I'd like to specify in my question that I mean, of course, not an enemy from outside, an enemy who might possibly have landed. I am referring to the opponents within the area of your corps.
A. The political situation in Albania was even more confused than the one in Crotia. There were bands of the most varied types. Some of them were so-called National bands which tried to join the area to a greater Serbia. Then there were other National bands who wanted an independent state of Albania. And then again there were other bands, Communist bands, who counted themselves as belonging to the so-called Tito bands or tried to join up with these groups.
Our real enemies were only the Communist bands; The National bands partly, remained neutral towards us, and partly they fought the Tito bands, the Communist bands.
Q. In order to clarify these rather interwoven conditions, I'd like to refer back to one document which I have already offered. This particular document is on Page 127 of Document Book 2 Leyser. It is Leyser Document 44 which I had offered as Leyser Exhibit 21. This is an affidavit of the former Lt. Colonel Hans Klein who, according to Number I of this affidavit, from January 1945 until the end of the capitulation, was the I-a of the division and was, therefore, subordinate to the 21st Corps.
In order to deal with the problem which I have just discussed, I'd like to refer back to Numeral 7 of this affidavit which is on Page 130 of Leyser Document Book II. The witness says here: "Opponents of the German Wehrmacht: According to my knowledge of the conditions since September 1944 the following distinctions must be made in appraising the opponent:
a) Partisan bands which pursued their normal occupations and, occasionally, came to the fore as opponents of the Wehrmacht, carrying out surprise attacks when an opportunity presented itself.
b) Partisan forces which, while organized on military lines, were only partly uniformed or wearing insignia which could be recognized at a distance.
c) Forces which conformed with the Hague Land Warfare Rules. Excepting one case in Fall 1944, when a Yugoslav brigade, coming from Italy, had landed in the area to the South of Mostar, such military formations never appeared in front of the divisional sector in the area between Brod and the Reich frontier until the last two months of the war. These units were uniformly using Russian clothing and equipment.
That the bands had no regard for the civilian population in carrying out their acts of sabotage is proven, for instance, by their attempts on the Mostar - Sarajevo railroad line, which, for all practical purposes, only harmed the civilian population; an interruption in the supply of the division was never achieved. The civilian trains were cut out, and after the line had been repaired military trains had the right of way as the situation required."
In Number 8 this is also material:
"8. Cetniks: At the beginning of my assignment in Fall 1944 the division collaborated with the Cetniks. There was no doubt, though, that the Cetniks inwardly rejected us as the occupiers of their country, that they were adversaries of the Ustasha in whom they saw the most uncompromising exponents of an independent Croatian state, while they wanted a unified Yugoslavia, and that they were no less inimical to the TITO-forces, because, in contrast to the latter, they aspired to a unified Yugoslavia leaning on the Western powers and not on Russia. Later on, when the Cetniks opposed the German forces, and obviously attempted to push to the coast in the Dubrovnik area, thus inviting the Western powers to effect a landing, TITO concentrated superior forces and defeated them in the Bileja and Trebinje area. They then withdrew to the North."
After this interpolation, General, we will turn back to the 21st Corps and the first thing I want to deal with is this Division Skanderbecg since almost all the documents which were used against you, where the 21st Corps is concerned, referred to this SS Division Skanderbecg.
I'd like first of all to have Document 16 of the Prosecution submitted to you. (Document handed to witness.)
Here on Page 164 of the German and 124 of the English test you find Exhibit 406 of the Prosecution. This is Document NOKW 1135 of the Prosecution. This document represents a report of the 21st SS Mountain Division Skanderbecg, dated 2 October 1944. Do you know this report, General?
A. No. At that time I was not present with the corps and on my return, when I came back to the corps, this SS Division Skanderbecg, had already been dissolved or at least it was no longer located within my sector.
Q. Could you tell us, witness, whether this report was at any time received by your staff?
A. That must have been the case. I cannot say for sure. To the best of my knowledge I have not seen this report because, as I have mentioned before, I was absent and when I returned this particular division was no longer in my sector and no longer under my jurisdiction.
Q. Could you tell us, please, General, when you returned?
A. Around the 16th of November I returned to the corps.
Q. We will deal with your absence which, according to your testimony, lasted from the second or third cf October until the 16th of November at a later time. You said that you cannot recollect this report of those days. Perhaps you can now, while looking at the document, clear up a few points which might be of importance in this trial.
It says here, on Page 164, which is 124 of the English text, the first page of the document under Number 2 concerning the organization of the Division Skanderbecg, that this division received the greatest possible help by the Plenipotentiary for the Reichsfuehrer SS in Tirana, SS Gruppenfuehrer Vitztdum, and that it was furthermore supported as much as possible by the 21st Mountain Corps.
Could you now tell us, witness, how the organization of this division Skanderbecg came about, what kind of a unit was it, who was the responsible person for it?
A. The SS Division Skanderbecg was a Waffen SS unit which was to be recruited from Albanian inhabitants. As I had already mentioned, Himmler had obtained the Fuehrer's consent that indigenous units of the SS could be recruited. With the organization of this SS Division Skanderbecg, the then SS and Police Leader was commissioned. This man was at the same time Plenipotentiary for the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. He was also Higher SS and Police Leader in Albania.
This recruitment and organization was, therefore, purely an SS matter which was no concern whatsoever of the Wehrmacht. After this recruitment and organization had been carried out there and, as I mentioned, was carried out in a sector which was more or less part of the 21st Mountain Corps area, my predecessor, General Fehn, apparently, took interest in this procedure. On this occasion I believe he gave this division one officer and twelve NCO's as instructors. This was a matter of course in order to support the military training of this division. On the other hand, this seems to have been the reason why there were differences of opinion between General Fehn and SS Leader Vitztum and the SS Brigade Leader Schmitzler who was in charge of this division.
I, myself, when I received the directive of the Field Marshall, did no longer take any interest in this recruitment and, therefore, I am in no position to give you any details about it.
Q. General, in this report of the 2 October, 1944, it says, doesn't it, that the Division was technically subordinate to the 21st Corps? Can you clear up this point for us?
A. Yes, that is correct; but that means that this subordination was valid at the beginning of the organization of this Division Skanderbeg. But it further says here: "The Division Commander mentioned that on the first of October 1944 the Division --" I beg your pardon -- "As of the first of October the Division was subordinate to the 21st Mountain Corps when the Division was organized." But it doesn't say that it is still subordinate to the Corps. That also shows that this Division was not subordinate to the 21st Corps. Besides, it is said in this order that it was a technical subordination and not a general subordination. This again proves that the subordination only applied at the beginning of the organization of the Division and then it was only a tactical one.
Q. What you say, General, is that when the Division was first organized it was tactically subordinate to your corps but that later on this subordination was rescinded on the order of Field Marshall von Weichs so that in the further course of your activities there was no more relation of subordination of the SS Division Skanderbeg to the 21st Corps. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is correct. During my tenure the SS Division was no longer subordinate to my corps, neither in tactical respect nor in any other respect.
Q. Just before you mentioned, General, that as of approximately the second of October to the 16th of November you were absent from the corps, which is a time period of about six weeks. During that time you were not in the area of your corps. May I ask you how it happens that you can give us these dates so exactly?
A. On the 29th of September I received a telegram which said that my wife had been killed on the occasion of an American air attack and my son was wounded; and subsequently on the second or third of October I received a special leave.
Q. I believe you ought to talk a little slower.
A. On the second or third of October I was, therefore, not with the corps. After my return about two to three weeks later Field Marshall von Weichs put his airplane at my disposal and with this airplane I was to fly to Tirana. The airplane, however, flew astray during the night and we did not have sufficient fuel and we had to make an emergency landing during the night.
We landed on the River Drina near Sarajewo and after this emergency landing I, myself, and the twelve other people on board the airplane lived as prisoners, more or less, of a Chetnik unit. I was detained there for about eight days with this Chetnik unit and the First Mountain Division liberated me.
Then I went to Zagreb, to the army group, where I had been asked to appear in order to report about the experiences which I had. Thereafter, approximately around the 16th of November, I returned to my corps. At that time, however, the corps was no longer situated in Tirana but had already retreated in the withdrawal movement and was in the area of Skopa.
Q. General, according to your description you stayed for about eight days and were detained by a band. On this occasion you had an opportunity to observe this band from a very close distance. Therefore, from your own knowledge and observations, can you tell us anything about how this band was organized, how it was armed and equipped, what kind of uniforms the members wore and perhaps you could also tell us something about their fighting methods to the extent to which it ms possible for you to observe them?
A. The treatment which my men and myself received at the hands of these bands is significant for the confusion which reigned in that area. We were actually not treated as prisoners because we were left our arms and ammunition which is usually taken away from prisoners. This band, because it was a Chetnik band, was a very strong opponent of the Tito bands which I gathered from remarks which I overheard there. These Chetnik bands were not opposed to the German Wehrmacht; otherwise they would have regarded me as an ordinary prisoner.
The bands who were there also did not fight against the German Wehrmacht but they only fought against the Tito bands.
Where the other questions which you put are concerned, the question as to how we were treated, I can say that after we were detained there by the bands, we were suddenly surrounded by two or three hundred people on the way who had machine guns, et cetera, so that it was not possible for us to advance at all and then I asked these people to let us have a doctor in order to treat the men who had been wounded on the occasion of the emergency landing.
Then we intended to go on and we were prevented from doing so. I then asked the Chetnik doctor who talked German why we were not allowed to march on and why we were treated as prisoners. He answered me: "I hope and I wish for you that you are not a prisoner with us because we, on principle, do not make any prisoners. All prisoners with us are shot."
That was a doctor who should have been in a position to know something about the treatment of Prisoners and that was his opinion. I, myself, and my men, were brought before the leader of these bands. He also told me at once - I believe he had learned that I was a general and he could also see that from my uniform -- that I was not his prisoner. He emphasized this fact. I believe he did that in order to impress his people of this fact. He told me he would have to keep me in protective custody because otherwise I would be killed by the Tito bands with my small number of surrounding men.
I did not quite see his point and told him I'd rather like to march on. I was, however, not permitted to do that. I had to remain with the operational staff of this band and I had to march with them, I must, however, admit that this leader was very chivalrous and behaved in a very proper manner. He even gave me his horse so I didn't have to walk. For hours we marched through that district to a mountain village which was situated high up in the mountains. In this village the staff of the corps was located. I established at that time that the corps staff of the band was involved here.
Q. May I ask you one question in between here? Was it possible for you to establish why this band or this so-called corps staff detained you at all? You said on the one hand you were no prisoner but, on the other hand, it was not a friendly Chetnik unit. I believe that the whole situation is not quite clear.
A. In the final analysis I did not quite realize why I was detained there. At that time I assumed that I was more or less regarded as an object for exchange. This staff was quite nervous and agitated. As soon as any reports came in, to which I might refer back later, that bands had appeared in the neighborhood, everybody was alarmed immediately. Everybody had to keep his luggage ready and then this staff would hide in some other bushes. Through this I gained the impression that at some time, when this staff would be badly off, and might be attacked by surprise from Tito bands, it would use me as an object of exchange, which seemed rather suitable.
Q. What kind of an organization was it, General? Before that you were talking about an army staff. In order not to let anybody gain the wrong picture here maybe you can give us your comments.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A I said the leader called himself the leader of a Cetnik ArmyCorps. All these people had given them military designation. This socalled corps staff consisted on the one hand of the commander who was a former Serbian General Staff Officer. This man acted in a very correct and proper manner towards me. His Chief of Staff was a University Professor from Belgrade and besides his staff consisted of two or three more officers. I cannot tell you where they came from. The rest were men about a body guard as he called them of two to three hundred men. In the opinion of these people it was a so-called corps staff of the bands. The members of this staff wore of course no uniform. For the most part they wore the clothing of that particular region and if they wore uniforms they were of the most varying types, German ones, Italian ones, Jugoslavian ones, and partly also, English uniforms. The arms of these people were also of a very varying type. There was German munition which they had captured, Jugoslavian munition, British, American, etc. I can remember the American munition very well because I was very interested in it. They had a double barreled machine gun which I know quite well. This proves they also had American equipment.
Q One more question in this connection, General. You told us that the members of this band and the members of the body guard gave a very varied picture where their clothing and uniforms were concerned. Can you also tell us whether these people wore the famous uniform and insignia which according to the Hague rules of land warfare is to be recognized at a distance?
A The only thing which was a common insignia amongst all these people was a Serbian eagle which was worn by all these people. It was an eagle of about 4 centimeters which could, of course, not be recognized at any distance and would in no way correspond to the Hague rules for land warfare. But, that was the only thing that was the same with every individual member of that band. I cannot say very much about a division or organization of these bands because I was in no position to observe it or judge it. It was rather interesting to me and rather important to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
observe their report activities. Since we had an opportunity in this small mountain village to move around freely within the corps staff area always accompanied by two armed men we had occasion to watch the reporting activities rather closely. The village was surrounded by a double or threefold security line and there was very lively reporting activity there. If one talks of regular army one cannot apply this term here. All the couriers which came and went there and there were a great number of them who were mostly old women, ragged children and old men. One could recognize this when one observed the whole procedure; that they show an identification to the guards and when they had shown this pass they were allowed to enter the village. In the same we observed this for the staff building itself. There also only those people were allowed to enter who showed a pass and then they came back with a report. It was typical for these couriers that for the last 200 meters the courier has to advance in running to the man he wants to report to in order to show him how important his report was. These children and boys did the same thing. When they had reached the post at a distance of 200 or 300 meters they started running in order to show that the report which they had was an important one. We, therefore, had extremely good opportunity to watch this whole procedure. To me, now, at this point, it is interesting wherein this trial itself always asserted that that was a regular army with all the training, equipment and uniform directives of a regular army; that I, myself, observed that all these couriers and everybody who belonged to this unit never wore a uniform. On the contrary they were only spies; they were dressed in civilian clothes and women and children were used.
Q Now, one concluding question concerning these observations which you made with your own eyes. Could this band which you described to us be designated as a regular unit which was asserted here so often?
A No, as I have stressed before their can be no talk of a regular army or a regular belligerent.
Q After this description of your personal experiences, General, Court No. V, Case No, VII.
we will now return to the document of the Prosecution. One preliminary question about the SS Division Skanderbeg. You have told us before that General Field Marshal von Weichs allowed you to use the SS Division Skanderbeg for technical operations and of the subordinate to the 21st Corps from case to case and you could make a request for this subordination. Did you ever make any use of this possibility and did you at any time have the SS Divisions become subordinate to you for the purpose of tactical assignment?
AA commitment of the whole Division Skanderbeg was out of the question because in my time this division was not even fully organized and I have never made use of this authority. I would like to mention, however, that smaller parts of the SS Division on the occasion of operations which were carried out by my divisions on the border line of this area from time to time a company or a battalion which was stationed there would be used when an operation against the bands took place and the division concerned would have this particular unit subordinate to it for tactical purposes only.
Q This brings me to the documents of the Prosecution, General; from your time with the 21st Corps we only have very few documents submitted against you by the Prosecution. I might say that all these documents refer to occurrences with the SS Division Skanderbeg. You have told us initially that this division was not subordinate to you and you also said that a tactical subordination of the division was out of the question. I would like to crystallize this point clearly with one more question. Did you have any authority to issue orders in a military sense for any units of this SS Division Skanderbeg?
A No, I did not.
Q I now have the first document submitted to you which was offered against you. It is contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution on page 112 of the English document book and on page 156 of the German text. This is document NOKW 952 of the Prosecution which had been offered under Exhibit No. 400 of the Prosecution. You Court No. V, Case No. VII.
have here a daily report by your corps dated 11 August 1944 and under the heading SS Division Skanderbeg it is reported: "During an attack East of Kukes minor own and civilian losses; 2 trucks burned out; 6 hostages hanged at the places of attack." Will you please give us your comments to this report, General?
A Towards the beginning of my examination I said that events which occurred in the area were reported also when the unit concerned was not subordinate to the corps. The channel of report concerning all units present in the area had for technical reasons to leave by the corps. For this reason the SS Division Skanderbeg, although it was not subordinate to the corps, reported to us. We then passed on this report to the Army as a report concerning the area. Besides this had been the same with my predecessor General Fehn and this procedure had been quite customary because the division had been tactically subordinate to him.
Q You are telling us, General, that this then is a territorial report if we can call it that. On the basis of this report were you in a position to take any steps?
A No, there was nothing I could order because the division was not subordinate to me. I further would like to point out that where reprisal measures were concerned the same regulations applied for Albania as it did for Croatia. By this I mean that reprisal measures could only be carried out by divisions in conjunction and with the consent of the Albanian representative of the government who used to be attached to every division.
Q. In order to clarify this problem may I ask you, General, to which order you are referring when you say the same applied for Albania as it did for Croatia?
A. I am referring to the order of Army Group F dated 22 December 1943. It was issued and signed by General Loehr to the best of my knowledge.
Q. Let's now go on discussing this problem, General. In the indictment it is stated that on or around 11 August 1944 for one attack East of Kukes 6 hostages were hanged. Was it possible for you to establish from the documents whether the attack near Kukes and the hanging of 6 hostages has ever appeared in any other document which was submitted against you by the Prosecution?
A. No, this count of the indictment has to refer to this particular document. It is not correct, therefore, that these hostages were hanged for one attack but as is shown by the document several attacks occurred and own and civilian losses had been suffered.
Q. After we have made this quite clear, General, we will turn to the next incident. This is also contained in Document Book XVI, which you have in front of you and I would like you to turn up page 157 of your document book which is page 113 of the English text. Here you find Document NOKW 1008 of the Prosecution which was submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 401. This is a IcDaily report of the 21st Corps addressed to the Army dated 30 August 1944. I believe the Prosecution did not include the whole report in its document because we have only got one entry here and I quote: "Situation in Bitolj unchanged. The anti-aircraft battery section Dossow which was surrounded near Prilep has fought free. The enemy losses, in the corps area, on the 29th:8 are: 5 estimated dead; 1 Italian deserter; 14 prisoners; 20 bandits hanged." This is the second case in all of the documents which were submitted against you where we find a reprisal measure with human life. Can you tell us anything about the hangings mentioned here?
A. It is not possible to clarify the incident here on the basis of this short entry. The quotation which you brought here shows a survey of the whole daily report. However, it is not stated here where these bandits were hanged or who hanged them and also does the reasons for this measure is not given. Therefore, we cannot state with any amount of certainty whether this is a reprisal measure or an execution carried out after a summary court martial. I would feel inclined to assume that the latter was the case because "bandits" are mentioned here and not "hostages." We can also not say whether this hanging was carried out by any units subordinate to me or whether they were carried out by any other unit ever which I had no jurisdiction. The difficulty is increased by the fact that in this document book we only have one passage of the daily report of the 30 August 1944.
Q. In order to clarify this incident as much as possible, your Honors, I have included in my document book the whole document and you can find the whole daily report in Leyser Document Book II on page 13. This is Leyser Document No. 48 and I am going to offer it as Leyser Exhibit 53. General, first of all, I would like to show you the original. By this I mean the photostat of the whole daily report and I would like you to tell us whether on the basis of this whole report you can clarify the incident which we have discussed. The document which I have just mentioned is Leyser Document 48. It is in Document Book II on page 139. May I ask you then to discuss the whole of this daily report, please General.
A. Even this whole report does not clarify the incident entirely. The 20 bandits are only mentioned under numeral 1 which is a survey of the whole report. There is no reference to them in any other report. The following passages deal with the events as they occurred with the individual subordinate units. These reports are given merely for territorial reasons.
Q. General, I believe you made a mistake. You said the following passages deal with the events with the subordinate units and then you continue to say that the reports were given for territorial reasons.
Didn't you make a mistake?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Maybe you would like to start all over again.
A. The following passages deal with the events as they occurred with the subordinate units and the last passage deals with events which occurred in the area of such agencies as were not subordinate to me. These reports are the ones which are merely given for territorial reasons. After examining the whole of the report I can now establish that numeral 1 contains the measures mentioned and that in my opinion this measure could only have been carried out for the attack reported on the anti-aircraft battery Dossow in the area Korueck 1021. From the report of Korueck 1,021 it can be seen that this anti-aircraft unit had been attacked. Besides the anti-aircraft battery had been surrounded and had to fight its way out. On the basis of this report I can vaguely recall that this attack which caused some excitement at the time it actually took place. Of course I don't know details any longer. All I can do is I can stress that the losses of the battery on the occasion of this surprise attack were rather high. They are mentioned here and it says that there were 15 dead., 12 wounded and 3 men were missing. That is a high number of losses if one considers the fact that an anti-aircraft battery consists of about 120 men; that lets us arrive at a loss of altogether 25 percent. This surprise attack has in my opinion some connection with the hanging of the 20 bandits mentioned. But, on the basis of the whole of the report I am in no position to say clearly whether this was the execution of a sentence by a summary court martial or whether it was a reprisal measure.
Q. You told us, General, that in your opinion these 20 bandits were connected with the surprise attack on the anti-aircraft battery in Dossow.
A. I couldn't explain it in any other way.
Q. Was this anti-aircraft battery subordinated to you?
A. No, the anti-aircraft battery was not subordinated to me. It was subordinate to the air force.
Q. This report, to which you referred just now locking at the photostat, can be found under the heading "Korueck 1,021." I would like to ask you, General, what does the expression "Korueck" mean?
A. Korueck means "Commander of the rear army area". A Korueck is as a matter of principle subordinated to the Army; never to the Corps.
Q. Let us try now to further clarify this incident, General. You told us you were in no position to tell us whether this was the execution of a sentence of a summary court martial or whether this was a reprisal measure. I don't believe there would be any other possibilities. If we here are concerned with a sentence of a summary court martial which we do not know -- which would have been the agency, according to this report, who would have called the summary court martial together?
A. According to this report, the incident took place between Prilep and Bitolj. In this district there was no troop unit stationed subordinated to me. As a consequence the summary court martial could have never been called by a unit subordinate to me. Since besides an anti-aircraft battery is concerned here which was subordinate to the air force, they could have been the ones who called such a summary court martial or the competent territorial commander in Korueck.
Q. Let us assume for a moment in order to clarify this even further a reprisal measure would have been the case here, which would have been the agency to order or carry out such a reprisal measure?
A. Here again the order applies which has been issued by the Army Group.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q In order to make this quite clear, General, I would like to state that I believe you are referring to the order just previously mentioned, dated 22 December 1943, issued by Army Group F; this order is contained in Exhibit 397 of the Prosecution which is on page 47 of the English text and page 98 of the German text. Could I ask you now, General, to carry on with your comments?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the volume, please?
DR. TIPP: Document Book XVI, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: And the page, please?
DR. TIPP: Page 47 of the English Document Book.
That is the basic order of Army Group F, concerning reprisal measures, which General Leyser has repeatedly mentioned during his examination.
Q Will you please continue, General?
A If a reprisal measure had been involved here, the order of Army Group F dated the 22 December 1943 would be the one which is valid. According to this order reprisal measures could only be carried out in connection with the Albanian representative of the Government, and since here possible also a unit of the Air Force is concerned, this unit would have to take up contact with the Albanian Government, and only thus the reprisal measure could be carried out with the consent of the Albanian Government.
Q Did I understand you correctly to say, General, that in the area Prilep Veles where the attack had actually occurred there were no units which were subordinate to you, is that correct?
A No, in that area there were no units directly subordinate to me.
Q I may then summarize and say that these measures, irrespective of what they might have been could not have been carried out by any units subordinate to you?
A No, they could not have been carried out by any units subordinate to me.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q One additional question, you said before that Koreuck was not subordinate to you, and that the incidents had taken place in his area; perhaps you could tell us for reason of clarity for which reasons this report of Koreuck was incorporated in reports of the Corps?
A I have already stated that all units which were located in the corps area had to report for reasons of information to the corps, and that these reports would be passed on to higher agencies. This is the report of the Koreuck which was included in the daily report of the 21st corps. From this daily report, which I have mentioned before, it can be seen that for instance the German General in Albania is mentioned, who is a territorial commander, who was also at no time subordinate to me.
DR. TIPP: In connection with this channel of report, if it please the Tribunal, I would like to offer one further document, which is contained in Document Book III for Leyser, page 207. This is Leyser Document NG 60, and I would like to offer it as Leyser Exhibit 54. This is an affidavit of the former Lt. Colonel Hans Klein, dated the 7 October 1947. This affidavit was duly sworn to on the same day before the Adjutant of the camp Neustadt, Captain Washburn. Hans Klein was the 1a of the 369th Division, which was for some time subordinate to the 21st Corps. He says under numeral 2:
"2. A Corps is an operational staff. For the execution of a tactical order certain units within a fixed area are subordinated to it. Within this area there can also be offices and units which are not subordinated to it.
"I know that the 369th Division, where I was Ia, reported in its daily reports on happenings even of units not subordinated to it, if "special happenings" were in question. I think it very probably that the Corps also reported in this way.
"The office, "German General in Albania", was normally subordinated to the Military Commander in Chief. If, for example, this office is mentioned in a daily report of the Corps, one cannot conclude Court No. V, Case No. VII.
from that, according to my opinion, that it was subordinate.
"There is also the possibility that, because of especially difficult communication connections, the Corps, in its daily reports, also included the daily reports of offices not subordinated to it."
Q General, from the documents of the Prosecution there remains just one incident to be discussed. This is contained in Exhibit 403 and Exhibit 404 of the Prosecution. Both of those exhibits are contained in Document Book XVI. The first mentioned document is on page 117 of the English text, and the second one on page 120 of the English text. We will later deal in detail with these documents. The actual occurrence which forms the basis of these documents is the attack on the evacuation transport consisting of female employees of civilian offices from Tirana, which took place on 3 September, and was East of Kukes. General, first of all, without reference to the documents, can you describe this incident in all its details and connections?
A Towards the end of August 1944, because of the general war situation, the female employees and the wives of members of the German Embassy in Tirana were to be evacuated. The German Envoy in Tirana, Dr. Schlieb, had contacted the Special Plenipotentiary for Southeast, Envoy Neubacher, and had asked him to let this evacuation take place by plane, but Envoy Neubacher refused this request. The evacuation transport was to be carried out by motor vehicle. The transport was therefore within the scope of work of the German Plenipotentiary in Albania. He and the German envoy contacted me and asked me to protect this transport, along the supply route. The Corps took over the protection of this transport. At that time we provided an armoured scout car and a 2-Centimeter gun fixed on an armoured car. Besides, it was ordered that the road east of Kukes was to be secured, particularly by the Battalion stationed near there. The attack on this motor column took place somewhere east of Kukes, beyond the border of the area of the battalion which undertook the security measures there. It actually took place within the area of the SS Division Skanderbeg. The Battalion Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Commander there was the first one to receive the report about this attack.
Q One question in connection with this, General. You said this Divisional Commander, are you talking about the Divisional Commander of the SS Skanderbeg Division, or are you talking about a certain officer of your own units, which is a Wehrmacht unit?
A I had said before that in that area a battalion, and that of course can only be a battalion subordinate to me, had been employed for the protection of this transport. This Battalion Commander here was a member of the 181st Division, which was subordinate to the 21st Corps. This Battalion Commander, as I said, was the first one to gain knowledge of this attack, and since he had men on hand for the securing of the transport he engaged in battle and freed these motor cars and reported the result to the corps.
Q General, can you tell us any more details about the attack itself?
A The attack was carried out by a band, which according to the reports, was approximately 100 men strong. On the occasion of this attack, three women were killed. Two women were kidnapped and a number of women were also wounded. Amongst them was the wife of the German Envoy. Besides, I believe there were 30 other people who were wounded, and a fairly large number of motor vehicles which had accompanied this transport were also destroyed.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, I have another document to offer which deals with the attack itself, and this document has been drawn up by the German Envoy Schlieb, who is the man just mentioned by General von Leyser. I think it would be expedient to submit this after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will have our recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for fifteen minutes.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)