The next paragraph again deals with the cooperation with Crotian agencies. I shall quote briefly from it.
The Croats who went into action with us, were given their orders - usually camouflaged once-only at the last moment as informers who would notify the partisans, were common there. There for instance, shortly before an action, the Commander of the 2nd Crotian Mountain Brigade went over to the partisans. The Croatian Commander of the Airfield of Mostar was in close touch with the bands and regularly transmitted orders which I had issued to the Croation Units, which fact I successfully used in order to confuse the enemy.
The next paragraph deals with the explanations given for orders. The affiant says:
It was the general practice, that motives for the issuing of instructions to subordinates were not to be stated. Motives were only stated when measures of an exceptional kind were to be taken, or if this instruction was interfering with a different area of command. It is the duty of every officer, to take action, even when not expressly instructed to do so, if he considers it necessary.
This brings me to the conclusion of the quotation from this document and I want to now have reference to Leyser Document No. 44 which is contained on page 127 of Document Book II. It is an affidavit by Lt. Col.
General Staff Hans Klein which I offered yesterday as the last document and it was Exhibit 21. There again I have only read one or two paragraphs so far and now I should like to have reference to paragraph 4 which is on page 128 of the document book. The affiant says, I quote:
4) Message Service: In view of the unsafe conditions, personal reconnaissance on the spot was never possible without major difficulties. I myself had contact with the enemy during such reconnaissance journeys, and I also remember that one general staff officer of the Army, on a tour of inspection to the division, was first set upon in the train, and, on continuing the journey, had contact with the enemy while riding in the staff car which was lost, and, on top of this, encountered an enemy airplane, when he flew back.
The considerable difficulties of handling the troop units in this area were caused by the lack of secured signal communications. The telephone and telegraph lines between Mostar (divisional command post) and Sarajevo (corps command post) were interrupted very frequently; not only that, but they were certainly tapped.
General, let me interpolate here. Am I right in assuming that this testimony by affiant Klein does not apply to the 15th Corps but judging by the places named Mostar and Sarajevo, to a later period of time the 21st Corps?
A. Yes, you are quite right. After January 1945, the 369th Division on which Lt. Col. Klein served as Ia was subordinate to the 21st Corps.
Q. Having cleared this up. I shall continue to quote:
Long distance calls, therefore, could only be made about insignificant matters. All important matters referring to tactics and supply had to be radioed.
Radio transmission in any case would allow only telegraphic brevity, especially when matters were involved which had to be treated as "top secret" because of their contents. This shows that it was technically quite impossible to put through messages from lower to higher commands regularly and on time, all the more so as I remember quite clearly that the radio communications, for instance in the Mostar area, between the division and its sub-units failed at certain times. The superior commands, therefore, were unable to take the matter up, in each case or to reply to inquiries on time.
The important matters were dealt with in the daily reports in telegraphic style. Unimportant matters were left out altogether or discussed occasionally by telephone, according to the situation of the communication service.
As a matter of principle, orders to subordinate units give no explanations. If they have to be radioed they are to be worded in telegraphic style.
General, let me ask you something about this affidavit. I would like to have your personal comments although some of your affiants have already given us their opinion. It is rather striking in the case of these reports that they are so brief. That actual events can hardly be identified from them. The two affiants have made it clear why this was so, but if a report of this brief type was submitted but when it was not possible to recognize what had actually happened, did you, when you were in command, were you satisfied with these brief reports? Or how was it that you were actually informed about what had gone on?
A. As I said before, when we had these situation conferences late in the afternoon every day, these reports were submitted to me, and Ia or else the expert concerned had to give me precise information when I put questions to them, namely what the reasons had been, or how a special event had come about. This man would have the duty to inform himself before the conference and then pass that information on to me.
Q. In order to make this quite clear, General, let me ask you an additional question. At that period of time when the events took place, you were informed not only by these reports but also by the additional explanations given to you by the Ia and he was in a position to do so?
A Yes, quite. Of course, sometimes there were delays in these things. As these two affiants have made quite clear, it took some time in some cases before we could inform ourselves what had really happened and it might in some cases take a day or two until I was finally informed but in any case the expert in question had the duty to investigate the matter and inform me about it.
Q Before dealing with the various individual reports on which the prosecution have essentially based their case, let me ask you a few basic questions about the reporting. Do these reports submitted by the prosecution give a complete and reliable picture of the situation at the time?
A They do not. By no means.
Q Why not, General?
A First of all, the chronological order of the reports show that they are not complete. Secondly, they include only brief extracts from these brief reports and thirdly these extracts have been selected from a certain point of view. Namely, only those things which appear to be incriminating have been submitted, but not the events which led to them-led to a reprisal measure, and that although very frequently the reason why a reprisal measure was taken can be seen from the reports themselves. But above all what is lacking are the reports which are so important, nor can it be seen from these documents what telephone calls have taken place in order to clarify the reasons behind the event.
Q Now the affiants have stated, General, that as a rule it was extremely difficult for a report to be delivered in time. Let me ask you,General, do you concur in this opinion? Is that the experience you had yourself?
A It is indeed. The lines of communication were frequently disrupted and therefore the reports could not reach us in good time.
Q Now, General, let us discuss a few of these reports and I would like you to give us your comments first on some reports submitted and which have reference to Cetnik units and Ustasha units. You said before, General, that no military subordination can be claimed in the case of the Cetnik units, and you have also stated that the Ustasha units were subordinate only for tactical purposes.
Why was it that in actual fact in order to make this point finally clear, were there reports about events which concerned these units?
A The reason was, as I said before, quite clear. Through these reports the corps was to be informed about anything that had occurred in the area, and what was worth knowing. Then there was another reason applicable for these reports. Through the special conditions under the ethnic struggle, these units often became guilty of cruelties which the Wehrmacht of course disapproved of as a matter of profound principle. The troops themselves and certainly the Commanding Officers were unable to do anything about it because these units were not subordinate to them, and these units were not under their disciplinary authority. This is the reason why all these events were reported to the corps and the corps passed it on to the army and it was hoped that through this method the Croatian authorities or the German Plenipotentiary General von Glaise-Horstenau could take active steps. That the troops frequently reported incidents which we shall describe later on, so that active steps would be taken by somebody becomes clear as I see it from the formulations which these reports contained.
Q If the Tribunal please, in this connection of reports concerning units which were not subordinate, I should like to offer a document which is contained in Document Book I. It is Leyser Document No. 19 and it is in Document Book I Leyser on page 58. I beg to offer this document as Exhibit 22. It is an affidavit by Eberhard Einbeck from Hamburg. The witness says under paragraph 1--it is on page 58 of Document Book 1. I shall read from paragraph 1:
"I have known General von Leyser since 1 June 1944. General von Leyser was commanding general of the 15th (Mountain) Army Corps, of which I became Chief of Staff on the same day."
I shall skip the next paragraph. Equally I shall skip paragraph 2, but I shall come back to it later on in these proceedings, and I beg to quote from paragraph 3. "I confirm the fact that the corps headquarters had to report to the army about all occurrences in the corps area.
This included actions, incidents, etc., involving Croatian and Cetnik units which were not under the command of the corps headquarters."
General, in this connection, a further question. When you received a report of this type which concerned a Cetnik unit or let us say a Ustasha formation, did you have to take any steps because of these reports?
A I had no possibility to do anything about these incidents, just as little as the divisions had. All I did therefore was to pass on these reports to the army, but of course what I could do was to pass on these reports to the Croatian liason officers who were represented on the Corps 2nd the divisional staffs, and I could ask those gentlemen to take active steps if possible, but that was all I could do.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q I wish you would comment on that feature or give some further explanation as to the liaison between the Croatian government or the Croatian military forces. I notice in this paragraph it says the division commanders had to investigate the facts of the case and decide on necessary measures in agreement with the Croatian liaison agencies. Now, what part did the Croatian units have in taking such action as was taken?
A The Croatian troops--that is to say the regular Croatian army or militia, who were for tactical purposes under the division, were not under the disciplinary or judicial authority of the divisional commander--they had their own judicial authorities and their own disciplinary arrangements. Now if those troops became guilty of any irregularities, what was done was to regulate these matters within the Croatian armed forces. What happened was, roughly, this, I assume that within a battalion of a Croatian regiment an irregularity occurred and it then, of course, became the duty of the Croatian superior officers to take steps.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not interested in that. I am not interested in disciplinary matters as far as the Croatians are concerned. I am interested in the sentence just prior to the one I read, where it says: "The execution of reprisal measures for the frequent acts of sabotage was in accordance with an order issued by the higher authorities assigned to the Croatians." Then follows the sentence, I quoted, What part did the Croatians have in these reprisal matters, if any? I am not interested in the discipline of the Croatian units, what part, if any, did they have in the reprisal actions?
THE WITNESS: I see, Your Honor. In the order it says that reprisal measures have to be taken by divisional commanders in agreement with the Croatian Liaison agencies. The decision about that is with the Croatian liaison officer, as the order says.
THE PRESIDENT: This is not an order. This is an affidavit here. This is an affidavit in which that is mentioned. It is not an order.
THE WITNESS: This affidavit has reference to the order as it existed at the time, because the affiant bases himself on these orders. What happened was roughly this, let us say an act of sabotage had occurred within the divisional area. This was reported to the division. Now, on the basis of many and frequent acts of sabotage within the area of the division, the population was told before in all probability that if another act of sabotage would occur, that is committed against the railway line, then a reprisal measure would be taken. Now, there would be a conference between the divisional commander and the liaison agency of the Croatian government. In the course of that conference those two people had to come to an agreement on what sort of a reprisal measure was to be taken and how it would be carried out.
The last word was then with the Croatian liaison officer. It would have been possible that the divisional commander would say in this event,"In this case here I think a reprisal measure is important," whereas the Croatian liaison officer might say, "Well, let us wait a little longer", in which case that particular reprisal measure would not have been carried out, because under the existing order it was the Croatian officer who held the decision.
THE PRESIDENT: Undoubtedly, it is quite possible there may be orders or documents that support this statement made in the affidavit. Do you have in mind any such documents, General?
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, may I interpolate? This order to which Your Honor has referred, and if I understood the witness correctly he had reference to the Army Group order issued on 22 December 1943, signed by General Loehr.
THE WITNESS: That is quite true, yes.
DR. TIPP: That order has been submitted in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution. It is Exhibit 379. In the English book it starts on page 47 and on page 98 in the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there other such documents that refer to such joint action on behalf of the Croats and the German authorities?
THE WITNESS: This one is the decisive order which was applicable during my period of time.
THE PRESIDENT: What I am getting at is, are there other orders which show that was the general policy, or is this the only one instance?
THE WITNESS: All orders which existed previously, as far as I can remember always said that as far as the carrying out of reprisal measures was concerned the divisions arranged with the subarea headquarters, that is the territorial agencies, and by this order of General Loehr, to which I have referred, it was then especially ordered through an agreement, I think Ambassador Neubacher was concerned therewith, that Croatian Government Liaison officers should be attached to these various agencies, and that it was those who had the decision.
THE PRESIDENT: That answers my inquiry unless you have further information along that line.
Q Now, General, about this order which is contained in Document Book 16, the order issued by the Army Group. I would like to put one question to you. Was that order which came from the Army Group an order which was applicable in an individual instance, or was it an order of a basic nature applicable for the ensuing period of time, so that the reprisal problem would be regulated for once and for all?
A This order by the Army group did not merely apply to an individual incident, but this was the decisive order. It was to be observed as a measure of principle for all reprisal measures if such measures became necessary.
Q Was this order rescinded while you were still down there?
A No, it was never rescinded at all. It always applied.
Q It would therefore be true to say that all reprisal measures which were issued after this order would be referring to this basic order of 22 December 1943?
A Yes, that is so.
Q. Let me ask another question in this connection. I believe I have understood his Honor to ask for further orders. They need not necessarily be orders issued after the order of the 22nd December you referred to. Do you not recall an order which was issued before this one, the order as to the cooperation between Croatian agencies and the divisional commands?
A Yes, there was one and I don't remember the date, but it had been laid down before. I believe it was an Army order, or an Army group order, but I am afraid I cannot give the date offhand.
Q General, the order which sums up all previous orders you have previously discussed, do you not recall which order was issued before this?
A By this I think you mean the comprehensive Army order of 15 September, and this also regulated, that on principle contact with the Croatian agencies is to be established.
DR. TIPP: Let me say for the record that the order which you have just mentioned by the Army Group, of 15 September 1943, is contained in Document Book 14, where it is Exhibit 340. It is one page 15 of the English version and on page 11 of the German version. I believe this brings me to the end of this inquiry.
May I continue, Your Honor?
Q General, after this we shall now discuss a few reports which are concerned with Cetnik formations and Ustasha units, to put it briefly two indigenous units. The first report of that type is contained in Document Book 15, which is Exhibit 367. It is Prosecution Document NOKW 1331, and the report to which I have reference is on page 20 of the German and page 20 of the English document book.
It is a report by the 373rd Division. I take that back, it is a report by the 15th Mountain Corps of 11 December 1943, addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army, and under the 373rd Division there are some reports contained which are of no interest in this connection, but the last paragraph of the report is the point I want to discuss with you now. I quote: "On the night of 9 to 10 December the Cetniks raided Communist I local committee in Seliste, 2 bandits shot, 2 escaped." May call the Tribunals attention to the fact that the same report was submitted on one occasion by the prosecution. It is contained in the same document book, exhibit 365. It is document NOKW 1399, and the passage which I have reference to is on page 7 of both the German and the English book. In other words, the same incident has been used for two different exhibits.
General, will you give us your comment about the incident itself?
A This quite obviously is an incident which occurred in the area of the corps, and that is why it was passed on to the command. Otherwise, because it was not a subordinate unit I had nothing to do with it.
Another report of this type is contained in Document Book 25 of the Prosecution. It is on page 45 of the English and page 35 of the German. The incident is contained in Document NOKW 1769, which is Exhibit 567. May I make a brief remark about this, Your Honor? When I give a page in the document book it is always the page of the document book on which the individual report concerned is contained. It is not the page whore the exhibit begins. The report to which I have reference here, General, is a daily report by the 15th Mountain Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, dated 10 January 1944.
I quote: "Butolica has been burned down by the Ustasha. 100 inhabitants murdered." What can you tell us about that?
A This incident is an incident which had to be reported on the area, but the description here shows what opinion the troops formed of this incident. The term "murdered" surely is an unequivocal one. No troops would use a term like that if they felt a regular operation had taken place. This report was undoubtedly done in order to get the Croatian authorities to do something.
Q Let me ask further, that probably was the reason why you included this incident in your daily report to the corps?
A Yes, certainly.
Q The next report of that character is also contained in document 25, page 52 of tho English and page 41 of the German. This is Exhibit 570, NOKW 1772. It is a daily report by the 15th Army Corps, again addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army of 9 February 1944. Under the 167th Division it says, and I quote: Cetnik reconnaissance detachment met small band, 15 prisoners, 12 of whom shot, 3 released." What is the meaning of that report, General?
A This report describes an excess committed by a Cetnik unit, and the troops were in no position to do anything about it. The event was reported so that people higher up would be informed. It was those incidents which led to complaints by Croatian authorities, and it was therefore of importance for the agencies to be informed about it whenever such complaints by the Croatians reached the Wehrmacht.
Q Let us go on and discuss another incident. It has been submitted by the prosecution in two different documents, one is contained in Document Book 16, page 93, of the English and page 139 of the German. It is Prosecution Exhibit 393, and it is Document NOKW 1428. The same incident is also contained in Document Book 25, Exhibit 567, NOKW 1577on page 109 of the English and page 83 of the German books. In both instances the event is part of a daily report by the 15th Army Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army of 5 June 1944. 373rd Infantry Division reported here that "Croatian combat troops have destroyed bandit hospital Southeast of Udbina. 20 enemy dead, including 2 physicians. In addition 95 wounded and 6 killed." May I point out to you a mistake in the translation of the document book? The German original the term is used for "niedergemacht", which I don't think the word "killed" is quite sufficient there. Perhaps it should be "slaim," "massacred" or "slaughtered." May I ask the interpreter if that proposed translation is correct?
THE INTERPRETER: I think it is, your Honor, if I may say.
DR. TIPP: Then perhaps this correction could be made in the English document book as well, if that is agreeable with the prosecution.
MR. FULKERSEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I think a statement should be made for the record.
MR. FULKERSEN: It is agreeable with the prosecution, Your Honor.
Q General, let me ask you first, you have already indicated what is to be understood by a Croatian combat unit--
THE PRESIDENT: Before we get too far away, just where is the correction to be made in this document? Will the interpreter please give the line, and the sentence?-
THE INTERPRETER: It is the third sentence, Your Honor, page 4, which begins with the word "Thereby" and the sentence should read, "20 enemy dead, including two physicians, in addition 95 sick and massacred."
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
Q General, would you please tell us again what a Croatian combat group is supposed to be?
A Croatian combat groups, as I said before were local defense units, who as a rule were used for the protection of their own villages and surrounding neighborhood against the communist bands. They were neither a part of the Ustasha nor of the regular Croatian army. There was no subordination of them under the Wehrmacht.
Q Now, having cleared this up what can you tell us about the conditions of this report, what we are concerned with here is definitely an incident which the troops learned about after the event. They disassociated themselves from this incident, which becomes clear from the way they put it. The term "massacred" is used by the troops only for an act for which the troops feel contempt, but of course it was necessary to make this report for a reason which I have frequently said before. The troops, as I have said before, were in no position to do anything themselves, which is regrettable.
Q General, I can sum up what you said about these reports to the effect that here we are concerned with the incidents concerned with the local inhabitants, that is to say units were involved which were not under your order's, and the incidents themselves were quite beyond your initiative and that of the troops is that correct?
A Yes, that is quite true. The troops had no possibility to intervene.
Q Let us leave these incidents now, General. They are the only ones which are submitted against you in this trial, and let us turn to a different problem. We discussed before this long order concerning the way of reporting, which was Exhibit 369, contained in Document Book 15, page 51 English and page 75 of the German Book. One more question based upon that document. This order mentions that the troops are not allowed to give any enemy reports with the indication of the source where it came from. Why was that ordered, General?
A To give the source for enemy reports was highly important in Croatia. Quite generally the tendency existed to have reports exaggerated concerning the strength of the enemy.
For instance in the event of a report by the confidential agency, you could always reduce it by 67 to 80 per cent. Even the enemy wireless to which we listened reported none. Therefore, we soon learned they were exaggerated for reason of propaganda. For reason of camouflage alone the bands were inclined to exaggerate their strength. This becomes clear from the terms which they used to describe their units. For instance, I would like to point out here that band brigade is as a rule about as strong as a battalion, and a band division for the most part was as strong as a regiment.
Q May I interrupt you, General, and I point out here that the strength of band brigade or division is contained in a document submitted by the prosecution. It is contained in Document Book 15, page 26 of the English, and page 25 of the German. It is exhibit 368 and Document NOKW 1375. On the pages which I have mentioned there are these reports concerning the strength and personnel of a band brigade and of a band division.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, before the recess we stopped when we discussed the question what the reasons were that in reports about the enemy situation, the source of information was to be mentioned. First of all, you pointed out what the actual strength of a band brigade and band division and I drew to the Tribunal's attention the fact that this can be ascertained on the basis of a prosecution document. May I now ask you to continue with your answer to my question?
A The source was particularly important because thus it could be ascertained how the troops received their knowledge about the enemy. Only if the knowledge of the source exists one can actually say whether the enemy strength mentioned was in accordance with the actual facts and how the strength should be evaluated.
I was mainly interested in having this point clarified because I myself experienced the confusion which arose from such designations. A battalion of the 264th Division, which advanced towards Zara had encountered the enemy, who all of a sudden with infantry and machine gun fire attacked the marching column of the battalion and thus losses were suffered. The battalion Commander, who was not familiar with the particular district because he with his battalion had come from France, received a report that he was facing an enemy division, therefore he was under the impression that he could not take the responsibility to encounter a whole division with just one battalion and for that reason he stopped.
It so happened that I met this battalion in this particular situation, I explained to the battalion commander that such band divisions could not be compared with proper divisions and with ordinary troops. I then ordered him to get his men into position, to fire artillery shells and to attack with energy, then this so-called division would itself dissolve into nothing. That is what happened. I was able to get to Zara and this very same battalion arrived in Zara on the same evening. That is my own experience and in my opinion it proves that the bands were no regular belligerents even if individual members of them wore uniforms now and again and even if they called themselves divisions.
Q There are another few questions which I would like to ask you in connection with the reports. That was the exchange of reports between the neighboring units of equal rank and your own Corps?
A The great distances in that area resulted in the communications with neighboring corps being frequently disturbed. Even radio communications did not always function properly in this mountainous area. Therefore, we cannot talk about a regular and well organized exchange of daily reports, etc.
Q One additional question in this connection, General. Did you receive reports from neighboring corps such as can be seen from some documents, did you personally receive reports of the neighboring corps, were these reports submitted to you, did you read them or if not, how were you informed about occurances with neighboring corps?
AAs I have said, there were great difficulties in the exchange of communications and thus it happened only very rarely that we were informed about events with the neighborly corps. What I have seen from the documents here was that when I arrived in the area, it still happened occasionally that I received daily reports from neighboring corps, but later on that petered out because of difficulties of communications and therefore I am in no position to say that I was regularly informed about occurances in neighboring corps.
Q In this connection, General, may I refer to a prosecution document, which is contained in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution on page 5 of the English and page 11 of the German document book. This is exhibit 375 and it is Document NOKW 658. This rather extensive document contains reports from the 69th Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army. According to the distribution in the document, these reports also reached the 15th Corps or at least for a certain period of time; what are your comments to this document?
AAs I have already stated my predecessor was General Lueter. He was in this position up until August of 1943, i.e. he was Commander of the German Troops in Croatia.
All German units stationed in this area had to report to him in his before mentioned capacity. This duty did no longer exist when the staff was changed into the 15th Mountain Corps. The 15th Mountain Corps did no longer receive these reports as can be seen from the distribution. If they only received them for information purposes and no particular task was connected with the receiving of the reports as far as I was concerned.
Q You said just now you only received the reports for information purposes, General. The Prosecution when they presented their documents asserted in some particular connection to which we will come later on that the 69th Corps was subordinate to you. May I, in order to clarify this problem, ask you General whether this opinion of the Prosecution is correct?
A The 69th Corps was never subordinated to me at any time. General Rendulic, as Commander in Chief of the respective Army confirmed this a few days ago.
Q After having cleared up these fundamental questions, General, I would now like to turn to the specific points of the Indictment, and I would like to discuss the Indictment with you in the framework of your assignments as Commander of the 15th and later of the 21st Corps. It will be necessary for us at this time to discuss a number of documents which the Prosecution have submitted. Under Count 3 of the Indictment, it is stated that the Commander of the 15th Corps had issued and carried out an order or passed on to the troops under his command, an order for the shooting of 1 staff officer and 50 men of the capitulated Italian Army, which had sold, given away or destroyed their arms before capitulating, and that he had also ordered the shooting of 1 officer and 10 men of every division which had rendered motor vehicles unusable before turning them over to the German Wehrmacht. General Rendulic a few days ago dealt in great detail with the Italian question. Now, General, I would like to ask you to limit yourself to those particular questions which concern you personally.
First of all, would you tell us whether you had in connection with the Italian question received, issued or passed on any orders whatsoever?
A No, I did not do that.
Q Now, I will have to show you a document in this connection, General, in which this assertion of the Prosecution is possibly based. This document is contained in Document Book 14 of the Prosecution, on page 127 of the English text and page 97 of the German version. I am referring to Exhibit 360, which is Prosecution Document 830. The total document is an excerpt from the War Diary of the 15th Mountain Corps, from the period of 26 August to 31 December 1943. Under the date 27 December, 1943, we have an entry here. This entry, as I have already stated, is on page 127 of the English text, Document Book 14. There is one report here about the capture of 202 Italian officers and 9,000 men in Split. We have also a note here saying that the Italian officers, according to the Fuehrer order, were to be shot, however, the Commanding General had first of all ordered an investigation to ascertain the guilt of the people concerned, i.e. the Commanding General of the 15th Corps - and I assume that the Prosecution mean you when presenting this document. Can you make any comments about this, General?