This last entry goes to show that next to these Tito bands there existed so-called criminal bands.
Q General, were the German troops strong enough to annihilate the bands wherever they appeared?
A Yes, the German troops in the corps area were distributed in such a way that they were mainly stationed along the railroad line and apart from that covered the whole area, particularly the important points. They were at all times in a position to concentrate and thus appear everywhere in such strength as was necessary where band concentrations occurred. In this way they were in a position to combat these band concentrations successfully. Furthermore, in the Panzer-Grenadier training regiment 901, -- which I forgot to mention when I enumerated the troops under my command before, the corps had a fast mobile flying unit with an extreme firing power which could appear everywhere where it was necessary.
Q Did the troops of the 69th Corps in Croatia always succeed in dispursing the bands if these had concentrated in one particular area?
A Yes, all larger and smaller operations of the corps led to the desired result. This can be seen from the war diaries. The partisans were disbursed, and as a consequence of the constant operations of the corps they never found any rest.
Q What part of the troops committed in Croatia would have sufficed if the bands had not committed acts in contradiction to international law have been described here?
A In my opinion, a very small part would have been sufficient in the corps area, possibly a division or even less.
Q How do you explain the many sabotage acts along the main line?
A It is a fact that military experience shows that an objective such as this railroad line almost five hundred kilometers long cannot be guarded and protected at all times and completely even if we had had twice or three times as many troops as we had. This is impossible, particularly where the enemy, under violations of international law, appears as a harmless peasant near the railroad line in his cornfields in order to at the proper time carry out sabotage acts along this railroad line.
DR. GAWLIK: To prove that the corps did everything that could be done in order to guard the military and military-economic objectives, I have produced the previously mentioned exhibit Dehner No. 10 which is my document Dehner No. 16. In this particular connection, I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to Document Book III, page 30, where under the date of the 29th of August, 1943, we have an entry which reads as follows -- I quote:
"By order of the 2nd Armoured Corps Headquarters dated 27 August the corps reports local restricted security measures for such military or economic objectives which must be constantly guarded."
Also on page 32 under the date of 15 September we have the statement:
"Corps Headquarters orders renewed checking of security measures for protection of the railway lines and installations taken in the area of the 173rd Reserve Division."
On page 33 under the 20th of September 1943 we find an entry stating:
"173rd Reserve Division reports with No. 770/43 Secret that the checking of railway security measures in accordance with the order of corps headquarters of 15 September has been carried out."
On page 34 under the date of the 21 of September we have statement saying:
"The army orders to protect the transport of harvest stores from the area Broko that the protection on the line Broko-Vinkovci is to be increased immediately. 187th Reserve Division and German railway security staff Croatia receive corresponding orders."
On the basis of the order of the army received on 20 September the corps headquarters issued the standard order for the protection of the main line and, finally, we have an order on the 13th of October:
"Corps Headquarters reinforces the railway guard for the section Kukujevci-Deletovci with cavalry patrols of the First Cossack Division because of renewed and increased acts of sabotage."
This last entry I have produced to prove the fact that sabotage acts were not simply answered by reprisal measures but that they were countered with increased military protection.
This brings me to another chapter of my general examination.
Q To whom were the police units subordinated, General, the police units committed in Croatia?
A These were subordinated to the plenipotentiary of the Reichsfuehrer SS with the Croatian government. This was Gruppenfuehrer Kammerhofer. He held the rank of a Major General.
Q To whom was Kammerhofer subordinated?
A He was subordinated to the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Himmler.
Q Were you in a position to give orders to police units?
A No, I couldn't do that except on an occasion where we might have succeeded in having at our disposal one or the other small unit of the police for a certain operation and in combining this police unit with the troops of the corps. To achieve this was in most cases extremely difficult and diplomacy had to be employed. The police was extremely ambitious and wanted to do everything alone. If police units were at one time or another subordinated to some other units, then police units could be given tactical orders only, but they would never be subordinated in a disciplinary or judicial respect.
Q Were the police district leaders subordinated to you, General?
A No, the police district leaders were subordinated to their own superior which was the Higher SS and Police Leader Kammerhofer. They were completely independent of the corps.
Q Did you have to depend on cooperation with the police district leaders?
A No, that was only planned once during my period of service in the Balkans for the operation "Cannae" which was never actually carried cut. It was at a period of time shortly before the march into Hungary.
Q. Did you have an opportunity to prevent any measures taken by the police?
A. No.
Q. Were police operations reported to the Corps by units subordinated to the Corps, where these police operations fell into the area of the Corps?
A. They were not always reported. Frequently they were reported much too late to our extreme regret. We made every effort to be informed of police operations in the Corps area in good time -- at least through informational copies -- so that we could employ our own operations in conjunction with police operations and not work against each other at cross purposes. Our efforts were not always successful which was unfortunate. Where small-scale police operations were concerned we rarely were informed of them.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10, which is contained in Dehner Document Book III, on Page 41. There we have an entry dated the 10th of November 1943, and this entry shows the relation which existed between the Corps and the police. This entry reads, and I quote:
"On 9 November SS-Oberfuehrer and Colonel of the Police v. Sammern was requested to relieve Koprivnic with a Police Battalion from Virovitica. Colonel V. Sammern pointed to the fact that operations outside his security zone were subject to the agreement of his superior office, the Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer and Major General of Police Kammerhofer.
Endeavors made by the LXIX Reserve Corps and by the 187th Reserve Division in order to obtain this agreement from Major General Kammerhofer take more than 12 hours. The consent arrives on 10 November at 09.05 hours, i.e., at a time when the Police Battalion is already on the march from Virovitica back to Esseg."
In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the further entry of the 11th of November 1943 where it is stated: "As it is known by now, on 9th November a police operation was started against a guerrilla camp on the Letenka Mountain (13 Km north of Mitrovica) which is fortified by numerous pillboxes."
This last entry shows that the police acted completely independently, and the preceding entry shows that the Corps was in no position to give any orders to the police, but, instead, that such orders could only be given by Kammerhofer within the area of the LXIX Reserve Corps. That is why I read that particular entry.
General, did you gain knowledge of any measures carried out by the police, particularly reprisal measures?
A. No.
Q. In a large number of reports which have been submitted by the Prosecution we find reports concerning operations of the police. Why did the units of the Corps report about police operations?
A. This was done because these operations took place within the Corps area and because the Corps had to be kept posted about everything that went on in the Corps area. This had to be done so that their own operations could be started in conjunction with other events. Furthermore, this was also based on an order from a higher level, according to which everything that went on in the Corps area -- even operations carried out by troops not subordinate to the Corps -- had to be reported to higher agencies.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to mention that the order to which General Dehner refers now will be submitted by me in Dehner Document Book V.
Were the orders issued to your troops concerning measures about bands also applicable where police units were concerned?
A. No, the police units received orders through their own channels from Himmler.
Q. Did these orders apply to the Croatian Armed Forces?
A. No, the Croatian Armed Forces received their orders through channels from the Ministry of War, -- The Croatian Ministry of War.
Q. You, as Commanding General, were you in agreement with all the measures carried out by police units in your Corps area?
A. No, by no means. I was not in agreement with all measures of which I was informed, but I had no possibility to intervene officially because police units were not subordinate to me.
Q. That brings me to the end of the general part of my examination, and brings me to the chapter concerning hostages. First of all, I'd like to ask some general questions about this problem.
General, did you, at any time, give an order for the execution of hostages?
A. No, I never gave an order for the execution of hostages.
Q. If troops subordinated to you did, at any time, carry out executions of hostages who then would have issued the order for such an action?
A. According to orders, that would have been the responsible division commander who was, at the same time, the judicial for the area.
Q. Why would it have been the divisional commanders who were responsible for such measures?
A. They were responsible in accordance with orders from a higher level. They were judicials, as I mentioned before, and they were also within easy reach; thus, they were in a position to decide personally.
Q. Did the Corps Headquarters, at any time, order the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A. No, the Corps Headquarters has never ordered the carrying out of reprisal measures.
Q. Did the Corps Headquarters ever authorize subordinate units to take reprisal measures?
A. No.
Q. Did the Croatian authorities have to take any part in the ordering and carrying out of reprisal measures?
A. Yes, that is so, and it can be seen from a number of orders and documents. It becomes apparent from the basic Army order of 15th of September 1943, and it also can be seen from a Corps order, which I believe was dated the 23rd of September. It can also be gathered from a communication from the Corps addressed to the Army, and, if I am not mistaken, also from a War Diary entry.
Q. If the Tribunal please, the Army order of the 15th of September, 1943, just mentioned is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 15 of the English text and Page 3 of the German Document Book. This is Prosecution Exhibit No. 340, Document No. NOKW-509. The Corps order of the 23rd of September 1943 is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 19 of the English text and Page 10 of the German text. This is Prosecution Exhibit No. 340, Document NO. NOKW-509. The just now mentioned communication of the Corps addressed to the Army, dated the 23rd of September, is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 45 of the English and Page 25-A of the German text. This is Prosecution Document No. NOKW-509, Exhibit No. 340. The entry in the War Diary which General Dehner mentioned is contained in Dehner Document Book III, on Page 38 of the German and of the English texts. This is Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10. The entry is dated the 16th of October, 1943, and it reads as follows:
"In order to avoid mistakes in taking of hostages which could result in far reaching consequences for the relations between the German Wehrmacht and the Croatian population, Corps Headquarters orders that taking of hostages and arrest of Croatian citizens should, as a principle, only be carried out in close agreement with the Croatian authorities."
Q. Were representatives of the Croatian Government attached to German military units?
A. With the divisional staffs, and, partly also when tactical operations were carried out, also with the Corps staff.
In order to confirm these statements made by General Dehner I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10, Dehner Document Book III, Page 43. There we have an entry of the 19th of November 1943, where it states, and I quote: "Ustascha Colonel Servatzky, Vukovar, reports to the Ia as delegate of the Peglavnik with the LXIXth Reserve Corps."
What were the tasks of this representative?
A. It was the task of these representatives to guard and represent the interests of the Croatian State.
Q. Did these representatives raise any complaints because of excesses of German troops?
A. It is not known to me that they raised any complaints because of excesses on the part of German troops, but there were complaints about the behavior of the Cossacks.
Q. Were these complaints followed up by the Corps?
A. Yes, they were followed up to the last whenever they came to the attention of the Corps. The guilty persons were taken to account in a severe manner.
Q. Were you in a position to take away from the divisional commanders the right which they had received through superior orders-namely, to arrest hostages in reprisal cases?
A. No, the divisional commanders would have then had the right to make complaints. On the basis of such a complaint any measures taken by me would have been rescinded. Furthermore, the divisional commander exercised the authority of a judicial. I, in my capacity as Commanding General, was not the judicial authority in the area and could, therefore, not restrict him in this respect. The Corps could not reserve for itself this right because, as I mentioned previously, for ter ritorial reasons this was not possible.
Q. When you arrived in Croatia what did you know about orders which had been given to the divisions under your command, concerning the arrest and treatment of hostages?
A. My units were, before my arrival in Croatia, subordinate to the Commander of the German Troops in Croatia, General Lueters. The units acted in accordance with orders, decrees, and instructions which existed at that time. These orders, decrees and instructions had been issued before my period of service down there. Whether the Chief of Staff had informed me in detail about these orders originating from an earlier period, and whether these orders were at all with my staff at that time I can no longer tell you today with any amount of certainty. (The staff arrived in Brod from Vienna; the troops were already there; the staff was a new installation). I still remember that at the beginning we had tremendous difficulties in billeting and accommodating our members. We were just then in the first phases of getting into our stride, and I believe that I can well remember that there were a number of instructions, decrees and orders applying to earlier periods which were not there at all, and we had to go to a lot of trouble to get them.
Q. Did you have any occasion to instigate any amendments of the orders which the two divisions had?
A. No, I believe, as I stated just now, that I didn't even know all those orders in detail. I started from the assumption that these orders were admissible under International Law without doubt.
Q. Could you revoke an Amy order?
A. Only the leader of the Army himself could revoke an Army order, or the agency superior to the Army.
Q. What was your opinion of reprisal measures after you had got to know the situation and conditions on the Balkans?
A. The Balkans have been, for decades, a source of unrest. At the present time also there is no peace on the Balkans, although one cannot say at the moment that there are Germany troops down there.
The conditions on the Balkans were so involved and so unique that in my opinion it is impossible down there to maintain public safety and law and order without reprisal measures.
Q. What orders did you receive from your superior agencies concerning the treatment and arrest of hostages when you were Commanding General of the LXIXth Reserve Corps in Croatia?
A. There was one order of the Second Panzer Army, dated the 15th of September 1943. This was an order which I didn't receive. It reached the Corps during a period of time when I was on leave, and my responsible deputy during my leave passed it on to the divisions. On the basis of documents which have been submitted I assume that the order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated the 22nd of December 1943 reached the Corps.
Q. In the case of the order of the 15th of September 1943, the one which you mentioned first--this is Prosecution Document NOKW-509, Prosecution Exhibit No. 340. It is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV. The other order you mentioned, the one of the 22nd of December 1943, is Prosecution Exhibit No. 379, which is Prosecution Document NOKW-173, contained in Prosecution Document Book XVI, on Page 47 of the English text and Page 98 of the German text. I beg your pardon, Your Honors. I don't know whether I mentioned the English page in connection with the first document, the one dated the 15th of September. This is in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 15 of the English text, which is Page 11 of the German text. I shall show you Prosecution Exhibit No. 340 witness which is Prosecution Document NOKW-509. This is the order of the Second Army, dated the 15th of September 1943.
Who was in charge of the Corps, General, when that order reached the Corps?
A That was my responsible deputy, Major General Braune.
Q What happened to that order?
AAs the documents bear out, it was passed on to the subordinate divisions of the Corps.
Q When did you get to know anything about this order?
A I cannot give you the exact date at this moment, but I am inclined to assume that, as customary, after my return from leave, the chief informed me of events which took place during my absence.
Q Did you have a possibility after your return from leave to revoke the passing on of this order?
A That was completely out of the question. The order had already been with the troops for some time. It was valid and the Corps Commander responsible at the time, Major General Braune, had carried out the passing on of the order in question which had been issued by my superior. It is quite impossible to revoke such an order as anybody knows who is familiar with military matters.
Q Did you, after you knew about that order, consider this order to be in violation of international law?
A No, that idea never entered my mind that orders which came to us from the highest level could be in contradiction to and in violation of international law.
Q Was the reprisal ration mentioned in the army order carried out at any time?
A No, to the best of my knowledge a much smaller ratio was applied.
Q What was the proportion of own losses caused by surprise attacks and sabotage acts and the number of hostages executed?
A There are a number of daily reports between the period of September and December 1943 and these daily reports are contained in Document 658. These daily reports, however, are not complete. Of 120 daily reports, only 30 approximately have been submitted. These 30 reports, however, are sufficient to prove that only every sixth or seventh surprise attack or sabotage act was retaliated. I believe I am right in assuming that in those daily reports which were not submitted, further surprise attacks and sabotage acts are reported but most likely no reprisal measures.
Otherwise, these would have been submitted. If we add to this the War Diaries which we received later on from Washington, we will arrive at the following conclusion if we take into consideration the entries in the War Diary: Only after every eighth or ninth surprise attack or sabotage act, reprisal measures were taken after, prior, to that, repeated warnings, threats of punishment had remained without success. One can, therefore, obviously assume that the number of our losses through sabotage acts and surprise attacks was larger than the number of hostage executions.
In stating this, I have not even taken into consideration the military damage which in some cases was quite considerable. I mean a damage caused by sabotage acts. Take for instance, an interruption of a railway line lasting only for one hour. A disruption of this is vital lifeline meant for the army and the civilian population that the whole schedule was out of order and such an interruption can cause a military train or a supply train, whichever one might be concerned, not to arrive in time which again can result in unexpected disruptions and losses.
The numerous locomotives which were found derailed along the railroad line between Zagreb and Belgrade - and I saw those with my own eyes on frequent occasions -- covered sometimes a stretch of kilometers -- that is, derailed locomotives and train wagons. These precious locomotives could not be replaced throughout the whole of the war, as I was told by a high-ranking railway official in Zagreb.
Q Were losses suffered during combat actions with bands retaliated?
A No, those were not retaliated.
Q General, you talked about surprise attacks. Did you yourself observe cruelties committed by the bands?
A I myself saw along the railroad line between Zagreb and Brod that the train had to stop because of a battle which had taken place a few hours ago on that particular spot.
On the telegraph poles there were a number of hanged German soldiers in uniform covered with blood; their noses and their ears were cut off, their chests were bared and swastikas were cut into the flesh. On the ground one could see traces of the battle which had taken place.
Q Could you describe some other cases or incidents, General, of which you gained knowledge in some other way?
A I remember sworn reports of German soldiers who succeeded in an unguarded moment in escaping from the partisans. During a surprise attack on a train, German soldiers were shackled with wire. Before that, their uniforms, and above all their shoes, had been taken away from them. That was during the late autumn months and after that they had for days and nights to march over the mountains with bare feet. Some collapsed, their feet bleeding, and were driven on. One or several succeeded in escaping. They swore to their statements and we reported these facts officially to higher headquarters with the request to inform the Geneva Red Cross of such occurrences.
Another incident is the following. Several German soldiers had been captured by partisans and were dragged to a camp in the woods. There they were questioned about their troop units and about the intentions of their troops. One soldier steadfastly refused to make any statements and he was hanged from he hands and feet between two trees about one meter above the ground. Pistol women started a fire under him, which they pushed to and for under him. The poor man eventually screamed with pain. One man who had to excuse himself, made use of this occasion and escaped. This incident was also reported to the army through official channels with the request to inform the Geneva Red Cross. Several German soldiers encountered some partisans in a village. Some of them succeeded in hiding in a haystack where they watched the following:
A German soldier was captured by the partisans. One of the partisans went to a locksmith shop and fetched a burning blow-torch and while the other partisans hold on tightly to the soldier, this monster went up and down the poor soldier's spine with the blowtorch until he collapsed, screaming with pain.
I happen to remember this case also, because it is so atrocious, and it was reported to higher headquarters through channels.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until 1515 hours.
(A recess was taken.)
(Following Recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. In connection with the last answer which General Dehner gave, I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner document book No. 3, page 28 in the English and page 28 in the German, Dehner document No. 16, exhibit Dehner No. 10 and especially to the entry under the 23rd of August, 1943 and there it states:
"It looks as if criminal elements are beginning now without having any direct connection with the bands, to plunder and rob on their own responsibility. Among other things numerous cases of plunder and levying of warcontribution in the country, carried out by individual armed bandits were consequently reported by the Rural Police Headquarters from the Vukovar area."
General, who carried out reprisal measures in the area of the 69th Reserve Corp?
A. The army order, dated 15 September ordered that the carrying out of reprisal measures should be done through the Croatian authorities. In the order for reprisal measures, it was stated that this right was open to the divisional commander, but in practice and on principle the Croatian government or the Croatian officers had the executive power, and the right to order reprisal measures and their execution.
Q. Were reprisal measures ordered by the Croatian officers and the police and carried out in the Corps area reported to the Corps?
A. As a rule they were reported to the Corps through the divisions.
Q. Did the reprisal measures taken have the desired results?
A. At that place where the reprisals were carried out it was peaceful for a time. The reprisal measures caused the bands, who had carried out sabotage in that area, to stop for a time as can be seen from the War diary received from Washington. If no reprisal measures were taken, the rail artory would have stopped very quickly and in the whole of Athens, including the Island, this would have meant a catastrophy for the troops as well as for the civilian population.
Q. In connection with this, I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner document book No. 3, page 35, this is Dehner document No. 16, Dehner exhibit 10, the entry for 28 September 1943 in which it states:
"In the last 24 hours band activity was comparatively slight, since apparently the operations Kammerhofer and the operation of the 187 Res. Div. in the Dilj mountains are having the appropriate effect".
And also to the next entry for the 29th of September, 1943:
"Activity of bands in the area of the Corps continues to be slight."
The same for the entry of 1 October 1943:
"Only slight activity of the bands."
Q. The prosecution has asserted that you tried to insure the carrying out of the order for reprisals. This is on page 73 of the transcript. Did you ask for the carrying out of the reprisal measures or not?
A. No, I never demanded the carrying out of a reprisal measure and I never urged anybody not-carrying out a reprisal measure to be reprimanded.
Q. From document book 16, page 37 of the English and page 90 of the German, I would like to refer to exhibit No. 376.
This document contains two orders dated 19 of December and 20 of December, 1943, both orders are signed for the Corps Headquarters, the chief of the General Staff signed Steinbeck. What does this signature mean "for the Corps headquarters"?
A. It means that the chief of staff has issued a Corps order in the absence of the Commanding General. On 19 December I was already on leave and this lasted until 8 January 1944.
Q. Who was Steinbeck?
A. Steinbeck was the chief of staff for the 69th Reserve Corps.
Q. Did you tell Steinbeck to issue the order of the 24th of December, 1943?
A. No, I did not instigate the issuance of this order, because this order states the Commander has cause, because of an inquiry, and from this I assume that this cause arose while I was on leave.
Q. When did you hear about the order dated the 24th of December, 1943?
A. I assume after my Christmas leave which terminated on the 8th of January, 1944.
Q. And was there any reason for you to issue the order dated the 24th of December, 1943?
A. No, no. There was no reason at all to do this.
Q. Can you give us a rather more detailed reason for this?
A. The order shows the efforts to set down standard regulations for the selection of hostages and according to these regulations only the guilty people should be taken as hostages; people who were definitely innocent, however, as it states in the last paragraph, were to be released again as quickly as possible.
The decision is borne alone by the Divisional Commander, who, as I repeat again, was at the time Supreme Judicial Authority. The order, as can be seen from the figure (d), takes away from the SD all of the hostages which they have taken, and I could only declare myself to be in agreement with the one factor. The inquiry with the Army to the office which supplied labor in Germany, that is on the first page, under figure 2 (c), this inquiry could only be of a negative result because this office did not function; as far as I know, the prisoners were never sent for work in Germany. They could only have been volunteers.
The labor allocation was a purely territorial matter, which the Croatian government exercised. The order only, as I see, looking through it, mitigates the order from higher quarters, about the taking of hostages, which was already in existence. The clause about labor allocations had a negative result. There was no labor office.
Q. The Corps order dated the 24th of December, 1943, was this order an alteration in the former attitude, - in the attitude of the Corps --or did it only make this attitude clearer?
A. No, the order was no alteration in the attitude of the Corps which was still followed. Only a special case had been selected in order to show and to state again the general attitude of the Corps to the divisions and to make it clear.
Q. The Prosecution has submitted that it would be assumed that this order dated the 24th of December, 1943, went to the 173rd, the 187th and to the First Cossak Division. This can be seen from the English transcript, page 1478, and the German transcript, 1476. Can you comment on this?
A. The order cannot have gone to the First Cossak Division because the Cossak Divisions had already left the Corps area.
Q. When did the 1st Cossak Division leave?
A. On the 27th of November, 1943.
Q. Under figure 2 (c), the answer is mentioned in reply to the inquiry to the Army, with regard to the labor. Do you remember this answer?
A. No, I don't remember this answer. It is possible that the answer also came in during my leave, - probably even.
Q. And what offices were meant by SD in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b)?
A. In any case the Security Police is meant.
Q. And what were the tasks of the SD?
A. So far as I know, the SD had police and political tasks. It was especially trained in interrogating prisoners. The Security Police was never subordinate to me.
Q. Were bands suspects handed over to the SD?
A I cannot remember, but according to a document which I have found here, it can be assumed that it happened only in cases of emergency, to check the prisoners, as stated in the order, by the Chief of Staff dated the 24th.