Unfortunately there were a number of Norwegians who fulfilled this demands with their women and children.
As far as the German Command was concerned it could have left the Norwegians to their fate. No doubt they all would have perished in the mountain. But in order to help these misled people and to preserve them from certain death the German Wehrmacht employed patrols to comb through Fjalls and Fjords to pick up Norwegians there who were full of gratitude to their last hour saviours. This for instance, 212 Norwegians were found during a search operation of a Mountain Jaeger Regiment in the area west of the road Lakselv-Kistrand on 5-7 December 1944 in the area north of Kistrand and Repparfjord. These rescue operations were carried on by the Wehrnacht at a time when the Wehrmacht itself had to accomplish marches of an extraordinary extent. If at present some individual Norwegians still keep hidden in the caves they alone are responsible for their miseries.
The Lapplanders through their leaders had been informed by the German Wehrmacht that they should move off to the west with their reindeer herds. The Lapplanders were promised an ample reward for every reinder they would drive across the road SkibothSlilastua. At first the Lapplanders accepted this offer particularly because the German Wehrmacht assured them of special protection for their reindeer herds.
If not withstanding the mass of Lapplanders with their reindeer herds did not move off it is obvious that they acted that way because enemy agents had misled them and caused them not to carry out their intention. Neither Lapplanders nor Norwegians have ever been told by the Germans that they would be shot to death if they did not evacuate.
The evacuation of the territory evacuated by the Wehrmacht and the complete destruction of all roads, billets, transportation and food stores prevents the Bolsheviks from a thrust into North Norway. That produces a great disappointment to the Soviets, their planned continued march will have to be delayed for the time being. That is why they agitate against the evacuation of North Finnland and North Norway and why they are trying to incite the neutral countries on this issue. And for all that it was Stalin who during the withdrawal of the Russian troops in 1941 for the first time caused the Russian population to evacuate and all residences to be destroyed.
Because Germany is fighting this struggle for her existence she must reply to the Russian methods of warfare with the same means unless she wants to lose.
During the evacuation all Norwegians were treated decently. The German soldier knightly has assisted all Norwegians requiring his help find thus he helped to mitigate to a great extent the emergency produced by the evacuation. In individual cases he has shared his rations with Norwegians and he helped the halt and the women loading their baggage.
The population was evacuated by means of ships or motor trucks. All available shipping space was mobilized. Inorder to cite one example: two large transports with about 1500 Norwegians each left for Tromsoe in the first half of November from Billefjord and Hamnbugt in the Porsangerfjord. The space put at the disposal of the Norwegians was intended for transportation of German Wehrmacht, goods. All German motor vehicles -- as far as space permitted - took along Norwegians. The young Norwegian capable of marching was permitted to go along on the ship or the motor vehicle only in order not to separate him from his family.
For this the German soldier managed long stretches on foot and had to spend the night outdoors.
If it did happen that in individual cases single family members were separated from their families the Germans did everything in their power to reunite the family.
German Wehrmacht doctors cared for the civilian population while en route and in the interim billets. The troops themselves furnished sufficient rations and established the billets.
And all these measures were carried out at a time during which the Germans themselves carried out one of the most difficult march movements.
In as far as Norwegians had to leave their personal property behind measures were taken to compensate them. As far as the transport situation permitted the rest of the entire Norwegian possessions particularly household equipment, clothing, fishing equipment, stoves, lighting fixtures were salvaged and evacuated.
(initials)
VaAw (signature) .emberg.
MR. RAPP: The next document, Your Honors, Norway No. 9, we offer for identification only, as 518-a, and we then turn to page 60, Norway 10 which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit No. 519. This is the proclamation to the population of Noway, published by the Reichs Commissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories, Terboven, and also by the Defendant Rendulic, at that time Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army: "TO THE POPULATION: The evacuation of a part of north Norway has been rendered a military necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique."
THE PRESIDENT: Page 60?
MR. RAPP: That is on page 60, Your Honor--Page six zero.
THE PRESIDENT: The document Norway Do. 10?
MR. RAPP: That's correct, Your Honor.
"The evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him, he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him active assistance in achieving his aims.
This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can be left to the Bolshevik enemy in the fighting zone. All such installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food stocks must be destroyed or removed.
THE POPULATION IN THESE DISTRICTS WILL THEREFORE BE DEPRIVED OF THE BASIS FOR THEIR EXISTENCE, SO THAT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SURVIVE, THEY MUST EVACUATE TO THOSE NORWEGIAN TERRITORIES WHICH ARE STILL PROTECTED BY THE GERMAN WEHRMACHT.
* * * * * * * * *
HE WHO DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THESE UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS EXPOSES HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY TO POSSIBLE DEATH IN THE ARCTIC WINTER WITHOUT HOUSE OR FOOD."
The next document, Your Honors, is Norway Norway No. 11, and we will mark this for identification, 520-A; Norway No. 12 will be 521-A, and then Norway No. 13, which Your Honors will find on page 89.
Norway No. 13 on page 89, page 83 in the German document hook. It is being submitted as Prosecution's Exhibit No. 522. This, Your Honors, is an Order of the Day, signed in his own handwriting by the Defendant Rendulic, and it reads:
"The Commander-in-Chief 20th Mountain Army Army Headquarters and Armed Forces Commander Norway 18 December 1944 As of today I assure the supreme command over all troops hitherto under High Command Norway.
I welcome at this occasion all Command authorities and Troops Units of the other parts of the Armed Forces employed in the Norway Theater, In the coming year of decision I expect smooth cooperation of all Command authorities and Offices.
Our common take serves only one goal: To help the work of our Fuehrer toward final victory.
Long live the Fuehrer Signed RENDULIC COLONEL GENERAL AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER NORWAY."
If your Honors please, there is still Norway 6, Document Norway 6. We submit this for identification only. Norway 6. That 523-A. And then Norway 7 we submit in evidence as Exhibit 524. Your Honors will find this on page 27 of the document book. I believe it is on page 29 of the German document book. It is: Command Post 19 December 1944 Office APO No. 02192 Subject:
Evacuation of the area West Bank Lyngonfjord.
Pursuant to the application by the Norwegian evacuation Chief in Lyngon Major Ress the time limit for the end of the evacuation is extended from 21 December 1944 to 10 January 1945 For the Office of APO No. 02192 By order (signature) Grothe Major G S C I believe, your Honor, this will conclude Document Book 23 but for the submission of the additional proof required by the Tribunal and after the elapsing of the 24-hour period tomorrow we shall come back to that.
There is one additional certificate, your Honor, which we would like to submit at this time for identification only, in order to got the 24 hour time limit in.
It pertains particularly to document No. 9 and I am sure we will talk about that some more tomorrow. So for the time being, if your Honor permit, we will call this particular certificate for identification, 525-A. If your Honors please, we request the Court to instruct the Marshal to summon the witness Arne Dahl.
THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal is directed to present the witness named to the Tribunal.
Does the witness speak English?
MR. RAPP: The witness does speak English, your Honor, but there may be occasionally a word which he told me he may not know, so we also would like if your Honors please to swear in the official Norwegian interpreter in cases of emergency.
THE PRESIDENT: The interpreter will raise his right hand and be sworn.
I do solemnly swear that I will perform my duties as interpreter before, this Tribunal according to the best of my ability and skill.
(The Interpreter repeated the oath.)
ARNE DAHL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. The witness will raise his right hand to be sworn. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this Tribunal will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, would you please give your full name?
A. My full name is Arno Dagfin Dahl.
Q. Witness, how long have you been in the Norwegian army?
A. I have been in the Norwegian army since 1915.
Q. Have you been active since that time?
A. Yes, I am a regular officer from 1915 and I have been active since,
Q. What is your present rank, witness?
A. My present rank is a major general.
Q. And how old are you, witness?
A. I am 53 years of age.
Q. Could you state for us shortly your military career, please?
A. I was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1938, a Colonel in 144 and a Major General in 1945. I have been commanding officer of the Military College of Oslo, aide-de-camp to the King of Norwar, and commanding officer of the Western Finnmark district since the 1st of January, 1938.
After that, after war broke out in Norwar, I took part in the fighting up in North Norway and had the command of a battalion and then a brigade. Later on, I got over to Great Britain from Norway in 1940 where I commanded the Norwegian troops in Scotland. I got to Schtland in 1940 and commanded the Norwegian troops there. In 1941 I was appointed head of a military mission to the United States and Canada where I stayed until 1943 when I went back to England and in 1944 was appointed head of a military mission to Russia. In 1945, as I said, I was appointed a Major General and am now commanding the Northern District of Norway which is about one-third of Norway.
Q. Witness, where were you located when the Norwegian resistance collapsed?
A. When the Norwegian resistance collapsed, I was not very far from Narvik in the mountains near the Swedish border.
Q. And you said after that you went to England, you escaped so to speak.
A. Yes, we demobilized our army and I went to England by boat.
Q. Did you have to sign any paper, parole or oath not to fight against the German armed forces?
A. No.
Q. Witness, when was the first time after your escape to England that you re-entered Norwegian territory?
A. I re-entered Norwegian territory on the 10th of November, 1944 after having come to Murmansk on the 6th of November.
Q. What was your mission at that time? What did you do?
A. My mission was to cooperate with the Russian forces and at the same time to have command of the Norwegian troops being sent to Finnmark. Besides, I had the mission to reinstall Norwegian authorities in re-occupied territories. For that reason, my mission also consisted of representatives of the different Norwegian government branches such as social affairs, justice and police, finance, information, and so on.
Q. Now how did these troops, these Norwegian troops that you speak of -- how did they get into Finnmark?
A They got to Finnmark in the same way as I did and the mission, by sea from Great Britain. The Norwegian forces to start with were merely a taken force. We had very small forces in Scotland or in Great Britain and it was taken aboard a convoy and came to Murmansk on the 5th of November.
Q Now you say, witness, that you landed and these troops landed in Murmansk. What was the reason that they had to go so far cast when they wanted to go into Norway?
A Well, there were several reasons for that. The first reason perhaps to get into cooperation with our Russian Allies by the way, secondly that it was very difficult to land anywhere in North Norway at that time because of the destruction.
Q Did the Germans in these days command the Coast area?
A Yes, I think I might say so, not all of it but most of it.
Q Witness, did you actually engage the Germans up there in Finnmark?
A No, I can't say so. When we took over from the Russians, which was by the end of November, the German troops had already got such an advance that we did not get into touch with German troops until about the beginning of February and that was only a patrol skirmish. No had some small engagements later on in Western Finnmark but nothing very much.
Q Now, witness, when you arrived up there in Murmansk and you got in touch with the Russians, were you told at that time what intentions they had in reference to the German forces up there?
A I was not give any definite plan but I got to know that the Karelian Army under General Retneskop had been sent south, the most part of it, south to the main theater in the Baltic, but as comparatively a small force was left in North Norway and I had not been there a very long time until I understood that it was not the Russian intention to follow the German forces. When we got to Norway, the eastern part of eastern Finnmark, the most forward patrols of the Russian army were on the Tana River.
Q If you want to-
A Well, have you got a pointer? Perhaps I might point it out.
Q Yes, we have.
AAs I said, when we got to the eastern part of Eastern Finnmark, the Russian forward patrols wore on the Tana River and the last contact which had been between Russian and German troops was on the 6th of November and there is the River Tana (indicating).
We heard the Russians did not try to follow up and there might be severed reasons for that. We asked that tho Norwegian troops might be put in the frontline as soon as possible. But when we got there, there was no enemy there.
Q that date are you speaking of, witness?
A I am speaking of the--now about the 27th or 26th of November when the Norwegian troops got to the Tana line.
Q Was there fighting or any contact between you and the Russian forces and the Grmans around Kirkenes prior to that date?
A No, there was not.
Q Now witness, did you advance in a westerly direction with your brigade?
A Yes. I had not a brigade to start with, but by and by we got troops from Sweden and from Great Britain so that in the spring of 1945 we had a brigade. The advance was very difficult because of the difficulties of time of year, of the roads, and the climate and I might be allowed then to say a few words about the country about which we are speaking.
The area of Finnmark is more that 48,000 square kilometers. That means it is larger than for instance Switzerland or Denmark. In this area were living about 60,000 people, mostly rather poor people and most of them fishermen. The main part of the population was living along the coast. The climate at that time of year is very, severe, and you might understand that when I show you that the Polar Circle is very for south of this area.
I will point to it now. Here it is (indicating) The mean temperature in December is about the 70th degree, 14 degrees Fahrenheit in December.
In January it is about 11 to 12 degrees. In the inner part of the country it is far colder and the temperature may drop to 40 below, even more. The country is very high so that the northern winds coming right in from the arctic Ocean have a tremendous bite. There is not a very great amount of snow.
I might say, generally speaking, about one meter. But because of the heavy storms, especially from the North, this snow is drifting up in largo drifts and that again means that it is very difficult to keep the roads open. Not so much because of the amount of snow but because of the drifting snow and I would like to point out that even with the assistance of great number of Russian prisoners of war, the Germans were not able to keep Main Road 50 open all the year around.
There are certain stretches which would be very difficult to keep open and as I said one special part of it just west of the Tana Fjord was not kept open any year as far as I know during the war.
I might also say that there is only really one road leading from cast to west. That is Main Road 50 and that is just a road which is so difficult to keep open. There is another road coming from Ivalo in Finland going through a Norwegian place called Karasho and joining Main Road 50 at the Possoni Fjord. (indicating) There is one more road from Finland to Norway and that is south of this area coming into Troms country or territory.
Q General, how far were the German rear guards ahead of you on the average?
A Well, I really don't know but I should think that they were very far ahead because the last contact between Russian troops and German troops and that was only patrols was on the 6th of November and we didn't get there until about the 26th--that means about three weeks. They had a three weeks' advance. I should think personally, sir, that by the end of November, all German main forces would be out of Finnmark and that only very small rear guards and destruction troops were loft behind; the Germans had then been in this territory for four and a half years and of course knew it very well.
They had a great number of fortifications along the Coast, partly belonging to tho Navy and partly belonging to the Army and commanded by tho Army, but all these bases were destroyed by and by.
Q Now witness, did you generally follow the main route to retreat of tho German army, generally speaking?
A Yes, one mountain force of the Norwegian troops followed that main road.
Q. And they were under your command?
A They were under my command but not until the beginning of February. Before that date, they were under the command of the Russian troops. According to an agreement which the Norwegian Government had, a similar agreement between the American, British and Russian Governments, according to which the Norwegian forces fighting in Norway should be put under the command of that particular allied commander but in the beginning of February I got command of all the troops up there.
Q What was your estimate at that time how large the German forces were who were retreating in numbers?
A Well, I had a very good order battle of the German troops. I cannot now remember exactly how many it would be.
Q Roughly.
A But I should think something between 100 and 150 thousand men.
Q Now General, you said that these Norwegian troops which followed up this German retreat or withdrawal were under the over-all command of the Russians until February, 1945. Is that right?
A No, until the 5th of 6th of February.
Q All right. Now were there substantial Russian forces accompanying these Norwegian forces?
Q. All right, Now were there substantial Russian forces accompanying these Norwegian forces?
A. There were no Russian forces accompanying the Norwegian forces, and it was quite clear as I have previously stated from the beginning that the Russian forces would not enter Finnmark. It was too difficult proposition at that time of the year to follow up with large forces in a country like that. And besides, the position was not in Norway, and it didn't very much matter to the allied forces if Finnmark was occupied or not.
Q. General, as you were going west with your brigade, between November and February, up there - just what did you see?
A. I saw the scorched earth policy as I have never seen it before. All the communications were destroyed. The roads were blown up and mined, the bridges, the quays, the telephone and telegraph centrals; the telephone poles were either out down or blown up, and in the craters along the few roads were a great number of both teller mines and personnel manes. Also the housing was destroyed - not everything in the eastern most part of Eastern Finnmark because the Russian attack had prevented that destruction. Otherwise, speaking of the line West practically specking - west of the Tana River, everything was completely destroyed. That includes all housing and what I mentioned before; also historical buildings and churches. Not all of them but more than half of the churches were destroyed. And this destruction took place - as far as I know from October until rather late in the spring of 1945. The destruction took place not always at one particular time. There were places which were raided two or three time.
Q. What do you mean by that, General?
A. That means the place was destroyed once. Not all of the population was evacuated. Some were left for some reason or other, and this was, of course, known to the German troops so that they came back for a second and a third time and got away the rest of the population and destroyed the shacks and huts or what they might have built in the meantime to be able to survive.
Q. General, what was the approximate date - I mean in months that the subsequent destructions of these towns happened?
A. I think -- well, I am sure - that places like Kjullefyord (witness spells the name) were raided by the end of November and by the middle of December; and there are several other places which are difficult to spell - I think I will drop it - which were raided a couple of times, too.
Q. General, do you have any knowledge as to the date - or the approximate date - that some of the main communication centers were destroyed, going from east to west, from Kirkanes.
A. Well, of course, there were destroyed as the German troops withdrew. And I should think that most of them were destroyed by the end of November. But I cannot tell anything exactly about that.
Q. Now, as the German troops withdrew and the destruction had taken place by the end of November, do you know whether or not other destructions occurred as the German army withdrew which would fall into the months of December and January?
A. Yes, I have just told you that at least two or three places on the coast were raided at a later date; and I also know for certain that some places in western Finnmark were destroyed, for instance, in the month of December. I think I am not wrong, but that can be verified by the official papers, when I was in the town of Hammerfest and Kjullefjord and Upper Alta were destroyed about the middle of December.
Q. General, did you get, at that time that you were up there, these reports that these various towns and hamlets were destroyed?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you think at that time, was the reason for these destructions?
A. Well, I thought that it was wanton, and I could not see that it was a necessity for the German forces so completely to destroy the country as was done.
Q. Now, you say "so completely" -- do you mean that - do you want to say that not everything represented military targets? What do you mean by that? Will you explain it to us?
A. Well, I can understand that communications were destroyed, but I cannot understand and I cannot see that according to any international law that the housing, for instance, and especially along the coast where there could, not be any advantage, were so destroyed as theywere; and monuments and churches, and so on; and hospitals, for instances, were also destroyed.
Q. Now, you stated that the highway 50 was, so to speak, the crux, the most important part of this entire evacuation.
A. Will you please repeat that question, please?
Q. The Highway 50 was the most important element that has to be taken into consideration both by the forces in retrograde movement as those who were following up, is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, as it possible for either the Germans, or for you, to not follow this highway 50 and still advance?
A. Yes. It could be done.
Q. To what extent?
A. Well, it could be done, but only with smaller forces and with troops on skiis, and it would, in any case, take a very, very long time; and these troops had to live under Arctic conditions, complete darkness; it rained up there for two months, from November to January so that troops which advanced outside of the main Road 50 would be exposed to very great hardships. But I don't doubt that small groups might be able to advance from east to west.
Q. But not in large bodies?
A. No, i think that is the great difference between these two things. Large bodies could not be supplied. This is the main thing.
They could probable also advance, but as they could not get supplies they could not keep themselves up.
Q. General, have you ever seen, or as it been officially reported to you, that there was substantial destruction away from Highway 50?
A. Yes, as I said, sir, I had on my mission representatives of the Norwegian government, different branches, and they sent in representatives of our government, through me, as I was their head. I read them all and saw the reports. Besides, I get reports from my unit commanders, more of a military nature. So I knew at any time what had been -
Q. You saw them?
A. And reported it.
Q. Now General, in that time that you were up there did you ever converse with the indigenous population of Norway, or Finnmark?
A. I did.
Q Did these conversations evolve around the subject of the evacuation?
A. Yes, very much so, as these people were in a very poor condition As a matter of fact in order to be able to save them we had to concentrate on saving lives instead of trying to kill Germans. We sent out three expeditions; one along the coast, which got rather far along and under the command of a lieutenant colonel, and he actually succeeded in getting back into safety more than 1,000 people. I sent another expedition along the Tana Riber down to the Sogne Fjord, which I just pointed out on the map, in the center of Finnmark. All these expeditions were equipped with clothing, food medicines, and so on; blankets -- to try to help these people who, we heard, were living in great distress. And if we had not been so well prepared with that relief work I think that the destruction would have been much greater than now happened.
Q. Now, General, you said your forces did not amount to more than three thousand men in February, is that right?
A. It did not amount to so much as three thousand men in February, but I think in March.
Q. Then did you commence this action, where you helped your country men up there.
A. We started right away. I could see that there was very little chance of capturing any German rear guards. I found it much more the much more important thing to try to save our countrymen's lives, so I started in November by sending these expeditions along the coast north, and a little later the expeditions inland.
Q. How many men did you have at that time when you commenced?
A. I had about three hundred men.
Q. Was their help effective?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Well, how many people did you have to help?
A. Well, they were left there in eastern Finnmark. We hoped to start with fifty thousand people but by and by we found manymore, hidden in most strange place. They were hidden in the most strange places; and then we got these reports from scouts so I think that if we had not prepared this eventuality we might not have found some people that winter.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors, please, I had a talk with the defense Counsel for he defendant Rendulic, Dr. Fritsch, and ho tells mo that ho is agreable that we withdraw Identification 515-A. That was the document which was a certificate by the Norwegian representative here in Nurnberg giving evidence as to these documents we are trying to put in, but when he made out this original certificate ho listed all the documents, including those which have meanwhile been received. I suggested to Dr. Fritsch that we pare this particular document down to include only those which have not been received, and hat I will furnish him tonight a copy of such certificate in lieu of 515-A, and that he should consider the 24-hour rule still being covered by that arrangement, and Dr. Fritsch told me that was agreeable to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors, please, I would bow like to continue the examination of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
Q. Witness, prior to the recess we were concerning ourselves with reports or conversations you had in connection with the Norwegian population which you met up here, and I asked you to tell us he nature of this conversation as far as it had any bearing on the evacuation which took place at that time?
A. I think I mentioned that we saved at least 1,000 Norwegians living on the coast, and many more, but I don't know the exact number of people living inland. Now, these people, as I said were living in the greatest distress. First of all, this was at a part of the year where the temperature is very low, and they had no houses. They had no food. It was taken away when the German forces withdrew. They had no means of getting food, because their boats, motor boats, and even small going boats, were either destroyed or sunk.
So that it was an obvious task for us to try and get hold of these people, and get them back to safety. We got a report from one island west of Hammerfest, - that was in January, that about 1,000 people were living in the greatest distres, and they had to be relieved. We could not do that because we hadn't got boats enough, therefore we had to send a message to London and ask for a relief expedition from there, and that was accepted on the 15 of February, when about 500 people were brought away to Murmansk, and later on to Scotland.
Q. Did any of these persons that you saved or you administered medical care, over mention to you ho fact why they did not evacuate?
A. Yes, I cannot remember any special remark, but these people had their homes up there. Norwegians have been living in these areas for several hundreds of years, and the way they were evacuated was in such a crude manner, that they thought it would be bettor to stay there, to stay behind even when taking the risks of the cold and the scarcity of food and so on.
Q. You speak of the way - or I believe you said the cruel way of the evacuation how do you know that?
A. I have read all the reports. They nave made a general impression on me and I do not remember details, but I do remember one instance which was stated in a report to me on the 15th of December 1944 by an Army officer, who had made his escape himself. That was from a place called Berlevaag. When the withdrawal from the Eastern part of Finnmark started in October, the main population of Berlevaag got the orders to meet at a curtain day at a certain hour, and the order went on to say those who did meet would be shot. This man, this Army officer met also, and they were ordered to carry ammunition shells from dumps down to the boats. The shells weighed about 35 kilos, and they were also ordered to carry dynamite and gun powder down to the boats, and they did that for about two days.