Q You yourself are of the opinion that this was one of the essential reasons?
A Yes, I personally think that was the essential reason.
Q But do you not remember whether this was expressed in the public notice?
A No, I don't think so, but I cannot remember.
Q Witness, do you remember then, whether in this public notice, anything was mentioned that there was no reason to have pity for the population?
A Well, I don't think anything like that would have been said in the public notice.
Q Do you remember whether it said anything to that respect in the order which was issued from the 20th Army to the 19th Corps?
A I have already been asked whether this was contained in that order. When I saw the OKW order for the first time, in its original wording - which I had not seen until that point - I said then, and that is about 18 months ago, that I cannot remember that this wording -- that these things were mentioned in the order. Even today I cannot say with certainty because in my mind now the memory of the order from the OKW, is confused - that is, this order which I saw 18 months ago - I confuse with the memory of the order by the OKW which I carried out so many years ago.
Q Witness, you mentioned military destructions which had to be carried out if there was any certainty that the Russians would follow. Do you mean by this "military destruction" - do you also mean the destruction of isolated houses, little fishing shacks, and do you also mean churches?
A No, I did not mean churches in that respect, but everything else would be considered accomodation.
The enemy air force would not mind whether a unit would be accomodated in a house of say three floors or four or five isolated or detached small houses. Some of these in the country, from the military point of view, in the isolated and detached houses, are of more advantage.
Q When you say "detached and isolated houses", do you then mean that the accomodations which were to be tactically and military easy to supervise, but you do not mean when one unit is for instance 10 or 12 kilometers distant from another unit -- you know the neighborhood around there don't you? Isn't it a fact that very often houses are at a great distance, one from the other? Isn't it true that there are isolated houses?
A Yes, that's true. There are houses which are isolated, but usually they are houses which belong to a little settlement.
Q Witness, if I understand you correctly, you fought against the Russians in Finland?
A Yes.
Q At that time, in this fight against your Army, that is against the German army, did the Russian forces have to depend on such accomodations and food and other commodities which the Finnish population gave to the Russians, or such as they confiscated from the population?
A Yes, in part.
Q Putting it in other words, although you said there were almost five Russian Corps, do you mean to say these five Russian Corps were partly dependant upon using such things as they confiscated there - that is as far as food and accomodations and any other things is concerned?
A Yes, that is quite correct for one Corps - that is the Russian Corps which came through the Tundra, and continued on the icy straits because that corps carried food only for five days, and as we know from the statements of prisoners of war, they had been told that they would have to find all of the other food from the Germans.
Q That, from the Germans, but not from the Finns?
A I think in this case that was almost the same.
Q Witness how could it be the same, if the Finnish population was -- the native population -- lived in houses and had their own reserves, whereas the German army was so to speak opposed? I do not understand that.
A I only meant to say by that, that at that time, the Finnish population had already been evacuated, and in that territory there were available Finnish accomodations, and such accomodations as had been erected by the German army.
Q But witness you mean then that four of the Corps were either to fight without essential support of these accomodations or get food from the Finnish?
A Yes.
Q How did these four Corps live? In Bivouacs?
A Well for the major part they were accomodated in old positions which they had before, and later in Bivouacs. That is, field camps. Partly, they also lived in such accomodations as we had been unable to destroy.
A Witness, is it a fact that the Russians, although there was such destruction, were able to progress in Finnmark?
Q No, the Russians did not progress.
Q Was that because of the destruction that the Russians did not follow?
A That is very difficult to say with absolute certainty today. It is quite possible, although not probable, that the fact that so much had been destroyed had an influence on the Russian operations.
Q You have already said, I think you said on Friday -- that the main fighting formation of the Russians, which was the one which would have been provided for the pursuit of the retreating armies, had gone to East Prussia; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Witness although you told us on Friday that you yourself except very occasionally, had never seen destroyed villages or houses or slaughtered cattle, did you know, witness, that such destructions not only had taken place, but also had been continued for weeks and months - that is December and January and later?
A Yes, I knew about that, because after all, I had the order by the AOK, and I knew that this order was being carried out. Further, when the retreat started, I and the troops which were under my command, carried out such destruction and ordered it, in the territory of Karlov.
Q That was quite in the beginning?
A Yes, that's right.
Q But even at a later point you knew that destruction went on?
A I knew that the destruction continued.
Q Witness, did you ever receive an order from the Army at any time - I think that would have been right up to the time when you were taken prisoner in April, 1945 -- that this order for the "scorched-earth policy" had been withdrawn?
A No, I don't.
Q Even by telephone, verbally or by any letter?
A No, as up to February, 1945, until April, 1946, I was not in Norway.
Q Would you have been informed of it during your absence, if such an order had been received?
A Yes, I would have.
Q Witness, was it ever mentioned that territories to the west and later to the south should be destroyed, and later also to the south of Finnmark, right up to Norvak and further?
A No, it was never said. I myself, when I was present in Germany, had discussed these questions with my brother. I can almost repeat the exact wording which I used when I told him, and that was in the course of a discussion of the general military position.
A ... "For God's sake don't send me such an order for scorched earth again, because a second time I could not take part in anything like that. If it should be decided to withdraw from the North of Norway and to withdraw into this space south of Narvik, I would not be prepared to lay waste once more flourishing villages and houses and to destroy everything." My brother's reply to that: "I didn't think you would; I didn't expect you to say anything else, and it's quite out of the question." So, it's only in this very personal connection that we considered the possibility of a further laying waste of the territory to Narvik.
Q After this discussion or on the basis of this discussion with your brother, do I understand you correctly if I draw the conclusion that you discussed the whole point with your brother because you were of the opinion that this destruction was unnecessary or for what other reasons?
A I think I'd rather say for humane considerations. This destruction of the North of Finnmark was one of the hardest tasks I had ever been given throughout the war.
Q Did you have any military considerations in that respect or were you only moved by the humane idea?
A I have already, at the beginning of my statements, expressed that I personally, right from the beginning, did not believe that the Russians would progress beyond the River Tarna.
Q Witness, when did you discuss these points with your brother?
A That was at the end of March, 1945.
Q So that was at a time when there was no invasion from the Russians. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q So if the scorched-earth policy had been ordered for Narvik, you not only instinctively but also from a military point of view would have protested against it. Is that right?
A It's very difficult to answer this question because one doesn't know how the conditions had developed; but what I said to my brother and expressed to him was that for absolutely humane principles I would be quite incapable of carrying out against a country in which I had lived, whose people I had come to value and to respect.
And that had no bearing on the fact whether it was military necessity or not. Furthermore, this question of military necessity has always been a much-discussed one. If in this Courtroom I may point this out, even the commander of the enemy forces had to consider the problem whether it would be justified to lay waste and, for instance, to bomb French villages and towns and then invade France. I have read that this question has been debated very intensely. For military reasons it was then decided to further such a policy in order to save human lives, but that one took the risk that through this bombing thousands of French women and children would die. I am quite convinced that there were people in England, as well as in America, but did not agree and did not consider such a policy necessary.
Q Witness, if I understand you correct, do you want to draw a parallel with this explanation or a justification?
A No, I only wanted to state and show that the question of military necessity is always a doubtful consideration. Some people always think any measure is necessary from a military point of view; other people do not agree. I personally have, for instance, when the North Finnmark was destroyed, held that the disadvantages of such an action were greater than the advantages. That is also in case the Russians had pursued us with part forces only.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, this is Defense Counsel Fritsch for the Defendant Rendulic.
Q General, your opinion with regard to the pursuit of the Russian Army has been discussed here in detail. May I ask you to answer one question? If it had been considered possible, up till the end of November, that the Russian Army would follow, -- would it not have been necessary to carry out and decide the evacuation even before that point?
A Yes, that's correct.
Q Was just in the North--was there not another point of great importance? I mean the weather.
A Yes, that's right. Before the withdrawal of the forces they were always faced, I'd say, by a horror that the winter would break out. The position was such that we had extraordinary luck with the weather, if the usual big storms had broken out at this time of the year, not only the army but also the population might have had catastrophic experiences through the weather.
Q General, we talked about the pursuit by the Russians. May I ask you, first of all, what forces and at what strength did the Russian forces have when you faced them at the end of October?
AAt the end of October we had more or less lost contact with the Russian forces. The last battles which only took place on the level of Battalions took place on the Neyden-elf. It is very difficult to say, therefore, what forces we faced at the end of October. I can only say that certain formations or formations beyond the strength of regiments did not cross the Neyden-elf, and the greater part of the enemy forces remained in the Kirkenes.
Q Now, this territory around the Kirkenes was under your jurisdiction wasn't it?
A Yes.
Q You have repeatedly said that the contact with the Russians had been lost. Now then when did the German Army lose Kirkenes?
A I think that must have been toward the middle of October. I do not remember the date exactly.
Q Well, if I put it to you, Herr General, that according to my documents it was on the 5th of November, is that possible?
A That sounds a bit late to me, but may I just work it out in my mind? As far as I remember, it must have been around the 20th of October, but I cannot say this with certainty.
Q Well, anyway the fights took place towards the end of October. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q When you evacuated was only the pursuit of the Russians of importance as far as military points were concerned?
A No. One also had to be prepared for Norwegian units which were in England at the time--would come to this territory...
Q Do you mean they would land there?
A Yes.
Q Do you think other enemies in the country itself did not play any part?
A Well, of course one might consider the danger of Partisans and espionage; but I don't think there would have been any other forces which we had to fear.
Q General, I do not consider the point only from the East, that is yourself, but I also think of the line in the South. I would remind you, therefore, of your relationship with the Finns which had changed. Now, this question: Did they have any bearing on your evacuation for military reasons?
A I must really say that I never considered this problem in any way because these problems did not concern my territory and were not so actual for me as they were for the Army of the 18th Corps or for the 36th Corps. It is quite possible that the Finns forced by the Russians might have been ordered to pursue beyond the South frontiers of Finnland. That is quite possible. After all, in the East, also the Bulgarians were forced by the Russians to pursue right into the West.
Q In this connection, Witness, do you know that the Norwegian Government in exile had permitted the Finns to follow the Germans into the Norwegian territories?
A Yes, I know about that.
Q Well, if you considered this fact, would you not say that the question I put to you before gained more importance? Did you yourself never hear anything that the Finns actually penetrated?
A Oh, yes, because they even attacked in position of my forces and the Lyngen fjord but that only up to the point where we had occupied one little corner of Finland. When we left this little corner at the border the Finns ceased to attack. I cannot remember to have any reports to the effect that the Finns had crossed the Norwegian border.
Q Do you mean then that the Finns did not take part in the actual fighting?
A Yes, they did fight, particularly with the 18th Corps and the 36th Corps.
Q How, at that time then could you know whether apart from the Russians, the Finns also pursued your Army?
A I cannot answer that question because this possibility was not so acute in my district. I was not concerned with such a possibility.
Q Do you know the strength of the Finnish Army?
A Well, at that time I think there was only one division, as far as I remember. At least there was one division confronted by us. I think perhaps the whole of the Finnish Army had a strength of about six divisions.
Q Witness, I do not mean the territory in which the Finnish Army faced you but I mean the total of the Finnish Army.
A She Finnish Army was much larger, of course. After all, they had the total front line right from the Varanger botton down to the Baltic Sea; so they had at least thirty divisions, but I don't remember the actual figure.
Q Would you say that the Finnish soldier, as a soldier, would be of the same quality as the Russian soldier?
A I would say that he would be much superior to the Russian soldier.
Q General, do you know anything with respect to the preparations for the evacuation? In your direct examination you were asked with regard to this point, and you stated then you had received orders to the effect. Now, did you actually know what happened and what was done in order to carry out the evacuation in good order?
A Yes, of course, I know that because, after all, I had my relative orders. The evacuation was a rather big problem. It could only be carried out without any friction if the evacuation plans were strengthened and safeguarded by orders with regard to food and accommodation.
Q I think the roads in the Northern territory were of great importance. Had the roads been prepared for the withdrawal?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us in detail with regard to this preparation of the roads?
A The disposal of the heavy snow was of great importance. Alarge organization for the traffic control was necessary and special arrangement had been made to secure the tunnels. Accommodation barracks had been built in the retreat area, military installations had been put up, and medical supplies were ready, and collection and transfer camps had been built.
Q General, you mean all these installations had been built for the evacuation of the civilian population?
A Well, for the civilian population and our own troops.
Q In the area of your supervision, General, did you ever hear of any excesses, riots or cruelties by German troops in the course of the evacuation?
A The first time I heard anything like that was in February or April. I do not remember exactly. That was, I heard and read in Swedish newspapers of an incident which happened in a home for old pensioners. That was a home in Varanger bottom.
Q Witness, I would not like to dwell on rumors or anything which you heard from other sides, but I would like to hear of such incidents which were reported to you because you were the commander of troops.
A Nothing of that kind was ever reported to me in my capacity as commander.
Q Can you tell us anything with regard to the fact whether the demands during the evacuation of the civilian population took preference over the demands of the military troops?
A The position was such that we had to unload munitions and similar materials from our trucks in order to transport the civilian population instead. In some instances we put Red Cross ambulances at the disposal of the civilian population. Although we ourselves had thousands of wounded whom we had to transport into hospitals which lay hundreds of kilometers to the rear. I know of another case where we had a transit camp for wounded which we put at the dispotal of the civilian population. This we did although the accommodation for our own troops along the main Route 50 was very limited. The food which we distributed to the civilian population in the area of Tarna-this food did not really mean a sacrifice because those food reserves we could not have taken along with us anyway.
Q But any way the civilian population was supplied with such materials.
AAs far as we could possibly do that we did it, but after all this was still during the war. Everybody had to fight until his last strength, but I can say with my full conviction that everything was done which could humanly be done under the conditions which we had to struggle.
Q Witness, you went from Kirkenes right down to the Lyngen fjord. Will you be good enough to show us this stretch on the map which we have here?
A (Witness rises from witness stand and is given a pointer). Now, here we are at the end of the Varanger bottom. There's Tarna, Mjor elf, there's Alta here, and there's the Lyngen fjord.
Q Thank you. General, how much time did you need to cover this area? I mean just approximately?
A Well, I think I left Kirkines about--that means the area around Kirkenes--on the 12th of October, and I arrived beyond the Lyngen fjord, that may have been on the 20th of November.
Q So during this period of the evacuation you were on the way in this territory for about six weeks.
A Well, that means in such a way that I always remained several days in a fighting area.
Q Do I remember rightly, witness, that you stated in the direct examination that never you never saw a piece of slaughtered cattle or dead cattle?
A No.
Q In this connection, I may ask you the following question. With regard to the position of the German Reich, was supply of food one of the most important tasks of the military operations?
A Yes.
Q In the army, and also in your own command, it was particularly attached to the safeguarding and security of food?
A Yes, definitely. It even went so far that in order to safeguard food in the area Kirkenes, I had the order from the high command to hold this area for a longer period than I thought it possible according to the general position.
Q Now, with regard to this attitude of the high command, would the definite slaughtering of the cattle be punishable by the high command?
A Well, the killing of cattle would not have come into the question at all. I can only think that the Norwegian population were not able to hold and to look after the cattle and they therefore transferred them to German soldiers. A similar thing happened in Finland. I remember for instance, I remember in detail, that my staff, before the Finnish population was evacuated, received from the peasants in Petsamo which came under my command, or rather bought a cow for several thousand Finnish marks because the farmer couldn't take the cattle along with them.
Q General, did you ever hear that cattle was burned to death in barns?
A No, I never heard anything like that at all.
Q General, according to your direct interrogation, you stayed in Norway for about three years. Is that correct?
A No, I was in Finland.
Q Oh yes, I am sorry -- Finland. I think you know how the population was made up. Now, generally speaking, what sort of professions did the Finnish population mainly have?
A You mean the Finns? Oh yes, well the Finns apart from the purely city population consists mainly of farmers, forestry workers and fishermen.
Q Now among the last categories, which one was the predominant?
A Well, the peasants, of course, are the predominant category. There are also timber workers, forestry workers, but, very often they sort of exchange, they run together.
Q Now with regard to the Norwegian population, what is the position there?
A I think most of the Norwegian population was engaged in fishing.
Q So that is a very hard and weather beaten sort of person?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Now what sort of transport means were used by the Finns?
AAlmost exclusively their boats.
Q In that respect, do you mean large boats?
A Oh no, they are usually the little fishing vessels.
Q Now if I leave this particular population out of consideration what makes up the Norwegian-Finmark, as far as territory is concerned?
A The Norwegian-Finnmark consists mainly of desert-like tundra areas, scattered in the valleys there are some smaller settlements with some agriculture, and for the rest there are also the Lapps who mainly pursue reindeer breeding.
Q Would it be easy to walk about this district off the ordinary roads?
A Well, it would not be possible if you had any vehicles, but a single person could easily cross the country.
Q How many roads -- that is, in this approximately 800 kilometers long territory from Kirkenes to the Lyngen fjord, how many roads are there?
A I think that can be shown clearly on the map. In this district there is practically really only the Reich road 50 and into it run the roads which the Germans have built, Yverlaa, Mjr-elf and the other road along the Finnish-Swedish frontier which runs onto the Lyngen fjord.
Q So you mean in the real Finnmark, there is only one road, is that correct?
A Yes, there is only one road which was completed by the German to carry right through.
Q General, would you agree with me if I say that the destruction of parts of this road and the bridges on this road would have been of decisive influence on a pursuing enemy?
A Yes.
Q Those bridges which were on this Reich Road 50 -- were they already there when the German army marched into Norway?
A I did not take part in the invasion but I know that the Reichsstrasse 50 only existed in parts. I also know that this road running right through and being negotiable for vehicles of all kinds was only created by the German troops and the OT.
Q General, the houses in Finnmark, what were they like? Were they stone buildings or timber buildings? What material were they made of on an average?
A On an average, they were made from timber, log cabins.
Q Do you know anything with regard to forests which were destroyed?
A I think the forest around Alta and also the forests in some side valleys around to the coast were cut in order to produce building material for military installations.
Q General, the town Kirkenes came under your supervision, didn't it?
A Yes.
Q When you left this territory, was Kirkenes destroyed then?
AAfter the fighting was over, just to give you a sort of measure, about 3 or 4 fifths were destroyed.
Q Do I understand you correctly - you mean that happened in battle?
A Yes, that is in battle. The decisive destruction happened during two Russian air attacks. First of all, half the town, and then in the second attack, essential other parts were destroyed.
Q And you estimate this destruction at about 4/5ths -- that means 80 per cent?
A Well, I would say between 3 and 4 fifths.
Q The remaining buildings, were they destroyed by the German troops when they withdrew?
A No, only in part because we hadn't enough time to do anything like that. We succeeded to blow up the quay's but otherwise the withdrawal was carried out under strong Russian pressure.
Q North of Kirkenes in the Varanger territory, there are the towns Vara and Vard. Were these towns destroyed through military actions or by evacuation measures?
A I can tell you that exactly, because I visited those towns shortly before we withdrew. At that time, Vara, after the last aerial bombardment by the Russians, gave the impression as I mean on a comparative basis, it looked like Nurnberg looks now. Vard was destroyed slightly less.
Q If I remember rightly, you mentioned that you have 5,000 wounded. When you mentioned that figure, did you mean that is at the time when you started your withdrawal or was that another time?
A These 5,000 wounded fell on at about the 10th of October during the course of the fighting. They were constantly being transported to back lines.
Q Would you say you had sufficient transportation for these wounded?
A Oh no, by far not.
Q In spite of this fact, you say you put your own trucks, at the disposal of the evacuation particularly at that of the medical unit?
A I wouldn't like to put it that way. Mainly we gave convoys that means truck convoys, and only in extreme cases and only when we were particularly asked did we send any ambulances.
Q Today in the direct examination you mentioned the public appeal to the Norwegian population.
You say this appeal was signed by the Reich Commissioner and also the Supreme Commander of the 20th Mountain Army Corps. Do you know anything about the relationship of the General Rendulic to the Commissar Terboven?
A. Well, the relationship was not a friendly one.
Q. How do you know that?
A. The Supreme Commander, at the end of November, 1944, visited me in our combat position west of the Lyngen fjord. On this occasion, he also reported difficulties with the Reich Commissioner.
Q. Do you remember any details, any particular remarks from this report?
A. Well, today I do not remember anything in such detail that I could repeat it here.
Q. But you would like--you mean to say that the relationship between the Reich Commissioner and the Supreme Commander was rather tense?
A. If I may add, I think I can just remember one remark which the Supreme Commander made. He said that he assumed the total responsibility for Norway as Supreme Commander in Chief and he would not allow the Reich Commissioner to interfere with this responsibility.
Q. General, with regard to this appeal, I beg your pardon I don't mean the appeal--but I mean the order which came from the army with regard to the evacuation, do you remember that the word "ruthless" was used?
A. No, I do not remember that.
Q. What was the relationship between the soldiers and the civilian population?
A. The relationship was a very friendly one. Particularly, of course, between those soldiers who had lived in this territory Vanga with the population.
Q. That would mean that in order to prepare the soldiers emotionally for the evacuation from their homes of those people with whom they had lived, very definite language had to be used.
MR. RAPP: I object to this type of questioning. I believe defense counsel is getting a conclusion from the witness rather than a testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
MR. RAPP: I believe the witness already has answered, Your Honor to this question. We would like to have this stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: The question may be answered.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. Would you answer this question, please?
A. This word "ruthless" I have always considered in that light, that it was to prepare the soldier emotionally because as I have said before, I as well as my soldiers considered this necessity for destruction a very bitter one.
Q. Did you in Norway meet Norwegians who were not Quisling followers?
A. I was hardly ever in Noway. I had my combat position in Petsamo. I only came temporarily to Kivkeneg and in the district of Vard and Vara. After I had lived in those districts, I came to my combat position which was South of Troms. They were very small places. That was the end of November, 1944. I had no personal contact with any Norwegians. That is, neither to Quisling followers nor to anti-Quislings.
Q. Were you not a prisoner of war in Noway?
A. Yes.
Q. During that time of imprisonment, did you talk to Norwegians, particularly did you talk to then with regard to the evacuation?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember any remarks which were made by these Norwegians with regard to the success and the carrying out of the evacuation? I mean their remarks which were made to you in this respect?
A. I never heard any remarks in the negative. Generally speaking, I personally was reproached with having taken part in the destruction of the Finnmark.