Q In Exhibit 75 you made the suggestion for a confirmation of the sentences by the presidents of the district courts of appeal. Under what circumstances and for what reasons did you make that suggestion?
A This suggestion to have the sentences by the courts confirmed is in a close causal connection with this practice of transfer, to describe it briefly, which I have just told you about. Hitler's Reichstag speech of April, 1942, left no doubt in my mind that these interventions would increase, and my suggestion was to the effect that Hitler should delegate the right, the prerogative which he reserved for himself, to the Ministry of Justice and to the presidents of the district courts of appeal. If this had been achieved, the whole matter would have remained in the hands of the Administration of Justice, for even the applications for non-confirmation according to my draft were supposed to be made by the general public prosecutors who in turn had received instructions from the Ministry.
My letter in regard to this question of confirmation shows again what means I had to use. I could not reveal the real reason if I did not want to be unsuccessful from the very beginning. Bormann, however, in this case saw through my reasons. In a letter from Bormann to Lammers, Bormann writes: this attempt was again a confirmation of the will of the Administration of Justice to keep these matters in their own hands, as, for example, the question of analogy or the extraordinary objection or the nullity plea, but in the Ministry of Justice there was not the will to apply these means with the necessary severity.
Above all, Bormann saw clearly that if my draft would have become law, the intervention right of Hitler's would have been destroyed by one stroke. All the presidents of the district courts of appeal wore supposed to pronounce their decisions in Hitler's name, and. if they had. confirmed in the name of Hitler, Hitler could no longer have attacked their opinion. If I may use a common saying, I can say that Bormann, the fox, did not fall for the trap. In that connection, perhaps.
I may point out two points. Lammers remark in the document shews that I refused to have the party drawn into this confirmation procedure basically. Furthermore, the document shows how I lead to go about such things. These confirmation sentences existed in the case of military courts, that is, also in the case of Luftwaffe courts which were subjected to the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, that is Goering. Thus I could count an understanding for my suggestion in the case of Goering, and, therefore, I secured his support through a special oral report on my suggestion.
Q Were you also competent for clemency questions?
A Yes. Since the time when I took over the Ministry of Justice, that is, since 30 January 1941.
Q Please give me a description about the competency of the clemency question?
AAccording to German law, clemency includes two questions: first, to pardon a penalty has become final or to make it more lenient, or to eliminate entirely, that is, the actual pardon, the right of pardon; and, secondarily, the so-called quashing. That is a right before a case has been legally decided to order that there should be no trial. Then clemency was the competency of the head of the State.
Through a decree of 1 February 1935 Hitler in addition to the right of quashing the proceeding had reserved to himself only his personal right in case of death sentences or cases of high treason and treason. In the remaining cases he delegated the right to issue pardons to the Ministry of Justice. This delegation of authority was extended by decree of 3 September 1939 to the effect that the Minister of Justice also in the cases which Hitler had reserved to himself, as I have just mentioned, could order the execution of the carrying out of the sentence on his own. If, on the other hand, in these cases he thought that a pardon should be granted, he had to obtain the decision of Hitler through the mediation of Under-Secretary Meisner. Later on this was changed. A clemency proceeding itself was laid down in the regulation about clemency of 6 February 1935, and in the case of death sentences the already-mentioned Article 453 of the Penal Code, of Procedure, was relevent.
This Article said that no execution could be carried out a s long as there was no decision by the person who had the right to grant a pardon and who had to be informed about this case.
This decision that the right of pardon should not be used: During my time in office, and also during Guertner's time, was signed by the Minister, even when Hitler had decided himself, that is, the wording of the decision about the clemency question as it is submitted here in the document, does not show whether the clemency pleas was decided upon by the Minister of Justice on his own, or with a refusal by Hitler.
Q. I do not believe that we have to go into the technical details in the right of the clemency question. The Almeier affidavit, exhibit 441, gives us a clear picture. However, it seems to me to be essential that you should describe to the Court under what point of view your decisions were made, and in the clemency question, in the case of death sentences?
A. In the foreground, I would like to put this statement, namely, that the Minister of Justice acted as a deputy of Hitler; therefore, he had to take Hitler's will into consideration, and above all from the way Hitler had made decisions about clemency pleas, he had to gather what possibilities existed all together to make a positive decision, that is, to grant a pardon. All of those possibilities were exhausted to the limit. To get through with the clemency plea to Hitler, that was the Chief of the Presidial Chancellory, Meissner. In the cases where I desired to have a pardon granted I referred the written clemency plea to Meissner; then, in addition I went to Meissner in person and consulted with him extensively in what manner this individual case could, so to say, be made palatable to Hitler. Meissner also followed my suggestions: frequently he succeeded even in rather weak cases, and he told me how frequently, for weeks he had to let cases remain in the files until he succeeded in catching a favorable moment, and to make use of Hitler's personal pecularities.
In any base, I can say with a good conscious that within the limits imposed upon me, I also had a tendency for leniency, and that in numerous cases I succeeded in getting a pardon which if I had dealt with a case in accordance with my duty, but only officially, I would never have achieved.
Q. In exhibit 458, three cases of death sentences are mentioned, in which a report by the competent Oberstaatsanwalt was given by telephone; these cases seem to be in contradiction to the careful written wording of the cause given in the Altmeier affidavit. Please make some statement about this.
A. No, they are not in contradiction. These cases have been worked on equally carefully as all other cases. The pecularity was only that in the written clemency report a few supplementary remarks, in which a mis-understanding because the telephone was being used, was out of the question, were made. Incidentally on this occasion, and I think this is apparent from the document, I pointed out that in this limited scope, I did not desire telephonic supplement, but always required that everything be handled in writing.
Q. The Prosecution has submitted the document regarding the execution in cases against Poles in the People's Court, in that it confirms your decision that you did not make any use, of the right of clemency, which was given to you by the Fuehrer; this is Prosecutions exhibit 137. Can you explain this?
A. Yes, certainly, I would like to do that. For the reason which I explained before, from the wording of the decision about the clemency plea, one cannot conclude with certainty whether Hitler made the decision or whether I did, but let us start from the assumption that I made the decision on my own, because I considered submitting this case to Hitler held no promise for success.
These defendants had been condemned because they belonged to an organization which represented tendencies for greater Poland, nationalistic tendencies; this organization aimed at the Incorporation of extensive German territories, and to a greater Poland which was to be merely created, the territory up to the river Oder, which has been mentioned these days quite often. That these efforts represented a clear and very dangerous case of high treason, for which according to the existing laws, the death sentence was applicable, that is obvious. A pardon by Hitler was out of the question. But, may I be permitted, on this occasion to point out expressly that in clemency questions, I was never influenced by the question as to whether the condemned persons were Germans or foreigners; this applies especially also in regard to the Poles. The difficult duty of deciding on clemency questions I also took very seriously and objectively and free of political tendencies, and the decisions which I made, was made merely on the basis of the law, on the basis of the seriousness of the act, and the practicable possibilities which existed to succeed with Hitler in the case. Moreover, the pardoning of Poles, did not occur frequently.
Q. From exhibit 367, there is a correspondence with Meissner regarding the execution of sentences in cases against Czechs. Can you explain the letter you wrote to Meissner on 13 March 1942?
A. The difficulty is that my letter to Meissner is not here. Therefore, I have, from the answering letter from Meissner to me, I have to reconstruct the case.
I know the following about the case itself: In 1940 when Freiherr von Neurath was Protector, it had been ordered by a Fuehrer decree that death sentences against members of the Czech Resistance Movement should for the time being not be carried out. It was believed that with the increasing military successes of Germany, the activity of the Czech Resistance Movement would gradually subside. Hitler did not want to create martyrs. That would only have increased the resistance.
However, he ordered very clearly that if the Resistance Movement should increase again the sentences must be executed for the purpose of a deterrant. Toward the end of September, 1941, Heydrich became Deputy Reich Protector and was given the order to break the newly developed Resistance Movement. Soon Heydrich instituted policecivilian courts martial. Although the Fuehrer Decree of 1940 already lost force and sentences would have to be executed I did not take any steps. In March 1942, however, the question became acute when Heydrich called me on the telephone and said that as far as he knew, several members of the Resistance Movement who had been sentenced to death, were still under the custody of the Administration of Justice. He urged execution. He pointed out that due to the change in course, which was being followed, the Fuehrer decree of 1940 had been outmoded for a long time and the execution should have been carried out.
Since I had to count on an intervention on the part of Heydrich with Hitler, I now turned to Meissner. That the prerequisites of the 1940 decree were no longer existent, was a fact that could not be disputed. Now in trying to reconstruct the situation, I can no longer say with certainty whether I reported this in my letter as Heydrich's opinion or as my own; but in any case, the situation was so obvious that Meissner could not object to Heydrich's request. He refused to comply with my wish to submit the matter to Hitler because the Reich Protector, alone, was competent. Even at this point, I did not give in entirely.
I now turned to Lammers. He did not share Meissner's opinion, but believed that even at this point, Hitler still wanted to refrain from the execution. He said that he was ready to comply with my wish and report the matter to Hitler.
What happened after this, I regret I can not say anything about that. My memory is not sufficient to tell you about that, and in the submitted documents, I do not find anything about that either.
Q The Prosecution reported about the quashing of the proceeding against a certain Klinzmann who because of kidnapping and bodily injury while in office, had been sentenced to six years. This is contained in Exhibit 107. How did that quashing of proceeding come about?
A Klinzmann was a police official in a small town, Seehausen. The population of that locality was terrorized by a group of juvenile criminals. There were numerous thefts especially and cases of arson. To this band belonged three people who were mentioned by name: Brand, Utesch and, this is important, Bloedling. Klinzmann, the police official, received the order from a superior to proceed with severity. He interrogated the people and since Brand and Utesch gave an impertinent answer, he hit them both over the head. Klinzmann had arrested Bloedling because he refused to work after he was denounced by his employer, and only after two weeks did he bring him before a judge.
T his interim he used in order to find out whether Bloedling had not participated in one of the large cases of arson. These investigations brought about a positive result. Bloedling confessed that he committed intentional arson and was sentenced to death. While Bloedling was in police custody, Klinzmann boxed his ears twice when he gave impertinent answers and on occasion of an attempted escape during the night he hit him once with a bludgeon when Bloedling pretended to be asleeppin order to prevent investigation. The court found out that Klinzmann was an especially conscientious and good civil servant who so far had not been reproached or charged with anything.
He went after criminal gangs conscientiously and one could thank him only for the fact that there was again peace in the locality without thefts and arson.
Brand, Utesch and Bloedling were slackers, liars and criminally inclined people. These findings justified clemency. Through the extraordinary objection the proceeding was pending again and could be squashed. Thus the possibility Was given to rehabilitate the official in his position and to prevent his being made subject to a disciplinary proceeding. The purpose of squashing the proceeding was for the purpose of avoiding such severe measure.
Q What can you say about the Katzenberger case about which the Prosecution talked, Exhibit 152?
AAbout that I can say only that I heard about the Katzenberger case when it came up by way of a clemency plea. I suggested to Hitler to grant a pardon. Hitler refused to pardon Katzenberger.
Q With Exhibit 463 and Exhibit 420, documents about the Gruenspan trial were submitted. This was the attack on the German attachee von Rath in Paris. Please make a statement about this.
A The Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Office had the desire to exploit the Gruenspan trial, propagandistically, to a large extent. Due to Hitler's desire, both Ministries intervened in the carrying out of the trial. I do not need, probably, to state the reasons why for me such a propagandistic exploitation of a trial was unpleasant. I disliked it. One of the important men in these affairs, did not comply with the truth. It was discussed, that possibly the defendant Gruenspan could claim that in regard to the attache, Von Rath whom he had shot, had had a sexual relationship. He would not put a political but a personal motive at the basis of his action.
It is obvious that the propagandists exploitation of this trial would have had the opposite effect if doubts as to the political background of the action had arisen.
Now, Goebbels stated that Hitler knew of the possibility that Gruenspan might use that as his defense, and that in spite of that he wanted to have the trial carried out. I was under the impression that Goebbels was not telling the truth here, that he did not believe that Gruenspan would say such a thing, and he was very willing to assume the risk that the attachee von Rath who had been killed would be discredited, so that he would not have to give up his propagandists aims. Therefore, I urged that Goebbels should expressly confirm to me that Hitler knew of the possibility of this statement by Gruenspan and that he desired to have this trial carried out in spite of that. I never received such a statement. I was right: the trial was not carried out.
Q To what extent did you participate in the legislative work and the execution of the Night and Fog Decree, the Nacht undeNebel Erlass?
A First, I must make a temporal limitation here. The Tribunal knows that on 20 August 1942 I left the Ministry of Justice. Thus, in regard to my person, only the previous period can be considered. During that time the procedure, as well as taking prisoners into custody, remained exclusively in the hands of the Ministry of Justice.
If I am supposed to make some statements about the decree, I would like to emphasize that the jurisdiction of the Ministry did not refer to the Western territories, which are under consideration here. This was entirely under the competency of the military commanders. Hitler had issued the order to Keitel that in the future merely in very clear cases, and in such cases where the death sentence could be expected with certainty, the military courts were to pass sentences. The rest of the culprits were, for the purpose of a deterrent, by the police, to be transported to Germany, to remain under the custody of the police, and - and this is the expression he used - to disappear during night and fog.
The Chief of the Legal Division of the Wehrmacht, Dr. Lehmann, realized what the situation was and, after unsuccessful attempts with Keitel and with Hitler, he tried to have it avoided that the prisoners be left in the custody of the police by having them tried before the ordinary courts. He called on Freisler. Freisler did not disagree with Lehmann, and basically asked for my agreement. I gave my approval.
Here, too, I had to make a serious decision. On eht one hand, the fate of the prisoners was concerned. If they were in police custody, their fate could not be controlled. On the other hand, there was the necessity to loosen certain regulations which formed definite components of our legal system.
The Fuehrer order was based on the fundamental idea that the deterring force, through the cutting off of the prisoners from every contact with the outside world, could be achieved in this manner. If we now wanted - and this is the decisive question to have the direction of the prisoners, if we wanted to avoid having the prisoners remain in police custody and thus not carry out Hitler's decree but break its head, no other recourse was left to us but to conduct our court proceedings under the point of view of secrecy, since otherwise Hitler would immediately have forbidden and actually prevented the fact that ordinary courts should handle these matters.
However, in order to avoid any doubt. I want to emphasize expressly in the following that I have to state we are concerned only with regulations governing proceedings. The NN prisoners were supposed, and were, to be tried materially according to the same regulations which would have applied to them by the courts martial in the occupied territories. The rules of procedure had been curtailed to the utmost extent. In German law we also know of the possibility, because of the endangering of the security of the state, that the public is excluded when the opinion on which the sentence is based is pronounced.
We now had to take one more step, to issue an order to make available the possibility that the pronouncing of the sentence itself would not be made in public. One could not avoid the recognition that otherwise the secrecy would not be maintained, and I have to repeat, the cases would have been taken out of our hands immediately.
Everything else was based on this. For example, the limitation in the selection of defense counsel. Germany had a very eminent legal profession, and in my opinion it was a matter of course that every lawyer fulfilled the oath of secrecy given to him by law. However, one had to realize that as with every other profession, the lawyer's profession too, during such times, was permeated with bearers of the resistance idea, and therefore here too a certain caution was needed and it was necessary to limit the selection of defense counsel.
It is well known that in the executive order which I signed and it was the same as the draft submitted in the document book that I limited the use of foreign evidence. However, if one thinks the matter through correctly and thinks of the practical application, one will realize that this limitation worked only in favor of the defendants because numerous acquittals occurred according to the principle, that governs other law as well as ours, in dubio pro reo. In accordance with this basic attitude, it was decisive, under all circumstances, to avoid the subsequent transfer of the NN prisoners to the police.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 30 June 1947)
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. We have come to the discussion of the NN regulations. Will you please continue there?
A. I have take the liberty to explain that the purpose in including ourselves in the procedure was to counteract Hitler's plan to have prisoners in the hands of the police. There arose a problem: If one had to consider that in the regular course of procedure a penalty was found which expired before the end of the war. In such cases there would not have been any possibility to keep these people but they had to be taken over by the police and that would have thwarted the purpose of the inclusion of our administration. That one had to consider. The matter was simple, if the prosecutor, after examining the facts, arrived at the result that the penalty had to be so low that the term would expire before the expected end of the war because then he did not demand that a date for the main trial be set; the procedure remained pending and the accused remained in the custody of the administration of Justice. The situation, however, could become more difficult if the prosecutor intended to demand a higher penalty which probably would expire after the end of the war and if the court would arrive at a more lenient sentence. The way out could be found only by quashing the proceedings in time and in order to do that various means could be applied. In could have been put to the court, that is, by Legislation of course, to make a decision for this continuance, and could also put the prosecutor in a position where he would demand discontinuance and then let the court decide for discontinuance. I took the latter approach. Therefore, I provided that if the court wanted to deviate from the demands of the prosecution it should inform the prosecutor so that he had the possibility to demand discontinuance but with all emphasis I want to stress there can be no question that the courts were to be bound in any way by the demands for a penalty on the part of the prosecutor.
That would have been quite irresponsible.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Dr. Schlegelberger, are you still speaking with reference to the NN case?
A. Yes, So, it is quite out of the question that the courts were to be bound in any way to the penalty as requested by the prosecutor as Freisler has stated in a letter which was written for special service to Thierack and which is quite wrong but I repeat again the intention was only for the court to tell the prosecutor, "we are arriving at a lower sentence than you requested,". so as to put the prosecutor in position to demand discontinuance; then the matter remained in the hands of the Administration of Justice; that is to say that the defendant was in the custody of the Administration of Justice. May I summarize: The provisions concerning secrecy had to be made so that the matter would not be taken out of our hands by Hitler. I was faced with the problem as to whether I should refuse to take over the NN cases altogether and the Tribunal will recognize that would have been very simple for me. I could have held the position that as far as my department was concerned that I had nothing to do with the matter and therefore could reject it or refuse to have anything to do with it. But I could not take the responsibility to assist to contribute that Hitler ordered would be carried out and that the NN prisoners remain in the custody of the police. And, I believe that decision has also found its justification in the findings of the International Military Tribunal concerning the treatment of these prisoners in the hands of the Gestapo.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. To what extent did you deal with the euthanasia measures which have been discussed here?
A. Until Guertner's death, that was until the 29th of January, 1941, I had officially nothing to do with euthanasia. Guertner dealt with these matters in his office and as the documents reveal transferred letters which he received to state secretary Freisler, forwarded them.
According to my recollection I signed one purely formal letter which I shall discuss later. I found out about that period the following: On the part of various supreme authorities in the Administration of Justice the District Court of Appeals in Stuttgart, Dresden and Nurnberg, the Reich Ministry of Justice and Guertner had received information according to which people in insane asylums had been brought into other institutions without notification to the Surrogate courts as to the new location. There were also certain rumors about these deaths. Guertner tried to find out about these matters. He had various conferences with Reich Minister Lammers and probably heard from him that certain measures of this nature were based upon direct orders from Hitler. He, on his part, expressed immediately that illegal killings could not be carried out under any circumstances. Lammers told Hitler about Guertner's point of view and reported to Guertner that Hitler refused to issue a law containing legal guaranties. Thereupon on the 24th of July, 1940 Guertner wrote to Lammers stating that from this attitude of Hitler's only one thing could be concluded, that is, the necessity to stop immediately all secret killings of insane people. Guertner continued to investigate and found out that these emanated from the Chancellory of the Fuehrer. The chief of this office Reichleiter Bouhler on the 27th of August 1940 submitted to Guertner the well known letter by Hitler to Bouhler and Brandt and on that very same day I, upon orders from Guertner, sent a copy of his letter, Lamers to Bouhler, that is, the letter I mentioned before. According to my experience Guertner gave me that order by telephone because he could not get in touch with Freisler. I know how Guertner occupied himself for that matter. He particularly had a visit from Pastor Braune, from Prof. Sauerbruch and they told him further details which shocked him indeed.
As I have heard, there were also certain drafts of laws that had been worked out by the Reich Minister of the Interior, the Reich Chancellery, which had contained various provisions, such as discussing it with relatives, decisions made by groups of doctors, and provisions for appeal. But nothing ever came of these drafts. When I saw Guertner shortly before his death in his apartment, he asked me to take all material that had come to his office in this matter and send it to Lammers, and he added, "May be that will make an impression." That is what I have to say about Guertner's era.
If I come now to the time during which I was acting in the Ministry of Justice, I have to say the following. Immediately after Guertner's death, I went to Bouhler and once more with all emphasis told him about the atrocious extent of that entire matter. I applied the tactics as were dictated by the situation. Therefore, I stressed particularly what the impression of such things would be on the morale of the population. I had the impression as if in the end Bouhler's attitude was shaken. I asked him also to send me certain forms concerning the technical application. I wanted to gain further information. He was willing to do so; partly from himself, partly through Brack. All that material according to the wishes of Guertner, so to say, according to his last will, I sent to Lammers; also various letters which I had received from the clergies.
It has been discussed that I had given orders to various officials to designate letters received that dealt with these matters as matters to be reported upon. The purpose was clear. I wanted to make sure that I would be informed about all these matters. I believe that I was successful in the tactics I applied in passing on complaints from special clerical circles, also to see to it that for political reasons these measures should be stopped -- that I was successful in doing that. In August of 1941, these measures in fact were stopped.
If I should be asked now whether or not I could have done more, then I have to answer that in the negative. I have thought it over very carefully.
The letter from Hitler to Bouhler and Brandt states -if I may be permitted to read its text -- "Bouhler and Brandt are ordered with full responsibility to extend the authority of certain doctors, that incurable persons after thorough examination of their condition, the mercy death should be accorded". Whether that letter from Hitler to Bouhler and Brandt had the nature of a law has frequently been disputed and debated.
I answer that question in the affirmative. Consequently in my opinion, doctors who abided by that letter from Hitler did not commit a punishable act. One has to distinguish that the order from Hitler to Bouhler and Brandt certainly was not a law. It was an administrative measure of the nature of the application which I had received to take care of the affairs of the Ministry. But what was in the nature of a law was the authorization to Bouhler and Brandt to select doctors and to authorize doctors, that is to say, to extend their authority. That this law became only known to those who were immediately connected with it does not contradict it.
I may state here that even in the case of formal laws, their proclamation was not considered absolutely necessary. I refer to the Reich Defense Law which was never proclaimed and yet whose being in force has never been denied. If that letter from Hitler to Bouhler and Brandt were not a law, then there was no legal basis for the killing of the mentally ill. Then there were punishable acts on the part of the physicians. A prosecution of the physicians, however, could have been squashed by Hitler immediately. First of all, however, any proceedings could not have been limited to the prosecution of the doctors but would have had to go against Hitler himself who caused these killings, and proceedings of that kind naturally would have been an impossibility.
The question, therefore, was essentially the following: should I have to embark upon a path which showed no signs of success from the outset and would make it quite impossible to modify these measures, or should I apply other possibilities of influence to see to it that these measures be stopped?
I decided for the latter. I was successful as far as my goal was concerned to have these measures stopped. One can only understand all these matters if one takes into consideration the entire distribution of power during that period.
Q Will you please give your explanation concerning the question of sterilization?
A First of all, I would like to say that the Administration of Justice only within the scope of the law to prevent progeny afflicted with hereditary disease of the 14th of July 1933 had anything to do with sterilization. The idea of sterilization, such as in other countries, has been discussed in Germany for decades. In the same manner as in other countries also, it found its regulation by law. The law for its application contains all possible legal provisions. I do not believe that the prosecution has attacked the law as such, but it has asserted that the law in its practical applications was used on the basis of racial and political consideration - in other words, misused.
I can say with good conscience that during the entire period of my official activity, I was not shown a single case which would have justified the mere suspicion of such an abuse. The legal provisions, the composition of the courts, the legal remedies available - all that makes any abuse seem impossible. The prosecution mentioned from all the provisions just one single provision which it deems open to attack. Article 4 of the third provision for its application provides for the possibility that for important reasons the appearance before the Health Courts and Supreme Health Courts of deputies could be prohibited.
I may say the following for elucidation: the provisions of the Reich Law about matters of voluntary jurisdiction of the 17th of May 1898 are applicable. There a regulation is found for the appearance of deputies and people to represent the person.
If in the course of these procedures a deputy of that kind, a layman is incapable to appear before a court, then the law of 1898 left only one alternative to the court. The court had to demand that the person in question had to appear in person, and thereby he lost the right to be represented by somebody else. From the experiences which we have gained from that field, another method, another procedure was selected for procedure before the hereditary health courts. The courts were authorized to exclude that representative and then, automatically, the right arose to appoint, to select another counsel. That is the content of that provision.
Q I should like to refer to some individual documents which have been submitted by the Prosecution. First, I refer to Exhibit 429, that is the circular decree by the Reich Minister of the Interior, concerning the establishment of border zones of 20 September, 1938. What can you say about this?
A The prosecution on the basis of this measure, as is shown by the table of contents of the document book, has concluded that measure reveals that I knew about the intentions of aggressive foreign war. That conclusion is in error, for the decree concerning the border zones, promulgated by the Ministry of Interior, is a definite administrative measure which is customary in every country, and as such in times of absolute peace prepared for in case of mobilization and in the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, the following is important: That decree from the Ministry of Interior is dated 20 September, 1938; that was the time of the Sudetenland crises. The Ministry of Justice sent out the directive by the Ministry of the Interior on the 12th of October; that was after the main crises. Not at the time of the highest tension; did we think of the danger of war; and, therefore, we passed that directive from the Ministry of the Interior through the normal channels.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, there seems to technical difficulties, which are making you sound like ocean waves in the earphones.