A. That is so.
Q. General, there is another point which has not been made quite clear and that is the relation between the Croatian armed forces, the Ustasha, and also the repeatedly discussed Chetnik units with respect to the German troops. I am quite aware of the fact that it is not your fault that this has been made quite clear but it is possibly the fault of the conditions at that time which are rather difficult to clarify.
Perhaps you would be good enough, in large outlines, to explain to us the Croatian armed forces and after you have done that, to describe the relations between the German Wehrmacht - by this I mean particularly your corps - and the Croatian armed forces. I'd like to put a few questions to you in this connection. Into what parts did the armed forces of the independent State of Croatia Divide? Perhaps you could use terms here which are being used frequently and known to everybody.
A. There was the Croatian army which consisted of the so-called Domobrane battalions and then there were the socalled Ustasha battalions. At this point I'd like to draw attention to the fact that when talking about the Ustasha one has to distinguish between the Ustasha battalions which, when compared with Germany, approximate the Waffen-SS, and the other Ustasha units which would, compared with German conditions, be the general SS.
Q. One interpolation, General. You said that the Croatian armed forces was divided up into Domobrane units which could be compared with the army and the Ustasha units which could be approximately compared with the Waffen-SS; and then you talk about other Ustasha units which you are comparing with the General SS. These other Ustasha units which you have mentioned, were they also a part of the armed forces or did they have no connection with the armed forces at all?
A. No; that is why I distinguish between the various Ustasha units. The Ustasha units were never part of the armed forces. They were a Party organization and, as such, they came under the command - I would like to put it this way - of the Party authorities as the Gauleiter, et cetera. That would mean the Croatian authorities but they were never part of the Croatian armed forces.
Q. In order to anticipate this particular point let us first of all remain with the Ustasha units which we, as a comparison, shall contrast with the General SS. Was there at any time a state of command of the German armed forces units over these Ustasha units?
A. No; because the Ustasha units had never anything in common with them. They were merely a Party organization which could never have been designated as any army unit and, therefore, they could never have been under the command of any parts of the German armed forces.
Q. Therefore, they would not be committed in any tactical operations?
A. No.
Q. And any responsibility on the part of the German armed forces does not apply at all to these particular units?
A. No, it does not apply at all.
Q. In the following questions we can now, after we have clarified this, restrict ourselves to the Croatian armed forces. By this I mean the Croatian army, the Domobrane units and the Ustasha battalions. What was the subdivision in the Croatian army? By this I mean the Domobrane.
A. They were subdivided into corps and the corps again were subdivided into brigades. At the moment I am not quite sure how many corps there existed. I am afraid I can'd recollect.
Q. And the subdivision lowered down into lower echelons.
Did that continue?
A. I believe a brigade consisted of two regiments and the regiments again in battalions and the battalions consisted of companies.
Q. And to whom was this subdivided Croatian army subordinate to?
A. This army was subordinate to the Croatian War Ministry.
Q. Was the subdivision of the so-called WaffenUstasha similar?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And who was the head man of the Waffen-Ustasha?
A. This again was the Croatian armed forces.
Q. You said, General, that Ustasha battalions and Domobrane battalions were tactically subordinate and the conception of tactical subordination you have already clarified when you said that this tactical subordination would mean that a German unit, a division or a corps, could only give such unit orders concerning combat actions and that it did not mean that the German unit had disciplinary or juridical authority at all over these Croatian units. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes, you did.
Q. There is something else we have to clarify, General, which in my opinion was not made quite clear on cross examination. The Croatian armed forces in its entirety or individual parts of this Croatian armed forces is subordinate tactically to the two parts of the German armed forces as a general rule or only in individual cases?
A. I am afraid that must have been misunderstood at some point. These Croatian units would be tactically subordinate only during certain operations in which they participated.
Q. I am not quite sure now, General, whether I know enough about military matters in order to be able to clarify this completely but I hope I do. I'd like to ask you what was the actual practice now. I'd like to give you an example. The 392nd Division, let us say, intended to commence some sort of land operation. Within the area of this division we would have a Croatian Brigade under its brigade commander. The German divisional commander would now desire to commit for this operational two or three Domobrane battalions which were favorably located for this purpose.
Would he, on his own initiative, be in a position to issue a direct order to these Domobrane battalions? Could he, for instance, order Battalion Ten on the first of May at a certain hour to be committed in a certain locality and the second battalion on the same date somewhere else or, if not, what was the actual channel of command and how would it be carried out in actual practice?
A. It would be carried out in the following manner: The divisional commander would contact the commander of the Croatian Brigade and would tell him that he intended to carry out a certain operation and at the same time he would ask him to have Battalion A and B put at his disposal for this operation because they were favorably located for the purpose and if the Brigade commander would agree, these two battalions would, for this operation, be tactically subordinated to the 392nd Division.
Then, when the operation was concluded, these two battalions would return to their garrisons. They would then no longer be under the command of any German unit and would again be at the disposal of the brigade commander and would receive their orders from him. That is how it happened.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, the tactical subordination again would only apply in individual cases for certain specific operations.
General speaking, the tactical subordination of Ustasha and Domobrane units would only apply to their own brigade commander. Is that correct?
A. Yes it is.
Q. One additional question in this connection: Who, seen on a large scale, would be the agency that would issue the orders to the Croatian brigades? I mean, who would order their operations which they made independently and who would order them to disperse their troops in a certain proportion in a certain area? Did these orders come from German agencies or from whom did they come?
A. These directives came from their own superiors and when they were expected to be included in German units, General von Glaise was an additional personality and he would be the liaison and he would establish if brigade was in a certain area. In this case the brigade would be situated in the area of the 392nd Brigade. Then a certain area would be assigned to this brigade and in this area it would be completely independent and would act in accordance with these orders which they received from their own superiors.
Q. What do you mean by "from their own superiors"?
A. I mean from their War Ministry.
Q. Did these Croatian units, on their own initiative, carry out tactical operations on their own initiative?
A. For the security of their own area they could carry out such operations on their own initiative. After all, they were an independent army.
Q. If such a Croatian Brigade, on order of its own war ministry, carried out an independent operation, and if the German armed forces would gain knowledge of this, let's say for practical purposes the German Division in whose area this brigade was located gained knowledge of this operation, would the results of this operation be reported to the Corps?
A. I believe I stated that on examination everything that occurred in the corps area was reported and, of course, the results of such operations would be reported by the division to the Corps and we, the Corps, would pass it on.
Q. In order to keep this brief, General, I'd like to ask you whether all that you said about the Croatian armed forces, applies to the Domobrans as well as to the various Ustasha, the Waffen-Ustasha and the Battalion-Ustasha.
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Now we will continue and deal with the other units which also play a part here, the so-called General-Ustasha. You have told us that there was no relation between the German armed forces and this General Ustasha and that such Ustasha units were, for practical purposes, not committed and that there there was never any state of subordination under any unit of the German armed forces.
Now my question is, did these general Ustasha units occasionally carry out any operations on their own initiative?
A. Yes, they did. These party Ustasha units did carry out their own operations on order of their party authority.
Q. The next question, General: Were such operations of the General Ustasha, if they became known to the German unit, also included in the German reports?
A. Everything that occurred in the area was reported, if we heard about it.
Q. Now, the next indigenous unit which has been discussed here repeatedly is the so-called Chetnik units. This problem also doesn't seem to have been completely clarified in my opinion. Under the concept Chetniks can one think of any uniform organization or are there certain discrepancies here also?
A. The Chetniks are Croatian citizens of Pravoslav faith and these Chetniks are, I might call them, home guard organizations within their own locality and these home guard organizations call themselves Croatian combat units and the Serbian expression Chetniks - I am sure these groups has connection with Mihajlovic in Serbia who was a Chetnik leader there -these Croatian combat units which saw in themselves the defense of their own farms, of their own villages, had gathered together in order to defend themselves against Tito.
Q. Were these people, as a general rule, gathered in fixed units? In order to give you a practical example, would they be quartered in a proper accommodation and could they be called a proper troop or what was it, General?
A. There can be no talk about a proper unit. These people lived in villages and if it became necessary they would join and for selfprotecting action. These so-called Chetniks could never be denominated troop or any part of a regular belligerent. They were purely organizations for the purpose of self-protection. At least, that applied for my area. What applied in any other area I am in no position to state.
Q. General, could I perhaps explain this in hand of a concrete example and I'd like to ask you to tell us whether I am correct or not. I would imagine that such a Chetnik peasant has his gun at home in his cupboard or hidden behind his cupboard. As a general rule, he would just follow his own occupation.
MR. FULKERSEN: If your Honors please, I'd like to object to this question. I think the witness should testify and not counsel for the Defense.
DR. TIPP: I am merely trying to state, your Honor, how I imagine this to be. I am not trying to put a leading question. I have never been in the Serbian area and, therefore, I cannot give any testimony about it. All I hoped was to clarify this on hand of an example, the correctness of which General Leyser was supposed to confirm or deny and all I was trying to do is make it a little more concrete.
MR. FULKERSON: If your Honor please, it is a leading statement just to say I imagine that this and that is true.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the objection of the Prosecution is sound. What we are interested in is the information that the witness can give us from his own information. I think you can ascertain that by not asking him leading questions. If he has any information he can give it. If he doesn't he is not able to.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, then I'd like to ask you to describe the facts to us as clearly and concretely as you possible can. I want to know all that you know about it.
A. The situation was approximately this: I am thinking about the area northwest of Knin. There were numerous small Serbian villages and farms. In a distance of about 20 to 30 kilometers from each other, or even further yet off the main read, so that it was not possible for every little farm and for every little village to be occupied by a German unit. For the protection of these villages and farms the Serbs, the Pravoslav Croats who lived there had organized self-protecting organization. The reason was that on repeated occasions the Tito band had attacked these villages and farms and had requisitioned and taken property away from the inhabitants. Now, these people had joined for a self-protecting organization. The procedure would be approximately this, that they had their guards who watched the district.
If such a Tito band appeared which intended to requisition and plunder this post, which had been established to watch the district, it would inform the self-protecting organization in all surrounding villages and then these home guard organizations would help each other and join together against the attacking Tito bands. If these home guard organizations succeeded in helping their own cause that was quite in order as far as we were concerned and if shootings occurred on these occasions that was unavoidable. After all, it was not the fault of the Chetniks who merely wanted peace and order in their own villages. It was merely the fault of the Tito bands who wanted to plunder and rob down there. This is one possibility. And then it was also possible that such an event would reach the knowledge of German units and this would be reported to superior agencies and that is how we gained our own knowledge about it and on these occasions also the Chetniks might advance and might make counter attacks.
If the Chetniks defended themselves against the Tito bands and if they did not themselves succeed to master the attacking bands they would report this to any German units stationed nearby and now this occurs, what the Prosecution apparently regards as a crime, that is, the working together but now it was even the task of the German Wehrmacht to establish law and order. In this instance we would know about these things and the command of the German troops would order an operation against the attacking band and during this operation of the German units, of course, and that is quite obvious to everybody who wants to defend their own home. These home guard organizations would be joined together with the German units.
It is just as much a matter, of course, that the German commander would include these communications -- I don't want to call them reports; that would be too military -- in his own reports and made use of them in order to be able to order his own attack against the attacking band. The Chetniks, of course, took part in this in order to gain possession again of their own village or farm or whatever might have been concerned; but I don't think this could be designated as a tactical subordination.
That would merely have been in the interest of the Chetniks themselves; so that they would be in a position to help themselves. That is how the cooperation between the German armed forces and these Chetniks actually took place.
Q If I understood the Prosecutor correctly, General, for this collaboration between the German Armed Forces and the Cetnik units he reproached you. This reproach would be concerned with the fact that on the one hand the German Armed Forces thought so little of this band warfare and yet on the other hand at least suffered the fight of these Cetnik bands. Can you briefly tell us what, in your opinion, is the difference, the basic difference, between the fight of the Cetniks and and the fight of the Tito partisans.
A The fight of the Cetniks was nothing else but an emergency defense against the Tito bands. They merely protected themselves and defended their home against plunderous attackers. The Tito bands fought against the German Armed Forces in order to harm us by sabotage acts, etc. Let me put in this way. The Cetnik unit had the same feeling and the same desires as we had. They wanted peace and law and order in the country which was just what the German Forces wanted. The Tito bands, however, did not want law and order but they desired unrest.
Q Now, one more point which we tried to clarify on direct examination but which I am afraid was not made quite clear, General. You said that the German Armed Forces was by no means interested in making use of the Ethnic fighting which was going on there and using it for extermination of the population. You gave us an example for this and you said that you forbid that Ustasha units be stationed in Serbian villages, at least, that is what I understood you to say. It is possible that it wasn't expressed quite clearly. It seemed to me as if the Prosecutor assumed that you also forbade that Cetnik units were stationed in Croatian villages. Perhaps you would like to make this point quite clear and perhaps you would like to tell us what you meant when you made these statements and what your order was to avoid.
A First of all I would like to say that Cetnik units stationed in villages was completely out of the question. I just tried to explain that these Cetniks were in a local organization within their own villages for the purpose of protection. Since I had no jurisdiction over these people I would never be in a position to order Cetniks to be stationed in another village. Now, we have to come to distinction between Ustasha and Cetnik units.
The hatred between the Croats and the Serbs which did not only exist at that time but which had been in existence for centuries, since these two parties fought against each other, the German Armed forces was mainly concerned with the fact that they would no longer continue to fight against each other and in order to prevent this fight I ordered at the time that when the general Ustasha units were formed, which were a party organization, that these particular Ustasha units should not be stationed in villages which contained Serbian inhabitants to a majority just in order to avoid such a conflict because the German Aimed Forces was mainly interested in peace, not in fighting. That was the reason why through negotiations, I would like to stress this because I had no authority over these party organizations, other than negotiations, I achieved that the Ustasha units were not stationed in the Cetnik villages to maintain law and order. That was my endeavor and that was the reason why I gave this order. It was certainly not to incite these people against each other.
Q I believe, General, that we have clarified this complicated problem as much as possible. One further question which deals with the independence of the Croatian State is the following. You realize that the Prosecution maintains the point of view that the Croatian State was not independent state in the sense of International State Law. I realize that this question is open to legal argument but I would like to ask you one question in connection with it. Was there in Croatia a clearly defined state area?
A Yes, there was.
Q Was there in Croatia a clearly defined government with the corresponding functionaries?
A Yes, there was.
Q And did Croatia also have a nation?
A Yes, it did.
Q I believe those are the prerequisites which make up a state and one further question. The Prosecutor asked you for that length of time the Croatian stats had existed and whether it continued to exist when the German Armed Forces were through.
I would like to ask you to ignore for a moment the wartime conditions and I would like you to tell me on the basis of your knowledge on that particular area whether the Croatian State as such was in a position to continue to exist after all you know?
A If the Croatian State, as it existed at that time, had not been made any difficulties from outside then in my opinion to the best of my knowledge and judgement the Croatian State was certainly in a position to continue its existence.
Q You said, General, difficulties from outside. Do you, by this, mean that the Croatian State collapsed not because of internal reasons but other forces were committed which influenced this state?
A Yes, that is what I mean.
Q Would you further please tell us what was the power that caused the Croatian State to collapse?
A I believe one can say that it was Russia.
Q Now a few small questions which arose during the course of the cross-examination. Above all the hostage question is of a certain importance. On direct examination you said and established on hand of the documents that in the area of the XV Corps there was only one case when hostages were executed.
A Yes.
Q I assume, General, you recall this particular incident?
A Yes, I do.
Q The Prosecution put to you on cross examination the following. On hand of the documents you had explained that the first Cossack Division which is the one that plays a part here, had arrested hostages for sometime in a certain area, the name of which I do not recall. You also said, in your opinion, these hostages were at some later date executed and those were the hostages which can be found in a later report of the Cossack Division. The Prosecutor here put to you that this was not justified because these hostages were doubtlessly quite innocent of anything that took place after their arrest.
Perhaps you could clarify this whole question on principle here. By this I mean I would like you to tell us how such an arrest and execution of hostages was to take place in theory and how it took place in actual fact to the best of your recollection.
A There would be for instance along the railroad line which was supposed to be secured by the Cossacks almost daily and continuously exploding actions. This railroad line, however, is of vital importance for the military situation because it was the only larger railway line which existed in that area. As a consequence the German Armed Forces could not always stand and watch how this railroad line was destroyed. As much as possible the sabotage acts were carried out at night time. That was mainly the case. Therefore, it was very difficult to apprehend the real perpetrators. It was almost impossible and just because it was impossible all that remained to do for the German leadership was to warn the population which had been ordered in the order from higher agencies. This was done in the following manner: In the villages posters would be exhibited and it would be publicly announced that if these sabotage acts were not ceased then one would have to take steps and arrest hostages and these hostages, if the sabotage acts still did not cease, might possibly be taken to account for these acts so that the population would be quite well informed of what happened and what was to happen.
Q And now, from where and from which walks of life were these hostages taken?
A The hostages were to be levied mainly from those groups of people who were under suspicion of having participated in these sabotage acts. I believe the document shows that these people who had been arrested as hostages had became suspicious in connection with this sabotage act on the railroad line. Despite warnings these sabotage acts kept occurring and now after one particular attack on a railroad line had been carried out the measure was fought over actually and now if the German Armed Forces did not want to become ridiculous it really had to assert itself and therefore the copulation and those parties which took part in the sabotage acts and which could not be brought to reason had to be finally deterred from carrying out these acts.
Here again, as has been ordered, a member of the Divisional Commander together with the representatives of Croatian governments had to establish these measures and this representative of the Croatian government of his own country was, in the final analysis, according to the order which we had, the man who was to decide whether and how this measure was to be carried out. This is how it actually happened and was carried out in actual practice.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
BY DR. TIPP:
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued)
Q. General, before the recess we discussed reprisal measures connected with the Cossack Division and you have explained that in your opinion the hostages executed on that occasion had been seized from among the hostages who had been arrested by the Cossack Division a few weeks previously. Now, I wanted to ask you a question. Following up what the Prosecution put to you, namely that the hostages executed on that occasion could not possibly have had any connection with the deed which was to be retaliated for because they had been arrested long before the actual act had been committed. I would like you to tell us in this connection how things were handled and how the theoretical relationship was between hostages and perpetrators. I mean by that, is the point of reprisal measure to hit the perpetrator or what other purpose does a reprisal measure have?
A. Well, what one should endeavor to achieve is to get hold of the actual perpetrator but as that was not possible, warnings were issued as I have indicated and hostages were seized who were to pay for the act: that is the actual difference between hostages and perpetrators. One realizes that people who were not actually connected with the act under consideration were still made responsible and this is what happened in this particular case as I see it.
Q. A further question in this connection, General. I would like to clear up matters arising from Exhibit 614 which is the last document submitted by the Prosecution during your cross-examination. It is NOKW 963. It is your order of 10 August 1944 concerning security measures for roads and from that document the Prosecution have used Paragraph D. This concerns the arrest of hostages and this is what the order says.
In the case of repeated attacks in a certain sector of the road Communist hostages have to be apprehended from the villages of the immediate vicinity who have to be sentenced in the event of repeated surprise attacks. Sentencing of hostages according to orders by the XXIst Army Corps, Number so and so concerning reprisal measures and then there is a bracket, Commander in Chief, Ia, No. 296/43 Secret. Here, therefore, it is ordered that in the event of repeated attacks hostages are to be taken from the villages in the immediate vicinity and they are being called Communist hostages and should there be more attacks reprisal measures will be carried out on them. Now, I would like to ask you, General, is this arrangement ordered by you as an original order or did you base yours in this connection on another order which existed and if so can you explain that former order, if there was one, with regard to the present one?
A. Yes, I think this becomes quite clear from the order. This order is based on the order by the Commander in Chief, Southeast In, F, No. 296/43. In other words it is not an order by me but it is the important and basic order which I have mentioned here before which is applicable for retaliation measures. I think it is the order of 22 December 1943. Perhaps you could show me the original.
Q. In that case, General, I would like to hand to you Document-Book XVI of the Prosecution. There on page 98 of the German text there is document NOKW 172 which is Prosecution Exhibit 379. It is an order by the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 22 December 1943. It is Exhibit 379, Document Book XVI, on page 98 of the German text. It is on page 47 of the English book. Would you, General, please compare those two orders and then give us your comments, whether this is the order mentioned and why you can conclude that with certainty.
A. Yes, this is the order to which I had reference just now from which can be seen the following. This order by the Commander in Chief and the parenthesis which has just been mentioned contain the same file number, that is to say, Commander in Chief Southeast INIF, No. 296/43. This is the same file reference which is also contained in the order by the Commander in Chief of 22 December 1943, Department Ia, F, No. 296/43. In other words this is not an order which was issued by me originally, but it has reference to an order by the Commander in Chief Southeast which already existed.
Q. Perhaps, General, I might ask you to be a little more precise, particularly with reference to this one point. It says in the order by the XXIst Corps which I have submitted to you just now, that Communist hostages were to be arrested from the neighborhood. Do you, in the order of the Commander in Chief Southeast find a similar paragraph?
A. Yes, under D, Paragraph 2, it says there, if such people as are guilty cannot be found those persons must be resorted to who without being connected with the actual deed nevertheless are to be regarded as co-responsible; first of all those who recognize Communism and this is on what this paragraph in the order is based on.
Q. And what in order to make this quite clear, is the purpose General, of the order of the XXIst Corps of August 1944.
A. The purpose was to have the subordinate divisions and units reminded once more as to how they would proceed with reprisal measures in accordance with existing orders.
Q. I think we need not discuss the problem of reprisal measures any further, Inasmuch as it was important to the cross examination and I would like to clear up something else with you, General.
On cross examination two reports were put to you, which dealt with he organization of large scale bands, How they were broken down into corps and divisions, etc. They were put to you, I assume, in order to prove that these large scale bands amounted to regular troops. I would like to ask you this, General, without wanting to have arguments about International Law with you, is it in your opinion of decisive importance whether a unit is organized or not for it to become a force which is fighting legally, which is the first important point.
A. As I see it the most important thing is that a Government exists first of all, then the so-called organization must comply with the four well-known conditions of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations, and in the case of Croatia, the situation was that the Yugoslav Army had capitulated, the capitulation had become a fact. The country was occupied by Germany. A new Government had been formed, which was forming its own armed forces, and consequently in my opinion, inasmuch as I can say anything about International Law there couldn't be a second or third army besides. To me as a soldier the Croatian Government was the agency which represented an Allied State, and as far as I was concerned there was only the Croatian armed forces as armed forces with full legal status.
Q. It seems to me, General, that sufficient mention has been made of the fact whether or not the Tito partisans complied with the four well-known stipulations of the Hague Land Warfare regulations. We have cleared that up adequately, it seems to me, on direct examination. I simply wanted you to express your basic attitude as to whether or not units became legalized simply by complying with the fourt stipulations of the Hague convention. If I have understood you correctly you said just now that no legal group in that sense could be formed against the Croatian Government, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Perhaps just a few brief points now, General, concerning operation Panther, and again a few obscure points have crept in which I would like to clear up with you. The Prosecution has asserted, that according to your testimony there were in the area where the operation was to be carried out no villages, and it therefore could not understand that in the order concerned it was ordered to apprehend people who were strangers to various localities, and vagrants in that area.