DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I should like to turn now to some defense documents. The next document which I should like to offer is contained in Volume V for Felmy. It is Document 103 on page 54. It is offered as Exhibit 23. I offer it so that the picture will become quite clear of the situation as it developed at the time when the Italians surrendered in the area of the 68th Army Corps. This is an extract from the war diary of the 68th Army Corps for the period of time between 1 July and 31 December 1943. This document again has come from the Washington material. I shall read from page 55. It says there:
"At 2100 hours" -- this apparently means 8 September 1943 -"It has been announced by radio that Italy has allegedly concluded a truce with the Allies. For the time being this news item is considered to be Allied propaganda.
"2240 hours Wehrmacht Communications Command at Athens announces that the measures according to order by the communication chief of Army Group E, which were issued for code word "Axis", are to be put into effect in the communications service without delay.
"2300 hours Chief of General Staff receives confirmation by telephone after inquiry from Chief of the German General Staff with Italian 11th Army Corps High Command that news about Italian truce is true. Army Group E has already given code word "Axis". Passing on of the code word is being postponed as negotiations between Chief of German General Staff with Italian 11th Army Corps High Command and Supreme Commander of the Italian 11th Army. General Vecciarelli, are still in progress.
"2345 hours As the Commanding General is absent, being on an inspection tour in Patras, all German troops stationed on the Peloponnes are "alerted". Based on the radio announcement and having been alerted, the troops are able to prepare in good time for the expected measures following the code word "Axis". Everywhere inconspicious preparatory measures are being taken.
"The Commanding General in the Patras is informed by phone to go to Athens on the following day as quickly as possible, in order to continue the negotiations, and possibly to take over Army Group Southern Greece.
"9/9/1943 0500 hours First transport of VII Fortification Infantry Battalion 999 arrives on the island of Zante.
As the radio station of the battalion was left behind in Athens and will only arrive with the last transport, there is no direct connection between the VII Fortification Infantry Battalion and the High Command: (Radio connections only via Admiral Aegaeis).
0520 hours Order by telephone (later by radio) from German General Staff with 11th Italian Army Group High Command: Begin to put into effect measures "Axis": 0800 hours.
"0730 hours Commanding General flies from the aerodrome at Araxos to Athens to take over the command of Army Group Southern Greece."
"0800 hours. In the whole of the Command area, except the island of Zante, the execution of the measures ordered for the code word "Axis" commence: Taking over of heavy weapons, supply deports and communication connections, disarming and collecting of Italian troops. Nowhere is any resistance offered to the German measures on the part of the Italians. A large part of the Italian troops show their joy about the cessation of hostilities for Italy. Others are totally indifferent and passive. Only few express the desire to continue the fight on the side of the Germans.
"0900 hours 1st Armored Division reports that the bridge across the Corinth Channel is firmly in our hands, Barracks and local headquarters of Corinth have been occupied.
"0930 hours Commanding Officer of 1st Panzer Division, MajorGeneral Krueger, arrives in Wytina and assumes command of the LXVIII Army Corps. Colonel Soeth, has been given the command of the 1st Armored Division.
"1020 hours 1st Armored Division reports that the disarming of Italian troops in Corinth has been completed.
"1200 hours The division are ordered to leave, for the time being, the units detailed for taking over the Italian coast defense sectors and to place coast security groups right in front. The disarmed Italians whose evacuation is planned, are to be kept together. III./ Fortification Infantry Battalion 999 (Kyparissia) is tactically subordinated to the 117th Infantry Division, effective immediately.
"1430 hours. In a telephone message to Army Group Southern Greece the Strategic and Tactical Planning General Staff gives the following survey of the situation:"
THE PRESIDENT: May I inquire, Dr. Mueller-Torgow, as to how extensive you intend to continue as to the reading of these reports? It seems to me they are tactical reports which the Tribunal can give consideration to but it will take a lot of time and, unless it is absolutely necessary. I wouldn't think that anything in particular would be gained at this time by reading it into the record. I do not want to restrict you, though. Do you have some particular purpose in reading it all into the record?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: All I wanted to read was just the next paragraph, if the Tribunal please; but I shall do without it.
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, go ahead if you care to.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: In general, the taking over of the heavy weapons is completed. In the sector of the 117th Infantry Division hand weapons have partly been retained by the Italians. Almost all Italians with the 1st Panzer Division and the 965 Fortification Infantry Regiment have been disarmed. Of the coastal artillery in the sector of the 965 Infantry Regiment 1 naval coast battery 20, 3 (Cape Papas) and 3 betty batteries 12, 2 (north or Pirgos) have been taken over according to plan and are ready for defense action. The measures in the sectors Guthion and Sparta are still in progress; there have been no reports concerning Pilos."
May I read just a few more passages from this document so that we can see what effect the Italian surrender had on the hand situation particularly in the Peloponnese. Under 14 October 1943 it says in the third paragraph:
"Commanding Officer of 117th Infantry Division in appointed military commander for the Peloponnese. Authorities and units of the air force and Navy have been ordered to cooperate closely with the Commanding Officer of the 117th Infantry Division in as far as the defense of the Peloponnese is concerned.
Then from page 59, on top, second paragraph:
"Because of the constant increase of bandit attacks on the main roads of the Peloponnes orders are issued, immediately effective, that all individual trips with motor vehicles are prohibited and that convoy traffic is to be introduced.
"New instructions by the Army Group regarding the uniform conduct of the fight against Communism pursuant to the Fuehrer Cyder (see enclosure). According to this the political leadership of all operations against Communism is taken over by the Special Plenipotentiary for the Southeast, Envoy Neubacher, who amongst other things has the sole right to conduct negotiations with the bandit leaders or to approve of them."
Under 7 November 1943 I should like to draw attention to the second paragraph where it says:
"To the northeast of Kalamata a monastery which the bandits had turned into a fortress like building is destroyed by artillery fire. On searching it afterwards military equipment is found and some prisoners are taken."
3 paragraphs further down it says:
"The Regiment Brandenburg conducts a reconnaissance operation in the area of Akphissa-Arachowa at which 140 men of a bandit reserve company are captured."
And under 11 November 1943 it says in the second paragraph:
"Pursuant to Fuehrer Order permission is now given for the forma tion of Greek volunteer groups.
(Restrictions: Must not be placed in own front units for fighting the Anglo-Saxons, no sizable indipendent formations to be organized."
I am informed this entry was on the 12th of November -- not the 11th of November.
The next document I beg to offer is contained in Elmy Volume No. II. It is document No. 64 on page 57. It will be given exhibit number 34. This document is an affidavit by Heinz von Guldenfeldt who was once General. It says in paragraph 2:
"With regard to Count 3 of the indictment, figure 12-i, pages 17/18, I can confirm that within the area of the 68th Army Corps, as in the entire area of Southern Greece, no Italians were shot while they were disarmed and evacuated. The entire operation was carried out in the territory of Southern Greece without shedding one drop of blood."
The next but one paragraph reads:
"The negotiations with General Vecchiarelli on disarming had the result that he ordered his Italian troops in Southern Greece first to deliver the heavy weapons and then the light weapons; also the delivery of the motor vehicles, depots, etc., as well as the evacuation of the Italians was arranged with General Vecchiarelli or his delegate. Thus by the interference of the Italian Supreme Commander himself, it was achieved that the whole move was carried throughout without friction or bloodshed."
In order to make everything quite clear, I should like to point out that General von Gyldenfeldt was, as I believe I mentioned before, German General Chief of Staff with the 11th Italian Army.
The next document which I should like to cover is contained in the same volume. It is Document No. 58, on Page 24, and it is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 35. This is an affidavit by Rudolf Pohl. I shall read only the second and third paragraphs: "I was assigned from September, 1942 until the end of the war as chauffeur to the LXVIIIth Corps." I shall now read the third paragraph: "When the Italians were disarmed, no Italians were shot, as far as I know. At this time I was with many other German officers in the Italian camps: everything took place in an orderly way and without incident."
The next document to which I should like to come back is the affidavit given by Guenther Kleykamp in the same volume. The Document is No. 59, on Page 27 of Document book 2. It says there, under Roman I, on Page 27:
The 11th Italian Army was subordinated to the German Army Group E at Saloniki. The Army's area included almost all of Southern Greece as well as the Islands. The Army consisted of several Italian corps, composed partly of Italian and partly of German units, and of the German LXVIIIth Corps, composed of 2 Italian and 2 German divisions, on the Peloponnes.
Since the Italians considered exclusively their sphere of interests, the German influence was very small. This was shown especially in the capital, where the German Wehrmacht had been granted only part of Piraeus as its sphere of influence. The Italians did almost nothing to stem the increasing economic, financial and political deterioration in Greece and thereby to decrease the dangerously growing of the Commnists. Since the activity of the Greek partisans at that time was directed mostly against Italian and only little against German troops, the Italians were primarily interested in measures to protect their own safety. The Italian units were almost always stationed in garrisons located in large towns, and disliked, to undertake operations against the partisans, who ruled the country to an increasing extent.
After the capitulation of the Italian Armed Forces in Italy on 8 September 1943, "Army Group Southern Greece" was formed as directingstaff (Fuehrungsstab) for the troops stationed in Attika-Poeotia and the Peloponnes. It was possible to control the critical situation which had arisen danger to the defensive front on the Southern part of the Balkans.) General VECHIARELLI, the Commander-in chief of the 11th Italian Army, gave his approval to a peaceful demobilization and internment of those Italian forces, which did not want to fight on with the German Wehrmacht against the Allies. He issued orders to his Army, which contained regulations on the surrender of arms, the turning over of supply installations etc., to the German Wehrmacht as well as on the internment of Italian officers and soldiers. Corresponding orders were issued to the German troops by Army Group Southern Greece, the commander of which General FELMY had become in the meantime. The latter also contained an order, that any possible resistance be broken by force of arms. That however did not become necessary within the area of the Army Group, since the Italians almost without exception obeyed the orders of their Commander-in-chief, and since they desisted from hostile actions. Scattered resistance by local Italian commanders was eliminated by negotiations. In this manner, all the measures necessary for the security of the German positions within the area of Army Group Southern Greece, were carried out without friction. That however did not prevent the Italians from turning over their arms to the partisans or from selling them to other interested parties (thus Italian handgrenades, for instance, were still sold months later on the black market in Athens.) Neither compulsory measures nor yet shootings were carried out within the area of Army Group Southern Greece, as far as I know.
The Italian armed forces were demobilized while constant liaison existed between the Army Group and the Supreme Commander of the 11th Italian Army. The staff of the Italian Army continued to function until the most important measures had been carried out.
According to my recollection nothing that could be considered of international agreements, or the laws and customs of warfare, secured within the area of Army Group Southern Greece. In addition, our work in carrying out this operation was acknowledge in a written order by Army Group E, to which we were subordinated: Owing mainly to the successful negotiations conducted by the German General Staff at the 11th Italian Army and by the Army Group with the Italian Supreme Commander, the demobilization of the Italian armed forces - in all of Greece was carried out without friction - and with the exception of several cases outside the area of the Army Group - without bloodshed.
And the last document offered in this connection is contained in Felmy Document No. III. It is Document No. 76, on Page 33. It is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 36. It is an affidavit by Dr. Erich von Shaeure, who, at that time, was a military judge with the 117th Mountain Infantry Division. From Page 34 of this affidavit I should like to read the third paragraph: "I never heard anything on the Peloponneusus about the shooting of Italian officers and soldiers. The capitulation of the Italian Army was carried out in complete calm and order. The Italian officers willingly surrendered their weapons to us and wished us luck in our war against Comminism, which they hated."
Q General, what did the Germans do in order to hit back against band surprise attacks now that the Italians were no longer there?
A The German troops were facing an increasing activity of bands, which expressed itself in surprise attacks, and they did not know what to do at first because, up till then, their relations with the Greek population had been extremely good, and they could not understand why the situation should have become more tense. The OKW had issued its regulations for the fighting of bands, and they provided for very harsh measures. They were issued from the point of view that only if one takes extremely severe reprisal measures he will be able to intimidate the malicious elements and thereby bring them to give up their violations of International Law.
Q What was your attitude towards these orders, General?
A Personally I shared the opinion of the OKW only up to a point It seemed to me to be too rigid and too general. It did not take into consideration individual cases. Military necessity for reprisal measures depends on the extent and the circumstances. As a hard and fast rule, it seemed to me that the ratios ordered were very high, but there must have been a reason why the OKW decides on those ratios
Q Did you think that reprisal measures were necessary in every single case?
A We did not take reprisal measures for every incident. According to the Washington document, which came in belatedly, from the War Diary of the General Command, between July and December, 1943, I could see that from among 91 acts of sabotage--blowing up of railway lines and telephone communications, surprise attacks on vehicles, and other matters--reprisal measures were taken foronly 60. Nothing was done at all about the remaining 31 cases.
But this had two aspects. It was impossible to do nothing at all about these surprise attacks because the confidence of the troops in their leaders would have gone away. Officers and men would not have understood why murder s and mutilations of their comrades were not being avenged and why nothing happened to get the bands to give up their bolshevistic conduct of warfare for the troops had given no provocation for them to act as they did. Otherwise, the danger existed that the troops or individual soldiers, in an entirely natural excitement, would act independently on their own and go out and carry out their own reprisal measures of some sort.
Q General, is it your view that the surprise attacks would have diminished or ceased altogether if reprisal measures would not have been taken at all?
A The terror by the bands would not have ceased. It would have grown to such an extent that the mission of the Corps would not have been possible of realization any more. After all, one can see what happens in Greece today, and nowadays they can act with quite different measures than we could at the time. An amnesty has just been issued but it did not bring about any essential change. I won't say another word, Mr. Fenstermacher.
Q General, as a topic, I would like to give you "the surprise attacks on the Air Force Field company.
A That was the turning point. This surprise attack was near Inoy-to spell it:I-N-O-Y- which is to the north of Eleusis. This is Eleusis along the Athens-Corinth Road, and along the Athens-Thebes Road is Inoy to the north of Eleusis. There in the second half of October, 1943 the Company suffered a surprise attack. Some of them were shot down.
A third of the remainder were slaughtered in a bestial manner. Air Force soldier Doerner--D O-E-R-N-E-R--who suffered a knife wound near his ribs - the knife slid off his rib - fought his way back to the troops, was treated in a hospital, and then he was interrogated by court-martial Judge Buschenhagen. I would liked to have called him as a witness so that he could tell this Tribunal, from his own experiences, how the bands observed International Law, but he is a prisoner of the Yugoslavs; so I could not contact him. In this slaughtering I saw clearly, for the first time, what influence Bulgarian Communist elements had. A thing like that had not happened in the Peloponnes up to that moment, and we did not take any reprisal measures. I must admit that this was a very difficult decision for me to reach because, after all, I had to be straight-forward with my troops and shoulder the responsibility. All that happened was that the military experiences were analyzed and passed on to the divisions. I should like to say this was the dilemma that I faced: was I to take reprisals immediately or must I, once more, use other methods and means in order to bring about a change? So we dropped pamphlets and sent wireless messages and used other types of propaganda in order to try to influence the bands so that they would fight decently.
But we soon saw that this was a complete failure. The situation did not improve, but it grew worse.
Q May I, in this connection, offer a document which is contained in Felmy Document Book II? It is Document No. 63, on Page 54, and it is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 37. This document is an affidavit by General Drum, who, at that time, was the Commending Officer of the 11th Air Force Field Division, between January and October, 1943, and as such he was subordinate to General Felmy. I should like to read a few extracts from this document. On Page 54 it states in the second paragraph:
"In September or October, 1943 (I no longer remember the date) a company of the 21st Air force Jaeger Regiment..." I might interpolate that this Company is the one to which General Felmy has just had reference. "...was subordinate to me, together with a platoon of the Police Regiment stationed near Eleusis happened to get into a trap of bandits in the mountains northeast of Eleusis, east of the road Athens-Thebes on the return from a reconnaissance patrol. The company was almost completely annihilated by concentrated machinegun fire and other weapons from the steeply mounting heights all around a narrow basin. The company leader and all the officers with the major part of the company and the Police Platoon were found dead (over 100). Only a few soldiers (5-6) were able to save themselves and report the incident. About 30 men, most of them wounded, fell into the hands of the bandits, a soldier of the company who was badly wounded from being stabbed into the chest with a knife later succeeded in escaping under unspeakable difficulties and troubles, disguised as a bandit. He was the only survivor among the prisoners."
I might interpolate here that this is the man Doerner whom General Felmy has mentioned.
"He reported that all those taken prisoners after the raid had been slaughtered in a brutal way by the bandits. Their bellies had been ripped open with knives so that they died in dreadful pains.
"On the day after the raid the 21st Airforce Jaeger Regiment with 2 battalions under the leadership of the regiment commander, Brigadier General Pawelke, was assigned upon my order to fight the bandits however it did not succeed, since the bands after a short rearguard action retreated into the mountains as usual. The regiment did neither succeed in taking prisoners nor in finding any dead on the battle-field, so that no clear information could be obtained on the strength and membership of the bands. I, personally, was in the battalion which was assigned on the right flank during the battle and could see about 300 retreating bandits. On the evening of the same day I reported to General Felmy on this as well as on the outcome of the whole battle. Although the raid and the brutal slaughtering had embittered him, as well as all the troops and staffs in Greece in general, General Felmy did not order any reprisals in spite of the fact that just during that time raids and cruel brutalities against the supply lines on the road AthensThebes, as well as in other places, were increasing. The motives for the mildness which Felmy showed at that time as well as on every occasion were to be attributed to his extremely decent and noble personality. He avoided harsh measures even when they were justified and it was not in his nature to pay off in the same coin. His opinion in this case was, that the bandits had to be annihilated in battle, that, however, reprisals should not be taken against the population as long as its cooperation with the band was not proved."
THE PRESIDENT: Before you start on another document we'll take our morning recess.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, in order to summarize what we have discussed before, you maintain that reprisal measures were unavoidable. Would it not have been more correct to punish those who were actually guilty?
A That question is a theoretical one and, as such, is justified, but in actual fact things couldn't be done that way because it was the very tactics of the bands that they attacked from ambush and as soon as the German troops appeared on the scene they would hide and disappear in the mountainous terrain. We, as soldiers, would have preferred to act the other way. We would rather have annihilated them in combat. That would have made the deterring effect even stronger.
Q Who was responsible and competent for the ordering of reprisal measures and authorized to order such measures?
A The provisions concerning this changed frequently. As early as June 1943, for instance, a regimental commander could order reprisal measures. In later directives the reprisal measures were left at the discretion of divisional commanders or the military commanders, to the extent to which those held executive power.
Q How were you, as commanding general, and your corps staff, involved in the ordering or reprisal measures?
A Since the right to order reprisal measures was the right of the regimental or divisional commanders, the Corps Headquarters would only learn of such reprisal measures through daily reports, after they had been ordered. The divisional commanders, when ordering reprisal measures, had to adhere to the provisions of the OKW and to comply with the directives which I had discussed with them in order to be able to deviate from the rigid scheme which had been fixed and in order to gain understanding for the special circumstances which prevailed.
Q General, who was it who decreed, at the time, that reprisal measures could be ordered by divisional commanders?
A That must have been in October 1943.
Q WHO was it - what agency?
A I would say the OKW, via the Army Group.
Q And who dealt, in your Corps Staff, with the incoming reports?
A The I-c in the Corps Staff was the one who dealt with the incoming reports and he had to pass them on to the Army Group, in the so-called morning and evening reports. These reports were passed on by teletype or they might even be passed on by telephone. If the communication lines did not function, then these reports would have to be sent on by mail, or courier. The I-a also reported sometimes about the execution of reprisal measures, if such reprisal measures would be in connection with the commitment of the troops, which happened occasionally. Apart from that, the I-a was the man who worked on the commitment of the troops and the organization of the troops.
Q Were only reprisal measures contained in the I-c reports?
A No. The I-c reports were set up according to a certain scheme. They contained a number of other facts; above all the reason for such reprisal measures could be seen from them - for instance, the number of German losses.
Q What other agencies in your area, apart from the I-c, reported to the Army Group?
A There were quite a few who did that. In the Corp Area the Military Commander, sometimes the Higher SS and Police Leader, the Admiral Aegean, and the Sea Commanders subordinate to him; there were two of those on the Peloponnes. One was stationed in Patras and one Sea Commander was in Kalamata; one Sea Commander was stationed in Attica, somewhere near Athens; and then there was the Commander of the German Air Force in Greece. All those agencies reported; within the framework of their jurisdiction they could order reprisal measures and report about them to the Army Group.
Q Were only such reprisal measures incorporated into the reports of the Corps as were taken by agencies subordinate to the Corps?
A The Army Group wanted to be informed about all of the incidents in Southern Greece.
Therefore it was customary that not only special events were reported but also reprisal measures taken by other agencies. The Military Commander did things in the same way. The I-c Department, if I may call it that, is a kind of information office within the Army Group and the sentence "novarum vrum cupido" can be applied to it because even insignificant reports could be of military importance; they had to be evaluated and analysed.
Q The Prosecution has submitted quite a number of reports concerning reprisal measures which appeared under the heading "68th Corps." Does that mean that all these reprisal measures were taken by agencies subordinate to your Corps?
A No. I just tried to explain how this report machinery worked and how these reports came about. There was one additional factor also. The higher agencies have a situation map in the scale of 1 to 1,000,000 because they have to be informed of all theaters of war and have such maps concerning all these places. On such a map, in the proportion 1 to 1,000,000, an area such as Southern Greece is very small, of course, and so there was only space left to enter the report of one command agency and since the tactical leadership was in the hands of the 68th Corps, in the event of an enemy landing, all these reports were sent out under the heading "68th Corps."
Q. In this connection, I would like to mention one example in Document Book No. 20 of the Prosecution. In Document NOKW-1551, Exhibit 458, page 4 of the English Document Book and page 3 of the German text, there is a report "West" of the OKH, dated 4 April 1944 and reprisal measures in the area near Levadia - Delphi are reported by the Police Regiment 18, under the heading LXVIII Corps: General, was that Regiment subordinate to you?
A. No, Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police leader, but it was in the area of Levadia - Delphi.
Q. But, it was not subordinate to you?
A. No, it was not subordinate to the Corps.
Q. In the same document raids and reprisal measures in Athens are mentioned. Was the Corps Headquarters involved in that?
A. Where raids and reprisal measures in Athens are concerned, the Corps Headquarters played no part in that.
Q. Finally in this document, a British command operation is mentioned on a radio transmitter on the Island of Santorin; did the Corps Headquarters have anything to do with this as this incident is also charged to the Corps?
A. No, the Corps was led by an airforce man, but there was no naval officer in this staff. In the event Santorin, an Island is involved, which is not even in the Corps area. I will point out the Island on the map. The Island Santorin is immediately north of Crete.
Q. Apart from the daily reports, did the war diaries and activity reports of the divisions reach the Corps?
A. No, the divisions sent the war diaries and the activity reports directly to an Army Archives. Documents of that type could not have been read in my staff neither or me nor the expert, because we just did not get them.
Q. In this connection, I offer a document from Felmy Document Book 5, which is Document No. 89, on page 2, it will be offered under Exhibit No. 38. On page 3 there is a memorandum entitled: "The Purposes of the War Diaries and War Documents". I merely want to point out one paragraph on page 5, under V, "Conclusion of War Diaries and where to deposit them", it says there in the second paragraph:
"Concluded war diaries with all enclosures and activity reports go, while informing the superior authorities by report, immediately to the Chief of the Army Archives, Potsdam, Hans von Seeckstr. 8."
General, how were the incoming reports dealt with in the Corps Staff?
A. All incoming mail was submitted to the Chief of Staff and he disseminated it to the departments concerned. He was informed about possible reports coming in by telephone through the officer on duty if he himself did not happen to be on the telephone. Then the departmental chiefs, namely the Ia, Ic, the IIa, the quartermaster and others concerned, after having looked through the incoming mail, reported orally to the Chief of Staff whenever that was necessary. Either at that time, or right away when the mail came in, the Chief of Staff ordered what was to be shown to me personally or decided which events I should be informed about orally. The bulk of the individual reports never actually reached my desk, those things that were submitted to me I would initial.
Q. I would again like to draw attention to Document No. 59, Felmy Document Book No. 2, which is the affidavit Kleykamp from which I have read repeatedly.
If it please the Tribunal, I would like to turn to page 31, it says there under 2:
"2). The necessary interference of the LXVIIIth Corps with questions of Greek internal politics, economics and propaganda not only practically required much effort and understanding, but also was impeded formally by the duplication of the many German offices stationed in Greece. Since those offices had their own communications channels, the Corps had to obtain appropriate information privately, if it wanted to remain informed on all the important events within its area, for instance, the results of an operation against bandits by the 18th SS-Police Regiment, on the proposed anti-strike propaganda by the Military Commander, on a razzia conducted by the Higher SS and Police Leader in a communist section of Athens, on the shooting of communists by Evzons, etc. The results of those investigations were included in the daily reports by the Corps (mostly Ic reports) to the Army Group E, since otherwise the latter would not have been informed at all or only late. It was not always stated specifically, whether those measures were carried out by German soldiers or by other organizations, since the Army Group was interested only in the events as such. Thus the report of the Corps might contain for example statements on retaliatory measures, which were carried out within the Corps area, though not by its units, but by the Military Commander, the Higher SS and Police Loader or by Greek volunteer units."
I would like also to read paragraph 3 on the top of page 32:
"3). All the offices were often inclined to make exaggerated statements in their reports (slanted reports). Neither did Army units resist from that practice. Even the lower headquarters liked to increase the amounts of booty and the numbers of prisoners to round figures. This phenomenon was multiplied during the processing and compiling of reports at higher headquarters, so that almost always misleading impressions were created. Unfortunately that did not apply to Greece alone, but to the whole Wehrmacht. Above all it also applied to the figures, which were reported in connection with retaliatory measures and the shooting of hostages. All those figures must therefore be taken with a grain of salt."
General, what was the normal course that the daily work in your Corps would take?
A. As I have stated on an earlier occasion, it was the main task of the LXVIII Corps to conduct the defense against possible attacks of the Allies, whether these be from the sea or from the air. That was my main task, which filled most of my time. The danger of an enemy landing was hanging over us like the sword of Damocles and it even increased in the course of time.
Q. Why did it increase?
A. Partly we had direct reports and partly it was the evaluation of the reports received by the highest agencies, because the high agencies had machinery to evaluate such reports, agencies abroad, etc.
There were reports to the effect that English elite divisions were being concentrated in Egypt. Sometimes reports were there about the presence of ships in Mediterranean harbours. We were fairly well informed of the organization of the so-called Greek Army of Liberation, which also was in Egypt and we were also informed about planned commando operations which were mainly supposed to come from the Island of Cyprus (Cypern) which is situated at the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and within the British area of supremacy. We heard of planned landings by air and similar surprise attacks, which we might anticipate. That was the reason why we had constantly to check on the defense preparations of the troops.