Criminal proceedings, however, before state tribunals of the victorious powers may appear to many a questionable method in order to remove existing doubts and in order to establish authoritatively what is right in doubtful cases. Total war has changed the nature of many a law. In an age when the policy of "scorched earth" is partially applied by the warring power in its own country to a large extent, the general devastation, which has been ordered in the cause of large scale strategic operations is not a suitable subject of a criminal proceedings."
Since the prosecution has not proved its allegation, since further it has not shown any facts which could be considered criminal actions perpetrated by the defendant during the evacuation, the motion which I have put forward is justified and I beg the High Tribunal to rule upon it.
V.
With regard to the general position of the defense in my case I consider myself now at the conclusion of my remarks obliged to point out to your Honors the difficulties with which I as counsel for the defense have to cope; especially with regard to the case for the Balcans only a small part of really very extensive material is available. The evidentiary material, which would serve to show more clearly all possible circumstances which led to the various actions of the defendant Rendulic are not accessible to me. Also it is possible for me to submit parts of the prosecution documents only to a small extent, parts which can serve to exonerate the defendant, the defendant and therefore also the counsel for the defense must in the main rely on the memory of the defendant in the conduct of his defense. It is simply beyond the capacity of the human brain still to remember details, facts, persons, conferences and discussions, relevant for this trial after 4 years and more than 3 years since the conclusion of the war during which the defendant was active on many fronts, during which he had to deal with any number of superiors and subordinates in constantly changing positions, and during which he had to tackle the most complicated problems of warfare, and to prove such reminiscences with material of probative values The prosecution had many months in which to prepare its case.
The defendant and his counsel have received the evidentiary material of the prosecution only at the end of June and during the month of July 1947 in such a short period of time it is not possible to examine this material as thoroughly as one should and a.t the same time to collect the necessary rebuttal evidence especially since the latter is particularly difficult in view of the present situation in Germany and takes an unduly long time. As counsel for the defense I consider myself obliged to help to establish the truth. But I am also obliged to point out those circumstances which might make this even technically impossible for me.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that a prima facie case, at least, has been made against the defendant Rendulic in regard to the evacuation of the province of Finnmark, and the motion of his counsel to dismiss that portion of the count will be overruled.
Is counsel for the defendant Dehner prepared to make his opening statement?
DR. KLINNERT(For General Dehner): Your Honors, James W. Garner, the well known American teacher of International Law, Professor for International Law at the University of Illinois, author of the well known work "The International Law and the World War" gave a lecture in Berlin, on 30 November 1935, on the subject of "The International Law and the Wars of the Future". In this lecture Garner said in regard to international law during world bar I, 1914-1918, inter alia the following: I quote:
"Both sides maintained that many of the old standards dating back to a time in which conditions were either not applicable, illogical or ineffective and would therefore have to be discarded. Or they would have to be adapted, by way of additions, to the new conditions, or the new means of warfare, under which and by means of which the war was to be continued.
It is a fact that the laws of war were in a chaotic state; many points were not covered by any law at all, with regard to other points there existed no agreement as to what was lawful, and with respect to other points again the standards were hopelessly incomplete, illogical and badly suited to the new conditions under which the war had to be waged."
With a prophetic eye this lawyer, who is among the greatest teachers of international law of our centry, stated the following with regard to a future war which unhappily has become reality: I quote:
"The next great war -- in case we should unhappily have to live through one again -- will thus to a large extent have to be waged without fixed standards or under standards, which will be ineffective or imperfectly adapted to present conditions, unless in the meantime the existing standards are revised or supplemented by new ones ......"The world did not grant Garner's demands for a revision and a new setting up of the standards of International Law.
The standards of International Law have not been supplemented or strengthened. They have not been revised. It was not ascertained which parts of the laws of war were still valuable and useful.
On the strength of these facts the following questions arise:
Is it possible at all for a charge to be based on standards which have been termed hopelessly incomplete, hopelessly illogical and hopelessly ineffective by one of the greatest teachers of International Law?
And would it not be an injustice to base a condemnation on such standards?
Prior to the examination of the evidence the following task must therefore be fulfilled:
The Laws of War that are laid down in the Hague Convention and in the text books of International Law, must be analysed with regard to all their finer points. First of all one must ascertain, which parts were still generally valid during the last war. Only when this is established could the Tribunal arrive at a just decision.
I am expressly using the word "could", for establishing this point only does not suffice.
No punishment without a wrong being committed.
This is a universally valid legal maxim of all penal systems.
This legal maxim is valid in particular in ail countries guided by English and American Law.
It is true that on principle ignorance of a law is no excuse for a punishable act.
This maxim, however, does not possess unrestricted validity even as far as the penal law of individual states is concerned, American law especially knows of exceptions to this rule. In this context I refer to Winthrop "Military Law and Precedents" edition 1920. On page 29 of this work Winthrop cites some examples in which ignorance of the legal norms excludes culpability.
Owing to the chaos concerning the validity of the legal standards in International Law, this maxim can, however, find no application at all in International Law.
Otherwise this would mean demanding a better knowledge of the standards of International Law from a soldier than from the recognized authorities on International Law.
General Dehner, who is represented by me, could thus only be punished,
a) if violations of those norms of the Laws of War car be proved whose general validity was still recognized during the last war by those nations abiding by International Law, and,
b) if it is established that General Dehner was also conscious of this.
It is therefore necessary to subject the Laws of War as laid down in the Hague convention to a very searching analysis.
For this reason I cannot by any means agree with the Prosecution if in their Opening Statement they say:
"Nor--- can the true meaning of this case be drawn from learned arguments by counsel, analyzing and refining the laws of war as they are written in the Hague Conventions and in textbooks on international law."
(Page 10 of the German and page 11 of the English record) But I can even less agree with the Prosecution if in its' Opening Statement it further says that questions of evidence are of secondary importance.
The questions of evidence play a very considerable part, particularly in view of the confusion which predominated in matters of international law during the last world war.
In peace time it is, as a matter of principle, forbidden to kill a human being, not so in war time. Even the killing of hostages may be legal, as even the Prosecution has stated.
Destruction of foreign property, also, is not always illegal in case of war.
Therefore, the facts have to be thoroughly established in order to answer the question, whether the few norms of laws of war which still have general validity, have been violated.
It is not sufficient, therefore, when the prosecution presents evidence for the fact that hostages have been killed, and that inhabited localities have been destroyed.
Instead, the prosecution will have to present in all cases the pertinent circumstances, especially the reasons leading to the killing of hostages and destruction of inhabited localities.
The documents which have been submitted, especially the teletypes do not show this in any way.
Generally speaking the following can be said with regard to the documents which have been submitted as evidence against General Dehner, especially with regard to the daily reports:
These documents have no probative value according to the regulations concerning evidence of the American rules of procedure, for the following reasons:
1. They do not constitute the best evidence which could be presented by the prosecution, but instead "secondary evidence" which is not admissible:
I quote: "The best evidence must be produced of which the case is susceptible." (Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 1920, page 321.)
2. It does not suffice, therefore, that the prosecution submits that their evidence consists of captured documents.
Instead, the prosecution has to prove, that General Dehner himself, either wrote them (daily reports), received them, or was informed of their contents. Such a proof would be necessary even if - which is not however the case - these documents had been captured amongst General Dehner's effects. I quote:
"Neither is it sufficient to show merely that the letter or telegram was found in the possession of the person in question, without further showing that he wrote, received or knew of such writing". End of quote.
(Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Cases 1935, Vol. II, page 1394.
To refute these ay statements the regulations of Ordnance No. 7 could be quoted, according to which Military Tribunals are not bound to any rules concerning evidence. In this connection I would like to point out the attitude of two judges, who even today are members of the Supreme Court. These two judges have expressed the following attitude in connection with this question in the case of Yamashita:
Mr. Justice Rutledge has said:
"The rules of evidence are not only a matter of evidence. They go to the basis right of defense." (Case Yamashita, page 12.)
I quote further: "They go also to the basic standarts of trial", end of quote. (Case Yamashita, Page 2.)
Mr. Justice Murphy has said: "The punishment should be based upon charges fairly drawn in light of established rules of international laws and recognized concepts of justice." (Case Yamashita, Page 12.)
In this connection the Prosecution further submitted, they did not believe it would be refuted; that:
1. the killings charged in the indictment actually took place, 2. they were carried out by troops under the command of these defendants, and 3. they were actually ordered by the defendants.
These statements of the prosecution do not apply under any circumstances to General Dehner, whom I represent.
To begin with, it will certainly be refuted that all killings alleged in the indictment did actually take place. The Prosecution did not present full evidence for these allegations.
Furthermore, it will certainly be refuted that, inasmuch as the killings with which General Dehner has been charged, took place at all, they were carried out by troops under the command of General Dehner.
Thirdly, it will be fully refuted that General Dehner did ever at any time order an execution. Instead, the allegation to this effect by the Prosecution will be confronted by an allegation of the Defense that General Dehner had never ordered any execution. This can be seen from the very presentation of the Prosecution. The orders which have been submitted by the Prosecution in this connection were already valid at the tine when, in August 1943, General Dehner took over the command of the LXIX Corps. The order of the 15 Sept. 1943 was passed on by General Dehner's deputy, without the former's knowledge, while he was on leave.
According to these orders the divisional commanders were exclusively responsible for the reprisal measures and the executions of hostages.
As my colleague, Dr. Laternser, has already shown in detail, the court will have to go deeply into the question to what extent General Dehner can be at all punished for actions which his subordinates committed without his orders and during his absence. For all actions committed by General Dehner in his capacity as Commanding General of the LXIX Corps, were committed pursuant to orders of his superior military authority.
I do not want to repeat the statements which my colleague, Dr. Laternser, has made here, but instead I wish to point out the following points: This question cannot be decided on the basis of the principles of either the American or the German Penal Law, but solely according to the principles of international law. International law, however, is completely void of any norm, such as is defined in Article II, No. 4 b, of Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 March 1945. International law does not know of any norm establishing that a soldier should not base his actions on superior orders. Therefore, the court will have to go deeply into the question to what extent the Control Council could establish the norm of Article II, No.
4 b of Control Council LaW No. 10, dated 20 Dec. 1945 with retroactive power. In case that the Tribunal should want to base this decision on the principles of the American Penal Code, I should like to draw attention to the writings of William Winthrop in his work "Military Law and Precedents". In this book, it is stated - on page 296 that auctions of a soldier, committed pursuant to written or oral orders by a military superior, are not punishable.
In this connection the Prosecution has referred to the stipulation of Art. 47 of the German Military Penal Code and stated that the law of the German Army itself says that every soldier is in duty bound to refuse the carrying out of orders the criminal nature of which is known to him. The Prosecution has, however, not taken into account here the following point of view for the application of this stipulation. This stipulation always presumes the possibility of refusing to carry out an order. If this possibility were not open to the soldier, then his refusal would result in strict punishment for failing to carry out orders, without examining the legality of the order and the illegal act which had been ordered could not be prevented. The common soldier can refuse to carry out a criminal order given to him by a lieutenant, because he then has the possibility to complain to the superior of the lieutenant. The lieutenant can refuse to carry out a criminal order given by a staff officer, because he has then the possibility to turn to the superior of the staff officer. This possibility, however, does not exist if orders of any kind, the illegality of which should now be proved, have been issued by the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. And this possibility does not exist under any circumstances, if these orders have been issued by a dictator, who unites in his hand all the powers of tho state, as in the case of Hitler, a dictator who would, in fact, have had the orders issued by him carried out by using every means at his disposal. What was General Dehner to do in the face of the orders given him? How could he have prevented their being carried out, and after his Septem ber leave those orders had already been carried out.
Where was General Dehner to seek justice when confronted by illegal orders of Hitler's?
Without answering these questions reference to a superior order cannot be excluded.
With regard to the four counts of the indictment under which General Dehner is charged I have to make the following detailed observations:
Under Count 1 of the indictment General Dehner is charged with responsibility for the cases listed under 5 i, k and m.
In case 5 i General Dehner is charged with the responsibility for the shooting of 40 hostages on or about 15 September 1943 in Croatia by troops of the 173rd Reserve Division.
The Prosecution has submitted no proofs to this effect.
From none of the documents submitted by the Prosecution it follows that on 14 September 1943. 40 hostages were shot in Croatia by troops of the 173rd Reserve Division. None of the witnesses examined by the Prosecution has testified to that effect.
If the Prosecution had proved these facts which they have asserted, I would prove that General Dehner was on leave during that time and that for this reason alone General Dehner could not be held to account under penal law for the shooting of these hostages.
It will, however, not depend on proving this point because as already mentioned there is so far a complete lack of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
JUDGE CARTER: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. KLINNERT: I shall now continue my opening statement:
Under 5k of the indictment General Dehner is held responsible under penal law for the shooting of the 40 hostages in Croatia on 28 September 1943 through troops of the 173rd reserve division.
The arrest and execution of these hostages took place on the basis of an order of the 2nd Panzer Army of 15 September 1943. Document NOKW 509, Exhibit 340, Document Book XIV; Page 10. This order was passed on during General Dehner's leave. For this reason along General Dehner bears no responsibility under penal law for the passing on of this order.
On the basis of this order the divisional commanders decided independently with regard to the shooting of the hostages.
In the case of Yamashita the Supreme Court had pronounced the following legal maxim:
"And in Gen. Orders No. 264, Hq. Div. of the Philippines September 9, 1901, it was held that an officer could not be found guilty for failure to prevent a murder unless it appeared that the accused had "the power to present" it."
(Supreme Court Nos. 61 Miscellaneous and 672, October Term, 1945 (Page 10.)
General Dehner did not possess the power to prevent the execution of these measures ordered by a superior.
Moreover the shootings of hostages reported by teletype of 28 September 1943 were carried out during the leave of General Dehner. Under count 5 m General Dehner is charged with responsibility under penal law for the execution of 20 bandit suspects by troops of the 187th Reserve Division.
The teletype of 10 October 1943 submitted by the prosecution as evidence for this assertion; bears no signature; initial. It is merely an unauthenticated typewritten letter. This document has no probative value whatsoever.
No further evidence was offered by the prosecution for this assertion made under count 5 m.
I therefore move to discontinue proceedings against the defendant Dehner regarding the indictment point 5 i and m because the prosecution has offered no evidence which incriminates General Dehner beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the further shootings listed in the teletype of 15 November 1943 and 12 November 1943 (Document NOKW 658, Exhibit 375 I shall prove that these shooting were not carried out by the divisions belonging to the LXIX Reserve Corps.
In a further teletype of 21 September 1943, Document NOKW 659, Exhibit 375, a report is made of the shooting of 10 hostages as a reprisal measure for an attack on the motor truck of a Croatian Panzer Regiment. Here I shall prove that
a) General Dehner was on leave during this time,
b) the shooting of these hostages was carried out not by troops of General Dehner's, but by Croatian units not subordinate to General Dehner.
Under Count 2 General Dehner is charged with plunder and devastation.
The devastation of 2 Croatian villages listed in the indictment under 9 c was carried out while General Dehner was on leave. For this reason alone General Dehner bears no responsibility under penal law.
Regarding the destruction of villages on 16 October 1943 listed under count 9 g, I shall first of all prove that it may be doubtful whether these two communities were burnt down at all.
In any case, the destruction of these two villages was not ordered by the corps.
I shall further prove that in so far the prerequisites of military necessity as well as the prerequisites of a reprisal action under international law were present.
To Count 9 h the Prosecution has up to date not offered any evidence that on 15 November 1943 troops of the 187th Reserve Division which was subordinate to General Dehner set fire to the village of Mamena. Up to now it has only been proved that this village was partly burned down as a definite nest of bandits on 7 November 1943.
This incorrectness of the Prosecution's assertion that the village was set on fire on 15 November 1943 follows from Document Book XVI, page 88, the daily report of 23 December 1943. According to this daily report this village was attacked in December 1943.
Thus it cannot have been destroyed on 15 November 1943.
Regarding the partial destruction of the village on 7 November 1943, I shall prove, that this measure was necessitated by the military situation.
Regarding the destruction of the village Grorewsky, on 27 November 1943 - mentioned under count 9 i of the indictment, I shall prove that this destruction was not carried out by troops under the command of General Dehner. Rather was this village burned down by police troops which were not subordinated to General Dehner. General Dehner neither ordered this destruction nor did he have the possibility to prevent it.
Besides, the teletype of 27 Nov. 1943 shows, that the locality concerned was strong point of the partisans. The destruction thus was a military necessity, and therefore not illegal by international law, as I shall prove, during the course of my evidence.
In so far as the other documents, which have been submitted by the Prosecution, s how that destruction of villages in the area of the LXIX Corps had taken place during the time when General Dehner was in charge of this Corps. I am going to prove that the destructions were either carried out by police units or that we are here dealing with measures which, taking in to consideration all circumstances, constituted urgent military necessities.
General Dehner is charged under Count 3 of the Indictment with having carried out and drafted illegal orders and the decrees subsequent to such, with haveng passed on such orders and decree and with responsibility for their execution through units of the Army.
As evidentiary material with regard to count 12 be of the Indictment, the Prosecution has submitted the Commissary by von Brauchitsch. This document merely proves that Brauchitsch issued the Commissary Order to the above date. This document docs not even go to show that the authorities listed under distribution actually received this order.
In June 1941 General Dehner was in charge of the 106th Infantry Division. This Division is not listed under the distribution given in the above document. Further evidentiary material with regard to this matter had not been submitted by the Prosecution. Under no circumstances can it therefore be taken as proved that General Dehner received this order. Beside, all evidence is lacking to show that General Dehner passed on this order or instituted any measures in order to have it carried out.
At this point I should like to refer to Wharton's words, which I have mentioned above, according to which it would have to be proved, that General Dehner wrote the above documents or received them or in some way informed about their contents.
Under count 12 h of the Indictment General Dehner is charged with having issued the Command Order; with having passed it on and with having carried out. To prove this the Prosecution has submitted document C. 18, exhibit 225; the order of Hitler from 18 October 1942.
( Page 17)
A distribution list does not appear in this document. For the reasons given by me previously; this document merely goes to prove that Hitler issued an order. All evidence is lacking to show which authorities; if any received this order. If particular it is not proven that General Dehner received it. The Prosecution submitted no evidentiary material to indicate that General Dehner passed on such an order or carried it out. The allegation con contained in the indictment to the effect that General Dehner issued this order is refuted through exhibit C 18 which has already been mentioned and which shows that the order was issued by Hitler.
Also with regard to this charge the evidence is not sufficient. Under Count 12 I of the indictment General Dehner is charged with having ordered the shooting of 1 staff officer and of 50 men for very division of the capitulated Italian Army as well as with having carried out this order Also with regard to that, the evidentiary material submitted by the Prosecution is insufficient to prove its allegation the prosecution has, to start off with submitted two Keitel orders of 9 September and 15 September 1943 document NOKW 898 exhibit 317 and NOKW 916 exhibit 323 which are supposed to show that General Dehner committed a criminal action.
Neither of these orders is addressed to General Dehner. As to that I am referring to page 27 of the English version Doc. Book 13.
On this page it can be seen to whom this order of 9 September 1943 was addressed. Document NOKW-916 does not show to which commands this order was actually sent. Besides, neither of these documents contains an order of the contents described in the indictment.
Therefore, neither of these documents proves that General Dehner received this order. There is no evidence showing that General Dehner passed on such an order.
Document NOKW-910, exhibit 327, page 43 of the English version of Document Book 13, which has not been submitted in evidence against General Dehner, shows, that such an order was sent only to the 15th Mountain Corps, which has never been subordinated to General Dehner, but that it sent to the 69th Corps for special tasks.
Neither was there any reason to send such an order to the 69th Corps for special tasks as there were no Italian troops within the area of the Corps. Apart from that General Dehner was on leave doing the period in question.
I therefore move that the proceedings against the defendant Dehner be discontinued with regard to Count 3 of the Indictment, since the Prosecution has not submitted any evidence, which might incriminate the defendant Dehner beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also the evidentiary material, which has been introduced with regard to Count 4 of the Indictment, can in no manner suffice to convict General Dehner. In accordance with the prosecution's own statements General Dehner is not involved in any of the individual cases mentioned under Count 4. None of the documents which have been submitted show that General Dehner has ever ordered arbitrary arrests of people indigenous to the area of his Corps for reasons of alleged racial inferiority or for political reasons. No case has it been proved that General Dehner ordered the indigenous population to be maltreated or even murdered. There is also all evidence lacking to prove that General Dehner ordered the civilian population to be seized and to be taken into the Reich for labor employment.
To prove this the prosecution has submitted documents NOKW-509and NOKW-657, which are exhibits 340 and 376 respectively, which, however, do not show that General Dehner was responsible according to criminal law. Document NOKW-509 on page 13 of the German Document Book 14 contains an order of the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Panzer Army from the 15th September 1943, which had been passed on by the Supreme Command of the 69th Corp for Special Tasks on 19 September 1943 and to which there was added a Supplementary Order on 23 September 1943, Both documents prove beyond doubt that the evacuations mentioned were by no means of an arbitrary nature. The order states literally. I quote:
"In those areas which are particularly important for the conduct of the war and which are infested with bands the male inhabitants from 15 - 60 years are to be evacuated. To begin with, they are to be collected in guarded labor-camps. The Army will issue further orders regarding their employment in labor. The evacuations are to be carried out as surprise actions in order to prevent the population from escaping before they take place.
Territories to be evacuated are: The surroundings of important passes and pass-ways, territory along railway-lines which are particularly endangered etc.
The intentions to carry out the evacuations are to be reported by the Corps Headquarters to the Ia of Panzer Army 2, and to the Quartermaster of Panzer Army 2. One Copy each."
This proves clearly that this evacuation constituted a military necessity and was therefore permissible according to International Law and which, incidentally, was stopped when General Dehner returned from his leave.
This is Document NOKW-509, Exhibit 340, page 26, A, first paragraph. For these reasons these documents do no suffice for the conviction of General Dehner.
The Prosecution has offered no evidence whatever to show that these evacuations were actually carried out. Also the evacuations, which had been ordered by General Dehner's deputy, according to Document NOKW-509, page 26 of the German document book, had been ordered because of constantly repeated attacks against the railroad Zagreb Joganovac, as can be seen from the document. Also these evacuations were legal in the sense of military law.
The prosecution has further submitted document NOKW-657 in evidence. This document does not prove any responsibility according to criminal law either, since firt of all this order is not illegal and secondly it was not been proved that this order, which was not even signed by General Dehner and was issued by his deputy when General Dehner was on leave, was ever carried out. Also with regard to count 4 of the indictment, the prosecution has not proved that General Dehner was responsible according to criminal law.
I therefore move that proceedings against General Dehner be discontinued with regard to Count 4 of the Indictment.
In summary I therefore move that proceedings against General Dehner be discontinued with regard to 5i and m of Count 1 of the Indictment, and with regard to count 3 and 4 of the Indictment, since the Prosecution has not proved that General Dehner is incriminated beyond a reasonable doubt.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the ruling on these motions should be reserved until the conclusion of all the evidence. If counsel for the Defendant Dehner sees fit to renew the motions at that time they will then receive the consideration of the Tribunal.
DR. KLINNERT: Thank you, Your Honor.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: (Counsel for defendant Felmy) Your Honors, May it please the Tribunal, in 25 document books the Prosecution has submitted the pertinent material which is to show that the defendants committed war crimes and crimes against humanity according to Control Council Law No. 10.
The documents submitted are of a purely military character, such as war time diaries, activity reports, daily reports etc. There was a certain form and contents prescribed for them in the German Wehrmacht. Higher authorities wanted to be informed on certain matters; these reports had to be short, but complete as well, so that the decisions made by the higher authorities would correspond to actual conditions. The documents, which were submitted by the Prosecution in the form of copies, have lost their original significance, insofar as omissions were made in essential points and their contents was thus robbed of its context from which alone the documents can be understood. For instance, in the Ic-daily reports the following matters had to be reported on: under paragraph a) the tactical position, under, b), c, d, e) further indications concerning the position, concerning judgment of the enemy position, etc., under paragraph f) "Miscellaneous", to which, among other items, also belonged reprisal measures.
Therefore, if, as happened in many cases, paragraph f) was included in the copy of the document but paragraph a) to e) were left out, then we are solely being acquainted with an actual fact as a result of some cause, which we are unable to perceive. This is only one example, but it is typical for the whole presentation made by the Prosecution. The Prosecution's presentation only states actual facts without even so much as making a marginal note about the cause, it docs not inquire into the "why" and we shall see how important and decisive this question is.
The Tribunal has decided that in the document books copies do not constitute evidence, but that only photostats arc being considered as such. But these, too, arc partly not complete in themselves, besides other pertinent documents for other periods arc missing, which also have to be submitted so that the contents of the document can be under stood.