Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Josef Altstoetter, at al, defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 27 June, 1947, 0930-1630-, Justice Junes T. Brand presiding.
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal 111.
Military Tribunal 111 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marsahl, are all the defendants in their places?
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honor, all the defendants are present in court except the defendant Engert, who is sick.
THE PRESIDENT: Proper notation will be made.
DR. HAENSEL: May I make a very brief statement. I ask you not to be suprised to see me standing here. My colleague, Dr. Kuboschok, will continue to conduct the Schlegelberger case, but I would like to explain something else. I am at the moment busy compiling a trial brief on the subject of conspiracy, and I am able to complete it in its essentials until tomorrow, if the Tribunal should consider it important, I think it is absolutely essential for me, as I had to no very brief before the deal now with the question whether the problem of conspiracy is to be regarded first under control Council Law No. 10, further from the fact of the occupation of Germany, as a legal instrument, for the consideration of this case, and; for that purpose I have to study the modern American legal literature on the subject. I only wanted to say that today, and I also would like to discuss another problem. My colleagues have told me that probably on the 9th a plenary session will be probably held at which that problem of conspiracy will be discussed by all courts in session in Nuernberg at the moment and which are interested in this problem. In preparation for this, I would like to submit my trial brief as soon as possible so that the Tribunal has sufficient time to deal with the matter before that joint discussion takes place.
THE PRESIDENT: We are informed, informally, that further opportunity for discussion by counsel of this issue may be presented in the near future, as soon as the time and place have been determined, you will receive official notice of it. I am referring to the possibility or the prospect of such a joint hearing as counsel has referred to. We haven't received official notice of it as yet, and, of course, this Tribunal won't take separate action on that issue until the hearing by the joint Tribunals has been held. You understand that?
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: However, we will welcome any brief which counsel cares to prepare, as soon as he cares to present it in writing.
DR. FRANZ SCHLEGELBERGER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. KUBOSCHOK:(Attorney for defendant Schlegelberger) Yesterday I pointed out that the five documents books which I had submitted for translation were not yet completely finished.
Yesterday two had been translated. One document book, No. 111, is already completed in the English language. I intend to submit, the documents which are contained in Book 111 to the Tribunal as exhibits during my examination of the defendant. I should be grateful to the Tribunal if it would rule that that completed document book be brought to the courtroom.
Q Witness, were you active in party politics?
A No, I never joined any party; I always staued away from politics. My life was devoted to the practical administration of justice, and to legal research. If cooking back now, I should say which one of parties of the German people, I fitted into, I would call myself as belonging to the right one of the progressive, conservative direction which was promoted by the German people's Party Deutsche Volkspartei, and which was also represented by the German Nationalist Party, Deutschnationale Volkspartei.
Q What was your attitude towards the NSDAP and National Socialism?
A In 1933 I was approached on the subject of joining the NSDAP; I refused. My reason was, first the fact that I could not subscribe to the program of the NSDAP. Further more, another reason was my views that under Secretary of Justice should remain neutral even on the surface and, therefore, must not establish any parties. I was never a National Socialist. It is obvious that a party program, in its many fold aspects, has many a point which one can adopt; for example, the program's aim of bridging class differences, that is to say, the creation of a trua national community, that point I welcomed heartedly, but, concerning the program of the NSDAP as a whole, above all the way in which it was to be put into effect, that was far removed from my own ideas. My own conservative attitude as a human being as a jurist accounted for that. It came as a great surprise to me when on 30 January, 1938 the Fuehrer's Chancellory informed me in a letter, signed by Bouhler, that Hilter had ordered that I was to join and be accepted by the NSDAP. I said that that came as a great surprise to me. I myself, like other Under Secretaries who had also come from the middle classes, had never heard of that order, and it was impossible to refuse because that would not merely have meant I would have given battle not only to the party, but to the state itself; and I never departed from that view. The membership which was ordered against my will and forced upon me I never made use of. I never attended a party conference or meeting. Naturally, I did not hold any office in the party either.
Perhaps the fact that I never changed my attitude is also demonstrated by the fact that neither my wife nor my sons every belonged to the Party. My social contacts too, as far as they were not conditioned by official affairs, moved almost exclusively within the circles of non-Party members.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Hitler order by which Schlegelberger's membership in the Party was decreed will be submitted by me as Schlegelberger Document No. 34 as soon as the document books will have been completed.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, what effect did that attitude of yours have on your official position?
A I always saw to it that Party members and Party functionaries were treated just like every other citizen. That played a part particularly in personnel matters. I only appointed that person to an office who, in my view, was properly qualified; and I refused to reward Party stars by appointing them to an office.
On the other hand, the attitude of the Party towards the Ministry and myself -- and I shall have to come back to that later on -- made great difficulties and brought about many inner conflicts.
At this moment I should like to point out the case to which the prosecution referred concerning notaries and their hostile attitude to the Party. They demonstrated it so obviously that when I came to hear of it in my official capacity I could not form a proper opinion on it. If I had tried to suppress those cases it would have been unavoidable that the Party would interfere, which definitely would have stated that the notaries had violated their duty of allegiance towards the State and the head of the State. Perhaps the Party would have welcomed it, because such opposition would have been a welcome cause to discredit the Administration of Justice and to jeopardize my personnel policy, on which depended the fate of many officials.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness has referred to the case of the notaries which, under Exhibit No. 436, in document book I, supplement, English Text p. 38, was submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the exhibit number?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Exhibit 436.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q The Prosecution refers to your lecture held at Rostock University in 1936. That lecture is compared as to its aim with a speech by the Reich jurist leader Frank, and the prosecution sees in it an avowal of National Socialism. Please give us some explanations about that speech.
A Counsel, you have pointed out that speech was made in 1936. Before I discuss the details about that speech I should like to say a few words as to how, at that time, one was able at all to discuss political questions in public. It wasn't that way that, when National Socialist quarters laid down program points, one was allowed to make a frontal attack. I ignore altogether the point of personal danger that might have arisen for an opponent. I would not have fought shy of that danger, because a person who held tho office which I hold was in daily danger. However, such a frontal attack would have resulted in the opposite of what I wanted to achieve, that is, an increase in the opposition against One had to look for opportunities which one could use, and, for example, the locality had something to do with that.
I chose the University for the place of my speech, and that had a decisive influence on my audience. I had to see to it that the National Socialist ideas which I wished to attack were beaten with their own weapons.
The actual reason for my speech was tho fact that Freisler again and again before the public, pointed out that the Party program was valid before as a law and was at least the framework of the law. Therefore, one was obliged to carry out that program immediately and completely.
I do not think I need to enter into any details here as to what it would have meant if that doctrine had been recognized. In the practice of the judges it would have meant separation from all legal provisions; the Party program could have been applied at random everywhere. It would, so to speak, have been the roof law under the protection of which, according to the wishes of those extreme National Socialists, legal life would have developed.
It was my aim to point out that such a construction would not be necessary at all, that the existing laws would also do justice to the fact that Germany was now a state under National Socialist Government. I must point out that the law adapts itself automatically to changed conditions of life and ideologies, and that from that the standard and the speed of legal changes are decided.
I intended to put in the place of the revolutionary changes of law advocated by Freisler, and evolutionary development of law. I based myself on the principle of the interior change of the legal system, a principle which, for the first time, I propounded already in 1929 in one of my works where I also elucidated that principle. That was at a time when one could really not say that I might have based my arguments on the National Socialist thought. The compromise laws, which had already been promulgated, I mentioned intentionally without evaluating them. That was how I had argued against that thesis, and I believe had refuted it. I also used the opportunity to give my views concerning other important topical questions as well. I turned against the interference with the carrying out of sentences which I considered inadmissible. Due to previous incidents, I warned the judges against currying favor with high Party officers. I appealed to the pride of the judges and the consciousness of their independence. I also found reason to turn against it that some jurists in an absolutely inconsiderate manner, placed their owm egotistic endeavours in the foreground, and did not show any understanding whatsoever for the sound idea of a true people's community.
Generally I used a tactic which I had employed repeatedly: I committed the high party leaders to adhere to many of their good words which they had probably spoken without reflection. I reminded then that Hitler during his first speech before the Reichstag had declared the independence of the judges as necessary. I pointed out that Frank had mentioned the internal value of justice; and, that Goering, in public, had spoken against interference with the administration of justice.
Q What was your relationship with Hitler?
A I believe that one must distinguish between the personal and the material evaluation, and at the same time one must connect the two. I believe that Hitler, concerning my own person, had a certain measure of respect. I believe he saw in me the experienced civil servant, who was without ambitions, and devoted himself to work and research. Concerning my sphere of work, civil law, he had not the slightest interest in it. The fact that I was unpolitical aroused a certain amount of distrust in him; that I suppose explains the fact that that contrary to civil servants of the same rank, I was never offered an honorary position either in the SS or the SA. That I, contrary to other high civil servants of the same rank , was not awarded the Golden party badge; that he restricted my connection with the Party to the absolute minimum; and that again explains in particular, I believe, the positively brutal attack on me in the well-known Reichstag speech of 26 April 1942. The fact that I was placed in charge of affairs after the death of Guertner certainly was not a demonstration of confidence. This is how I would like to put it: It was just a make-shift solution. At that time Hitler could not yet make up his mind to appoint a new Minister of Justice. What played a certain part, perhaps, was that the head candidate for the office, Frank, at that time, as Governor General of the Government General, was not available; thus there was nothing left as a way out, but to let the Ministry put the Under-Secretary who had seniority in the office in charge of the Ministry. Hitler's distrust, as far as my person was concerned, was altogether justified from an objective point of view.
I may say, and I wish to place special emphasis on that. I was never fooled or influenced by Hitler's demoniacal qualities. and I saved my own conscience, as far as he was concerned. For myself, Hitler was the declared opponent, in fact, the person who held the administration of justice in contempt. That conviction naturally placed me in a clear position. As far as it did not jeopardize my goal I upheld my different opinion quite openly toward Hitler. That was already the state of affairs at the time of Guertner. I may say that all of my life as long as I held office, I was out to fight for justice and against arbitrariness. In the avowal for justice there was no difference between Guertner and myself. Guertner was the recognized protector of arbitry, but he was not a fighter. If concerning the development which was slower to begin with and later became faster, he gave up opposition in some respect, that certainly is not due to a lack of honest will to uphold justice. Frequently he came to me for advice and assistance. But that time was overshadowed by a continuous struggle with the Reich Jurists' Leader, Frank. In continuous attacks Frank tried from his position tion as Reich Legal Office Leader to achieve his final goal which was to get the office of Minister of Justice and then to change the Ministry and make it into a National Socialist Ministry. That struggle can only be understood if one knew who Frank wan. Frank was the legal adviser and, in difficult times, the defense counsel of Hitler, and, therefore, he was particularly close to him. Before 1933, even, he had been the leader and propagandist of National Socialist legal ideas. If one bears that in mind, then one sees already on the one hand, the Ministry with its expert officials, the official activities; on the other hand, the combination of National Socialist ideas on law with the aim of overrunning the Ministry.
Frank recognized Guertner's qualities, therefore, he tried by the tactics of continuously wearing him down, to achieve his aim. If one knows National Socialist methods, one knows how stubborn and tenacious such a battle was in the methods in which it was waged, and that struggle had reached its climax when Guertner died and I took over the conduct of affairs.
Q What was the situation at that time?
A One gets a true picture of that situation if one forms a picture in one's mind of those three groups or parties which were fighting against the administration of justice with the aim of conquering the administration of justice in order to destroy it. I call these fighting groups by the names of their leaders: Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels; and, in so doing I would like to emphasize that during the whole time I only talked once to each of those three men.
Himmler proceeded by different roads; The undermining of confidence in legal administration of justice and the conquering of its competence. Attacks were being made continuously on the administration of justice in the periodical of the SS which had already been mentioned in this trial, "Das Schwarze Korps". They were not content with criticizing sentences but proceeded to defame in public the judges who had passed the sentences. Himmler collected material by sending secret observers to the court sessions. The officials of the Ministry were being watched and spied upon. Anonymous secret reports in which the Ministry was attacked were sent out. Persons who had been acquitted by a court sentences were taken into police custody. Others, who had been sentenced to a term in prison were seized by the police, and as the Minister of the Administration of Justice heard later, many of those persons were killed by shooting. All these things were intended and designed to undermine the confidence in the administration of justice. The administration of justice was to be discredited in public again and again as a backward and outmoded institution both as regards to personnel and the subject matter. On the basis of those steps Himmler proceeded. I should like to say with cynical frankness, he withdrew and claimed for himself many more fields of competence from the Ministry of Justice. He invoked his power of his position under Hitler and he demanded that the competence for penal cases concerning Poles and Jews should be transferred to the police. His attempts to conquer the public prosecutor's offices for the police were continued until the end. It is obvious that that aim, which was placed higher and higher, by necessity, would lead to the thought as to whether one would not have to show that by new and more stringent measures one was in a position to overcome, the criticism which Himmler used as a pretence and thereby take the wind out of his sails.
Q The answer which the witness has given to the question dealt with the following prosecution documents: The Ferber Affidavit contained in Document Book B-III-E, Page 39 to 41 in the English Text, and with the report by the President of the District Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgerichtspresident) of Hamm of 7 July 1942, Exhibit Number 74, in the English text of Document Book 1-C on Page 71, and furthermore, with Exhibit 98 in Document Book I-D, English Text, Page 110 to 115.
JUDGE BLAIR: What was the exhibit number of the first document?
DR. KUBOSCHOK: Unfortunately, I did not put it down. Unfortunately, I cannot give you the exhibit number of the Ferber affidavit, but it is contained in the Document Book III-B-I, English Text, Page 39.
THE PRESIDENT: III-E?
DR. KUBOSCHOK: B-I.
THE PRESIDENT: B-I?
DR. KUBOSCHOK B-I. I beg your pardon, B-III-I.
THE PRESIDENT: For what does the B stand?
DR. KUBOSCHOK: No, that wrong, Document Book III-I. What pant did Bormann play in that struggle against the administration of justice?
A Bormannts work extended, above all, to personnel policy. Under the existing provisions, no Ministry could against the opposition of the Party Chancellery, appoint an official or promote him. The Reich Ministry of Justice always made its selection entirely on the basis of professional qualifications. Bormann, on the other hand, attached importance exclusively to the political opinion and the merits for the Party. If he objected to a suggestion made by the Ministry of Justice, and it was not possible to overcome the opposition, there was nothing else to be done at first, but to wait for a better situation perhaps, and leave the position unfilled. I experienced it myself that the position of a President of a District Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) remained vacant for that reason for more than a year. But it is obvious that the possibilities of such action had a certain limit. It was inadvisable to leave vacant an unlimited number of positions. And sometimes one was forced to appoint to the Administration of Justice personnel of only moderate qualifications, whereas persons who were better qualified were left out.
Bormann knew very well how to promote Hitler's antipathy for the Administration of Justice on the one hand, and on the other hand, how to exploit the naturally weak and unpolitical position of the Ministry under Hitler. Hitler continuously received newspaper clippings about court proceedings and sentences. Usually, the facts were distorted or the reports in any case, were always inadequate. Hitler was always approached on these subjects only at a moment when for some other reason he was disgruntled and his attention had to be distracted. Those reasons were interruptions which resulted from the war situation. For Bormann, the Administration of Justice was the lightening rod. The Gauleiters cooperated with him. They collected the material by getting new paper clippings from provincial newspapers with great glee. The Gauleiter of Munich, Wagner, excelled. Every opportunity was used in order to discredit the Administration of Justice before Hitler with entirely inadequate documentation. The key to that situation lies in a statement which Goering made to me at the time the Administration of Justice became centralized. I will revert to that later. Therefore, our main endeavor had to be to inform Hitler at the earliest possible moment, and of course completely and honestly, I shall have an opportunity to explain how those attempts were constantly sabotaged by Bormann.
I should like to say now that our attempt to prevent Hitler from changing sentences after they had been passed by suggesting that the Presidents of the District Court of Appeal, (Oberlandesgericntspresidenten) should confirm the sentences whereby merely a technical, non-political review would have been carried out.
That attempt was intentionally brought to naught by Bromann for he realized that thereby it would have been made impossible for Hitler to reopen on the initiative of Party trials which had been concluded.
DR. KUBOSCKOK: the possibility which the witness mentioned concerning the possibility of Bormann's interference with every appointment of an official results from the decree of 10 July 1937 published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Reich Law Gazette of 1937, page 769. I shall submit that decree in a supplement to my document book.
Q. Witness, concerning the evidence submitted by the Prosecution, could you discuss a case which reveals such efforts being made by the Party?
A I am able to do that. I refer to the statements made by the Prosecution witness Ferber. He dealt with a case about which Guertner had frequently talked to me. That was the case against Heller in which the law against motor car traps had been applied. For the information of the Tribunal I may say that law was promulgated on 22 June 1938. It is based on the particular initiative of Hitler.
The facts of the case were as follows: Soon after that law had been promulgated, Heller and his mistress as the guests of a driving school, had attacked a driver and had robbed his meter. While the case was being tried before the Special Court in Hurnberg in the presence of Gauleiter Streicher, and Denzler, the Gau Legal Office Loader, Hitler appeared in Hurnberg unexpectedly. A death sentence against Heller was expected for certain. Evidently Streicher and Denzler intended to submit to Hitler in his presence a proposal for a death sentence on the basis of this new law in which Hitler was particularly interested. A telephone call was put through to the Ministry of Justice to hear an opinion on the question of clemency. Opposition was encountered there on the part of the Referent. That Referent was Ministerialrat, (Ministerial Counsellor) Westphal, who was indicated here. He refused to give his opinion because the legal problem which had arisen in the Heller case was being dealt with at a trial before the Supreme Reich Court which was still pending and was there to be submitted for the opinion of the Reich supreme court judges.
At that point the Party representatives became busy. Denzler reported this information to Hitler implying that Guertner obviously was sabotaging the application of this law, which Hitler himself had promoted, and he boasted that that was enough to bring about Guertner's fall. At any rate, that interference on the part of the Party led to the fact that Hitler, following Denzler's report, ordered the death sentence to be excited without waiting for the Ministry of Justice to give its opinion.
In Berlin Hitler took to account the Referent Westphal in great anger for sabotaging the law, and only because Guertner acted on behalf of his own staff and only with the greatest effort was it possible to save Denzler.
Q The Heller case which has just been mentioned is contained in the transcript, page 1327, English text.
What part did Goebbels play in that struggle against the administration of justice?
A Goebbels set the machinery of propaganda to work against the administration of justice. He deluded the public by telling them that the people no longer had any confidence in the judiciary. That was a delusion, for the opposite was true.
His propaganda machine did not only make direct or camouflaged attacks against the judiciary in public and tried to lower their prestige, but he also tried by his art of dialectics in his speeches on the administration of justice quite deliberately to lead the judges astray and to put to sleep their consciences as judges. He coined the concept of the exigency of the State and said that jurisdiction, too, ought to make that its starting point. For a sentence, first of all expedience was decisive, and only later, perhaps, justice might be considered, too.
Q Goebbels' speech before the members of the People's Court is contained in Exhibit 23, Document Book I-A, pages 82 to 84 in the English text.
text.
What were the opportunities at the disposal of those power groups and which they made use of in their struggle against the administration of justice?
A Himmler, Bormann and Goebbels were the closest confidants of Hitler. They had access to him at any time. For him they represented the uncompromising incarnation of National Socialism. He listened to them when they alleged National Socialism was being endangered by the administration of justice. The entire apparatus of Party politics, police and spying was at their disposal. On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice was entirely isolated. Contact among the Ministries which would have strengthened its position no longer existed.
Q Here, I would like to refer to the verdict by the IMT, English transcript, page 16963, and I would, like to quote that passage briefly: "Concerning the first reason for our decision, it must be stated that beginning with that time, which can be considered the beginning of a conspiracy for the waging of an aggressive war, the Reich Government no longer formed, the body with governing functions, but merely was a majority of administrative officials who were subject to the absolute will of Hitler."
Q. Witness, will you continue, please?
A. In view of that situation, what could a Ministry of Justice do which was directed merely by an under secretary who was in charge of affairs; who, furthermore, was not a member of the party and whose words, naturally, did not get the same hearing as those of a Minister; a man who, as the indictment said, never attained cabinet rank? According to an express instruction by Hitler, the chief only was told those things which were necessary for him to fulfill his own taks. It is evident that that instruction made possible all kinds of limitations.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time, fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. KUBOSCHOK:
Q Witness, before the recess we discussed the possibilities at the disposal of these power groups. Please, will you continue.
A I ventured to find out that Hitler had given an explicit order that a chief of any office should only be instructed about that which he had to know in order to carry out his tasks. And that went very far. That situation is better explained by the fact that the Minister Guertner, for instance, only found out about the Euthanasia decree when in reports on the situation rendered by the presidents of the District Courts of Appeal, a certain suspicion arose that this decree was carried out, and Guertner categorically demanded an elucidation. Whereas other Ministers were authorized to listen to foreign broadcasts, that was prohibited to the Minister of Justice by threat of punishment. When I objected against this, I was told in reply that I should turn to the Ministry of Propaganda which would inform me about everything that happened.
I may point out that the opinion of the International Military Tribunal states that on account of the control over broadcasting and over the press and the propaganda machine, an independent judgment based on freedom of thought became an absolute impossibility. I, from my own experience, can only confirm that statement. A significant example is given by the following occurrence -- an example showing the extent of that spy system. The Gauleiter of East Prussia had protested against the Administration of Justice in his district. In order to examine these complaints in 1940 or '41 -- I do not know the date precisely any more today -- I travelled to Koenigsberg and found out that as for the reports by the President of the District Court of Appeals, the Gauleiter was sooner informed about these reports than I was. Based on warnings received from reliable sources, I had to expect that in the various offices of the municipality which I had to visit, special microphones had been installed for the occasion of my visit, and I could only talk with my personal referent by going out to the beach and to pick out an isolated beach chair there in order to be able to talk to him without anybody listening to us and spying on us.
Q The passage in the Opinion of the International Military Tribunal, to which the witness referred, is contained in the English transcript on Page 16,813. Witness, the prosecution charges you with the fact that the Ministry of Justice was in an official contact with these offices which you have just mentioned. What can you say about this?
A I believe that that contact is inherent in the structure of the State: the distribution of tasks to the various agencies. A cooperation with the police was certainly to a certain extent unavoidable. According to German Law of Criminal Procedure, the prosecution is not in a position at all, without the cooperation of the police, to carry out the required investigations pending trial. If a denouncement has been received by the prosecution, the prosecution has to conduct the necessary investigation first of all. That the prosecution should do all that itself, considering the large number of things to be done, is quite impossible. The prosecution, therefore, has to turn to the local police and, for good reasons, in the German Judicative Act and the German Code for Penal Procedure, the police are designated as an auxiliary organ for the prosecution and directed to cooperate upon request of the prosecution.
Apart from the police, frequently the SD is mentioned in the trial. On the part of Hitler, that SD, apart from its function within the Party, had received important tasks, such as the delivery of information to various Reich agencies, and therefore even the court authorities had to refer to that source of information.
Q In this connection, may I refer to Exhibit 42. Please continue.
A The position of the Party Chancellery, was regulated legally in a way that changes of personnel, that is to say promotions and appointments, could only take place with the cooperation on the part of the Party Chancellery.
That I have already pointed out. Added to this was the fact that in 1942, the Chief of the Party Chancellery was given the position of a Reich Minister participating in legislation. It was therefore necessary to let him participate in the preparation of every law.
Q The decree of 16 January '42, to which reference was just made I shall submit as Document Schlegelberger, Exhibit 23.
AAnd then finally the Ministry of Propaganda. The direction of that Ministry by Goebbels may cause to a non-German's mind, the misconception that this was a Party function. That, as I said, would be a misconception because the Ministry of Propaganda was not a Partyoffice but a Ministry, just as the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Finace, or the Foreign Office, and that there was an official channel between all the Ministries, that is a matter of course in every State.
But that connection was also a necessity from the point of view of counter-intelligence. Only thus was it possible, at least from time to time, to guard one's self against surprises. Only thus was it possible, perhaps in the very last moment, to make successful objections.
Q The witness referred to a provision of the Code of Penal Procedure according to which the prosecution could authorize the police to make investigations. That is paragraph 161 of the Code of Penal procedure. Furthermore, in this connection paragraph 146 of the Judicature Act has to be considered. About the importance of reports and information from the SD, I shall submit as Schlegelberger Exhibit No. 92 a report from the handbook for Allied troops. Witness, in your own camp, that is to say in the field of the Administration of Justice itself, did you have to fight against opposition?
A That question, unfortunately, I have to confirm emphatically. First of all, and very briefly, I have again to mention Frank in this connection, the representative of the National Socialist Legal Conception, who through all available channels succeeded in bringing this thought before the public. As means he had at his disposal, first the legal publications under his influence, the National Socialist Lawyers' League, whose president he was, and the Academy for German Law which he had created. That Academy, which possibly according to its composition, could be considered a sort of scientific institute to aid the Administration of Justice, evolved by Frank as a competition in order to direct the Ministry of Justice, to overrule and to discredit it with the party. As soon as he found out, from his own information sources, that the Ministry of Justice intended to carry out reforms, he mobilized his Academy immediately which on its part was to prepare plans and to publish them, and not much emphasis was placed upon their quality. But the main purpose was to demonstrate that Frank was the leader of the living young justice in opposition to the old senile machinery of justice of the state.