And then another report, still part of this same exhibit, from the same Corps, the 18th, to the same addressee, the 12th Army, commanded by the defendant List, dated 29 August 1941. The daily report recites that an "Army wire circuit was cut in three places at Chalkis in the night 25-26 August 1941. The perpetrator as yet unknown. Three suspects arrested by the Greek police. 15 hostages taken. By order of the Greek Prefecture about 15,000 people not formerly resident in this area who had migrated thither are to be expelled from Euboea." And again it is from the 18th Corps.
The next document is NOKW-1387, which is offered as Exhibit 37, which is a report from the Commander in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and Headquarters 12th Army, dated 6 August 1941. It is a daily report and recites: "Train collision reported yesterday was not due to sabotage. Losses: 8 dead, 8 seriously wounded, 5 slightly wounded. Interruption of traffic for about 36 hours. Tonight 6 communists arrested at Petrovgrad with arms and incendiary material, 1 communist shot while escaping; at Mokrin, 10 miles north of Kikinda, 70 loads of wheat was burned, the perpetrator who was recognized escaped after disarming the custodian. At Zagreb 4 perpetrators, as well as 98 communists and Jewish hostages, were shot. New communist sabotage device: three pointed wire hook, 7 centimeters high, placed on roads, so far damaged 22 tires, according to reports. Forward directing center 'Jug' departed for Bucharest." And it is from the commander in Serbia.
And follows a daily report for the 15th of August 1941 to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, Headquarters 12th Army, again from the Commander in Serbia: "While proceeding to Sabac, car from 3rd Company 64th Police Reserve Battalion (passengers; 1st Lt. Ehrmann, 3 sergeants) subjected to machine gun fire by bandits in the vicinity of Skela. Patrol found the burned-out car. A company of the Police Battalion sent from Belgrade recovered the corpses of 1st Lt. Ehrmann and 1 sergeant out of the Save; 2 sergeants are missing. On 15 August, Skela will be burned and 50 communists from Belgrade hanged there.
Public informed through radio, newspapers and posters. On 14 August, in the vicinity of Lazarevac, 30 kilometers northeast of Valjevo, Telephone Operation Squad fired on by band. At Darosava, 20 kilometers northwest of Topola mines caused derailment of three railroad cars and engine; relief train coming from Lajkovac fired on by bandits; wire were cut. During the night 14-15 August, an ammunition train was attacked at Lajkovac railway station. Infantry Regiment 7 24 suffered 5 dead and 7 wounded, special force sent to the scene of the occurrence. 14 August, 4 band attacks on communities." From the Commander in Serbia.
Then follows a daily report for the 17th of August to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and the Commander of the 12th Army again from the Commander in Serbia. "During the night 14-15, a train carrying a detail transporting arms was attacked by a light machine gun, a heavy machine gun, and with hand grenades in the vicinity of Lejkovac, Wehrmacht losses: 3 dead, 4 wounded, 1 missing. The transport reached its destination after defending itself. According to traces of blood the enemy suffered losses. At 0230, 16 August, the Lejkovac railway station was attacked by unknown persons. Wehrmacht losses: 5 dead, 3 seriously wounded. 1313 hours, 16 August 'S.F.860' fired on by machine gun between Bralina and Stalac. 1330, 16 August, 1 member of Organization Todt shot on the road Cuprja - Jagodina, two kilometers southwest of Jagodina. 2030, 16 August, explosive sabotage on Tunnel No. 10 in the vicinity of Uzica railway station. No considerable damage. Own activities: In the evening of 16 August a fighter detachment of 704th Infantry Division located band 100 men strong in the vicinity of Mionica. Three missing German soldiers and 1 missing German police sergeant were liberated, two communists captured. Pursuit continues, Own losses: 1 missing. A further fighter detachment en route towards Pozega shot three communists and captured three of a band. At Banja, three kilometers north west of Topola, an army car was fired on. Thereupon, a fighter detach ment shot 11 communists and set a number of houses on fire.
16 August, farmhouse in the vicinity of the village of Kikinda burned down, presumably on account of arson. 16 August, band attacks on 5 communities. On 17 August, Sunday morning, five communists convicted of acts of terror and sabotage were publicly hanged in the main street of the city and left there until 1900 today."
The daily report for the 19th of August, again from the Commander in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and also head of the 12th Army. "On 16 and 17 August, 6th Company 920th Regiment sent out a fighter detachment in return for band attack on a German bicycle patrol on 16 August in the vicinity of Milanovac. Two bandits were shot, 6 captured, 4 houses set afire. On 18 August, a fighter detachment from of Pozega. Thirty-eight bandits were shot, 2 machine guns, typewriters and camp library were seized. 1800, 17 August, band attack on Serbian Gendarmerie Station between Zavor and Cuzica, as well as on Gendarmerie Station Cuca. In the morning of 18 August, band attack on Serbian Gendarmerie patrol at Mokrin. 17-18 August, band attacks on 6 community offices."
And the last daily report, the one for 29 of August, again to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and 12 Army from the Commander in Serbia. "Kraljevo airfield threatened by bands on 22 August, 24 August, 28 August, airfield troops were committed. Two Serbian gendarmes were killed, 1 communist was shot. Two 12-kilogram bombs were eliminated. On 28 August, troops operating in the area of Sabac dispersed bands. On 27 August at Kopljaro 3 houses were burned as reprisal measure. Ammunition was found. Between 22 - 28 August, 5 acts of sabotage in railway installations at Knjazevac, Paracin, Adrani, Vruzi, Darosava. Between 23-28 August, 5 further attacks in the Area Ivanjica-Mionica-Sabac. Files of the community were burned. On 28 August, near Stave, engagement between Serbian gendarmes and communists. Three communists dead, 2 wounded.
One Serbian gendarme wounded. On 26 August, band attack on Serbian gendarme Station. Seven Serbian gendarmes disarmed. On 27 August, Serbian Red Cross car fired on at Topola; driver dead, passenger wounded." The next recites of telephone lines being interrupted. "28 August, strong concentration of insurgents in the area east of Kos. Mitrovica. 28 August, again band attack on railway station at Umkare driven off. 28 August, Wehrmacht patrol shot at railway line Padej-Potiski. One wounded. 29 August, 6.45, truck from Organization Todt fired on 8 kilometers south of Kragujevac. One dead, 1 wounded." And it is from the Commander in Serbia.
These reports that are submitted are a fair example of the kind of opposition they were meeting down there, and there certainly is nothing to warrant the frightful ratio of executions of 100 to 1 and 50 to 1.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just understood that these exhibits, are to prove that such information was sent out. I cannot see any proof in that, and I would subsequently like to contradict the introduction of these things. It is quite clear from the photostat it is a common draft, the preparation for reports of which I don't know whether these reports later on went out like this. We see this from looking at the documents which are, incidentally, not signed. They don't bear any heading. They are again, as so many documents, submitted here, merely sheets of paper which have been written on with a typewriter. From the contents and from the corrections, we can see that they are drafts. The prosecution should at least prove from the evidence which it submits that it was actually valid and had some effect. For this reason, I object to the introduction of this exhibit NOKW-1387.
MR. DENNEY: Of course, Your Honors, we admit that the drafts of documents only go to the weight and are to be given such consideration as the Tribunal sees fit. However, we will have occasion later to show similar drafts where we will also be able to show orders and the finished product based on these drafts. Now, in this case, the only thing we found was these drafts and they are submitted for such weight as the Tribunal sees fit to give them.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled. The Tribunal is admitting these exhibits having in mind the character of the evidence as presented, and will so consider them in its deliberation and final determination of this whole matter. It is also being admitted with the thought that the very character of the evidence as being representative of this type, defense counsel can rebut these matters and also are in a position to comment upon the character of the evidence as presented. The objection therefore will be overruled.
MR. DENNEY: The document in Document Book I is offered as Exhibit 38. It is Document NO-2838 and it is an extract from a report of the Head of the Security Police and the SD in Berlin, 30 August 1941. With reference to Jugoslavia it states that the "Einsatzgruppe Belgrade reports:
"As a reprisal measure for the continuous attempts on members of the German Wehrmacht, 50 Communists well known as functionaries and terrorists were shot to death on 29 August 41 in agreement with the Military Commander of Serbia."
Now, we have seen before other reports by the Einsatzgruppe to the Head of the Security Police and the SD in Berlin which were again issued from the Berlin office of the Security Police and the SD and here on 30 August we have another one where the Einsatzgruppe are reported as committing an act "in agreement with the Military Commander of Serbia."
We also had the earlier order offered today with reference to the operation Geier wherein the Commander of the 65th Corps gave orders to his troops as well as to the SD for the cooperation of the two units in the operation Geier.
That concludes Document Book I and Mr. Fenstermacher will take over, if your Honors, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Denney, I believe this would be an opportune time for our morning recess, and may I again remind counsel for Prosecution and counsel for defendants that we -- that the Tribunal are desirous that two representatives from the prosecution and defense meet in our chambers during the recess period.
The Tribunal will be in recess.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom will please be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I believe, if your Honors please, several of the documents which we have introduced up until this time have been reports from subordinate units in the field to various higher headquarters. The reports of the various armies in the field were also sent to Central Headquarters in Berlin, to the office of the OKH. The next document, which id Document No. NOKW-551, we offer as Prosecution's Exhibit 39, shows the compilation which Army Headquarters in Berlin made of the various reports which they received from the field. In order that Your Honors may have some understanding of what these OKW reports actually looked like, I would ask that the Prosecution exhibit be shown to Your Honors, so that you might have some understanding of the nature of this document. If you will turn to Page 17 in your document book, ....
THE PRESIDENT: Volume I or Volume II?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Volume II, Your Honor .......you will note that on that page we have a translation of the Morning Report, which was prepared by the Operations Department of OKH, Berlin -- a Morning Report of the 29th of July 1941--and you will note that under the Southeast, meaning the matters which follow, were reported by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast on the 28th of July, the day previous.
The 28th of July, 1941, states as follows: 25 July, "In Belgrade Jewish attempts to burn German vehicles, 100 Jews were shot to death." There is the execution of a hundred Jews in retaliation for an attempt--an attempt! to burn a German vehicle.
On page 16 of the English document book, the daily report of the armed forces commander in Southeast for the 29th of July, "Because of sabotage acts reported previously not 100, but 122 Communists and Jews executed."
And on page 15 of the English document book the daily report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for the 1st of August 1941, "Telephone wires cut on the Road Mladenovac-Topola. Attack on Gendarmerie guard. Attacks of small bands on Serbian authorities without particular damage near Petrovgrad, Pancevo, Topola and Uzice."
On 31, July "Petrovgrad--90 Communists executed."
Page 14 of the English document book, the daily report of the armed forces commander Southeast for the 2nd of August 1941, "144 people shot to death during search operations against former Cretan Franc tireurs near Alikianu (southwest of Chania). The village of Skines near Alikianu was burned down because shots were fired from there, on our approaching troops."
On page 12 of the English document book, the daily report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast for 7 August, 1941, "3 more dead communists discovered after the operation Kikinda on 4.8. Meanwhile the leader of the band, a former Serbian 1st Lieutenant, was captured and shot dead." The German document itself admits that the band was led by a Serbian 1st Lieutenant. He must have been wearing a uniform or they wouldn't have known he as a Lieutenant. He was captured and he was shot dead.
On the 6th of August, eighty-seven more communists and Jewish hostages shot dead in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.
Turn to page 10 of the English document book, the daily report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast for the 8th of August, 1941--
DR. LATERNSER: I have to ask for a slower presentation since only the pages of the English document book are mentioned and the defense has to deal with the German document book and has to follow by that. Either both pages have to be mentioned or we will have to go slower, please.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I am sorry. I will try to mention the crossGerman pagination too, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. I think it would be adviseable if you did mention it. In fact, it is necessary that German page numbers be mentioned so that counsel can follow from it.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I will be glad to do that. The one we are on now is page 10 of the English--that is on page 6 of the German. The daily report of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast for the 10th of August, 1941. "In Uzice: Colonel von Stockhausen ordered the shooting dead of Serbs as a reprisal measure near the locality where an attack on German police drivers had occurred. The Police Company collected 81 Serbs from neighboring villages and Serbian gendarmes were forced to shoot them. The incident caused a temporary crisis in the cabinet. The matter could be settled almost immediately so that all was quiet with regard to this local incident."
Note in German sadism how they get Serbs to shoot Serbs in retaliation for attacks on German police drivers.
The next is on page 8 of the English. The daily report of the armed forces commander Southeast of the 15th of August, 1941, it is on page 8 of the German, 14 August p.m. German police guard attacked near Skela, 15 kilometers west of Pokonovac. One officer, one sergeant of police killed, three sergeants of police missing. As a reprisal, Skela burned down and 50 communists hanged on the 15th of August. Two men were killed and three were missing, but 50 com munists had to be hanged and the whole village had to be burned down.
The The next is the morning report of the 16th of August, 1941. It appears on page 6 of the English and on page 8 of the German, the political situation in the area of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast This document, if Your Honors please, will tell you exactly what the Germans themselves said was going on, what they were faced with.
1) Serbia:
Situation still tense. Acts of terror and sabotage, seemingly executed according to plan are directed also against the Wehrmacht. Lately also terrorization of the population. Attacks on soldiers have decreased, Operations almost exclusively of communist origin. Reason for this--amongst others - is mass expulsions of Serbians from Croatia. The alleged cession of the Banat which I might say parenthetically was to Hungary contributes to the unrest of the Serbian, population and also of the Germans still living there.
DR. LETERNSER: A mistake on the translation. In the German it says "for the pacification" and not as the translation says "for the unrest." That is for the future possible cession of the Banat.
THE PRESIDENT: May I suggest that the question of interpretation be handed to the official interpreter so that he may give the Tribunal his conception of this particular matter?
DR. LATERNSER: Page 6 of the English Document book, No. 1,9,8 -8 of page, it says in the English, "The alleged cession of the Ganat contributes to the unrest."
In the German document book, page 9, line from above 8. it says "to the pacification of the Serbian population." The correct translation would be to the pacification and not "to the unrest."
THE INTERPRETER: The correct translation, as Dr. Laternser has pointed out, is "to the pacification of the population",--"contributes to the unrest."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Shall we read that line for the purpose of the record then? "The alleged cession of the Banat contributes to the pacification of the Serbian population and also of the Germans still living there."
Continuing, "Up to now only individual actions, which however may lead to larger armed communist insurrection if the situation becomes more tense. The political and economical life has not been disturbed to any extent. The mass of the population itself also suffers heavily under the terror potions, and in general, behaves loyally. Cooperation of Commander Serbia with Commissar government and Sergian police is good. Combatting of bands according to plan of all available troops, police SS and Serbian police.
Turning to the next page , page 7 of the English, we turn to Greece for the moment, page 11 of the German.
"Increasingly negative attitude toward occupation troops as a result of organized communist and English propaganda. Some few cases of sabotage counteracted by reprisals."
So, we see that even in Greese, the resistance was not great - that the German answer was reprisal. Continuing on a. few lines later:
"The position of the Greek government is difficult. Lacking authority, a large part of the population rejects it. Population dissatisfied but quiet. At this time the situation does not give any cause for worry. However, we must reckon with further incidents. The remainder of the Franctireurs hidden in the mountains are making attacks on Crete. Sharp countermeasures assured."
In the morning report of the 17th of August, turning to page 5 of the English, page 11 in the German. This is the OKH report in Berlin and it includes the report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast to OKH in Berlin of the preceding day. Besides, the commission hanged Skela, prior to the report of the 15th of August which I have previously read, 15 villages inhabitants shot dead for omitting to report the presence of the bandits.
This is the attempt of the Germans to impress the local population with the operations of its own military forces.
Then turning finally to page 1 of the English, Morning Report of the 1st of September, 1941, page 12 in the German.
1.) 30.8 Communists have pillages Serbian Gendarmerie post Sidjagovac (or Siljekovac) (20 kilomaters southeast of Krusevac).
. . . . . . .
2.) 28.8 10 bandits taken care of by fighter detachment on ridges southwest of Beljavac (26 kilometer southwest of Zajecar). 7 Houses burned down.
30.8 4 Bandits shot in combat during band attack on the German police station Ubub (16 kilometers northwest of Lazarevac).
Shooting Communists and bandits without any defition of how a bandit was to be warned.
I turn now to the next document which is NOKW 626 becomes Prosecution Exhibit No. 40. These are extracts.
THE PRESIDENT: What page, please.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 20 of the English Document Book, Extract of the War Diary of the Commanding General and Commander in Servia And, again I wish Your Honors might take a look at the actual exhibits so you will know what a war diary really looks like, have some understanding of the nature of the documents we are presenting. We will be presenting reports and war diary extracts and actual orders and it may help to actually see what they are. This is from the War Diary of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia for the month of September 1941 and about in the middle of the page in the actual photostat copy you will see reference to the 2nd of September.
"20 Communists shot for the 3 German soldiers killed in the surprise attack on the mine of Ptanj (20 Aug)."
There is a relation of three Germans killed and 20 Communists shot in retaliation. A note at the bottom of the page, actual photostat, with reference to 3 September:
"50 Serbs shot in reprisal for the soldiers of the 724th Guard Regiment shot by Communists at 8 a.m."
And, that is from the War Diary of the Commanding General in Serbia. There seems little doubt that the actual report to which the war diary contains a reference was actually sent on to List and Foertsch and 12th Army Headquarters in Athens.
The next document is on page 21, Document NOKW 453 which becomes Prosecution Exhibit No. 41. This it an order of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, Field Marshal List, of the 4th of September, 1941 and as you will see tells the subordinates not to enter into any negotiations with the members of the Serbian Resistance Movement. Again, if Your Honors will take a look at the actual photo static copy you will have some idea of what a teletype order actually looks like.
You will see on the right the initials W B Suedost which means that the order went out from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. You will see on the left of the document that it went out on the 4th of September time 1545. You will see that it went to Befehlshaber, Serbia, to Commander Serbia, Higher Headquarters IXV, and the text is very interesting because it shows the great concern which Field Marshal List had for political maneuvers in Serbia:
Request immediate brief estimate of overall situation.
a. What guarantee is offered by the new Serbian government?
b. What are its prospects?
c. What concessions are offered? (Armed power?)
d. What intentions generally to restore the situation and its unconditional authority?
The situation in the insurrection area around Krupanj must be restored as speedily as possible with own resources. What measures are usually met with. Take strictest action. Use of arms without consideration, never discussions. Unified leadership of the operation (one commander). Insurrectionists must without exception feel the superiority of the German soldiers and the force of their arms. Do not employ inadequate strength. Reverses must be avoided since they are untenable. Relieve incapable leaders, and if necessary, call them to account.
With severe language like that issuing from a General Field Marshal in command of the 12th Army you can well imagine the type of reports which are going to flow in from the subordinate units in execution of that type of language. The order is signed, Wehrmacht Commander South East, 12th Army.
General Field Marshal List.
We now turn to page 23, Document NOKW 084 which becomes Prosecution Exhibit 42. This, Your Honors, is one of the most important documents.
I wish your Honors would take a look at the photostatic copy which is signed in the handwriting of Field Marshal List. It is from List? Wehrmacht Commander in Chief of the 12th Army. It is from his headquarters on the 5th of September 1941. Six copies were made and this one which we have actually captured is the sixth copy:
"Subject: Suppression of the Serbian insurrection movement. The situation in Serbia does not seem to eliminate the possibility of spread of the insurrection movement. Increased attacks on soldiers and Wehrmacht installations by strong, well-armed bands apparently organized and adroitly led, prove that previous counter-measures are not adequate."
Now, note that language. We are going to hear a lot about this case later on; that these were individual attacks, and that the insurgents were not lead by responsible leaders; that they were not particularly well armed; that they did not wear insignia and that they were apparently just individual bandits.
DR. LATERNSER: I ask for a slower presentation so I can check the correctness of the translation of this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel will keep in mind the request made. I think that is a, very reasonable request.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: This document begins, Dr. Laternser, on page 21 of the German, at the second paragraph.
Commander Serbia and LXVth Corps Command consequently are to make all preparations immediately to enable them to cope with any aggravation of the situation and to pacify the country completely before tha beginning of the winter.
In regard to the above the following aspects are to be taken into consideration:
a) If the tension in the situation in Serbia increases the Divisions are to be concentrated on the focal points and on the local centers of the insurgent regions. Then a list of the various places involved.
Villages are to be garrisoned not below battalion strength! Considerations of comfort and improved billets must be secondary! The units are to regard themselves as living under campaign conditions.
This is no insurgent movement by isolated bands. This is a real war. Turning to the next page, page 24 of the English:
"They will have to do without permanent billets during this period and make their billets more like those of mobile warfare. This requires a constantly maneuverable composition and equipment free of any unnecessary ballast.
"Surprising, sudden attacks on the centers of insurrection by surrounding them with superior forces (including Artillery!) The operations are to be commanded by senior, experienced officers, Divisional. Commanders, according to detailed plans of operation and after preceding patrolling and reconnaissance."
If I might say parenthetically, war against the insurgents is to be commanded by experienced officers, divisional commanders. And, the outrages which you will see in the succeeding documents, will not be isolated and sporadic retaliatory measures taken by outraged units under lower rank commanders. It will be under the direction of the Divisional Commanders and lead by officers of general officer rank. Continuing with the document:
Commandos assigned up to now as need arose are no longer sufficient in the present situation. The next paragraph deals with the types of objects these troops were to protect.
The protection must therefore - when not necessary - be limited to objects whose preservation is vital. In this category belong primarily: Belgrade as the capital (here sufficient mobile reserves!), the railway Lenkovac - Nis - Belgrade - Direction Zagreb, the Danube and the Save bridges, the Danube break-through near the Eisern Tor, the copper mines of Bor, etc.
Active strengthened propaganda in the Serbian language with all means at our disposal (radio, leaflets, newspapers, picture posters, etc.
) Increased pressure on the population in areas where insurgents are tolerated in order to bring the residents to a point where they will report the appearance of bands to the German authorities or other wise co-operate in neutralizing the focal points of unrest." Now, to the next paragraph, the most important one in the document. This is a field marshal of the German Army issuing orders to subordinate units, and this is the language he uses. "Ruthless and immediate measures against the insurgents, against their accomplices and their families. (Hangings, burning down of villages involved, seizure of more hostages, deportation of relatives, etc. into concentration camps.) Close supervision of the Serbian Gendarmerie. Effective punishment must follow immediately in case of passive behavior, for instance, permitting oneself to be disarmed without suffering casualties. On the other hand it is recommended that the prospect of rewards (premiums) be held out for courageous behavior and for corresponding procedure. Increased employment of confidential agents to find out who and where the ringleaders, wire pullers, and focal points of insurrections are. Full employment of the influence of the Serbian Government which is to be made to accept responsibility and to co-operate actively. All members of the German Wehrmacht in Serbia are to be instructed again and again in the situation in Serbia and on their behavior in case of attacks, etc. These instructions are to stress that initiative and prompt action must be demanded from every German soldier. That in no situation can he negotiate with insurgents and that he can never surrender. I particularly expect the unit leaders of all ranks to use exceptional energy and initiative as well as full personal devotion to the task assigned which at this time consists solely and exclusively of suppressing the Serbian insurrection movement rapidly and finally.
"Incapable---"
THE PRESIDENT: May I see the original German document again?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: That would be Exhibit No. 24, Major Hatfield.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The final paragraph. "Incapable leaders are to be relieved without delay and if circumstances warrant, they are to be called to account." Signed List, Field Marshal. The distribution list of this order is to the three subordinate units under Field Marshal List, 65th Special Corps Command in Serbia, the Commander in Serbia, and to the Commander in Greece of the Saloniki, Agais Theatre.
We will see in a few minutes the results which flowed in from the issuance of this severe order.
The next document is NOKW-625 on page 27 of the English which becomes prosecution Exhibit 43. This is the same order as the preceding document except that the-
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please, what is the German page number?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The German is on page 23.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly give the German page number at the same time you give the English page number?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I will, sir. This is the same as the preceding document from a content standpoint, but it shows the actual receipt stamp of the military commander in Serbia.
The next document is on page 31 of the English and page 27 of the German, Document NOKW-214. It becomes prosecution Exhibit Number 44. This is a report of 738 Infantry Regiment to the 718 Infantry Division, and it relates to various encounters which the regiment has had with enemy groups. The report from the Regiment is dated 9 September 1941, and it was received by the higher division on the 12th of September 1941.
We needn't read this in its entirety but the last paragraph which is on page 33 of the English and on page 29 of the German, under "Supplies.) It reads as follows: "The fights around Keviljaca have shown that the Serbian Insurgent movement already has at its disposal perfectly well organized and disciplined units under good leadership. Terrain and national character favor guerrilla warfare very outstanding in manner; the patrol service and the transmission of Communications facilitated in an extraordinary way the co-coperation of the entire population," and the report is signed by the regimented commander, first Lt. Dzaack.
The next document is on page 34 of the English and page 30 of the German, Document NOKW-1049, which becomes prosecution Exhibit Number 45. These arc reports of the 65gh Special Corps Command which was operating under General Boder in Serbia, commander of the 18th Mountain Corps under General Boehme, reports from those two units to List and Foertsch as the commander and Chief of Staff of the 12th Army in Athens. We need not read all of these again. I wish if Your Honors might take a look at the photostatic copies so that you will understand the nature of the reports of the subordinate units to higher headquarters. First is the daily report of the 17th of August 1941, and the reports are broken down into the various divisions subordinate to the unit which is reporting. For example, there is the 704 Infantry Division and what it reports, and later the 714 Infantry Division and its full line reports, finally 718th Infantry Division and its reports. Those three Divisions were under the Higher Headquarters of Special Corps Command LXV, and in its reports the Corps coordinates reports which it has previously received from the divisions operating under it.
Turning to page 35 of the English and page 32 of the German, the daily report of the 19th of August 1941, the 714th Infantry Division reports as follows: