Then the people were examined and if nothing could be proved against them they were dismissed.
Q Where the activity of the first Cossack division is concerned, another few incidents have been submitted and we will have to deal with them. The first of these is a daily report by the first Cossack division addressed to the 15th Mountain Corps, dated the 18th of December, 1943. This report is also contained in Document Book 15 on page 4 of the English text and page 3 of the German text.
This is Exhibit 364 which is Document NOKW-1136. This daily report from the 8th of December, 1942, reads, and I quote: "Railroad which had been blown up had been repaired near Point 101." Can you give us your comments on this incident, General?
A May I see the document, please?
Q As I said, General, this is the report of the 15th Cossack division to the Mountain Corps and dated the 8th of September, 1943.
A This whole incident can be reconstructed from the very same document on page 4, because here the division reports on the 7th of December, 1942, and I quote: "12 kilometers Northwest of Sisak, empty train struck mine on water bridge near Point 101. Bridge destroyed." And it is further announced here that on the 8th of December, reprisal measures were to be carried out. These reprisal measures by which I mean the arrest of the 36 hostages are then again contained in the daily report of the 8th of December, which is the one which you have just read out to me. As is shown by a number of documents, this blasting of bridges and interruptions of railroad lines in this district were affected by the reprisal measures. That was the reason why this operation Panther was carried out. The division had in several instances warned the population and had pointed out to them that if these sabotage acts were not to stop in that area, then some time steps would be taken and hostages would be arrested, and I would assure that is the reason why the Cossack Division apprehended these 36 hostages.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Q. General, before the recess we discussed the blowing up of the railway line near Point 101 on the 7th of December, and the reprisal measures carried out on the 8th December, namely the seizure of 36 hostages; before continuing I would like to call the Tribunal's attention to the following: this incident has been submitted by the prosecution in a number of documents, which I will give to the court. The blowing up of the bridge on 7 December is mentioned in the Daily Report of the 15th Corps on the 8th December, and as such has been submitted, Exhibit 367, page 17, Document Book 15, in its English version, and also on page 17, of the same Document Book 15, and in that daily report, the one of the 7th December, the reprisal measures are announced. The same incident is once again contained in the daily report of 9 December to the 2nd Panzer Army. That report is contained in the same exhibit on page 19 of the English Book and page 18 of the German book. In order to add further complications this daily report by the corps to the Army does not turn up only in this document. It crops up again in Prosecution Exhibit 365, NOKW 1339, also in Document Book 15, on page 8 of the English and German. In other words, this report is contained in no less than four different exhibit numbers, and these four different exhibit numbers contain the report twice or three times in some cases.
Now, to go General, to the next incident. I now have reference to Document Book 15. At this time it is Exhibit 370, which is of interest. The incident I mean is described on page 57 of the English Book, German page 84. It is a daily report by the Corps of yhd 27 January 1944. Here the First Cossack Division reports, and I quote: "Line Southeast of Topolje again passable, 22 hostages hanged." Would you please give us your comments on that incident, General?
A. This incident must not be regarded as an isolated case. These 22 hostages which were hanged constitute an absolute exception. They were not hanged because one railway line was blown up, but as a measure of retaliation and deterrence for countless disruptions and explosions which had occurred in this area during that period of time. It seems to me especially that these were taken from the 36 hostages whose seizure we have just discussed.
Q. This incident, namely the hanging of the 22 hostages has been offered on another occasion by the Prosecution, namely in Document Book 25, on page 45 of the English version and page 35 of the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Where did these hostages come from?
THE WITNESS: From the report we discussed before, the First Cossack Division had apprehended 36 hostages when they were combing out a certain area not very far from the railway line, and although these hostages had been arrested the acts of sabotage along the railway line did not terminate. As a means of deterring further acts we meant business on this occasion, and the 22 hostages as reported were hanged.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there any warning or statement made?
THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed. Warnings were issued to the population and statements on frequent occasions.
THE PRESIDENT: Were they in this case?
THE WITNESS: Yes, also in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything in the record to show it, anything in these documents to show it?
THE WITNESS: It is contained in several documents that on frequent occasions proclamations of this sort and threats were made by the Division to the population.
THE PRESIDENT: What I am getting at is, before a hanging of hostages was there some statement made to the immediate community that such hangings would occur, and can you show that as to every particular hanging or at least some of them, or incidents of hanging?
THE WITNESS: I believe I said this morning that this reprisal measure had to be carried out by the Commander of the Division by agreement with the Croatian representatives of the Croatian Government. I imagine that the incident here occurred in the following manner, and I shall show later on that in the course of this period of time no less than 23 incidents of blowing up railway lines occurred. The result of these acts must have been that the division, as I said before, repeatedly drew the population's attention to the fact that they must discontinue these things. The first measures taken by the division, as becomes clear from our document here, was the arrest first of all of the 36 hostages as a deterrent measure. Although these 36 hostages were arrested it becomes equally clear from the documents that these acts of sabotage continued. Thereupon the division, which had the order to protect this vital railway line for supplies, felt itself compelled to show the population for once that they meant business, and then in connection with the Croatian representative, as the order demanded, carried out this reprisal measure as a means of deterring people from committing these acts of sabotage.
Q. General, before his Honor put this question to you, you said that this incident must not be regarded out of context. May I point out here that the prosecution have used this same incident with the same date in another exhibit. This is contained in Document Book 25. It is an entry contained on page 45 of the English version and page 35 of the German. The exhibit number is 567. This is a daily report by the 15th Mountain Army. It is a daily report by 1c dated 27 January 1944. The Prosecution have only selected one sentence for their document book, which is contained on page 45, as I said before.
The sentence reads as follows: "As railway lines were blown up northwest of Sisak, 22 hostages were hanged on the site of the blasting on 25 January." From the photostat copy which the prosecution have submitted I have included further passages from this document in my own document book. This is Leyser Document 36, contained in Document Book 2, page 107. May I offer it as Leyser Document 27.
General, let me hand you the photostatic copy of this document and I want you to give us your comments on this document on the basis of the entire report.
A. This daily report by 1-C is interesting for a number reasons. May I quote briefly first under 2-A in this report. There it states that a mineblock was removed northwest of Vrlika and in the same paragraph it says on the road from Sinje to Vrlika and Knin one bridge head has been blown up.
Q. May I as the interpreter whether they have found the document?
THE INTERPRETER: No.
BY MR. TIPP:
Q. I beg your pardon, I just see that this part is not contained in the document book. Perhaps, General, you will be kind enough to read these passages verbatim from the photosatic copy for the record?
A. To repeat: "The road from Sinje to Vrlika and Knin, one bridge was blown up, twenty roads blocked with stones and 25 explosions." In other words 46 acts of sabotage along one single road and in no case of these acts is a single reprisal measure mentioned here.
Then we also have on the same page under Western Croatia......
Q. May I interrupt here, this remark is contained in the document book.
A. Western Croatia is the area of the 1st Cossack division. To quote: "On January, 24th, 5 kilometers south-east of Bihac plundering through strong bands."
To leave out one line and continue:
"10 kilometers south-west of Bosnia Novi a small demolition squad of the partisans chased away, 1 winch and 98 blasting cartridges captured."
"23 points along the line 7 - 15 kilometers east of Bosni Novi were blown up; probably in connection with the crossing of the San by the 11th Brigade."
Q. May I interrupt you briefly and point out here that in the photostatic copy there is another entry, with regard to the point I was discussing with General von Leyser, just now, that is the note that 22 hostages have been hanged; is that correct, General?
A. Yes quite.
Q. Would you then please continue, General?
A. All these acts of sabotage mentioned in Croatia, and the surprise attacks, occurred in other words in the area for which the first Cossack division was responsible. It is therefore absolutely certain that the division had threatened to take strong measures if there would be continued attacks. In a document which we have previously mentioned, mention was made that hostages had been apprehended beforehand. If therefore the divisional commander by arrangement with the representative of the Croatian government decided under these circumstances to take strong action in the case of repeated attacks, namely to carry out the reprisal measures which he so often threatened, nothing can be objected to there under the prevailing conditions as I see them, and in view of the large numbers of attacks it seems to me the number of people executed can be answered for.
THE PRESIDENT: May I make the inquiry as to why the guard is taking that paper away from the young lady?
THE GUARD: She is not supposed to write in here.
THE PRESIDENT: Whose orders?
THE GUARD: The sergeant of the guard, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any reason why she cannot take some notes on this trial if she cares to?
THE GUARD: Those are my orders, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You are supposed to carry out your orders and I am not taking you to task. I wish you would have the sergeant see me.
I am not taking you to task, you are doing your duty but let me see the sergeant later please.
THE GUARD: All right, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY MR. TIPP:
Q. General, had you finished?
A. Yes, thank you.
Q. Now, General, let me ask you one question about this incident. We have had a general discussion about this case, but in this special interest, did you hear about this reprisal measure before it was carried out?
A. No, not before it was carried out. I only heard about it when the division reported the incident.
Q. And now the question might be of interest to you General, could you find out in your perusal of these documents how many reprisal measures concerning human beings were carried out by the first Cossack Division as long as this division was under your orders?
A. From my perusal of the documents here, the only case in my area where human lives were taken as a reprisal measure, is this case of the Cossack division.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, this applies to the whole of the 15th Corps?
A. Yes, it does indeed.
Q. Well, General, let us leave the 1st Cossack Division; can you tell us when that unit left your area?
A. That becomes clear from an entry in the war diary. May I have that document? I believe it was on the 3rd of March.
Q. Just a moment, General, if the Tribunal please, in order to make various incidents quite clear in the case where we don't have sufficient documentary proof, I have included some of the war diary of the 15th Corps from among the documents we received from Washington.
It is contained in Leyser document Book 2, Document 28 on page 82. It is offered as Leyser exhibit 28. May I draw attention to the fact that here for once we have the same figure for document and exhibit. It might be important to refer to this because in the future course of the examination I shall repeatedly make reference to this document in order to clear up certain problems. May I hand you this document, General, then perhaps you can tell the Court when the 1st Cossack division left your area and how that can been seen?
A. The diary shows and I quote......
Q. Will you tell us where you quote from, the date, etc.?
A. It is the entry of 3 March 1944.
Q. It is on page 84 of the Leyser document book:
A. I quote: "By order of Special Panzer Army Headquarters, Ia (Enclosure 627/44 top secret), the 1st Cossacks Division and the 1st mountain Division are placed under the command of LXIX Army Corps. Transfer of command 9 March. Transfer of the current affairs by 12 hours 10 March 1944.
May I add to this perhaps that when the Cossacks Division was handed over, the corps area, that is to say the railway line ZagrebSisak was also taken away from the corps.
Q. General, you are saying that the 1st Cossacks Division left the area of the corps, you also said before that the 1st Cossack Division had been in charge of protecting railway lines; did your corps, that is to say your division in the area no longer have to protect railway lines?
A. Yes, they did. The railway lines in the other part of the corps still had to be protected. These protection measures of other lines were quite a considerable part of the duties of the 373rd division. This included the railway line to Bihac-Banja Luka, which was mainly in the area of the 373rd Division. Also in the area there were elements of the Railway Protection Staff Croatia, which however was not subordinate to my corp, the 15th, but to the 69th.
Q. General, you mentioned just now the 373rd division, let me talk about the field of tasks of that division and once we have cleared that up, let us look at the reports of the area of that division. Let me ask you a preliminary question first. The documents mention that this division 373rd was a so-called Croatian division, and it might well be that the designation Croatian division might start a lot of confusion. We heard this morning and this afternoon quite a bit about the Croatian armed forces, that is the Domobranan the Ustashians, the Ustashinan battalions, and we had reference to the Croation defense and combat units. In the case of the 373rd Croatian division as it is called in the documents; was that an underground formation or why is it that it is called 373rd Croatian division?
A. The 373rd Croatian division as well as the 392nd were what we called Legion divisions, that is to say the officers and N.C.O,s were Germans. Among them there were a large number of Austrians who spoke Croatian. About 70% to 80% of the men were Croatians, the rest were German nationals, German citizens who had up to then lived in Croatia.
Q. May I interrupt you briefly, General, I was just told there was a mistake in the translation. If I understood you correctly, you said that the officers and N.C.O.s were Germans or Austrians who spoke Croatian?
A. Yes, they were not Croatians but were Germans who spoke Croatian., that was the reason why they were called Croatian divisions. They were not divisions who were part of the Croatian armed forces but they were division which were a part of the German Wehrmacht. They could be identified by wearing German uniforms and not Croatian uniforms.
Q. Can you tell us briefly, General, what area was held by the 373rd division?
A. I could perhaps explain that best on the basis of the map of Sketch 1. The 373rd division was in the left sector of the corps in the rear area. I could explain this best by saying that was along the Banja Luka-Bihac railway line and then from Bihac-Knin-Simie there was the main road to Knin, that is to say Bihac to the coast, that was the area which the 373rd Division held.
Q. What was the task of that division in that area, General?
A. The assignment which the division held was first to safeguard this railway line Banja-Luka-Bihac and the safeguarding of the supply road from Bihac to Knin and secondly to keep this divisional area in a state of peace.
Q. What main supply lines were there which had to be safeguarded?
A. As I said before, first the Banja Luka Bihac railway line and the very important road of supplies from Bihac to Knin and up to Knin was held by the 274th Division.
Q. How was the safeguarding of the supply lines to be carried out in actual fact?
A. The important thing was in this to prevent acts of sabotage which were frequent in that part of the world. This was done by having fortified points along that road and we had frequent patrols between these points.
Moreover, if and when necessary, the division could in this area carry out more or less small operations against the bands so that acts of sabotage would be less frequent.
Q. The field of tasks if that division is now quite clear to us, General. Let us now begin to discuss the various incidents which were reported from the area of the division and are contained in the prosecution documents. I shall again observe the chronological sequence. The first instance is contained in a report of 2 November 1943. It is a daily report by the 373rd division to the 15th Mountain Army Corps. It is contained in document book 14 on page 57 of the English version and 35 of the German. It is contained in document NOKW 720, which is exhibit 343, as I mentioned before it is on page 57 of the English book and 35 of the German. It is reported there that the passenger train Bilvac-Bosnia Novi hit a mine near Blatna and as a reprisal measure houses were burned down north of the Una.
The same incident is included in the daily report by the 15th Mountain Army to its superior agency, and that report is submitted in document book 15 on page 13 of both the German and English. That this case we are concerned with exhibit 367 and it is document NOKW 1331. May I add that the same incident has been mentioned in two different documents. Now could you, General, perhaps give us your comments on the basis of prosecution exhibit 361 from document book 14 and the exhibit 343, about what actually happened?
A. It becomes quite clear from exhibit 343 that a mine was released by a wire, across the Una. This wire came from houses north of the Una. Five soldiers and ten civilians were killed and in this instance four soldiers and four civilians were injured and three cars were completely destroyed. The attack was carried out against a perfectly normal passenger train of a civilian railway. The houses which were burned down were deserted. If under those conditions troops burned down houses from which the mine was released, they were destroyed thereby, as I see it, in a perfectly justifiable manner because here we had a definite and positive strong point of the bands.
Q. In the same document, General, there is another incident which occurred in the same locality. The report, which I mean is contained on page 62 of the English document book and page 38 of the German, it is the daily report by the 373rd Division of 6 November 1943. This is how it reads:
"Area Box/Drupa/Dopp during special operation to Ivanjska/ one man and four women arrested and 12 houses burned down as reprisal measures for railroad dynamiting. The population had fled."
Before you gave us your comment on that instance, General. That same incident is once more contained in three other prosecution documents. This report by the 373rd Division of 6 November is contained also in prosecution exhibit 352 in document book 14, document NOKW 807. The report there is contained on page 101 of the English and 75 of the German book. The same incident once more crops up in the daily report by the corps of 6 November and it crops up finally in document book 15 on page 15 of the English and 14 of the German as part of exhibit 367. It crops up again in prosecution document book 14, included in exhibit 358 on page 115 of the English and 89 of the German. This incident has been quoted in other words in four different exhibits.
Having made this clear, I would be grateful, witness, if you would now give us your comments on the contents of this report?
A This reprisal measure cannot be analyzed as an isolated incident.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, as the prosecution in Exhibit 358 have included only part of this incident, I have included further extracts from this report in my own document book, finally to clarify this incident, inasmuch as the incident is of interest to us here. It is contained in Leyser Book IV in Document 34 -- Book II, page 102 -- and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit 29.
Q Let me hand you the exhibit, General, and ask you to clear up this incident with the help of our own exhibit.
A In the daily report by the Railroad Security Staff Croatia the reason for the reprisal measure is given. The report reads as follows:
"Locomotive derailed; train fired at and attacked with hand grenades; 36 people dead; 12 injured German soldiers and civilians" An attack of so grave a character seems to justify that houses were burned down which the population had already left and which would have been useful to the bands for further acts of sabotage -justifiable, that is, from a military point of view.
In my opinion, it was quite correct to destroy in reprisal the houses which made it possible for the bands to carry out attacks of this type.
Q General, may I ask you something in this connection. I seem to remember that the burning down of these 12 houses in reprisal was mentioned distinctly in the report by the Railway Security Staff. Is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q Now, let us discuss another incident which was also part of the Railway Security Service of the 373rd Division. This incident again is quoted repeatedly in the documents. It turns up in the daily report of the 15th Corps of 11 December 1943. This is contained in Document Book XV on page 7 of the English and page 7 of the German also. The exhibit number there is 365 and the document number is NOKW-1399.
The report is also contained in Document Book XV on page 20 this time of the English in Exhibit 367 which we have quoted before. It is a daily report by the 15th Corps of 11 December 1943. There again a pointer to the 373rd Division is contained.
Q General, may I ask you to make quite clear what this was about?
AAs the 373rd Division reports here, the line from Bihac to Bosnia Novi had been dynamited no less than three times. As reprisal for this, houses were burned down in this area which had been almost entirely evacuated by the population and was, therefore, used by the bands as bases.
Q This, I suppose, is all that can be said about this incident. Let us go on and discuss the next one. This is contained in the daily report by the 373rd Division of 17 December. This report is contained in Document Book 15 on page 10 of the English and page 9 of the German. It is part of prosecution Exhibit 366. It is Document NOKW-728. There the Division reports in its daily report two incidents which are separated from each other, the dynamiting of a line 6 kilometers south of Bosnia-Novi and the derailing of 400 meters of railway tracks near Jakodinja. In both cases 2 hostages were taken and houses burned down. The same incidents are contained also as usual in a number of documents, once again in prosecution exhibit 465, NOKW -1399 in Document Book XV on page 6 of both the English and the German and in the same volume in Exhibit 367 on page 23 of the English and 22 of the German.
General, what can you tell us about these incidents and the reprisal measures?
A These reports show how incidents in these parts increased. I am sure that the troops had announced their intentions of taking reprisal measures and, therefore, I think that as the sabotage acts increased it was necessary for them to take strong action.
Q Then finally in this context we shall discuss incidents which occurred on the 28th of January 1944. The prosecution document which I am referring to here is contained in Document Book XV on page 58 of the English and 85 of the German.
It is Exhibit 370. There the prosecution have only included one sentence. The Division says there in this entry: "Intention arrest of hostages on both sides of the lines southwest of Bosnia-Novi."
As the incident which explains this intention cannot be seen from this document, I myself have included in my document book Leyser II on page 103 further extracts from this prosecution document. I offer it is Leyser Exhibit No. 30. The entry to which I wish to have reference is on page 103 of my document book.
General, may I hand you the photostatic copy and ask you to give us your comments briefly about this matter?
A This daily report shows that the line to Prijedor-Novi had been dynamited at two points, near Kosara an armoured train hit a mine and that the oine near Omarsa had been blown up. It was reported that it was intended to arrest hostages on both sides of the railway line. That's all I can say about that; namely, the intention that hostages should be apprehended.
Q Would you please repeat the last sentence again?
A The daily report shows that the line had once again been dynamited twice, that an armored train had hit a mine, that the line near Omarsca had been blown up and, as intention, the report that hostages should be arrested on both sides of the line.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. May I have the document number again and page number? I take it you are referring to what you now term Leyser Exhibit 30. Will you give the information concerning it again, please?
DR. TIPP: Certainly, your Honors. If the Tribunal please, the report to which I have had reference -- or, rather, to which General von Leyser had reference -- is contained in Leyser Document Book II on page 105, on page 104 -- I beg your pardon. There is no page in the German document book. It is headed: "To Headquarters 2nd Panzer Army Daily Report 28 January 1944" and under "373rd Division," it is reported:
"At the action II 383 west of Prijedor strong partisan group thrown towards the North"; and then they quote enemy dead, their own dead, injured and so forth, and then comes the quotation which General von Leyser gave:
"The following night the railway line Prijedor-Novi has been blown up again at two points. In the area Kozara night attack on strong point repulsed. Armored train struck mine. I coach destroyed, railway line near Omarska blown up." and so forth. This is what General von Leyser just had reference to.
Q And if I understood you correctly, General, from the chronological sequence of these two reports from our own document book and the prosecution document you have drawn the conclusion that the arrest of hostages was done because of these incidents?
A Yes, indeed.
Q. May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that this incident is contained in a number of documents submitted by the prosecution. This includes, which becomes clear from the chronological sequence, the daily report by the Army of the 29th of January 1944, as the incident had taken place on the 28th of January, 1944. The report has been submitted twice in order to add to the clarity of matters; first, in Exhibit 370 in Document Book 15 on Page 59 of the English and 86 of the German. The report turns up again in the some wording in Document Book 25, where it is Exhibit 570. This is Prosecution Document NOKW 1772, page 59 English and 46 German. Would you, General, look at Document Book 25 and at Page 46 of the German and tell us what that shows us?
A. This daily report makes it clear that the Prijedor-Novi line again was dynamited, and that because of these many incidents twenty-nine hostages were arrested on both sides or the railway. This report, therefore, reports that the measure was carried out; namely, that the twenty-nine hostages had in fact been arrested. It was only a threat in the previous document. As these incidents increased to such an extent, the arrests of hostages, in order to safeguard this important line, seems to me utterly a military necessity. If things calm down the hostages will be released, of course, and in most cases it was shown that after hostages had been arrested, the sabotage actions discontinued.
Q. May I ask you something additionally in this connection? This brings us to the end of the problems concerning the 373rd Division. Have you found out whether in any of the documents submitted by the prosecution there is any indication that in the area of 373rd division there was, because of such sabotage acts, a reprisal measure which was actually carried out; that is to say, that hostages were shot or hanged.
A. I am afraid I haven't quite followed your question. Would you please repeat?
Q. What I asked you, General, was that---------we have found a number of documents that the 373rd Division has arrested hostages. Let me ask you, in addition thereto, have you found in any of the documents of the prosecu tion that actually hostages arrested were executed in the area of the 373rd Division?
A. No, the documents show beyond a doubt, although the 373rd Division reports frequently that hostages were arrested, but there is not a single case where they report that these hostages were killed afterwards. This, in my opinion, shows that the arrest of the hostages by itself was effective as a deterrent measure. As I said before, if things calmed down in that region, the hostages were released.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. Before we adjourn, I want to say that the adjournment will be until November 12, 1947, at 9:30. In making this announcement, I think we should further state that the Tribunal will be in session for the following Saturday, so that we can make up at least some of the time. The Tribunal with stand adjourned at this time until November 12th at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)