember correctly, he answered he didn't remember exactly whether two and a half or three million.
At that time it was quite obvious to me that neither positively nor negatively this had anything to do anymore with legal considerations because, Mr. Prosecutor, no matter what a State regulates concerning the question of review of a law the State has to think of normal conditions. These occurrences and matters can not be measured by any order of the world at all. Therefore, I believe that these things that happened in Germany behind a complicated system of secrecy, a system of mutual delimitation, and if then one adds the pressure of conscience of millions of people who felt themselves hemmed in between patriotism and hatred of the system, then the question which you put to me attains a very bitter human weight and I can only say I don't know any way out.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: Thank you, Doctor, Thank you very much.
If Your Honors please, I know the time to rise has come, I believe, has it not?
THE PRESIDENT: No.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: Oh, well, I have no further questions. Before we proceed any further unless there is any redirect, Dr. Marx is in the room and we can present to Your Honors a stipulation with reference to the defendant Engert.
THE PRESIDENT: I should like to ask the professor a few brief questions, if this is a convenient time.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: The Prosecution is finished.
THE PRESIDENT: In order to better understand your views which you have ably expressed, I understand your view to be that judges were obliged to obey the law of their State of Germany even though in doing so they violated a principle of international law. That is a fair brief statement, is it not, of the matter?
THE WITNESS: Yes. During the Weimar Republic this was already uncontestedly applicable, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I read the commentary of Anschuetz to Article 102.
THE PRESIDENT: And you would apply the same principle after 1933, would you not?
THE WITNESS: After 1933? There was much less the question whether this was different than before.
THE PRESIDENT: What court or tribunal ordinarily enforced the rule that judges must obey the law of their State under such circumstances? I assume the answer is obvious.
THE WITNESS: Excuse me. I didn't understand your question, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: What tribunal ordinarily enforced against the judges or upon the judges this obligation to obey the law of the State even though they in doing so violated international law?
THE WITNESS: I never heard that a court violated this principle so that there was no need to force the judges to conform to it. Mr. President, I never heard that a German court did not apply a Reich law because in the opinion of the court it was contrary to international law. I never heard of such a case. You see, it was entirely uncontested. The court just in such a case couldn't do anything but through official channels to call the attention of the Government to this contradiction so that the Government in accordance with its obligation under international law would see to it that the laws were changed. Let us assume the case that the Reich Supreme Court, for example, in deciding a case had come to the opinion that a German Reich law was contrary to an obligation of the Reich under international law. Then the Reich Supreme Court was not able to say: the indictment is refused because the Reich law which supports the indictment is contrary to international law. The Reich Supreme Court could do nothing but either to postpone the trial and to report to the Government so that perhaps changes would be made in time, but it was not even obliged to do that. It was obliged only if it did make a decision to decide in accordance with national law even if it was contrary to the international law.
That was the legal situation during the Weimar Republic.
THE PRESIDENT: That answers my question.
THE WITNESS: No?
THE PRESIDENT: It does, yes. The Reich Supreme Court would in proper cases lay down the rule that the lower court judge should enforce the German law even though it violated some principle of international law for which Germany as a State might be diplomatically held responsible, is that true?
THE WITNESS: No, that is not quite correct. I said that the Reich Supreme Court just the same as the other German courts in regard to this question did not have any doubts at all, and, therefore, it did not make any rules to which the lower courts had to comply. That was not necessary at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the lower courts themselves recognized this rule of which you speak that they must enforce the law of the State even though it violates a principle of international law?
THE WITNESS: Yes, and they only had to look at the Anschuetz commentary: that said so expressly.
Q Well, prior, at least prior to 1913, was there any tribunal other than the Court of the State which could punish the public officer or a judge, for making a decision which was contrary to international law, if it was made in compliance with the law of the State?
A No.
Q If the principle enunciated among other bodies by the first tribunal, the IMT Tribunal, namely, the principle of the penal responsibility of an individual officer for violations of international law, should be applied; then you have, do you not, a modification of your principle which you have stated with reference to the necessity that judges must obey the law of the state. In other words, if that principle of penal responsibility of the individual has become a part of international law, then the anomalous situation would arise where the officer, perhaps the judge, may have been required by his state law to make a decision, but may, nevertheless, be responsible if any tribunal has jurisdiction to try him, for a decision contrary to international law. Isn't that true?
A If I understood your question correctly, Your Honor, the general validity of the principles of the charter as international law could, in regard to judges of those states which require that their officials apply the law of the state as the final will, bring about tragic conflicts of conscience, for which, in my opinion, there is no indubitable legal solution at all. But, Mr. President, I do not know whether I quite understand your question correctly. It did not come through very well?
Q I do not think I will attempt to repeat it further. I understood your position. It is true, is it not that there was no tribunal in Germany, perhaps anywhere else, which had statutory jurisdiction to apply international law in a penal proceeding against a public officer of the state who had complied with the state law?
A Yes, that is correct.