AFTERNOON SESSION (The Tribunal reconvened at 1330 hours, 19 March 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SCHILF: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will now continue the cross-examination.
CONRAD FERDINAND WILHELM BEHL -- Resumed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION -- Continued.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q. Witness, at the end of this morning's session you compared a decision of the supreme Reich court. You quoted a statement by Dr. Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, from the year 1942. You drew a conclusion, and you said that the policy of the Third Reich and the position had undermined the competency of the courts. However, you yourself quoted that Thierack expressly stated that the judge must not be bound by directives.
The problem, therefore, amounts to the point as to what conceptions one has of the independence of the judge. I wish to ask you whether there can be several views admissible about that opinion, that is to say, that the problem of the independence of the judge can be viewed from various points of view. I should like you to say something about that.
A. No doubt it can be viewed from two angles, but never from an angle which allows his independence to become only apparent by directing him and influencing him.
Regarding the quotation from Thierack's speech, I should like to emphasize again that it was the dialectic tactics of the National Socialists under the Third Reich always, apparently, to say one thing, whereas, in reality, they meant the opposite. In the third Reich the concept of "involuntary voluntariness" was formed, and it arose as a joke, but it had a deep meaning which was characteristic of National Socialist rule. Originally, it was voluntary for children to join the Hitler Youth at a certain age, but those who did not join had great difficulties.
In reality, the so-called voluntary action of a human being in the Third Reich was only apparently voluntary. It became apparent during the de-Nazification trials that, on a large scale, human beings found themselves forced to take action owing to the general circumstances, and these actions looked as though they were voluntary.
I do not wish to say that all who today say they only joined the Party under pressure are speaking the truth; but it is known -- and I know it from my own experience with my own friends -- that people who were diametrically opposed to National Socialism joined the Party for pure reasons of necessity, because they were afraid of losing their existence. It is something that looked voluntary, but actually it was not voluntary.
Thus in this case the judge, after this speech of Thierack's, was apparently still independent, but he acted under directives and thus he depended upon the directives. The bad conscience of the National Socialist leaders of State is evident that, for example, the judge's letters which were sent to the judges and the prosecutors were strictly confidential; in fact, secret. They were handed out against personal signatures, and they had to be kept sealed. This is, therefore, a matter which definitely fought shy of open light, a matter which was intended to influence the judges, but which was not intended to get known among the public so that the independence of the judges could be stated as still in existence by Thierack.
I should like to say this concerning the question of direction of jurisdiction, that is, concerning the discussion of penal cases before the cases were heard. I should like to quote from a decree of the Oberlandesgerichtspraesident of the time in Bamberg, the President of the District Court of Appeal in Bamberg, of 20 October 1942. He sends, to the Landgerichtpraesidents of his area, the direct decree containing directives, which I have already mentioned, and he says, in writing, and I quote:
"The Landgerichtpraesidents, the Presidents of the District Court of Appeal, by my decree of 16 April 1942, have already been told -every time -- by agreement with the chief public prosecutor in their area, to keep in contact with him. I would ask you to continue that type of contact.
"On the occasion of the recent meeting of the Landgerichtpraesidents, the Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal, in Bamberg, I suggested that these discussions be held regularly, that is to say, that they should be held once a week, and I suggested that the expert on press matters should be present. In case there is a need, the President of the Special Court will also have to attend these meetings. For the rest, I refer to my ordinance of 16 April and to the manuscripts by Reich Minister Thierack and Under Secretary Dr. Rothenberger."
"Thoughts on the Reorganization of the German Administration of Justice", in "Deutsche Justiz" (German Justice), 1942, page 661.
I should like to say that the control and direction of the administration of justice is not limited to the field of penal law, but that it also extends to the other fields with which the judge deals, in particular to the sphere of civil law and voluntary jurisdiction. That this direction is compatible with the conception of the independence of the judge, that it needs further elucidation from some side, one cannot say.
Q. I should like to ask you this, witness. This word "direction", "lenkung", do you take it to mean the same as cancelling the independence of the judge?
A. Yes. As an example, I mentioned discussions prior to the trial which, by this decree, brought about directions.
Q. May I put this to you? It has always been a problem in the administration of justice that judgments or sentences on the facts, so far as the sentence was concerned -- that is, that views on that were very divergent. A judge of a local court in East Prussia might have decided a similar case quite differently from a judge of a local court in South Germany.
Because of that problem, the administration of justice in even purely democratic states has made attempts to overcome these differences. May I ask you to give us your views as to whether that problem existed?
A The problem existed and it was solved, or an attempt was made to solve it, by instructing the prosecutor to try to obtain a certain sentence for a certain criminal act, but never to take inference by direct action on a judge, which would have involved -- who had to fear disadvantages and who had been threatened more or less clearly with such disadvantages if he opposed the will of the leadership of the state. That is connected with the question of doing away with the law under which no judge could be deposed.
A By the side of this problem of various spheres and of different sentences, particularly concerning the punishment award, every administration of justice has to deal with a second problem, the difference between the propositions of the prosecution and the sentences. I am asking you whether this so-called direction perhaps also had the intention to do away with this discrepancy which was apparent so frequently, this discrepancy which was known to the public, whether it wasn't the aim to reduce that discrepancy.
A I don't know whether that point of view played a part. At any rate, that has nothing to do with the fact that the assessors, the assistant judges in the penal chamber, on account of this previous conversation by the President with reference to the disadvantages that might arise, had been put under pressure, a fact which was confirmed to me by a judge. He was a judge who had been exposed to such pressure as a consequence of this so-called direction.
Q Witness, may I point out to you that this individual case which you mentioned perhaps cannot allow generalization?
A This is not an individual case, but the judge told me that was generally considered to be interference of a gross nature.
Q May I say "Individual case" in that sense that you were only told this by one judge? Have I understood you correctly, Mr. President, or did several presidents tell you about that?
AAt the moment I was only speaking about one judge. I have only heard about this direction now since I have become the president of the District Court at Frieburg, where I found this decree on direction. Evidently at the time nobody mentioned it because the judges were ashamed, and also because they were afraid to tell about this interference at that time.
Q But you admit that as far as the direction is concerned, the fact is that the true problems which I mentioned were intended to be solved by it.
A That such reasons may perhaps also play a part is possible. Avariety of reasons of a different nature may have played a part, but the main thing was -- which is evident from the way this decree is worded -the essential thing is the fact that the judges were influenced before the decision. The Judges Letters do not in every detail prescribe that only in a certain way you the judge may pass your sentence in each case, but by their wording and by the way in which they are written, they make it obvious to the judge that decisions in the form under discussion here and with the severity mentioned here are desired by the state leadership. If one adds that at that time by virtue of the Fuehrer's decree on special authorities for the Reichminister of Justice of 20 August 1942, the Minister of Justice again was put under an obligation and was instructed, according to the instructions, according to Hitler's directives in agreement with the Reich Minister, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, the head of the Party Chancellery, to organize a national socialist administration of justice to take all measures necessary for that -- if one adds all this, it is evident that the judge who, by virtue of this authorization, could be dismissed at any time found himself under particular pressure if he differed from the views expressed in the Judges Letters, if he heard of the measures proposed in the Judges Letters and of the measures of direction. The decree which I have just quoted ends with the authorization to the Reichminister of Justice that he may depart here from the existing law. That is a general authorization in the interests of the national socialist state leadership, to diverge from the existing law. It was considered the task of the administration of justice in this decree, a strong administration of justice.
Q May I ask you, Mr. President, you have a copy of the Judges Letters in front of you?
A Yes.
Q Have you had an opportunity to study the entire collection of the Judges Letters?
A Yes. Naturally, not all, but -- yes.
Q Completely?
A Possibly one volume or the other may have been missing.
Q Did you notice that the Minister of Justice criticized sentences which were too severe and that he printed sentences which appeared too severe to the Administration of Justice?
A That is correct. Under National Socialism one observed the psychological effect of justice on the population, and particularly on the Party members, and for tactical reasons, no doubt, also frequently severe sentences were described as not compatible with the aims of National Socialism or as not favorable for National Socialism. In essential points, however, for example, on the question of race, an absolutely rigid National Socialist dogmatism is upheld in assessing jurisdiction.
Q Witness, do you really believe that sentences which were too severe were not printed for psychological reasons alone, or don't you think that a legal assessment, too, played a part?
A Possibly, but I don't know. Neither you nor I can find out about the real motives, but we can only speculate about the possibility of these reasons concerning criticism of severe sentences, concerning criticism of sentences which, in the view of the Ministry of Justice, considered too much the interests of Jews. It is evident from the criticism why these sentences were criticized. I only quote this, a literal translation has clarified the legal position of the Jews and has put restrictions which they as enemies of the German people must have imposed on them. A purely political question here is mixed up with the criticism of a sentence. We are concerned with the decision concerning the validity of a testament of a Jewish widow which she made in 1942. Here clearly we see the motive of the criticism.
Q. But may I contradict you on this point? The quotation clearly refers to legislation. The expert in the Reichs Ministry of Justice made his conclusion that a Jew is an enemy of the German People. You will admit that it is according to the German legal system that a Judge must keep to the law. The reproach could be made as far as the legislation is concerned, but not as far as the expert who criticized this verdict is concerned because he told the German jurists clearly what the legislation describes for the judge.
A. The expression "enemies of the German people" is not a quotation from a law, but that is an addition of the critic. That expressed his view to the judges. He thereby emphasizes the law.
Q It is a conclusion concerning the legislation which describes the Jews as enemies, but not the judgment of the individual judge. If the sentence of the Judge were ciritcized, the judge is merely referred to the fact that he has violated the law?
A. That is just a side criticism. This is a case of interpreting a law. To continue with this controversy, before we start hair splitting, I must point out again that the critic says here, "Legislation has placed the legal position of Jews in its limits." The critic adds the Jews need to be placed under these restrictions because they are enemies of the German people. This means that here he expresses his own views and says that must happen. He gives the directive to the judge in his interpretation of the law. In this individual case, according to this wording, the sentence of the judge in this case was not so very much against the Jew.
Q. Summarizing, I should like to ask another question concerning the problem of the independence of the Judge.
You, yourself, quoted the famous, or I should say, notorious speech by Hitler of 26 April, 1932. You are familiar with it and you quoted it yourself. Do you believe that according to that quotation of the decision of the Reich Court in 1923, that the independence of the judge, as you see it, could still be upheld until 1942? And only after that notorious speech, the page turned?
A. The independent had previously been threatened already by the compulsion which was exercised in particular on to young jurists by forcing them to join party organizations and being active in them. There was among other things, already in 1936 a circular decree concerning officials leaving the NSDAP, 3 March, 1936, Deutsche Justiz, German Justice, Page 350. I qoute: "The deputy of the Fuehrer, concerning civil servants, will make a report to the supreme authority of the civil servant. In every case a detailed investigation must be held to find what reasons caused the civil servant to leave the party. If he did it because the program or the political attitude of the party were against his own ideals, he will not be kept on as a civil servant."
Even if these conditions do not apply, the case of an official leaving the party with the close contact between the party and the state, indicates that the civil servant lacks close contact with the National Socialist state and the spirit of sacrifice, the spirit of diversion is lacking in him.
At least he then has to count on the fact that when it comes to promotion, he will be excluded. In fact, he will stay behind other people. Various decrees made it clear to the civil servant that they were not only members of the party, but that they had to be active in the service of the party or one of their organizations.
Many young jurists in this way found themselves compelled to be active in some way; thereby they became familiar with the idea of National Socialism. They acquired the feeling that the independence of the judge's position would not leave them free of disadvantages, if in their activity as judges, they opposed the Nationalist aims and tendencies. The pressure to which the judge was subjected increased more and more. There was a large number of judges who had sufficient character to withstand this measure and to suffer disadvantages as far as promotion was concerned and as far as having their own wishes considered was concerned.
In 1942, after the notorious speeches against the Germans, then the situation became considerably more acute. Then there arose an immediate threat of the judge's independence. That is no doubt quite certain after what we have said so far. Even then, in fact until the very end, there were judges who withstood that pressure, but they did so with ever-increasing threats and continuous worry about their existence.
Q. Witness, you have just quoted from a general law of 1936. May I ask you whether after many many other statements and laws, until the point of culmination of Hitler's speech in 1942, the justice in its administration let loose all their criticism? May I ask you whether you know that Goering made speeches against the administration of Justice; that Goebbels did so, and that Hitler repeatedly did so, going beyond the 1942 speech? Finally, you can draw the conclusion today that the administration of justice was less-liked by the leaders of the state.
A. The leading personalities were angry that among the many judges who had been trained in the old legal ideology, there was again and again propaganda activity carried out which the leading men of the National Socialist State did not like.
Q. May I ask you whether the judgment of a witness who will probably appear before the Tribunal, Gerhard Anschuetz' son, the present Landgericht director in Heidelberg, whether you will concur with his judgment in an affidavit which has not yet been submitted to the court in which he declared that Hitler's speech of April 1942, was a glorious page for German justice because German justice until 1942 was thought to be filled with terror measures? Would you, from your part, draw the same conclusion? Would you be ready to do so?
A. I think that goes too far, assessing a speech by Hitler whose boundless intolerance demanded further and further concessions. No doubt it is a page of glory for those individual judges who withstood the general tendency to place justice in the service of the National Socialist rule and who counteracted it, but that the entire picture of justice had been like that, and that this page of glory could now be claimed by the administration of justice, as a whole, I would not like to say. For even at that time, there were sentences by the special courts of the People's Courts which no doubt did not cause Hitler's anger, but of which he approved. Hitler only attacked the opposition in his blind violent manner. He attacked things he did not like. He saw sentences which annoyed him. One cannot say that speech means that the entire administration of Justice of that time was still opposing and had held out against National Socialism and its aims.
Q. Witness, what you said just now, I suppose I can call your own subjective opinion, just as it is an objective opinion of Anschuetz to say that that speech is a page of information for the whole administration of Justice.
A. The idea of that page of information can only be used in a subjective manner, but the statement that at that time there were already many judgments by the people's court and the special court, which no doubt did not displease Hitler, that is a fact which is not subjective.
Q. But, I should like to concentrate on the personal angle. Do you think Hitler had cause to hold such a fatal speech unless the majority of judges had opposed it. If the majority of judges had pleased Hitler, there would have been no ause for him to speak with such extreme severity which had such extraordinary affects, and to criticize in such a way things done by the jurists as a whole.
MR. LAFOILETTE: If you please, Your Honors, I'd like to state an objection. We have, I think, gone quite far afield. I have not said anything up to now. As I recall, the direct examination covered a statement about the relative relationships of the criminal law before and after Hitler -the question of whether or not there was pressure on judges, and the changes between the two. Then there was a hypothetical question asked. The examination has been very extensive as to the question of whether or not there was pressure generally. I think now we have reached a point where the witness has been asked whether or not Hitler's speech was made because German justice had been well administered. If the court will recall, if this request is directed to the hypothetical question, the hypothetical question was restricted to persons operating within the Ministry of Justice, to the position of prosecutors and to judges of special and people's courts. This question encompasses asking the witness' opinion as to whether or not some judges were good and some judges were bad, which I do not believe has now much probative value or serves to attack the validity of the witness' statement on direct examination--to affect the credibility of that statement. And to some extent, although I don't like to limit counsel on that field very often, I believe it is also a field which has been gone over rather extensively.
Upon those arounds, even though we are in cross-examination, and I know great attitude is available, I believe at this time that it is proper, maybe, to call it back a little bit more towards the subject matter of the direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the cross-examination is within the field of proper cross-examination and has some relation of the matters brought out by the direct examination, and we are also adhering to the statement earlier made, that a great deal of latitude is permitted on cross-examination; and get there must be limits to it, and we hope that counsel will try to observe those natural limits and especially to avoid repetition.
DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, may I say briefly: The witness has been asked by the prosecution to be heard here on such a general subject, that is, on the development of the changes in German law since 1933. Only looking at it from the point of view of time, so many events took place during that period that the material is extremely wide, but I can give you the assurance that my cross-examination always keeps to the things which the witness said yesterday in the direct-examination. All things which he indicated during that direct examination, I shall try to concentrate even more in the remainder of the cross-examination.
DR. SCHILF:
Q. Witness, what I would like to know, that is why I referred to the Hitler speech, is to hear your opinion as to whether you think that the pressure on the judges and justice came from outside justice, and was greater from outside, or whether you think that the pressure came immediately from the administration of justice--from the Ministry.
A. To what period are you referring?
Q. To the period up to '42.
A. The pressure exercised on the judges came from the leadership of the state as such and from the Party; that it came immediately from the the Ministry, which was competent for this phere of public life.
Q. Yesterday, you mentioned an example and said that in 1936, the ********** had the Hoheits insignia attached to their robes, do you think that represented pressure from the Ministry of Justice or from some other authority?
A. Originally, that came from another quarter--from Hitler himself. * show, I assume it was that the administration of justice willingly and gladly dealt with this. And the hymn by Freisler, the Under-Secretary worded in exaggerated terms, in fact, it was merely a parody-- he awarded this party insignia to the judges who welcomed it. He said, "There is no longer a neutral judge." That indicates that the administration of justice was heavily involved in this event.
Q. Would you say in general that Freisler's expressions involved the entire administration of justice?
A. I said it was a parody. This is a charge, a burden on the administration of justice because the Under-Secretary of the Reich Ministry ********** welcomed the award of this insignia to the judges; and that he saw in it an obligation of the judges, and wrote four pages on the subject that say that now all National Socialist tendencies would be put into effect It would be necessary, although it would not be a pleasure to study these statements by Freisler and to read them out in their entirety to give the Tribunal an idea of them, to explain the hopes and wishes of the Reich Minister of Justice, that they welcomed this event.
Q May I ask you, witness, do you think Freisler was a typical representative of the Ministerial bureaucracy of the Reich Ministry of Justice?
A That demands a purely subjective point of view; he was the representative of the party in principle and all party tendencies in the Minister of Justice, but he was the under secretary in that Reich Ministry, and, a*** such, he acted and he signed this him, which he had written concerning the insignia; he signed it as under secretary.
Q Excuse me if I interrupt you; we know that; I only want to get ** view whether you personally considered Freisler a typical official of the German administration of Justice.
A Of the old style, no, definitely; but of the new style.
Q Yesterday you quoted Freisler, and you know that Freisler later became a judge; he was President of the Peoples' Court. I should like to you the same question. Do you think -- do you consider Freisler a typical German judge?
AAgain I can only give you the same reply, of the old style, no.
Q Of the old style; what time are you speaking?
A L933.
Q Not 1942?
A No.
Q Yesterday you said that a number of judges were of the opinion ** it was better to stay in the administration of justice; it would be better continue in this position than to give all the posts over to the typical ** who would flood into the administration. You then made a critical remark; answered that they wanted to prevent something, but that they could only on preventing things until they would be prevented themselves. I should like to ask you whether it was not an honorable reason that the judges, as such wanted to stay in their post to prevent people, undesirable people from assuming their post.
A That is an error in your question; I wasn't talking of judges but of a conversation I had with a high official of the Ministry; that is a different matter, concerning many judges, in fact, who found it a very serious sacrifice to remain in officer under the Nazi regime and to try to counteract the necessary serious effects. Under heavy pressure, which was ever increasing, this laudible attempt in many cases failed, and gradually their resistance, owing to the threat of economic and professional retribution gave way. Today I said several times that there were judges who under the very end held themselves. This is what I mentioned, concerning a conversation with a high official in the Ministry to whom I said that in the Ministry even though attempts were being made to prevent certain things that for any length of time that would be impossible, and that either those person would have to leave or would have to give in an themselves sign such thing which were purely serving the National Socialist rule of terror. If you ***** I can give the name of the official.
Q May I ask you if it is possible to really revert to that time, that day; what would you, yourself, told the mass of German jurists if you had said your present opinion, that they could not have gone on, from the moment that the party insignia appeared on the robe.
A I, as a judge, consider it would have been impossible to appear before the public as a judge without being ashamed.
Q Now, I want to discuss various questions which arose yesterday during your direct examination; it concerns typical features of the Nazi regime, the Nazi administration of justice; if I remember rightly, you were concerned with the introduction of the term "dangerous habitual criminal", of 24 April, 1942; you considered that a typical Nazi institution.
A That referred to the administration and other things.
Q In that connection may I point out to you that the clauses in decree of 24 April, 1934, that is the measure which referred to the socalled dangerous habitual criminal; that most of them are valid even now, and they are valid according to the law which I quoted this morning, which has the approval of the American Military Government, and what was promulgated with their approval, and which is called the penal code procedures, 1946.
The control council law, No. 11, which forms the legal basis, side by side with the code of penal procedure contains Article I, which says expressly rescinding of various rulings of the penal code in that last version during the Nazi regime, and particularly one it expressly says; Paragraph 42-A, 5, 42-K, where all other regulations concerning the so-called or habitual criminal concerning castration, and that is still a law, and I don't think I am wrong if I say that they are still valid laws at this time; then these measures against so-called dangerous habitual criminals cannot be considered typical Nazi measures; if you have an opportunity to compare it, you will see that a number of rulings are still valid as law now. For example, it be seen from paragraph 456, A, and 456-B of the code of penal procedure, 1946, I only want to quote one passage: 456-A, Section 2, the code of penal procedure, 1946, -- if somebody who had been deported returns, the execution can be carried out later, and the measure for protection, paragraph 42-G valid. Of the penal code, 456-B, Section 1, a measure connected with depriving the person of their freedom, of custody, and protection which run concurrently with prison sentence will be carried out when the prison sentence has been worked off." Will you have an opportunity, witness, to check up on that from the documents which you have?
A I have the ordinance here, but as you have read it out, I assume.
Q I should like you to now tell us concerning the general judgment you gave yesterday on the measures from April 1934, which you called typical Nazi institutions, what would you like to say on that now: have you any corrections to make on that now?
A In that form the earlier law did know them. The particular Nazi official concerning castration is definitely not such a measure. Today in the criminal procedure, which according to my information, it has a temporary nature of speeding purification. It has been rather roughly kicked out.
Q Now, I ask you do you wish to make any restrictions concerning castration as a typical Nazi measure?
A Yes, I particularly emphasized castration, but before you said other.
Q (Interposing) Do you want to talk about other measures. I find it necessary to refer to the Penal Code procedure 46. Witness, if you want to limit yourself to castration, then I should like to put this to you. I assume according to your statement this morning that you, during 1935 studied regularly the publication of the Deutsche Justiz. I have a Deutsche Justiz of 1934, an excerpt, and I want to ask you whether you read a number of articles which appeared before and after the decree of 24 April 1934, which introduce castration? It is by Reuffler. In the Deutsche Justiz of 1934 an article by Reuffler says as a means of, as a weapon of criminal policy -- sterilization in America; then the Norway sterilization law; 16,000 persons steriliz***** in 25 States of the USA. Subsequently further articles appeared, sterilization in Denmark; sterilization in the USA; sterilization of Jews abroad. Did you read any of those articles?
A Yes, I know that even before the Nazis there was much work written and said about this problem
Q Do you know the book and the title "Castration by a Swiss Jurist, Christian Wolf"?
A I have not read it.
Q Do you know that in Switzerland, Denmark and in Norway castration was advocated by leading jurists as possibly the only measure, the only safe measure to ruin the incorrigible and criminals?
A Yes.
Q You know that?
A Yes, I do.
Q If you know that, I believe your judgment will become a little bit doubtful when you say it was a typical Nazi measure when castrations were performed.
States that are democratic like Switzerland, Denmark and Norway introduced these measures and that is evident from the articles which I quoted and these measures had become law, for example, in Denmark. I should like you to give us your views on the matter in saying it was a Nazi measure?
A I think I shall have to come back to fundamental points. That what matters is not the abstract, but what matters is how it happened and in what circumstances. Under a dictatorship, in a state which is governed by a dictator, such a measure is dangerous, and much more dangerous than in country in which all legal guarantees exists, and where there is no need to fear that under certain circumstances the political opponents can be turned into a criminal and that such measures as castration would be applied in order to hit people who are not persona non grata. In fact, National Socialism actually used such measures, introduced them and it meant a danger to the administration of justice.
In other words, you want to say the fact that castration was introduced by law is not a typical Nazi element, but only the carrying out of that measure. Do you believe that in 1934 one could get an opinion on ****
A Yes, it was introduced because National Socialism would not oper** with parlementary guarantees and parlementary safety valves, particularly when it introduced such a dangerous and highly disputed measure. This was introduced without any discussion. The introduction of this measure in Germany was not preceded by parlementary discussions which normally on a large scale would take place before such a measure was introduced. Here National Socialism forged ahead with castration and other such measures or weapons.
Q Do you know of a case where somebody who had opposed political ** was castrated? Can you say that actually did happen and can you actually say that castration happened because you gave that as an example?
A No.
Q You believe that? You believe that is a means to eliminate a p***** opponent?
A Yes, in a certain sense.
Q You can not say it actually happened?
A I told you I can not quote a definite case, but that such endeavor were under foot to do that, even after the war.
Q And, you have that law now?
A No.
Q I only reported it because yesterday you told of other typical examples. Now, I want to discuss the second example, that is, the principal of double jeopardy. You said that it was undermined by several laws under the third Reich. You quoted examples, the so-called extraordinary nullity. May I ask you whether you know whether the nullity plea is a long tested institution of the Austrian law previous to the Anschluss?
A I know that legal means were employed in Austria law bureaus.
Q But, you, yourself, would not say it was a legal means. If it was legal means, then it does not inflict the principle of double jeopardy?
A I probably used the wrong expression when I said legal means just now. Double jeopardy, this means that there is a legal decision which w** one year can be attached and can be deprived of its legal validity.
Q You would say that you do not want to describe the nullity plea a a level means?
A No.
Q Then we must discuss legal Germanic questions because I think it is an extraordinary legal means. If you hold the view that the reviewing of sentence limited to one year as an interference with the principles of double jeopardy, then revision and principles, then you would describe revision and principles as extraordinary legal means. Every revision of a sentence in an orderly procedure, in my view would be a legal means. It simply a technical question whether this revision is a law in one year a shorter period. It is purely a technical jurist consideration which would made no difference here.
A Revision, of course, does not come over legal validity.