Q If I understood the Prosecutor correctly, General, for this collaboration between the German Armed Forces and the Cetnik units he reproached you. This reproach would be concerned with the fact that on the one hand the German Armed Forces thought so little of this band warfare and yet on the other hand at least suffered the fight of these Cetnik bands. Can you briefly tell us what, in your opinion, is the difference, the basic difference, between the fight of the Cetniks and and the fight of the Tito partisans.
A The fight of the Cetniks was nothing else but an emergency defense against the Tito bands. They merely protected themselves and defended their home against plunderous attackers. The Tito bands fought against the German Armed Forces in order to harm us by sabotage acts, etc. Let me put in this way. The Cetnik unit had the same feeling and the same desires as we had. They wanted peace and law and order in the country which was just what the German Forces wanted. The Tito bands, however, did not want law and order but they desired unrest.
Q Now, one more point which we tried to clarify on direct examination but which I am afraid was not made quite clear, General. You said that the German Armed Forces was by no means interested in making use of the Ethnic fighting which was going on there and using it for extermination of the population. You gave us an example for this and you said that you forbid that Ustasha units be stationed in Serbian villages, at least, that is what I understood you to say. It is possible that it wasn't expressed quite clearly. It seemed to me as if the Prosecutor assumed that you also forbade that Cetnik units were stationed in Croatian villages. Perhaps you would like to make this point quite clear and perhaps you would like to tell us what you meant when you made these statements and what your order was to avoid.
A First of all I would like to say that Cetnik units stationed in villages was completely out of the question. I just tried to explain that these Cetniks were in a local organization within their own villages for the purpose of protection. Since I had no jurisdiction over these people I would never be in a position to order Cetniks to be stationed in another village. Now, we have to come to distinction between Ustasha and Cetnik units.
The hatred between the Croats and the Serbs which did not only exist at that time but which had been in existence for centuries, since these two parties fought against each other, the German Armed forces was mainly concerned with the fact that they would no longer continue to fight against each other and in order to prevent this fight I ordered at the time that when the general Ustasha units were formed, which were a party organization, that these particular Ustasha units should not be stationed in villages which contained Serbian inhabitants to a majority just in order to avoid such a conflict because the German Aimed Forces was mainly interested in peace, not in fighting. That was the reason why through negotiations, I would like to stress this because I had no authority over these party organizations, other than negotiations, I achieved that the Ustasha units were not stationed in the Cetnik villages to maintain law and order. That was my endeavor and that was the reason why I gave this order. It was certainly not to incite these people against each other.
Q I believe, General, that we have clarified this complicated problem as much as possible. One further question which deals with the independence of the Croatian State is the following. You realize that the Prosecution maintains the point of view that the Croatian State was not independent state in the sense of International State Law. I realize that this question is open to legal argument but I would like to ask you one question in connection with it. Was there in Croatia a clearly defined state area?
A Yes, there was.
Q Was there in Croatia a clearly defined government with the corresponding functionaries?
A Yes, there was.
Q And did Croatia also have a nation?
A Yes, it did.
Q I believe those are the prerequisites which make up a state and one further question. The Prosecutor asked you for that length of time the Croatian stats had existed and whether it continued to exist when the German Armed Forces were through.
I would like to ask you to ignore for a moment the wartime conditions and I would like you to tell me on the basis of your knowledge on that particular area whether the Croatian State as such was in a position to continue to exist after all you know?
A If the Croatian State, as it existed at that time, had not been made any difficulties from outside then in my opinion to the best of my knowledge and judgement the Croatian State was certainly in a position to continue its existence.
Q You said, General, difficulties from outside. Do you, by this, mean that the Croatian State collapsed not because of internal reasons but other forces were committed which influenced this state?
A Yes, that is what I mean.
Q Would you further please tell us what was the power that caused the Croatian State to collapse?
A I believe one can say that it was Russia.
Q Now a few small questions which arose during the course of the cross-examination. Above all the hostage question is of a certain importance. On direct examination you said and established on hand of the documents that in the area of the XV Corps there was only one case when hostages were executed.
A Yes.
Q I assume, General, you recall this particular incident?
A Yes, I do.
Q The Prosecution put to you on cross examination the following. On hand of the documents you had explained that the first Cossack Division which is the one that plays a part here, had arrested hostages for sometime in a certain area, the name of which I do not recall. You also said, in your opinion, these hostages were at some later date executed and those were the hostages which can be found in a later report of the Cossack Division. The Prosecutor here put to you that this was not justified because these hostages were doubtlessly quite innocent of anything that took place after their arrest.
Perhaps you could clarify this whole question on principle here. By this I mean I would like you to tell us how such an arrest and execution of hostages was to take place in theory and how it took place in actual fact to the best of your recollection.
A There would be for instance along the railroad line which was supposed to be secured by the Cossacks almost daily and continuously exploding actions. This railroad line, however, is of vital importance for the military situation because it was the only larger railway line which existed in that area. As a consequence the German Armed Forces could not always stand and watch how this railroad line was destroyed. As much as possible the sabotage acts were carried out at night time. That was mainly the case. Therefore, it was very difficult to apprehend the real perpetrators. It was almost impossible and just because it was impossible all that remained to do for the German leadership was to warn the population which had been ordered in the order from higher agencies. This was done in the following manner: In the villages posters would be exhibited and it would be publicly announced that if these sabotage acts were not ceased then one would have to take steps and arrest hostages and these hostages, if the sabotage acts still did not cease, might possibly be taken to account for these acts so that the population would be quite well informed of what happened and what was to happen.
Q And now, from where and from which walks of life were these hostages taken?
A The hostages were to be levied mainly from those groups of people who were under suspicion of having participated in these sabotage acts. I believe the document shows that these people who had been arrested as hostages had became suspicious in connection with this sabotage act on the railroad line. Despite warnings these sabotage acts kept occurring and now after one particular attack on a railroad line had been carried out the measure was fought over actually and now if the German Armed Forces did not want to become ridiculous it really had to assert itself and therefore the copulation and those parties which took part in the sabotage acts and which could not be brought to reason had to be finally deterred from carrying out these acts.
Here again, as has been ordered, a member of the Divisional Commander together with the representatives of Croatian governments had to establish these measures and this representative of the Croatian government of his own country was, in the final analysis, according to the order which we had, the man who was to decide whether and how this measure was to be carried out. This is how it actually happened and was carried out in actual practice.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
BY DR. TIPP:
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued)
Q. General, before the recess we discussed reprisal measures connected with the Cossack Division and you have explained that in your opinion the hostages executed on that occasion had been seized from among the hostages who had been arrested by the Cossack Division a few weeks previously. Now, I wanted to ask you a question. Following up what the Prosecution put to you, namely that the hostages executed on that occasion could not possibly have had any connection with the deed which was to be retaliated for because they had been arrested long before the actual act had been committed. I would like you to tell us in this connection how things were handled and how the theoretical relationship was between hostages and perpetrators. I mean by that, is the point of reprisal measure to hit the perpetrator or what other purpose does a reprisal measure have?
A. Well, what one should endeavor to achieve is to get hold of the actual perpetrator but as that was not possible, warnings were issued as I have indicated and hostages were seized who were to pay for the act: that is the actual difference between hostages and perpetrators. One realizes that people who were not actually connected with the act under consideration were still made responsible and this is what happened in this particular case as I see it.
Q. A further question in this connection, General. I would like to clear up matters arising from Exhibit 614 which is the last document submitted by the Prosecution during your cross-examination. It is NOKW 963. It is your order of 10 August 1944 concerning security measures for roads and from that document the Prosecution have used Paragraph D. This concerns the arrest of hostages and this is what the order says.
In the case of repeated attacks in a certain sector of the road Communist hostages have to be apprehended from the villages of the immediate vicinity who have to be sentenced in the event of repeated surprise attacks. Sentencing of hostages according to orders by the XXIst Army Corps, Number so and so concerning reprisal measures and then there is a bracket, Commander in Chief, Ia, No. 296/43 Secret. Here, therefore, it is ordered that in the event of repeated attacks hostages are to be taken from the villages in the immediate vicinity and they are being called Communist hostages and should there be more attacks reprisal measures will be carried out on them. Now, I would like to ask you, General, is this arrangement ordered by you as an original order or did you base yours in this connection on another order which existed and if so can you explain that former order, if there was one, with regard to the present one?
A. Yes, I think this becomes quite clear from the order. This order is based on the order by the Commander in Chief, Southeast In, F, No. 296/43. In other words it is not an order by me but it is the important and basic order which I have mentioned here before which is applicable for retaliation measures. I think it is the order of 22 December 1943. Perhaps you could show me the original.
Q. In that case, General, I would like to hand to you Document-Book XVI of the Prosecution. There on page 98 of the German text there is document NOKW 172 which is Prosecution Exhibit 379. It is an order by the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 22 December 1943. It is Exhibit 379, Document Book XVI, on page 98 of the German text. It is on page 47 of the English book. Would you, General, please compare those two orders and then give us your comments, whether this is the order mentioned and why you can conclude that with certainty.
A. Yes, this is the order to which I had reference just now from which can be seen the following. This order by the Commander in Chief and the parenthesis which has just been mentioned contain the same file number, that is to say, Commander in Chief Southeast INIF, No. 296/43. This is the same file reference which is also contained in the order by the Commander in Chief of 22 December 1943, Department Ia, F, No. 296/43. In other words this is not an order which was issued by me originally, but it has reference to an order by the Commander in Chief Southeast which already existed.
Q. Perhaps, General, I might ask you to be a little more precise, particularly with reference to this one point. It says in the order by the XXIst Corps which I have submitted to you just now, that Communist hostages were to be arrested from the neighborhood. Do you, in the order of the Commander in Chief Southeast find a similar paragraph?
A. Yes, under D, Paragraph 2, it says there, if such people as are guilty cannot be found those persons must be resorted to who without being connected with the actual deed nevertheless are to be regarded as co-responsible; first of all those who recognize Communism and this is on what this paragraph in the order is based on.
Q. And what in order to make this quite clear, is the purpose General, of the order of the XXIst Corps of August 1944.
A. The purpose was to have the subordinate divisions and units reminded once more as to how they would proceed with reprisal measures in accordance with existing orders.
Q. I think we need not discuss the problem of reprisal measures any further, Inasmuch as it was important to the cross examination and I would like to clear up something else with you, General.
On cross examination two reports were put to you, which dealt with he organization of large scale bands, How they were broken down into corps and divisions, etc. They were put to you, I assume, in order to prove that these large scale bands amounted to regular troops. I would like to ask you this, General, without wanting to have arguments about International Law with you, is it in your opinion of decisive importance whether a unit is organized or not for it to become a force which is fighting legally, which is the first important point.
A. As I see it the most important thing is that a Government exists first of all, then the so-called organization must comply with the four well-known conditions of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations, and in the case of Croatia, the situation was that the Yugoslav Army had capitulated, the capitulation had become a fact. The country was occupied by Germany. A new Government had been formed, which was forming its own armed forces, and consequently in my opinion, inasmuch as I can say anything about International Law there couldn't be a second or third army besides. To me as a soldier the Croatian Government was the agency which represented an Allied State, and as far as I was concerned there was only the Croatian armed forces as armed forces with full legal status.
Q. It seems to me, General, that sufficient mention has been made of the fact whether or not the Tito partisans complied with the four well-known stipulations of the Hague Land Warfare regulations. We have cleared that up adequately, it seems to me, on direct examination. I simply wanted you to express your basic attitude as to whether or not units became legalized simply by complying with the fourt stipulations of the Hague convention. If I have understood you correctly you said just now that no legal group in that sense could be formed against the Croatian Government, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Perhaps just a few brief points now, General, concerning operation Panther, and again a few obscure points have crept in which I would like to clear up with you. The Prosecution has asserted, that according to your testimony there were in the area where the operation was to be carried out no villages, and it therefore could not understand that in the order concerned it was ordered to apprehend people who were strangers to various localities, and vagrants in that area.
Perhaps you can clear up that misunderstanding; were there really no villages in the Panther area, or what did you want to say on direct examination?
A. What I think I said was, that if I mentioned small villages or places which were scarcely villages, what I meant was the mountain villages, but I don't think I said on direct examination that there were no villages at all in Croatia. In the Panther area villages certainly were there, because it was a relatively large area which was involved in this operation. I then said that there existed people who remained outside the villages during combat actions, and that they seemed to be suspects, because as a rule civilians did not like to be involved in fighting; that if such are round about in an area where there is fighting and shooting, and if people roam about in the open there, that alone is suspicious. I said it was precisely the tactics of the partisans to hide their arms as quickly as possible somewhere in order to roam about as apparently harmless civilians. That is why that passage appears in the order that these people were to be apprehended in order to find out whether they were suspects. Another point, General, which was also mentioned on your cross-examination, which was put to you by the prosecution this morning, from Document NOKW 1772 contained in Document Book XXV, which is Prosecution Exhibit 570, from page 46 of the German and page 61 of the English. This is the report by the First Mountain Division of the 10 February 1944. It concerns the situation between the 26 of January and 10 February 1944. Can you tell us first, was the First Mountain Division subordinated to you at that period of time.
A. I couldn't say that off-hand, unfortunately. I assume it was, because the villages named were in that area, and I know that for a short period of time the division was subordinate to me at once. That is all I can say with certainty.
Q. From this document the Prosecution had quoted one sentence, which reads: "Establishment of special units in British-Italian uniforms as well as civilian clothing, and for expedient employment similar to Regiment Brandenburg would certainly bring unrest to the enemy ranks, and success," and I suppose the Prosecution concluded from that that troops under you were disguised in that manner. Now, a distinction will have to be made, I figure, between the things contained in this document and the conclusions which one might possibly draw therefrom. I don't think that became quite clear from your examination. Now, I read this sentence to you again, General. Would you like to tell us what this sentence meant as it stands there?
A. Well, it is a suggestion.
Q. A suggestion by whom to whom?
A. A suggestion by the First Mountain Division is contained in this report. Whether this reached me at all cannot be seen from this document.
Q. Was the suggestion ever carried out?
A. Not as far as I was concerned. Nor do I believe I could ever carry it out, and I believe I said so this morning. The risk would have to be viewed that these people might be caught in the middle of this stratagem, and then would have to expect to be punished with death off-hand.
Q. If I understand you correctly, General, you say that this sentence amounts to a suggestion or opinion by the Division?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Then it says "similar to Regiment Brandenburg, -" I don't think that explains it quite fully, General; can you tell us once again what Regiment Brandenburg was?
A. All I can say is that this Regiment Brandenburg was subordinate to me for a short period of time, like any other military unit, and it was said of this unit that it was under the OKU direct, by whom it would from case to case or from time to time be given a special assignment. As far as I am concerned it was a unit like any other unit, such as I would use for tactical purposes, such as might become necessary in my sector.
Q. Now, if the Brandenburg Regiment was employed by you for special purposes, would it then become possible that the Brandenburg Regiment, or men of that Regiment could turn up in civilian uniforms or foreign uniforms?
A. Not that I know of, nor did I ever order such a thing. I used them as a troop unit as any other unit.
Q. Could you tell us anything about how the employment of the Brandenburg Regiment was handled, whether they changed their uniforms in that sense, as alleged here, etc.?
A. I know nothing about that.
Q. But in any case you know, according to what you said just now, these orders did not come from your corps?
A. No.
Q. General, once again this difficult question of hospitals. Destruction of hospitals, so-called hospitals, has been discussed in a number of cases in testimony before; I merely would like to make one thing clear, which wasn't made quite clear this morning in cross-examination......the Prosecution have put to you that in one document mention is made of destruction of one hospital barracks with 500 beds, in other words that must have been a fairly considerablesized hospital.
Destruction of 500 beds is mentioned in only one document, which I shall hand to you now. It is contained in Document Book XXV of the Prosecution, page 104 of the English and page 81 of the German. Let me hand you this document, General, and tell the court what actually is mentioned about the destruction of this hospital barracks in the document, which is contained in the Daily Report of your Corps, 12 June 1944 under the heading 373rd Division?
A. What it says there about the so-called hospital is this: "9 hospital barracks." I said myself that they were barracks. The Prosecution maintained that nothing was said of this in the document. They merely said that it was one hospital with 500 beds. I should like to remark in this connection that in the original this paragraph was crossed out. In other words although this has been made part of the document, it was never used as a report. Why it was not, I do not know. Perhaps the whole matter was not correct in this form because in the original the whole paragraph is crossed out.
Q. Then, there is only one more document which I'd like to discuss with you which was shown you on cross examination. This is one of those collective documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a moment. In connection with this document to which the defendant has just made reference, Exhibit 575, can the Tribunal see the original, is either in the court room?
MR. FULKERSEN: It has already been made an Exhibit, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but reference has been by the defendant that this portion that is in this document here was crossed out of the original. Now, we'd like to see the original. You may proceed, we will come back to that later when we get the original.
DR. TIPP: Very well, Your Honor.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. The only document left to us now is a document which the prosecution showed you on cross examination. It is one of those collective documents which always bothered us a bit. I am talking a bout NOKW-1426, introduced as Exhibit 613 by the prosecution. I only have a few questions about this exhibit. Let me show you the document first.
You were asked this morning what your attitude was concerning the conscription of able-bodied men, and what it meant when the various documents referred to the fact of the able-bodied men being apprehended. I don't know whether there was not some misunderstanding due to the translation.
It was my impression that the prosecution was of the opinion that the term "seizing able-bodied men" was equivalent to "arresting able-bodied men." The German term "erfassen", in the case of conscription into the German Wehrmacht always has been a definite term. Even at home, an able-bodied man would be "conscripted". Therefore, would you please tell us, General, what was meant by the term "erfassen" (conscripting) in the case of the German armed forces. Perhaps you can give us an example in this connection.
How, in order to specify my question, was an able-bodied man fit for military service conscripted into the Wehrmacht?
A. There was what was known as Armed Forces District Offices in Germany, and there those fit for military service had to report when it was their turn. They were then medically examined, their papers were looked over, all the personal data taken down, and then they were told that they will be sent to this or that unit as recruits; and all that we called "erfassen", the conscripting of people fit for military service. Now, if the documents here speak of the fact that these able-bodied men were conscripted, that means, as the order and also the document mention, that these able-bodied men were conscripted by a commission of the Croat authorities, in order then to be inducted into the Croatian Armed Forces. This is what we mean by "erfassen".
Q. May I draw your attention here to the fact that this term is particularly important in document NOKW-1426. First in the daily report of the 7th March, 1944 where it says under "284th Division", roughly in the middle of the page, "200 able-bodied men conscripted." May I assume, General, that this is how you want to explain this particular entry?
A. Yes.
Q. Then the same term reappears in the daily report of 9 March 1944 which is on page 4 of the translation. I think that makes that clear.
Now, another question, General, concerning the occupation and evacuation of the Island of Raab which is also discussed in this document.
The prosecution have put to your from the document just mentioned the final report concerning the Raab operation. It is contained on pages 7 and 8 of this document. It is a report by the 15th Corps of 24 March 1944, addressed to the Second Panzer Army. Do you recall, General, what division it was that occupied Raab?
A. I think it must have been the 392nd Division because it was stationed in that sector.
Q. The report which I have mentioned just now was made by the 15th Mountain Corps. What were the actual facts on which the Corps based itself for this final report?
A. It had the daily reports of the Divisions concerned.
Q. In other words, the 392. Now, the prosecution have put to you concerning the final report that it said "a hundred people arrested and transported to Fiume." This, at least, is what the final report by the Corps says, which is dated the 24th of March, and the subject of which is the Raab Operation. I would like to draw your attention to page 6 of this document. There is the daily report of 20 March 1944 which includes a report by the 392nd Division. Would please look at this report and then tell the Court whether in your opinion it could be said that this report was one of the things used for the final report by the Corps?
A. May I look at the report of the Corps again?
Q. It is part of the same document, General, a little further back, but I could also hand you the photostatic copy. Let me show you the photostatic copy, General.
A. Having compared the two reports, I'd like to say that the report by the Corps to the Panzer Army is based on the report which you have just shown me. Of course, the same subject matter is discussed, namely the occupation of the Island of Raab. We occupied it only once.
Q. Could you then tell us, General, please, whether in the daily report of the 20th of March, mention is made of those hundred people and what expression is used there about them?
A. In the report by the division, it merely says a hundred able-bodied persons brought to Fiume.
Q. And what does the Corps say?
A. The Corps says "a hundred arrestees transported." It is rather striking here that the report by the Corps also contains 25 Jews who are not mentioned by the 392nd Division. This is a symptom, as I discover here for the fact, that during the combat operation the troops only seized these hundred able-bodied persons which was not so in the case of the Jews, and then later it was probably reported to the Panzer Army that the opportunity was used for these 25 Jews to take these people on the boat to Italy.
Q. A final question in this connection, witness. This morning they put to you the question why these able-bodied people were sent to Fiume and since you say they were to be put at the disposal of the Croat authorities, I am not quite sure whether you can make this quite clear. Was Fiume a city which was exclusively subordinate to the Italian authorities, or was there another part of Fiume, an additional suburb or something, which was under Croat authorities?
A. As far as I know, part of Fiume belonged to the Croatian State. That is how I remember it, at least. And there, I suppose, one of those agencies had its seat which accepted able-bodied recruits and that one simply used these boats, since these people had to be transported somewhere, to take them to Fiume.
Q. My final question, general. The report does not say anything about the 25 Jews being deported as arrestees. All it says is that they were transferred to Fiume.
A. Yes. That becomes quite clear from the report, especially if you compare those two reports.
DR. TIPP: Thank you very much. I have no further questions on redirect examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other counsel for the defense have any further redirect examination? Is there any limited recross examination on behalf of the prosecution?
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q. There are just a few things I would like to ask you, General. You gave us a fairly detailed description here in the last few minutes about how these executions of hostages were carried out, that is, who had to be consulted and who was in charge of it, etc. Now you have emphasized that there are only two references in these documents that refer to reprisal actions in which persons were actually hanged or put to death in some manner in your corps area while you were there and you disclaimed having any knowledge about either one of these. You said you did not have any independent recollection of either incident.
How then.... That is true, isn't it? You said you did not recall either one of these instances?
A. I did not say that. When am I supposed to have said that?
Q. You recall that you were questioned first about the 22 hostages who were hanged at the site of the blasting -- I believe that is almost literally what the document said. You said you didn't know anything about that. Then you recall that in the course of direct examination, Dr. Tipp read this short passage in which it said that 20 hostages were either hanged or shot, I don't recall what, and you said you could not tell from the document what that was about and that you had no recollection of that. Do you recall that?
A. No.
Q. The only reference in the document is the 22 hostages and you said that you did not have any recollection at all about that incident.
A. I never said that. During my examination I stated how I supposed the matter went at the time but I never said that I did not recall the matter. I cannot remember saying anything like that.
Q. Well, then, let me ask you now. Do you or do you not recall any incidents in your Corps in which hostages were hanged or shot?
A. I am saying that on the basis of the documents given me I reconstructed the incident as I think it happened at the time and I have stated that on the basis of existing orders and regulations I explained how a matter of that sort was handled; and as, according to the documents which I have seen and which were submitted by the prosecution, this incident occurred in the sector of the 15th Corps, I stated this incident must have been handled as it was ordered.
Q. Well, I repeat my question, General. Do you personally recall any occurrences in which hostages were hanged or shot in the area of the 15th Corps while it was under your command; regardless of what's in the documents or what is not in the documents, do you recall any such incidents?