I am here in a position to tell you about one of my experiences which might be of interest for this proceeding. In the district court of Schweinfurt the Board of Examiners by which the individual judges, officials, employees of that district, are examined on the basis of their personal data and interviews with them, that the Board stated that the so-called Action Engert, the defendant in that, for a half year, I believe, yes, it was in 1934, he was president of the district court at Schweinfurt, and in his opening speech, which I heard from people who actually heard the speech, he had said, "We do not have to have this God-damned humanism." That was quite clear to me and resulted in extraordinary pressure to the judges and officials of the district in order to force them into the Party, as was in other districts only during the years 1935 and 1937. The majority of the officials and civil servants, who without much further reason of personal enthusiasm or opportunity had joined shortly after the seizure of power where then in these other districts, that happened at this late date.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems that at least to myself that the answers of the witness are in the main a repetition of sentiments expressed at least once and I fear more than once in the course of his lengthy examination and cross examination. Now, this may not be altogether the fault of defense counsel. The questions that are propounded by defense counsel who now appears at the microphone, of course, are somewhat different than those which were propounds by Dr. Schilf yesterday but in the sense that they are a challenge to the soundness of the opinions of the witness it calls upon the witness to make these same statements in defense of the soundness of his opinions. Now, I realize that this is a very difficult matter to take care of but it must be apparent now, as it was apparent to me before we began our session this morning that we were bound to have too much repetition. Now, Dr. Wandschneider represents a defendant and he has duties to perform but the Court, of course, has a certain right, too, that I am sure Dr. Wandschneider will be able to observe. Try to do a little along that line, otherwise there will be further admonitions.
MR. WANDSCHNEIDER. I come now to another question and that is the following you said, witness, that Freisler was a typical example of National Socialist justice and you mentioned his statement of a neutral justice which should not be allowed to exist anymore. You mentioned Frank in a similar sense. Is it known to you that there were a good many jurists and there are, who were members of the party and who fought against it? Men like Freisler, and in official meetings of jurists expressed that opinion?
A. I have heard about that.
Q. Is it known to you that in a number of attacks -- serious attacks of judges and their judgments came from the Black Corps?
A. Yes.
Q. Also from Kreisleiters directly against judges and their sentences?
A. Yes, it happened frequently.
Q. Didn't you say yesterday that attacks against the judges were always channeled through the Reich Minister of Justice or did I misunderstand you?
A. No, I didn't say that.
Q. I have misunderstood you in that sense?
A. Yes.
Q. But you admit that direct attacks in a very definite form and directly from the party functioners, especially from the Black Corps were directed against the judges and against the sentences?
A. I say that I know of one case. Streicher in the Court in Nurnberg--the Jury Court in Nurnberg attacked the judge, not by mentioning his name but so clearly everybody know who was meant and that was no account of a sentence in which party functioners in connection with the corruption had been sentences. I believe it must have been in 1935.
Q. Yesterday you spoke about the Special Courts which you considered particularly dangerous as regards political justice and in this connection I meant to ask you whether you know that particularly during the last War the Special Courts according to their number and importance, were primarily occupied with purely criminal matters, that is to say for example, looting, black-out crimes, etc? Is that correct?
A. I could not apply a measure of comparison between these crimes and matters. However, as I have seen from sentences by Special Courts or some cases of common crimes and by applying the test against public enemies, there is a tendency or a color toward the political side, as far as the judgment even of common crimes is concerned.
Q. As an expert, witness, did you consider this political coloring in terms of emergency or relation? Did you now consider it as a natural consequence and an unavoidable consequence because naturally any crime or misdeed in normal times can just be judged as a misdeed whereas under extraordinary circumstances it has an entirely different importance of extreme danger to the State?
A. This may be true in a certain sense that daring extra-ordinary times a crime which finds a lighter judgment in normal times gains more importance by the uncorrect terms created by National Socialism, Volksschaedling, public enemies. I also remind you of the term of the certain sentiment of the people "Gesundes Volksempfinden" and similar ones. These terms have an additional meaning -- an additional coloring -- and in reality what is meant by it the attitude of the Gesundes Volksempfinden as exposed to National Socialism -
on the basis of the wrong slogan on which National Socialism built its' regime that the slogan that every German was a National Socialist, on the basis of this slogan the interest of the Nation was identified with the interest of the National Socialist Party. In doing so also the more severe penalties in emergency periods get a further political National Socialist aspect and coloring.
Q. Witness, in this connection I want to ask you whether independently of the prevailing political system the fact that penalties were rendered more severe during periods of emergency? Was it that more than that these penalties were given in a political sense without it having anything to do with the political shade of the Party?
A. I believe I have already stated that I do not necessarily consider this increase of severity of penalties in times of emergency a political factor. It doesn't have to.
Q. Thank you. I come to the next question now. What was the consequence of the impression of the Fuehrer Speech of April 1942? Is it correct that the impression of this speech was a catastrophic one?
A. Yes. Certainly among jurists throughout. It was considered a challenge and an atrocious insult to justice that judges only -- a person could be surprised -- astonished who expected anything different from Hitler.
Q. You stated -- you spoke about a decree of 19 October 1942 where mention is made of the direction of jurisdiction of administration of justice. Do you have this decree before you? Would you be so kind to take it up now?
THE PRESIDENT: May I inquire whether you are referring to the decree of April 27, 1942?
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: The decree of 19 October 1942, Mr. President. That is a decree in which mention is made of the direction or of the steering of the administration of Justice, but which is not known to the Tribunal because it has not been submitted as a document yet, it was just mentioned by the witness.
THE WITNESS: I have here the files of the District Court in Schweinfurt, and in these files there is an excerpt.
BY DR. WANDSCHNEIDER:
Q. This decree concerns, as you have already stated, Mr. President, the direction of jurisdiction of the Administration of Justice in war-time, and you have stated it as an example for the limitation of the independence of the judges.
A. Yes.
Q. Now I should not like to argue about therms, "direction" --"lemkung" is "direction" -- "lenkung" , or "steering". One cannot speak about that, so I am concerned now with something else.
Granted that a direct on exists, we can only try to find out to what extent individual jurists reacted to this decree about direction, whether they increased the pressure on judges or whether, within the Administration of Justice, they counteracted that pressure.
In that connection, are you aware of, or do you know how the man who signed this decree considered his task, how he approached his task?
A. No; I could not say anything about that.
Q. Thank you.
Is anything known to you about the fact that from 1939 on there was a direct contact between the individual prosecutor and tho judge and it was proscribed officially ?
A. Will you please repeat that question?
Q. Do you known anything about the fact that I ready since 1939 a direct contact between the individual judge and the individual prosecutor was prescribed or desired or had existed?
A. I have not heard about that.
Q. In it as correct that, on the basis of the decree of October 1942, a direction of the Administration of Justice was seen to mean that the chief prosecutors should make contacts with the presidents of tho district courts, would you see in that an improvement compared to the point of view which I have mentioned before of 1939?
A. Did you say "improving"?
Q. "Improvement", os, a tendency towards improvement, because hero we are concerned only with general principles and not with a contact between judge and prosecutor.
A. As far as that does not go into the individual case, I would say "yes".
Q. You mentioned , in your testimony, the Fuehrer decree of 20 August 1942, which defines the authority, or which concerns the authority of the Reich Minister of Justice. In this decree of 20 August it is stated that to fulfill the tasks of the Greater German Reich, it is necessary to have a strong Administration of Justice. What do you understand it to mean, witness, if you do not consider the fact that Hitler was the one who demanded that strong Administration of Justice? What do you understand by that term "strong Administration of Justice," "Starke Rechtsplege"?
A. If I consider the individual words as such, then "strong Administration of Justice" can mean all sorts of things.
It may mean that the administration of Justice has to be carried out to combat certain influences coming from the outsdie; it may mean that it should be particularly severe. It has many meanings. There are many meanings possible according to the meaning of the term "strong" which, in the German language, can be used in many cases. It may have various meanings. But this is a purely theoretical discussion which I am making quite apart from this decree.
Q. Witness, this question is interesting for me, naturally, because those are not the words of Hitler, but of personalities who count. For that reason, I should like to supplement my question to ask you whether it isn't so that generally the term "strong Administration of Justice" has the emphasis on "Administration of Justice" and is not identical with the term of a more several Administration of Justice , which puts the emphasis on the "strong", or the "severe".
I have to repeat that this is more of a philological question, which I an prepared to answer and have already answered.
Q. In the decree of 20 August 1942, which, as we know was the basis for a reform of the law, it states that prevailing law can be disregarded, or existing law can be disregarded, when the reform of law takes place, Isn't it quite understood that deviations of previously existing laws occur? Isn't that a natural consequence?
A. In eases of a reform, of reforming tho law, as the name indicates, there is an intention to change existing law. In a constitutional state there are, of course, more or less strong guarantees that that cannot be done arbitrarily, but hero we are concerned with a sort of power of attorney given to the Reich Minister of Justice.
Q. And as to in what sense and to what extent that power of attorney was used, you couldn't tell us anything about that, could you?
A. No, but I assume -- and one has to assume -- that the immediate dismissal of judges was possible on the basis of that decree. It should be added to this, that after that speech by Hitler, which was an insult to administration of Justice, the Reichstag had closed up and that Hitler, as the supreme judge was in a position to dismiss judges.
Q. On the basis of the decree of 20 August 1942 -- In your opinion, was it possible on the basis of that decree?
A. Yes.
Q. In this connection you mentioned the decree of october 1942 about personnel measures for the reconstruction of the Administration of justice. Do you recall this decree which you have mentioned, witness ?
A. I could not say at the moment.
(The witness was shown a document)
A. (continuing) Yes, I know it. I don't know whether I mentioned it yesterday.
Q. From this decree, or rather, the draft of a decree, I should like to quote the following and put it to you, witness: "To facilitate the reconstruction of the Administration of Justice", it says here, "judge and civil servants in the Administration of Justice of the Reich may, until 31 March 1943, be transferred into a different office of the same category of pay, or into an office with the same possibilities of career but less pay, or into retirement, or into retirement with pension."
If such a draft was considered necessary in October 1942, was it possible then to be of the opinion that this dismissal of judges could already take place on the basis of the decree of August 1942?
A. According to the text of this decree, such as it can be seen here, this is possible because the Minister of Justice of the Reich could have deviated from existing lav and therefore also from guarantees existing for the judges.
Q. Is it known to you that this decree remained a draft, a draft only, and was not issued with legal validity, and do you know, could you tell us whether any dismissals took place?
A. That I don't know. The judges mentioned to me their serious concern that they could be dismissed on the basis of that decree.
THE PRESIDENT: We have reached the point to have cur usual morning recess and we will therefore recess at this time for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: May I continue with the cross-examination?
The Tribunal said the point which we discussed at the end was not quite clear. It referred to the transfer of judges for the reconstruction of the administration of justice. Here I referred to an order regarding personnel. It is an order of October, 1942. I pointed out that even though this draft of the order provided for the retirement of judges, this draft did not become the law. My question to the witness was whether he knew that it remained only a draft. He stated, if I understood him correctly, that he did not know whether it was an order having legal force or whether it remained only a draft. Moreover, the witness affirmed that he did not know whether a civil servant was actually ever transferred for those reasons.
A. I added, however, that judges were, on tho basis of the decree of August 1942, concerned with the fact that they might be dismissed.
Q. I would now like to go on to the next question. You said any now draft of Paragraph 2 of the Legal Gazette, Penal Code, regarding healthy feeling of the people and the discussion of the basic principles of the similar law was regarded by us as a deviation from proper legal thinking. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. You added the other day when you were examined that it was foreign to German thinking to have analogous application of the law.
That is criminal legal thinking. Yes. It was foreign to German criminal legal thinking.
Q. I do not want to try, now, witness, this conception of yours by pointing to the opinion of the International Military Tribunal; I do not wan to destroy that conception because then the Tribunal would probably tell me that in the first opinion, it was already affirmed that the principle, nulla, poena sine lege, no crime without law, was a principle of general justice. It was recognized as such by the first International Military Tribunal.
Within the course of this cross-examination, I do not want to discuss this question because it would go too far afield from the actual subject under discussion.
I want to say this right now. The fundamental discussion of this question before this Tribunal is necessary. It should be done at another time since this Tribunal, in view of its jurisdiction, is autonomous, entirely autonomous.
JUDGE BRANDT: Suppose you ask the witness a question. You will have an opportunity to present that problem. Go ahead with the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the next question is propounded, I would like to have one matter cleared up in my mind. This witness stated yesterday the doctrine of nullity pleas was introduced by the Chief Reich Prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court. I am not sure whether that is any legal way of rendering a decree or whether that is a law or decree or what it is, or who this particular person is. Who is the Reich Prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court. How much force was given to that decree and how authorative was it? Does the witness follow me?
A. I am sorry, I could not quite follow you.
THE PRESIDENT: What I desire to know is this: Referring to your testimony of yesterday, that this nullity plea decree was introduced by the Chief Reich Prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court, was that the authority for the nullity pleas law?
MR. LaFOLLETTE: If Your Honor please, I do not think the witness so testified yesterday. The Chief Reich Prosecutor did not decree a law. The witness testified yesterday that the Chief prosecutor of the Reich and other Prosecutors used the nullity decree. The Court's question is not directed toward what the witness said.
THE PRESIDENT: If you will turn to Page 579, you will find exactly what I have stated.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: I am sorry If the people recording the transcript did not record it properly but the witness, at no time testified that the Reich Prosecutor decreed a law.
THE PRESIDENT: He said he introduced it. That is the reasons I an trying to find out if that is a decree or merely an introduction.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: If the word was used Your Honor, it is an improper translation or improper transcript.
He did not introduce anything. It was a decree. He used it. I am only saying that I realize Your Honor has read the record, but the transcript to that extent is inaccurate. The witness did not so testify.
THE PRESIDENT: I am depending upon the transcript. If it is confusing I wish to have you correct it.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: I am sure the witness did not make such a statement. I am equally sure that no attorney acquainted with German law would make such a statement.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I must confirm what Mr. LaFollette just said. I have never said that this decree was introduced by Reich Prosecutor. It was a decree introduced in the same manner as all other decrees, but it gave the Oberrichsanwalt the right to use the remedy given by the decree. There must have been a misunderstanding in the writing down of my evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Can the witness inform me now as to the authority of that decree? It is dated February 21, 1940. It is a very important matter. I would like to have a clear understanding of it.
Has the Prosecutor's office access to that transcript?
MR. LaFOLLETTE: Yes. I have access to it Your Honor, but I do not have time to read it.
THE PRESIDENT: Two or three lines at the bottom of the page is all I care about.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: The transcript of yesterday's testimony is not out. You are referring to the transcript of the day before, which cane out yesterday?
THE PRESIDENT: That is right.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: I will see if I can get my copy. I am in court a good deal, so I do not get much time to read the transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: This can come up at another time. We should not interrupt the proceedings.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: To which section were you referring?
THE PRESIDENT: I was not referring to any section. I was referring to a page of the transcript, and more particularly, to the nullity pleas.
No number was given. It was the decree of February 21, 1940.
THE WITNESS: This decree of the nullification plea has been introduced by Article V, Zustaendigkeitverordnung, 21 February, 1940. The nullity plea is introduced by Article V, of the competence order of 21 February 1940. Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 1, Page 410. By further simplification order of 13 August 1942, Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 1, Page 508, Article 7. changes it to the effect that the reasons for the submission of a nullity plea have been enlarged. That has been done by the provision that not only because of a mistake in the application of the law, makes the decision unjust, but a nullity plea is permissible also in cases where there is considerable doubt against the correctness of the facts which have been laid down in the decision.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has now answered it to my entire satisfaction. Those figures were not given in the testimony of the day before yesterday.
BY DR. WANDSCHNEIDER:
Q. Mr. President, may I continue with the cross-examination of the witness The meaning of my question was the following: I wanted to ask whether the witness, who is partly familiar from his own experience with English legal concepts, he knows that this concept of analogy is an absolutely legal concept in English law. Would you like to make a statement to this, witness?
A. In English law, which I know -- or at least I know something about it-I was not in London as a criminal lawyer, I know that English law knows the conception of the legislative decision of a judge. Paragraph 2 of the Reich Penal Code, apparently wanted to refer to this concept. I do not want to report again about the real meaning of the happy sentiment of the people, which in the German execution of their legislative act of the judge, is very important, because I have already said everything about this.
Q. Witness, it is obvious that this concept of happy sentiment of the people had a certain definite meaning. I agree with you on that. However, the legal concept of the analogy is a constitutional concept which only by its connection with the concept of happy sentiment of the people -- only by this connection -- did it receive its negative meaning.
A. Yes, but I have to add that in German criminal law, until the advent of the Third Reich, it was so.
Q. A further question. Your legal political concepts, witness, in your presentation of the legal conditions before and after 1933 are based on the concept of the Reichtsstaat, the constitutional state. Now, we have at the present time different concepts of democracy and constitutional, state which are interpreted differently by Soviet Russia than by the Angle-Saxon powers. Could you tell me on which concept of constitutional state you base your judgment of the German legal conditions?
MR. LA FOLETTE: If Your Honor please, I think the question constitutes a direct argument with counsel. I don't believe that it is pertinent to the issue. The comparison that the witness made was between German law applied in 1933 and German law subsequent to 1933. To ask him to make a comparison between systems of law outside of Germany, to me, is to, in the first place, bring in extraneous matters which will lead us far afield, and to an extensive cross-examination well beyond the field covered on direct, and attempt to set up the standard which the witness did not use in his direct testimony.
As I recall in his direct testimony, he testified as to the changes between German law of the Weimar Republic and prior thereto and those that took place afterwards. He made no comparison between German law and Anglo-Saxon law. He made no comparison between German law and the Soviet concept of law. And I believe it is an improper cross-examination to ask this question which requires that he make a contrast which is neither pertinent or relevent, by using standards which he did not use on direct examination. For that reason, I do object to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Wandschneider, we think the stand taken by the prosecut ion is sound and therefore we sustain the objection.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: I do not. May I briefly state my opinion, Mr. President I only want to give the reasons for my contention; the Tribunal may decide what it thinks is correct, according to its judgment. I only want to say why I am justified in posing these questions, and I would like to ask the Tribunal for a decision. I know that, of course, any questioning of this kind -and I just want to say that this is my last question -- that such a complex of questions involves a danger of the law under discussion. Therefore, I am making every effort to concentrate on the subject of the evidence. However, I consider it absolutely essential to discuss this question because it seems to be of fundamental importance to me.
The defendants are reproached that they had been removed from constitutional thinking and that they had approached the thinking of the totalitarian system -- that they turned toward totalitarian thinking. In other words, the cardinal problem of this trial is the relationship between law and might, and pure force. If, now, it is correct that this basic problem of law: right of law on one side, which is represented by the administration of justice; the might as such on the other hand, which is represented by the direction of the state--the pure government-- if this is the problem, then it is impossible that the defense is denied the right to ask which concept of the constitutional state should be the decisive one.
We know that we in Germany, and also it can be recognized by the Tribunal, had different conceptions of democracy and right and law and constitutional state. The decisive question herein is how the position which the state takes toward the personal liberties of an individual, and these different concepts answer that question differently. For the purpose of judging the motives and the acts of the defendants-- it is of decisive importance to discuss just exactly this borderline on which admittedly they often, in the polarity between might and right, between administration of justice and executive, they found themselves within these limits. In my opinion, it is impossible to do justice to the defendants if the execution of the problems of justice -- of the administration of justice is considered abstractly from the totality of the state-- if they are taken out like by a surgeon, and if it is overlooked entirely in doing so that the are not only legal students but also living human beings-- members of a certain people and of a state-- that they were. For this reason, it seems to me-- that the discussion of this subject which I have opened, the concept of the constitutional state, relationship of right and might to each other and the relationship of the state and right and the liberties and rights of the individual-- they seem to be of importance to me and of significance.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: I feel that the Prosecution is entitled to make a statement again. I need not reiterate my basic reasons about this witness testimony with reference to the contrast with German law. I have no quarrel with the statement of Dr. Wandschneider as he makes it as an argument to this high Tribunal eventually on behalf of his client, but it is not a question within the competence of this witness' testimony, nor is it one which this witness is competent to testify to, because we do then get into the position where even an expert witness is called upon to decide the very issues before the Tribunal, and for that reason I again reiterate that the question is not proper cross-examination. I make this statement so that I will not be put in the position, nor the Tribunal put in the position, that without an explanation appearing, deny to defense counsel a position which he feels should be necessary. I din't think it will be denied on the final argument.
THE PRESIDENT: The ruling of the Tribunal will stand, and in support of that ruling, we put it on the ground that there is no basis for cross-examination of this witness on that point. If Dr. Wandschneider has a point to make, he can introduce it in his own way at the proper time, but it is not proper cross-examination of this witness on a subject which he does not base his judgment.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: I am finished.
BY DR. GRUBE: (Attorney for Defendant Lautz)
Q I ask permission to begin my cross-examination. Witness, you have testified that in the Administration of Justice, after 1933, there were fundamental changes. Therefore, I want to ask you did these changes also have their effect in the building up of the prosecution?
A To the extent that in addition to the chief public prosecutors at the Reich Supreme Court, new parallel prosecution, the chief public prosecutor at the Peoples' Court was established.
Q In relationship to, between the different prosecutors on the one hand and the Ministry of Justice on the other hand, were there any changes? Especially is it correct to say that even before 1933 as well as after 1933 the members, that is to say, the public prosecutors, were obliged to follow the statements of the public prosecutor?
A Yes, also before 1933.
Q Did this duty to obey the Justice Minister, on the part of the public prosecutors exist only in regard to special directives, general directives, or also in regard to directives which were given in individual cases?
AAlso in individual cases.
Q Therefore, the Ministry of Justice had the right to give orders to the public prosecutors and the chief public prosecutors also; to give them orders whether they were allowed to make an indictment in an individual case, or not, and which charges they had to make?
A Yes, that was before 1933 and after 1933; yes.
Q The Prosecution has pointed out after 1933 it happened that the judges and public prosecutors were constantly changing so that the judge acted as a judge for sometime, then as public prosecutor, and then again as judge, etc. Witness, was that something that happened only in the Third Reich?
A No, it happened already before, occasionally, but it increased to a considerable extent, especially later, during the war; judges were suddenly sent as public prosecutors to the eastern territories.
Q Witness, do you know that this constant change between judge and prosecutor activities was a topical thing in Southern German Laender already before 1933?
A Yes, I know that too.
Q Do you know that the Reich Minister of Justice, Guertner, who was the Bavarian Minister of Justice, that this Minister of Justice Guertner introduced this change in the administration of justice in the Reich in general?
A This order or prevision about the introduction, I do not know; I know only the fact that it was practiced.
Q Witness, do you know that about 1936 there were efforts in the future to separate the careers of judges and prosecutors?
A No.
Q I now proceed to another point. I again have to refer to your remarks according to which the judges before 1933 applied the principle of any constitutional state, that the judge was autonomous and independent only under the law; witness, especially since you were active in Berlin, I want to ask you the following question: What do you know about the fact that even at the time of the Weimar Republic, that is to say before 1933, the government of the state, in individual cases by way of public prosecutors, informed the courts how they were to treat the matters, or hew the state government thought the matters should be treated; is that known to you?
A In my practice as public prosecutor and as judge, such a case did not happen to me.
Q Do yon know outside of your own practice as public prosecutor and judge, you were active for a short time in Berlin, are those matters which were known to you?
A I don't remember it.
Q What do you know about the fact that during the time of the Weimar Republic, that is before 1933, the prosecution often had to justify their actions to the Minister of Justice, partly because in the view of the Prussian Minister of Justice they did not make sufficiently strong applications, and purely because they did not comply with the commissions they received from the Prussian Minister of Justice; that they did not succeed with these requests in the courts?
A I do not know anything about that. From my own practice I know that in many cases I often asked in many cases for acquittal and that in spite of that, the courts condemned it without any reproaches being made to me by my superiors.
Q However, conversations, on the basis of your residence in Berlin, about that; did you hear anything about that?
A No definite cases; no.
Q Witness, do you know that at the time of the Weimar Republic, that is before 1933, the Ministry of Justice made attempts to influence the judges directly?
A No direct influence.
Q Did the Ministry approach the courts directly?
A No, I do not know of such a case.
Q Do you know anything about the following: That at the time of the Weimar Republic, that is the time between 1925 and 1930, in a trial which the prosecutor said was of particular importance, the acting public prosecutor in the reasons of his application pointed out that above the interest of the judges there were reasons of the state. Did you ever hear anything about this?
A No.
Q But this was general knowledge at the time, wasn't it?
A I was told about it, but I do not know the details about it. I was told that in some trial there was some influence exerted.
Q Who exerted these influences?
A The public authorities; such cases were, however, then criticized; I don't know the details about it, for I did not have anything to do with this trial. I remember that in Bermann-Profess there were some attempts undertaken or that they were supposed to have been undertaken.
Q Thank you. The next point; you discussed the nullity and extraordinary complaints, and in this connection you mentioned the chief Reich public prosecutor. I think there are some matters that have to be clarified here. How many Chief Reich Public Prosecutors were there?
A One.
Q Before 1933?
A Before 1933 there was a chief prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court, and then, as I said already, the chief Reich Prosecutor to the People's Court; there were two Chief Reich Prosecutors then.
Q What crimes did the Reich Public Prosecutor for the People's Court handle?
A For crimes which the People's Court was competent, that is crimes which previously had been discussed before the Supreme Court, high treason and treason.