"No doubt that SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach has gone beyond the limits of the orders for reprisal measures. However, he did not do so because of negligence or ignorance of the orders, or in a form which might be considered insubordination. Rather he believed that, in accordance with his duty and responsibility, he had fulfilled by the measures he ordered the sense of the reprisal order, even if he had transgressed the text.
"The communist bands in general are proceeding now not only to form rifle women formations but are also using women and children for espionage purposes, as communication agencies, because they have confidence in German humanitarianism which sometimes turns to softness. They train them for acts of sabotage and for throwing bombs (see i.e. Regimental reports on the enemy situation dated 10.6.44 and .7.7.44). The Company commander thought he would have to make an example in such a clear case of civilians belonging to a band, as happened in Distomon.
"Whereby the occupying power would prove with all clearness that it also know how to counteract the meanest and most vicious "warfare". If one side continously disregards the laws of warfare and international law, it necessarily forces the other side to employ measures going beyond the usual framework of soldierly, combat between two chivalrous adversaries.
"Though I appreciate SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach's idea from a soldierly end human point of view, I request to be permitted to punish him by disciplinary action, since "I cannot approve of his acting independently because on his own he overstepped the bounds which were laid down by order of superior authority."
Then with reference to the third point which is contained in the initial paragraph of the communication from the Regimental Commander of the 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.
"What factual errors and inexactitudes are contained in the combat report of the committed company, and how can such deviations from the actual occurrence be explained.
"From the combat report submitted by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach the regiment immediately appreciated that SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach had exceeded his orders. On the other hand it was clear that he had done so, gladly taking upon himself the responsibility. The regiment believed it had to cover SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach. His procedure seemed to be merely a transgression against formality and corresponded to a natural soldierly feeling, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach who is one of the best company commanders of the regiment was to be guarded against incriminating himself with insubordination in his combat report. That is why the regiment suggested changing the form of some individual paragraphs of the combat report. Statements pertaining to losses of the enemy and our own remain unchanged. However SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach unhappily changed the location of the fire attack in order to explain, to justify and to give the reasons for his reprisal measures, which were inwardly justified but which did not correspond to the text of the orders.
"In this manner, the combat report does not correspond in all points to the actual course of events. In regard to this also, I request permission to call SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach to account. The suggestion of the regiment not to incriminate himself was misunderstood and misinterpreted by him after he realized he was not authorized to give the reprisal order.
"In consideration of the sacrifices which the regiment had to accept in a relatively large measure in its present area, I request that the matter rest with the disciplinary punishment of the case and not to direct further measures.
In an understandable emotion, caused by the sad fate of their comrades, and 2nd Company, a unit particularly young and eager for combat, has made mistakes. The Company Commander was also in error. The regiment believed it ought to cover and excuse this action for reasons explicitly given above.
"Since the mistakes in the combat report are not due to any base motives, I again request permission to handle it by disciplinary proceedings."
Then there is a signature, which is illegible, of SS-Standartenfuehrer and Regimental Commander. Handwritten at the bottom, dated 22 July, 1944. The year does not appear, there appears:
"I agree to the procedure suggested by the SS-Standartenfuehrer and Regimental Commander."
And it is signed, "Felmy", and this is written in his own hand.
Then on page 19 of the German, page 26 of the English, is a report from the Third Battalion of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment No. 7, which is dated 20 July 1944, and over on the right is the statement.
"2 enclosures to Commander-in-Chief Southeast/ 1c No. 5924/44" These are minutes of an investigating officer, made by one SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Heske, SS Regimental Provost Marshal, recorded by SS Unterscharfuehrer Hillebrand:
"The person named below appeared by order of regimental commander. He was informed of the subject of the investigation and the legal consequences of untrue statements, and was interrogated as follows:
"1. Personal:
"I am Georg Weichenrieder, 24. I am on active SS leader and SSObersturmfuehrer. I am a platoon leader in the 2nd SS Pz. Grenadier Regiment 7. I am married and childless. I am a believer in God. I have no criminal record."
Now this man Weichenrieder is the one who is referred to in the letter from the regimental commander of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment to General Felmy, Commander of the 68th Corps, and that communication is dated 21 July 1944.
The reference to Weichenrieder is on page 22 of the English, and page 15 of the German.
Subject matter:
"I gave the order to fire on the 18 Greeks attempting to escape, who were thoroughly suspect of belonging to bandits. The contents of the combat report of the 2nd SS Pz. Grenadier Regiment 7, dated 11.6. 1944 are correct. They are incomplete, or rather inexact, only inasmuch as the attempted escape took place in two different localities. The combat report does not express that clearly.
"First, 6 men shot to death in the area of the Palioklisi Ridge. The remaining 12 were captured. These 12 men attempted their escape in Distomen as parts of the company returned to Distomen on their way back from a reconnaissance mission to Stiri. It is probable that the arrestees considered this moment propitious for their attempt to escape. Only I guard was available to guard the 12 prisoners since he was the only one remaining from the original Guard Group after the rest of the men of this group had to be employed for combat tasks. Two of the 12 prisoners had already escaped to behind the house in front of which they were guarded. 3 others were even able to reach a nearby vegetable plot. The in part almost successful attempt to escape could only be interpreted as proof and admission of membership of a band. Since I had been charged with the responsibility to guard these bandits I was obliged to stop their escape by opening fire on the fugitives.
"Thus, it was not a matter of shooting to death within the framework of any reprisal measures, but it was rather a military necessity to prevent the escape of prisoners who had been recognized as bandits."
It is certified to by, "Heske, and a signature SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer and SS Regimental Provost Marshal". On the left:
"This has been read to me, approved, signed, Weichenrieder, SS- Obersturmfuehrer."
On the next page, which is page 20 of the German, page 28 of the English, is a further report by the investigating officer:
"SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Heske, SS Regimental Provost Marshal.
"Recorded by: SS-Unterscharfuehrer Hillebrand.
"The person named below appeared by order of regimental commander. He was informed of the subject of the investigation and the legal consequences of untrue statements, and was interrogated as follows:
"1. Personal:
I am Fritz Lautenbach, 27. I am an active SS leader and SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer. I am a Company Commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7. I am unmarried. I am a believer in God. I have no criminal record.
"2. Subject Matter:
I am acquainted with the orders pertaining to the treatment of prisoners and reprisal measures. I concede to not having followed them exactly in all points.
"The following considerations constitute the reasons for my procedure. Accompanying circumstances showed beyond all doubt that the assistance extended to the bands by the civilian population of Distomon was the only cause of our own losses. The competent authorities would also have subsequently ordered reprisal measures in accordance with orders. The execution of these reprisal measures would have necessitated sending a strong mission with corresponding high fuel consumption to Distomon at a later time. These troops in their turn would have had to count with enemy resistance and consequently with casualties of their own. In fact, on other occasions, there was particularly stubborn enemy resistance in this same area. As the orders themselves state again and again, reprisal measures have an impressive effect only if they follow the action to be avenged immediately, and not only after a longer period of time. In the face of the dead and wounded of my company, these considerations caused my decision to follow the sense and not the letter of the reprisal order.
I understood clearly that my directives could be taken as formal transgressions. However, I figured that they would be approved post-factum on a soldierly and human basis.
"The regiment on its part pointed out to me that my combat report in its original version would incriminate me in regard to a transgression of orders issued, and that a new version was necessary. Thereupon, I rewrote the report. Whereby several unintended inexactitudes crept in, which however were not intended originally.
"Possibly one or the other formulations was influenced or limited by the dramatic and varied events of the 10 of June which in part were painful for the company because of the casualties.
"The 18 men shot to death in the areas of Palioklisi and in Distomon were all shot while trying to escape (6 of them were captured, the remaining 12 during an attempt to escape in Distomon). None of them was shot as a reprisal measure. The urgent suspicion that these civilians belonged to a band was founded on their behavior and the finding of blasting equipment and of parts of uniforms at the locality where they were.
"The shooting attack on parts of my company took place about 2 km. southeast of Distomon. Civilians from Distomon working in the fields energetically denied the presence of bandits. These civilians were about 500 to 600 meters distant from the enemy positions which were situated in an approximate semi-circle around the column. On this assumption it is impossible for them to have overlooked the bandits' preparation to attack. The efforts of the civilians to lure the soldiers into ambush proved their previously arranged and conceded cooperation with the bands. For this reason, I believe myself justified in the immediate execution of reprisal measures. The previous behavior of the population led one to the logical and immediate conclusion that further attacks from the ambush, even from the village itself, would have to be counted on at any time. My measures also intended to stop losses which might possibly occur in the future. My first combat report, which I later rewrote, expressed this also."
Certified, "Heske, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer and SS-Regimental Provost Marshal". It is also signed, "Fritz Lautenbach SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer".
Then turning to page 22 of the German, and 31 of the English, this is a communication dated 20 July 1944:
"Reference: Letter LXVIII Infantry Corps to 4th SS-Pol. Pz. Gren. Div.
"Subject: Verbal order of the Regimental Commander.
"To the "SS-Ranzer-Grenadier-Regiment 7 "STATEMENT "The statement made against myself in the letter cited above requires the following clarification:
"The combat group SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach accomplished independently the mission I ordered for the reconnaissance in the area Arachowa-Distomen. I received a report of the development of the action via radio at battalion headquarters in Lewadia. Shortly before the combat group Lautenbach reached the village of Distomon, radio connection with it was interrupted. It was reconstituted only after the fighting was over.
"Immediately after the mission, the 2nd company was transferred to Lamia for the execution of an operation in the Sperchios Valley and subordinated directly to the regiment. Since the preceding events required a regimental report to the Army Command, the disputed combat report was produced in Lamia by Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach and immediately sent to the regiment. This combat report was received by the battalion only later for information. For the above reasons, I still feel justified in having made the statements appearing in the last paragraph in my report dated 26 June 44 - Br. Diary No. 339/44 Secret."
Then on the next page, is a report from one George Koch, who has been referred to before, to the First Battalion of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, dated 20 July 1944, and again enclosed 5 to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, 1c, No. 5924/44.
Koch is an under-officer in the Secret Field Police Group No. 510:
I wish to add the following to the events described by me in my report dated 12.6.1944.
"I was unable to make personally all ovservations of the events described in my report dated 12.6.1944. It was absolutely impossible for one individual to observe everything in an operation executed by two companies, since I myself did not participate in everything nor could I be everywhere at once. That is why by mutual agreement with the members of the company I have used statements and also the combat report of the company as a basis for my report. Neither have I made any observations which would contradict the statement of SS Obersturmfuehrer Weichenrieder which has been read to me since. As explained in my statement dated 2.7.1944, I spent some time looking after our interpreter who was lying in the market place.
(Signed) Koch Unteroffizier" Then there is a personal pencil notation:
"1A IF. In answer to special inquiry R 19/7" I think that is all we have to say about it.
In looking at this document and the previous one, your Honors will please see the large figure 22 D, on this and other documents. On this one I do not know what it means, unless it is some sort of an identification or number that they put on to connect some of these papers.
The next is on page 25 of the German, page 33 of the English, which is from the Commander in Chief Southeast, Commander in Chief Army Group F 1c/AO No. 4506, secret, dated 20th June 1944.
Then if your Honors please, this is the file number that we have referred to before, the first time that was used was on page 2 of this book, and it was later used in July on page 1 of this book, and now they are using it again:
"Events during fighting in Distomon.
"According to the combat report of the SS-Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, the village Distomon was attacked during fighting with bands on the road Lewadia-Amfissa on the 10.6 and after a mopping up operation of the village, 250 to 300 dead band suspects and band members were counted. In other reports submitted by a Secret Field Police Unteroffizier of the Secret Field Police Group 510 who participated in the action Distomon was reached without fighting. The fighting with a band took place near Stiri (5 km. Southeast of Distomon) and the inhabits of Distomon were shot dead only after the finish of the operation Stiri and the return of the troops. Accordingly, in contrast, to the report of the troops, it would have been a reprisal measure. Interrogated by the Corps Judge of LXVIII Infantry Corps, the Unteroffizier of the German Secret Field Police fully reaffirmed this report. Corps Hqs. of LXVIII Infantry Corps ordered the commanding officer of the 4th SS-Pz. Gren. Div. to make an investigation of the entire incident because of deliberately false official report.
"The records available up to this point show a striking parallel to the events at Klissura which also concerned Pz. Gren. Regiment No. 7. Supplementary report after submission of the results of the investigation by Corps Hqs. of the LXVIII Infantry Corps is reserved.
"The special plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office who has asked for an explanation of the events has been informed as to the contents of the reports available up to now.
"According to radio Cairo in Greek of 15.7, Hull has commented on the events in Distomon during a press conference."
This is certified to by one, "Harling".
Now on page 26 of the German, and 35 of the English, this is a teletype to Army Group E.
"Subject: Fighting in Distomon".
And this again comes from the Commander in Chief Southeast, High Command Army Group F:"You are requested to request Corps Headquarters of the LXVIII Infantry Corps to submit speedily the results of the investigation re Distomon asked for by the 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Division".The signature here is typed, but at the left is sighed, "Certified, v. Harlingm Lt. Colonel".And then the next report-
PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER: I believe that this is a convenient time to take our afternoon recess.
(Recess taken).
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal 5 is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed, Mr. Denney.
MR. DENNEY: May it please Your Honors. Page 24 of the German, Page 35 of the English, Document No. NOKW-467, which is Exhibit No. 484 in evidence, is a teletype from the Commander in Chief, Army Group F and Commander in Chief Southeast, to Commander in Chief, Army Group E, again with reference to the fighting in Distomon. This is another copy of the same telegram which has just been read, and I don't think we need to road it. It bears pencilled notations which are apparent. And then on the next page, Page 26 of the German, Page 36 of the English - this is to the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, and it's from the Commander in Chief of Southeast and against refers to fighting in Distomon, and the reference is 4506, which goes back to that communication on page 2 of this Document Book, which has to do with Kassura. That is the communication of June 20, 1944 from Weichs, as Chief of Staff to the OKW.
"According to the combat report of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, the village Distomon was attacked during fighting with bands on the road Lewadia-Amfissa on the 10.6." And this continues, and I believe there's another copy of the same report which we had a little earlier. Yes, this is the same one which was offered as Exhibit No. 483, and I don't think we have to read it again here. And then the next page of the document is all typewritten and is dated 16 July 1944. It says: "Yesterday, British bombers attacked the German flying bomb base in Licour Northwest of Paris. Flying bombs dropped on the area of London and Southern England last night and today." And I don't think we have to read any more until we get down to the bottom of the page, which is Page 27 and 28 of the German and Page 38 of the English, where it says, "In connection with the destruction of the Greek village of Distomon by the German," and then there is the "Cordell" which should be Cordell Hull, and then as follows: "The execution of the village residents is one more example of the terrorist Reich which the Nazis have brought about in Europe.
They are getting wilder from day to day because they recognize more and more the approach of the day of retaliation. The Allied Nations will punish the criminals." And then ever on Page 29 of the German, Page 39 of the English, is a letter of 10 July 1944 from Army Group E to High Command, Army Group F, Commander in Chief Southeast, and it bears the receipt stamp of the Commander in Chief Southeast for 12 July, Subject: Events during fighting in Distomon. "Enclosed you will find a report of the commanding general of the LXVIII Infantry Corps with four enclosures as well as a letter addressed to the Commanding Officer of the 4th SS Polizei Panzer Grenadier Division for the purpose of a renewed investigation regarding a deliberately false official report from the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7. Obviously it is a similar case to that which happened at that time near Klisura." Here as there the incidents reports pertaining to the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment No. 7.
"In connection with the incidents themselves, it is pointed out that the regimental commander has reported that the orders issued from here concerning combatting of bands are known and allegedly were acted upon. The report of the investigation by the commanding officer of the 4th SS-Pol.Pz. Gren. Div. as ordered by the commanding general will be submitted in due course. It does not seem impossible that the statements of the member of the Secret Field Police will be voided by the testimony of witnesses of the participanting unit, SS Pz, Gren. Regt. 7. The final result is to be awainted.
As can be seen from the letter of the Commanding General, envoy Neubacher has requested submission of a report of the events. It is requested that envoy Neubacher be informed accordingly from there."
And then it is signed "For the High Command of Army Group E, Chief of the General Staff, Schmidt-Richberg." And the next document Page 30 of the German, Page 40 of the English, is from the Corps headquarters, 68th Infantry Corps, The Commanding General, who was, at that time, the Defendant Felmy, and it's dated 4 July 1944, and is addressed to Army Group E, and it bears their receipt stamp for 6 July.
"I am enclosing for the Army Group a report on the events during the fighting in Distomon dated 10.6.44. According to it, the SS Pz. Gren. Regt. 7 has submitted a knowingly false official report.
Envoy Neubacher has requested that a report be submitted from the local branch office regarding those events. I have asked the Branch Office to reply to the effect that the report has been submitted to Army Group E."
And this is signed by the Defendant Felmy. And then on the next page is another communication, again from Corps headquarters of the 68th Corps, at that time commanded by the Defendant Felmy, which is dated 4 July 1944. And this is again an enclosure to the Commander in Chief Southeast/Ic, No. 5298, and is addressed to the Commanding General of the 4th SS Panzer Division, "or his official deputy."
"The enclosed combat report of the operations of the 2nd Company SS Pz. Gren. Regt. 7 on the 10.6.44 pertaining to the fighting at Distomen has been submitted by SS Pz. Gren. Regt. 7.
Enclosure 2: This report and the official report rendered therein is deliberately false.
Under Number 1 of the combat report appears the following:. . . Civilians and bandits opened fire on an approaching dismounted platoon. 18 younger mem were shot while trying to escape, while we ourselves were rapidly advancing.
The facts are that no one shot at the troops from the fox holes which had been searched, that 6 Greeks who attempted to escape were shot dead and that the other 12 were arrested. Under number 2 of the combat report appears the following:. . . . . . . . Fire was opened suddenly against the company from the direction of Distomon with trench mortars, machine guns and rifles even before Distomon was reached.
The company suffered its entire casualties during this first fire attack; 5 men were killed, 18 leaders, subleaders and men were wounded, of whom 4 heavily wounded have died in the meantime at the medical central collecting point. Thereupon, I ordered the opening of fire and the attack on Distomon with all weapons at our disposal. After the mopping up of the village 250 to 300 dead members of bands and men suspected of belonging to bands were counted. Immediately following, the rest of the houses were burned down.
The facts are that Distomon was reached without contact with the enemy and that the troops remained several hours in the village without any action on the part of the enemy.
The fire attack of the partisans took place during a thrust of SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach with a light motorized column from Distomon in the direction of Stiri, about halfway on the road Distomon Stiri. After the return of the troops, reprisal measures were executed on that civilian population which had remained in Distomon. During that time the 12 prisoners who had been brought along were shot dead.
The shooting to death of prisoners is a transgression against the order of the Fuehrer who has determined that all prisoners of war are to be sent to Germany for labor employment. The behavier of the SS-Sturmbannfuehrer and battalion commander Hickert, has not only made the counter propaganda of the Corps Hqs. valueless, which was based on the combat report, but due to it, I no longer have any lever to take steps against the district chief of Lewadia.
Besides, the procedure used by SS Sturmbannfuehrer and battalion commander Rickert does not correspond with the orders issued by the Corps Hqs. Concerning this he says in his report dated 26.6.44 (diary) No.599/44 secret in the last paragraph:
I am acquainted with all orders issued pertaining to reprisal measures and shooting of hostages and I may assume that the superior authorities have confidence in me, that as an officer I will execute my tasks within the framework of these orders:
the strong accusations which I must make against SS Pz. Gren. Regt. 7 are based on the report of Group Secret Field Police 510 T.B. (daybook entry and the day) as well as on the interrogation based on that report of Unteroffizier Koch of the Secret Field Police 510 by the Corps Judge of the LXVIII Infantry Corps, Oberkriegsgerichtsrat Giesecke.
I request the Commanding Officer of the 4th SS-Pz. Gren. Div. to start an investigation of the entire incident and to report its results to me.
Attached: Enclosures 1 to 4.
(signed) Felmy And then enclosure 1 to this is from the Group Secret Field Police 510, Office No. IV, Diary No. 425/44:
"Subject: Operation for the purpose of freeing the road LewadiaArachawa on 10.6.44.
"Report.
"The 2nd Company of the SS-Pz. Gren. Regt. 7 with Lewadia as a base, supported by the 10th and 11th Company, with the base Arachawa, executed an operation to free the road Lewadia-Arachawa on 10.6.44. Attached to the 2nd Company during this operation were Unteroffizier Koch and interpreter Theo, who belong to the local unit.
"The fully motorized 2nd Company left their base in the direction of Arachawa at 8:15 o'clock of the 10.6.44. In order to deceive the bandits a civilian detachment of 18 men was employed. This rode in advance of the company on two Greek trucks at a fifteen minute interval. The civilian detachment contacted the units of the 3rd Btl., 7 Rgt, two kilometers west of the road fork Lewadia-Arachawa - Lewadia-Distomon at 0850 hours without contacting the enemy.
Twelve Greeks were arrested who were found in the dugouts situated five kilometers east of the road fork and one kilometer north of Palioklisi while these were being searched. At our approach six Greeks attempted to escape, whereupon they were shot dead.
"After completion of the actual mission SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach, who commanded the 2nd Company, received a new mission from the battalion. Together with the 10th Company he was to thrust ahead for reconnaissance to Distomon. It was not possible to take over the village at the same time. In Distomon the Burgermeister and the priest of Stiri informed us of the appearance in Distomon of about 30 bandits, who had arrived from the direction of Dessina on 9.6.44 about ten o'clock and left again about 1500 hours of the same day in the direction of Stiri. On 10.6.44, about ten o'clock, the bandits were said to have left Stiri in the direction of Kiriaki. Information was further received that the band leader of the 3rd Battalion, 34-Elas Regiment, who was known under the pseudonym 'Mawrojannis', might have been killed in combat near Dessina.
"The 10th Company having left Distomon about 1430 hours, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach decided to thrust ahead as far as Stiri for the purpose of reconnoitering the cross country and road situation. He took a light motorized column consisting of two Greek trucks, three passenger cars, and three motorcycles. The headquarters of the local unit also took part in the reconnaissance trip in order to undertake a further reconnaissance of the band situation in Stiri.
"When the head of the civilian detachment was about 700 meters northwest of Stiri - about 1510 hours - the column received strong machine gun and rifle fire from the ridges situated east and northeast of the road. Due to the lack of cover and the insufficient distance between the vehicles, most casualties occurred immediately after firing had commenced. For this reason the immediate deployment of the combat group and the opening of our own fire was not possible. Furthermore no heavy weapons had been taken along. The bandits also employed an 8 cm. trench mortar so that the fire of the bandits covered the entire area in which the combat group found itself. The enemy was in good positions and about 30 to 35 men strong. Alerted by red flare signals and the noise of the fighting, the troops which had remained in Distomon advanced for support. After our own weapons had been fully committed, the bandits took flight in an easterly direction. We followed them immediately. But a continued pursuit of the bandits was considered irresponsible because the combat group had been much weakened if one deduct casualties and medics as well as security troops. For this reason, the losses of the band could not be ascertained. However, it is very probable that the band had suffered losses since numerous traces of blood were found in their positions.
"The company returned to Distomon about 0730 hours. The view prevailed that the population was thoroughly informed regarding the position of the bandits because, oddly enough, there wasn't a human being tilling the soil in the fields situated within the zone of attack.
For this reason, the twelve prisoners and the population still remaining in the village were shot dead and a part of the houses set on fire.
"Immediately at the opening of the surprise fire, the interpreter Theo of the local unit was heavily wounded by a shot through the upper part of the thigh and stomach. He died from his wounds during the night of the 11th-12th of June. Unteroffizier Koch of the local unit was lightly wounded by a shell splinter.
"The heavily wounded were transferred to the main medical collecting station Amfissa.
"The company left Distomon to Lewadia about 1230 hours.
"Casualties: 3 dead; 18 wounded, of whom 4 died at the medical collection station; 1 Greek truck driver dead.
"Signed: Koch, Unteroffizier and Auxiliary Police Candidate."
And down below is typed: "Read: Signed signature Feldwebel and deputy unit chief."
And next again, which is all typed, and is the second enclosure, is the report of the SS-Sturmbannfuehrer and deputy regimental commander, with reference to "Operation near Distomon; Reference: Telephone call today from your Ic".
"To the Corps Headquarters, LXVIII Infantry Corps.
"Enclosed we are submitting a copy of a combat report concerning the operation near Distomon. In connection with it I wish to state that resistance was broken at my explicit order according to which enemy resistance was to be broken with all means at our disposal. All available weapons were employed before the company took the village by assault in order to avoid unnecessary losses above those which had already occurred.
"The descriptions of the prefect of Lewadia are immeasurably exaggerated and are thoroughly characteristic of the peculiar attitude of the person concerned. It is regrettable that innocent civilians lost their lives or were wounded in the skirmish, but in such cases this can not he avoided, particularly if the bandits open fire from ambush with trench mortars, machine guns, and rifles."
And then the rest is typed.
And then on the next page is the communication from Corps Headquarters, 68th Infantry Corps, dated 2 July 1947, and has to do with the affairs in Distomon, and a statement signed by Unteroffizier Koch of the Secret Field Police Group 510:
"Unteroffizier Koch of the Secret Field Police Group 510 appears by virtue of an order. Having been informed of the object of this interrogation, of the significance of his statement and also the possibility that he may have to swear to it, he states as follows:
"1) My name is George Koch, 30, Protestant. I am a professional waiter, Unteroffizer with Group Secret Field Police 510.
"2) Subject: the statements I made in my report of 12.6 about the operation for the purpose of freeing the road Lewadia-Arachowa on 10.6, correspond entirely to the facts. I make this report the subject of my interrogation today. I myself participated in the entire operation and was able to observe and follow the individual events.
"A.B.: 1) The Troops were not fired at from the dug-outs which were searched - 5 kilometers East of the road fork Arachowa-Distomon. 12 persons were captured and taken along to Distomon.
"2) Distomon was reached without making contact with the enemy. The troops remained several hours in the village without any action on the part of the enemy.
"3) The fire attack of the partisans took place on the occasion of the reconnaissance thrust on Stiri, halfway on the road between that place and Distomon.
"4) After the troops returned to Distomon, the 12 prisoners who were taken back were shot dead in the market place as reprisal measures, assumedly by order of an Obersturmfuehrer who most likely was present during that incident. Subsequent to that, all people present in Distomon were shot dead where ever they happened to be. At that time, I was at the market place and was looking after our wounded interpreter. As far as I observed events, 60 to 70 persons men, women and children - were killed in the vicinity of the market place. As far as I could see it, all were shot dead. I did not see inhabitants being killed in any other way, i.e. beaten to death by rifle butt, or by pouring gasoline over them and setting them on fire. Detachments were sent out to search for more people in the individual houses. I do not know how many people were killed all together. When presented with the statement that his statements directly contradict the combat report of the unit employed, I can only repeat my statements.