The Court assumed that it was not a case of robbery and sentenced the defendant to four years in the penitentiary. The Prosecutor had asked for six years. If a witness in an affidavit which has not been submitted here expressed the view that he had to tell me that the defendant Rene Nicaise was nothing more than a child, all I can state is that I am pretty good at estimating the age of defendants, and that --- well, I can show at hand of a case which we will discuss later --
Q. Yes, later. Later I am coming that case later. Now I am coming to case 31, the Richnowski case. I shall offer to the Court Exhibit No. 11, Document No. 5. Both documents contain the judgment against Richnowski and others. The date is 19 January 1944. Witness, may I ask you to comment on this judgment?
A. I have here the verdict passed by the Special Court at Stuttgart on 19 January 1944 in the case of Leopold Richnowski and eight other defendants, all of them foreigners. The defendants were Hungarians, Croatians, Serbs, and one Frenchman. The main Defendants, Richnowski and Popovic, had smuggled 1.6 tons of bread coupons -- that is to say, bread coupons to the value of 1.6 tons of bread. The Court found that the defendants had to be punished for trading in bread coupons. Richnowski was described as being a big Black Marketeer and the Special Court found that such people had to be stopped from engaging in their trade by sentencing them to heavy terms. The sentences were as follows: four years in a penitentiary for Richnowski; one year and six months in a prison for Popovic; and one week to five months imprisonment for the other defendants. As the witness Berthold Schwarz said, if he said that he had seen judgments where it was considered advisable to pass heavy sentences by way of making an example of foreigners, I imagine that he was having this particular judgment in mind.
Q. Witness, have you already mentioned that nationality of those foreigners?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Think you. I am now coming to the next case, Case 32. This is a case of the Prosecution. It is the Skowron case, with which the Prosecution dealt in great detail. A Prosecution witness has testified to this, and his testimony appears on Page 2056. This Prosecution witness, Dr. Witzigmann, was cross-examined by me and he made very detailed statements, and I think they were very material statements. He made these statements on 27 May 1947, Record Page 3670. I further refer to the indictment presented by the Prosecution, NG 1253, Exhibit 465. I should now like to hear what you know about the case, and I think I may assume that the indictment signed by the then Senior Public Prosecutor Link is on your desk. I now hand you for your information a document which later I shall offer to the Tribunal. It is Cuhorst Exhibit No. 12, Document 6. The document deals with the appointment of the Defense Counsel Dr. Feifel in the Skowron penal case of 21 May 1943. Witness, please comment on the case as a whole, and also in particular on the document which I am now handing to you.
A The prosecution at Stuttgart on the 10 of May 1943 filed the indictment written by the witness, Public Prosecutor Ruemmelin. The defendants were Skowron, a Polish farm hand; Ferdinand Potschivalschek, a Slovene and Arandel Dulic, a Sorb farmhand. According to the indictment, it was intended to ask for the death sentence on Skowron and Dulic, and a defense counsel had to be officially appointed for those two defendants. The defense counsel who was officially appointed for those two defendants--and tho appointment was made on the 21 of May 1943 -was a lawyer Dr. Feifel from Blaubeuren. I have the document appointin him before me. It also contains the summons for the trial on the 9 of June 1943, nine-thirty in the morning, at the Local Court of Ehingen on the Danube. Furthermore, a copy of the indictment was given to the defense counsel and he was told that the court files would be sent to him at an early date.
The defense of the defendant Skowron was stated to be a crime against the Public Enemy Law and others. I should like to point out that that information to the defense counsel of the Polish defendant was entered on a form which even before the beginning of the war, that is to say, in July 1939, had been printed. At the same time, the defense counsel received permission to visit his client and to visit both his clients, and that permission I have before me in the original.
Q Witness, what do you mean to say by going in to so much detail? I assume that you mean to say, do you, that you did not treat the defendants--those Polish defendants--any worse than you have treated a German subject?
A The proceedings were just the same as they would have been in the case of any German. The trial was hold at the Local Court at Ehingen on the Danube. The courtroom is about a quarter tho size of this courtroom. During the examination of the defendant Skowron, an incident occurred. The co-defendant Potschivalschek flung himself on Skowron, and in order to make sure that proceedings could continue, Potschivalschek, for the time of Skowron's examination, had to have his hands mannacled.
Skowron, who according to the indictment--the statements of which have been largely corroborated--was a habitual criminal, incriminated Potschivalschek seriously. Neither the court nor the prosecution, however, believed the defendant Skowron, and the witness Witzigmann, who was examined here, naturally attacked the credibility of the prosecution Witness Skowron. The client of the Witness Witzigmann was acquitted. Skowron, for serious thefts while utilizing the blackout, was sentenced to death as a Public Enemy. Dulic, his assistant, was merely sentenced to a prison term. The indictment by the witness Ruemmelin is extremely detailed and he entered every little detail into the indictment; in particular, he mentioned a number of minor offenses and evaluated them as offenses under the Law Against Poles. For these offenses, the Special Court, in accordance with its old custom, did not convict, but reduced the case to its essentials, and they were continued serious thefts under exploitation of the blackout, and it was for that that Skowron was sentenced.
Q Did Skowron only harm Germans by his thefts of foreigners as well?
AAs far as I know, Ukranian farmhands also had considerable amounts of money stolen by him.
Q I wasn't referring to money. I was referring to other things.
A Well, he also stole boots from them.
Q Why did you consider that a serious offense?
A I considered that a serious offense because at the time it was difficult to got boots.
Q Would you say that foreigners, farm hands in particular, suffered from that shortage?
A They were difficult to get for everybody.
Q In this connection, I am coming to an important question. Do you think you can remember whether Skowron was sentenced to death, if not exclusively yet by applying the Law Against Poles as well?
A No, I don't believe that, for in the summons for the defense counsel we hadn't even mentioned the Law against Poles. The introduction of the Law Against Poles into this case was a presumption committed by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Was it referred to in the indictment?
THE WITNESS: It was mentioned in the indictment among other legal provisions; that is to say, the Law Against Public Enemies, the Law Against Poles, the Law Against Habitual Criminals.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q The prosecution mentions a reason as to why in your view the man was definitely a habitual criminal--or to put it more definitely--a professional criminal. But the matter to which I am referring here, that you can only carefully indicate on account of the dignity of this Tribunal.
A It was found that the defendant Skowron, during one of these thefts, on account of an old superstition of thieves, left his excrements in the house where he had committed the theft. Such things allow one for certain to draw the conclusion that the offender was a habitual or professional criminal.
Q Because for them, if I understand you correctly, that is a sort of superstition?
A That is a superstition which is wide-spread in central and eastern Europe with criminals.
Q What is the superstition actually which gave a psychological explanation to the matter?
A I can't tell you that.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you a question? One defendant, Skowron, was sentenced to death, and one to imprisonment. Who was the one that was imprisoned?
THE WITNESS: The defendant Dulic was sentenced to imprisonment.
THE PRESIDENT: He was the other Pole?
THE WITNESS: No, he was a Serb. Yes, a Serb. The man who was acquitted was a Slovene, and the man who was sentenced to death was a Pole.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q What was the reason why one of the defendants--I don't want to talk about the one who was acquitted--but what was the reason why one of the two defendants was merely sentenced to a prison term; whereas the other one, and that the Pole, was sentenced to death?
A The defendant Dulic had taken part in only a few of the thefts committed by the defendant Skowron. As a rough estimate, the defendant Dulic only took part in a fourth of the offenses which Skowron committed.
Q Was there perhaps also a difference, as far as the previous convictions of the thieves go? Can you tell us anything about that?
A We could not establish anything in previous convictions.
Q In both cases?
A No, not in either case.
Q In connection with that subject, I would like to ask you a question of basic importance. Did you over convict a Pole and sentence him to death purely on the basis of the Law Against Poles? I said, did you sentence him purely on that basis?
A I do not know of any such cases.
Q Did the Special Court at Stuttgart over conduct special pro-ceedints against Poles within the meaning of the Law Against Poles of the 4 of December 1941?
A Not in one single case.
Q How was that possible? Was the application of the Code of Procedure within the Law Against Poles obligatory or was it merely a possibility to apply that?
A The provisions were optional, and the Special Court at Stuttgart had no reason whatsoever to employ special methods of procedure against Poles. That would have been impossible from the technical point of view alone.
THE PRESIDENT: After the recess, would you tell us what section of the Law Against Poles it is which gave discretion to the court to determine whether or not that law would over be applied. We will take our recess now for 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. BRIEGER: I am waiting for your permission to take up the examination of my client Cuhorst.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q. Witness, I have submitted to you now for the first time the so-called law against Poles in regard to what you just said, and I ask you to make further explanations provided that they are essential. Furthermore, I offer you the opportunity to correct the testimony you made so far because I am rather skeptical as to whether these were obligatory regulations as to procedure.
A. I have here the so-called Pick edition of the penal code of procedure. This is the form which we used at the German courts. From the law against Poles and Jews of 4 December, 1941, those provisions which arc decisive for the German courts, are Articles I, II, XIV to XVIII. These have been reprinted. Article VI to XIII--or rather IV to XIII, which are not reprinted in this appendant are regulations governing the legal procedure, which, according to Article XIV are merely applicable for those courts which arc situated in the incorporated eastern territories. From the excerpts of the law against Poles and Jews, that a.re reproduced here for the use in German courts, it can be seen that these regulations governing legal procedure are not to be applied to the courts in the Altreich. This is how it happened that the courts of the Altreich, generally, had no knowledge at all of these possibilities of procedure in the incorporated eastern territories since all courts worked from these manuals and not from the Reich Law Gazette. In any case, one thing is certain, and this also has been confirmed by the law in usage in Stuttgart, namely, that special provisions for penal procedure against Poles in Stuttgart and other places in the Altreich were not provided by law.
THE PRESIDENT; I wasn't asking what practice there was. I understood you to say that it was optional with the court to enforce the provisions of the law against Poles and Jews, and I asked you to show me what provisions of the statute there is which makes that law optional.
Of course we understand that the law gives discretion in different situation as to the punishment to be imposed, but that is a very different matter. Do you contend that it was optional with any court whether it would apply in a proper case the substantive criminal provisions contained in the law against Poles and Jews?
A. Your Honor, your question refers to substantive criminal law.
THE PRESIDENT: It does.
A. It was not optional for the German courts as to what penalties they wanted to impose. The German courts were bound by the scope of the penalty provided in the law, that is, insofar as the law against Poles and Jews was applied, they were bound by this law. As I have said, I myself do not recall any case where the penalty, except for the manner of penalty, if there was a prison term, was taken from the law against Poles and Jews , but even if one assumed such a case, the courts would have been bound by the scope of the penalty provided in law against Poles and Jews. Further discretion was not allowed to the courts. From the point of view of procedure, I was mistaken, because before the recess I did not have the full text of the law in front of me, but now I can see from the law that the procedural regulations of this law were not to be applied to the territory of the Altreich.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
Q. Witness, do I understand you correctly to say that you maintain what you said before the recess, namely, that your special court never applied special procedural regulations against the Poles, but as to the reason or the motive that was the extent of your error?
A. I erred only to that extent; the facts, as such, remained unaltered.
Q. I believe that has clarified this case. Now, I want to discuss Case No. 33, Pohilski, Arnold Pohilski.
With regard to this case I offer Exhibit 13, NG-4. It is the sentence against Arnold Pohilski of the 1st of December, 1943. Witness, please tell the Tribunal first-after I have shown you the judgment -- whether he is a German or a foreigner; and if he is a foreigner, what nationality did he have?
A. The defendant Arnold Pohilski was a Roumanian of German blood. I cannot gather from the judgment whether he had already acquired German citizenship.
Q. Do you mean to say by that, that he was born as a foreigner?
A. He was born as a foreigner in Roumania.
Q. Would you thus assume that the Roumanian government regarded him as a Roumanian or as a German?
A. I believe that he was still to be regarded as a Roumanian.
Q. What do you gather from the judgment?
A. The judgment is from the 1st of December, 1943; I was presiding judge. It was passed by the special court in Ravensburg. The facts are that Pohilski had stabbed his wife to death. The prosecution indicted him for manslaughter and asked for a long penitentiary sentence. The special court sentenced the defendant only to a prison tern; however, it stated that this sentence was supposed to serve to warn the fellow citizens of the defendant who had to assimilate themselves to the prevailing order in Germany. On the other hand, it considered in favor of the defendant, that it was merely an act of despair.
Q. May I go over to the next case, Case 34, Souechre. For this I submit Cuhorst Exhibit No. 14, NG-7, namely the sentence against Edward Souechre of the 7th of March, 1944. Witness, please first tell the Tribunal whether he is a foreigner; and if so, of what nationality.
A. The defendant Souechre was a French worker, 38 years of age. The judgment indicates that the defendant was in Germany voluntarily and that he committed his crime there. The sentence shows the offense was very mysterious. The expert physician did not want to say that the defendant had a lessened responsibility; the court was of the opinion that a man in his right senses could not commit such an offense, and the court on its part found that he had a reduced responsibility.
The prosecution asked for the death penalty, but the sentence was three years in the penitentiary. The defendant attempted while he was breaking into a house to injure a girl seriously, but she was stronger than the defendant and threw him out of the window, so that the defendant was seriously injured. From the judgment it is apparent that the special court of Stuttgart evaluated the crimes committed by foreigners in the same way as those that were committed by Germans; and that the especially tragic circumstances of the defendant, were taken into consideration fully. The trial took place out of town at the place where the crime was committed the spot where the crime was committed, was examined and I, myself, took photographs of the place of action.
Q. Witness, just not in describing the case you made a remark which I consider of basic importance. You said that this foreigner was in Germany voluntarily. How did you arrive at that finding? Did you ask the defendant expressly; or did, you have any other reasons to believe so?
A. During the trial the defendant said that; and, moreover, extensive medical examinations existed in which the defendant had put down his whole life history. The defendant, who had suffered a serious skull fracture, and had contracted retrograding amnesia, was examined extensively by physicians and when ho was examined by physicians, he told everything that seemed important in his life.
Q. In connection with my previous question, another question. Regardless of this special case, were there cases of foreigners, where due to the manner of living of the defendants, you could conclude with certainty that the person was in Germany voluntarily; or, in each case did you have to rely on asking the defendant; or, how did you find it out?
A. In no case did I find out that a defendant was against his will staying in the sphere of the district of the special court of Stuttgart.
In most cases by far, however, the court gathered from the examination of the defendant and from other circumstances that the defendants were interested in being allowed to work in Germany and thus were in Germany voluntarily.
Q. Witness, at that time did you know anything as to from what time on forced transportation of foreign workers to Germany started? And I am pointing out that this procedure did not start even at the time of the outbreak of the war.
A. The court did not know anything about these methods because it didn't concern itself with the question of recruitment of labor.
Q. Now, I want to go over to the next case, that is No. 35. Here in the mimeographed copy the name of the defendant is not very clear. As far as I remember, his name is Dorota; is that correct, witness?
A. Yes.
Q. It is spelled D-o-r-o-t-a. I submit a document -- no, I don't have it. Please comment on the case as far as you know anything about it.
A. I am going to discuss the case on the basis of the original indictment that I have here; the form of the indictment loads to the conclusion that the prosecution asked for the death penalty. Josef Dorota was a Galician railroad worker, thirty-two years old, who had seven times been previously convicted in Poland, and once in Germany. The Galician Dorota tried in the prison at Esslingen on the Neckar, to strangle the prison warden. The special court made a spot examination at the prison, and even though the motion was made for a death sentence, it merely passed an additional sentence of six months in the penitentiary added it to the penal sentence under which the defendant already was.
Q. In order to inform the Tribunal, I want to say the following: This case will also be discussed in an affidavit that I shall offer to the Tribunal in Document Book, Cuhorst, No. III. I just hear that this document book is still not ready, even though I handed it to the Administration at the end of July. Now, I shall discuss the next case -plunderers at the main station in Stuttgart. The witness Eckert from whom I shall submit an affidavit that he gave me in Document Book No. III describes a, case of plundering by a Frenchman in the main station of Stuttgart.
Do you recall the ease? Was the death sentence to be expected; and, why was it not passed?
A. I remember that case because it was one of the first cases of plundering at all. The defendant, a French worker, had after an air raid on the main station of Stuttgart stolen tobacco, etc., from the burning station. The indictment had as its grounds plundering, and a death sentence was to be expected. The special court found that such a large station, even after an air attack, was not a territory that was unprotected, and sentenced the accused Frenchman, because of theft to a short prison term.
Q. Do you mean to say thus that a court that was less well-wishing could have come to a more serious sentence under the point of view of plundering? What sentence would have been pronounced if they had found that that was a case of plundering?
A. Counsel, the well-wishing attitude of the court is less important than the exact, determined facts, as to whether the facts of plundering exist or not. The special court of Stuttgart, in this case, examined the facts of the case extraordinarily carefully and found that the legal prerequisites for punishing somebody for a case of plundering did not exist.
Q. May I now go on to the next case. After a pause of some time, I now shall again discuss a case sentenced by the penal senate; that is Case 38. Did you try a case in Waldshut against a number of Dutchmen?
A. In the spring of 1944 the penal senate in Waldshut, on the Rhine, tried a case against a number of young voluntary Dutch workmen who were working in a Rhine power station. They had. undertaken large scale destruction in the power plant, and attempted common escape across the Swiss border that was near. I may add that there the Rhine is the border between Switzerland and Germany. The main trial was in Waldshut. The evidence showed that the Defendants were seriously incriminated.
The court decided to take an eye-witness account at the place where the defendants worked and at the camp where they were living; and in so doing the court broached the question as to whether this whole undertaking was meant to be taken seriously at all. The defense counsel followed this possibility up, and when the trial was continued, the defendants could be sentenced only because of a few formal offenses to prison terms of a few months. I remember this case and recall that the father of one of the defendants sent a letter of thanks from Holland to the prosecutor because he had treated his son so well before court.
Q. In Case No. 39, this case will be discussed in an affidavit that I shall submit to the Tribunal. I shall offer the document in Document Book II. From this exhibit I gather, among other things, that the penal senate, while you were presiding judge, witness, sentenced a young Dutchman instead of for preparation for high treason, only for serious misdemeanor. Was this the result of legal facts of the case? It is supposed to be a case that was tried in Ravensburg against Nyhoff. Subsequently, and by referring to what the witness Dr. Barnickel testified here, a few days ago in the witness stand, I first ask if this is identical with the case discussed by Dr. Barnickel.
A. Yes.
Q. Please go into detail.
A. The defendant Nyhoff was a young Dutch workman; I estimate his age was about nineteen.
The general public prosecutor had indicted him for preparation for high treason. The trial took place while I was presiding Judge in Ravensburg. It was a trial by the penal senate of the District Court of Appeal. The defendant had, in front of the railroad station in the main street in Ravensburg, apparently repeatedly shouted "Heil Meskau" with a raised fist.
According to the impression that the penal senate had of this young man, it was rather a boyish prank, than a serious criminal offense, and even though the prosecution asked for a prison term of one year and for 6 months for preparation for high treason, the penal senate passed a prison term, that is, not a penitentiary, but a prison term of 6 weeks for severe misdemeanor and released the defendant. We were surprised at the time that no extraordinary objection was raised. The defense counsel of the defendant Nyhoff, was the lawyer Dieterlein in Ravensburg.
Q May I go to the next case? Did you ever try a Pole because of unnatural rape and crimes against children? Dr. Weber was Defense Counsel. Witness Rumelin was the prosecutor who described the case.
A A Pole, Bartholomaeus Mroviec had committed serious sexual crimes on several 12 to 16 year-old German boys. In my opinion, so far as I know, the trial was near Stuttgart in Vaihin-gen on the Ems.
The prosecution asked for a death sentence. The special court pronounced a prison sentence of five years because it had to make the finding that the Pole who was the defendant was not the only one who was guilty but that a number of his victims were not without guilt in this immoral behavior.
The German juveniles, so far as they were eligible for punishment according to their age were sentenced by the Juvenile Penal Chamber. I do not know any details about this.
Q Witness, do you happen to know, -- that is if you know the date that the sentence was passed -- whether at that time the law against Poles existed already?
A I cannot tell you that. So far as I know the trial was in the beginning of 1941. No -- I beg your pardon, - 1942, so that the law against Poles must leave been promulgated already.
Q Without your being able to say it with certainty?
A They were sentenced on the basis of Paragraph 175-A of the Reich Penal Code, in which the penitentiary sentence is the sentence that is pronounced as a rule.
Q Case 41 is again a case of sex crimes. The witness Eberhard Schwarz and Rumelin, on pages 2051, 2052 and 2085, of the transcript, described parts of a case which was supposedly tried in July against a Pole while you were presiding Judge. This case, which has a special characteristic mark, I want to have clarified. What was it all about? Will you explain it?
A In this case it was Edward Wozinak, who is contained on the death sentence list, exhibit 253, NG 398, under No. 21. The facts of the case are as follows:
Q May I interrupt you, witness. First of all, was he a foreigner?
A A Pole.
Q A Pole?
A Yes, May I continue?
Q Yes, I ask you to.
A The facts of the case were as follows: The Pole who was still a Juvenile; had committed sex crimes to a considerable extent on little girls. When I read the files, it seemed to me as though this was a crime due to puberty -- the puberty of a man who was not fully mature yet. Since from the indictment I had to assume that a motion for a death sentence would be made, I had pictures taken of the defendant without his clothes on, and had the pictures of the defendant put in a closed envelope, -- in a sealed envelope. By these pictures it was easy to determine that he was a young man who was not yet fully developed. The first sentence which was passed outside of Stuttgart, -
Q While you were presiding Judge?
A Yes.
Q Please continue.
A -- inflicted, so far as I know, a prison term of three years. The Reich public prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court filed a nullity plea, and the Reich Supreme Court quashed the sentence. The case was then tried again in Urach, Wuerttemberg for the second time, and again I was presiding Judge. The prosecutor in the trial was the witness Rumelin. The representative of the General public prosecutor -- for in case of a death sentence, the representative of the General prosecutor had to be present -- was the witness Berthold. Schwarz. Turing this trial, the witness Schwarz and I were urging together the witness Rumelin, not to ask for a death sentence, and the defendant was then, in September, 1942, in the second trial, as the witness Eberhard Schwarz testified correctly, sentenced to five years in a penal camp. There were no more nullity pleas filed.
Q Do you mean to say that this Pole was never sentenced to death, and that accordingly he is incorrectly on the death sentence list submitted by the witness, Eberhard Schwarz?
A I believe that is merely an error made by the witness Eberhard Schwarz, or by another person who compiled that list, for it is not difficult to gather from this list, that the first trial took place first in May, 1942, and the second in September, 1942.
JUDGE BRAND: May I ask you with reference to the sentence to a penal camp, that sentence was pursuant to the provisions of the law against the Poles and Jews, was it not, insofar as it provided for punishment or confinement in a penal camp?
A Yes, that is the nature of the penalty was chosen on the basis of the law against Poles, whereas the extent of the penalty was from the German Penal Code.
BY DR. BRIEGER:
May I add to the question, briefly. If the Poles were tried on the basis of the law against Poles, did the Court have the possibility at all to pass a prison sentence, or did they have to pronounce a sentence for a penal camp, or was that optional?
You don't have to answer that question only if you know it for sure.
A The Court had to pass the sentence for a penal camp.
Q Case 42. The witness Eckert described in the affidavit which I referred to already before, and which I shall submit later, further a case of a Pole in which a nullity plea was carried out. Would you know about this case? This is the case which was described as Skiflack, first name Josef, on the list I submitted.
On the death sentence list there is under No. 6, a case against a Pole, Josef Skoflack. I believe I am not mistaken if I think that this Josef Skoflack is the Pole who, due to a nullity plea, was sentenced directly to death by the Reich Supreme Court. Possibly it could also be the Sefka case, No. 48 on this list. The case was first tried by the Supremo Court in Stuttgart because of lending aid and comfort to the enemy, helping French prisoners of war escape.
The defendant made an impression of being mentally backward, and retarded, and he was sentenced on basis of Article 51, Section 2, that is, reduced responsibility, to a prison term, The Reich Supreme Court quashed the sentence, and sentenced the defendant to death.
Q You would thus say that this is an example for the statement you made the other day, that not everybody who was executed in Stuttgart had been sentenced to death by you, but only a portion of them, and that among those who were executed in Stuttgart, there were those who had been sentenced to death by the Reich Supreme Court and not by you?
A Yes, this is such a case.
Q Case 43. This is the case of Louisa Tonie. Here the witness Rumelin, who had to deal with the case, on pages of the Transcript 2058, 2066, and 2069, testified about this; also exhibit 211, NG 490 has been submitted in connection with this case. According to this witness, you were supposed to have exhibited an extra nastiness. Because of this evaluation, I attach importance to the discussion of this case. Please comment.
A The penal case against Louisa Tonia, a young Italian woman, was tried in the summer of 1944, by the Special Court of Stuttgart, while I was presiding Judge, and it was tried in Rabensburg. During an air raid on Friedrichshafen, on the Lake of Constance, the defendant had plundered a clothing store to a considerable extent. Since the court had to expect that a death sentence would be demanded, the court summoned an expert in psychiatry, in order to make sure whether the defendant night not be mentally fully responsible. The expert stated that the defendant was absolutely mentally sound. The facts were so clear that one had to assume that plundering had taken place, and the witness Rumelin as Prosecutor, himself demanded the death sentence.
Already during the consultations prior to the pronouncing of the sentence, the council decided to file a clemency plea which was well founded. The Judge Oberlandesgerichtsdirector Dr. Stuber, wrote this clemency plea, I signed it, and the prosecution also agreed with this plea, and the defendant Tonia, was pardoned to a prison term. I do not know the extent.
Q Have you finished?
A Yes.