Any occupation power would do the same if confronted with problems of that sort.
Q In the photostatic copy it says also:
"The political basis in order to establish a Greek volunteer unit exists because the anti-Communist part of the population has become convinced after the Allied declaration that Greece and the Balkans will be a Soviet Russian sphere of interest, that Britain has dropped the Greek nation and handed it over to the Bolsheviks."
JUDGE BURKE: At this point, we will take our noon recess (The Tribunal recessed until 1330 hours.)
(Following Recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. If it please the Tribunal, before the recess we had stopped when we discussed document NOKW 1245 contained in document book 20, which was exhibit 468 of the Prosecution.
I would now like to turn to page 61 of the English text, which is page 45 of the German text under paragraph 11, Enemy Situation, it says:
"Except for the coastal area occupied by German Forces, the Northwestern Pelopennes is entirely dominated by Communist bands. The Supreme Command of the Insurgents in thia area, consisting of one Greek General, several Greek Staff Officers, 5 British Officers and 21 Communist Italian Officers, according to reliable report by a confidential agent is currently located at Demasticha (19 Kms. Southeast of Patras."
General, will you please give us your opinion of this report?
A. This report contains the confirmation for the fact that Allied officers worked with the bands, furthermore it confirms that a number of Italian officers had deserted to the bands. It is significant that the headquarters locality is mentioned, which is southeast of Patras in an area in the vicinity of Kalavritha, which has been mentioned repeatedly as being a band center. This is further confirmation net only for the suspicion that this was the case, but for the actual facts. The facts were that Kalavritha was a band center. Taking into consideration the manifold constellation of members of nations, Greeks, British and Italians one can hardly talk about a unified leadership of the bands.
Somehow and sometime the varied interests in the area had to clash. There were examples to prove this fact.
I remember that one day we received on a torn off piece of a map from an intermediary, which said "Help wanted for Major so and so," who was a British officer, This proves that he did not feel very much at home with the bands because otherwise he would not have asked for help. The 117th Division, as a consequence, conducted a number of reconnaissance patrols, but they did not manage to get in contact with the Major and assist him as he had asked. That there was no unified leadership has been clearly proven by the course which events took later.
Q. I would now like to present a defense document, which is contained in Felmy document book 5, this is document No. 93 on page 14. It will be offered as exhibit No. 48. This is a Situation Report from the Military Commander Greece, dated 15 February 1944 and covering the period from 16 January until 15 February, 1944. In paragraph 1, "Political Situation," it says on the first page of this document in the third sentence:
"Feared advance of Communism stiffens the defense spirit of the possessing classes, therefore increased tendency towards the formation of self-protection organizations Endeavours of England and of the Greek government in exile to constitute a united anti-German front frustrated up to now on account of the opposition among the different political organizations and guerilla groups. The most important movement, the EAM, being in opposition to England, shows an ever increasing Communistic attitude. Formation of Communist cells in various parts of Greece. The government apparently makes sincere efforts to assist the occupation power in its struggle against Communism and economic ruin, however its authority and sphere of influence are too limited.
The unfavorable aspect of the over--all situation for Germany has unfavorable effect on the attitude of the government and of the population. Communist movement split up into Stalinites, Trotzkytes and Anarchists. EDES (national) divided into 3 groups. The Greek church bides the issue."
On page 14 a under 11, "Enemey Situation," it says in the second sentence:
"Considerable harassing of guerilla organizations by operations of our own, especially in the frontier district of northern Greece and in the southern Peloponnesus. Tactics of the guerilla-bands: Delaying action, falling back before German attacks and re--infiltration into moppedup areas."
I am now reading from the top of page 15:
"Contradictory reports on Zervas' attitude (nationalist, position West of Pindus). Considerable support by England in January 40,000 Gold Pounds. Efforts made to units Zervas bands with ELAS bands (Communists). A commission consisting of 4 English officers and 1 Russian Colonel allegedly on the way to Zervas."
The last sentence in paragraph 2 a reads:
"In the case of landings augmented activity by guerillabands is to be feared."
It continues under b:
"Air situation.
Increased enemy air activity during day and night. The population considers this to be demonstrations of power on the part of the Allies. During air attacks on Piraeus on 11, 13, and 22 January 1944 insignificant losses of our own, more than 600 Greeks killed, 1000 wounded. Considerable damage to buildings. Popular feeling at the beginning hostile to Englishmen, later on, in consequence of a whispering campaign, against the German occupation."
"Evzones (Greek Guards) have successfully continued their fight against Communism. Evzones Regiment 1 with 3 Battalions is stationed at Athens, Evzones Regiment 2 with 2 Battalions at Patras, from Patras a further battalion is being formed at Agrinion.
"Greek Constabulary has successfully acted at Athens during raids against Communists, 1065 constables were armed quite recently. Formation of Volunteer Battalions from native forces is planned.
"EDES - Euboea Company. Contributed to success of operations against guerilla-bands on Euboea by their constables familiar with language and roads, attached to Infantry Battalion 11 (L). Organized several townmilitias on Euboea against guerilla-bands."
Finally, I want to read from page 18, the third paragraph:
"Works of art and historical buildings put under the protection of the Wehrmacht. Museum buildings and monasteries exempted from occupation by troops."
The last paragraph under "VIII. Economic Situation. Commitment of Labor," on the bottom of the page:
"Of approximately 50,000 workers in the Piraeus the majority have fled after terror attack."
Now I want to return back to Document Book XX of the Prosecution.
Q General, the next document with which you are charged in this document book is Exhibit 469. NOKW-1122 on page 63 of the English text and page 46 of the German text. This contains a translation of two German leaflets which were dissinimated allegedly by German occupation troops. What are your comments on this?
AAccording to this, it has only been established that the leaflets were dissenimated in the Levadia area and that is where Police Regiment 18 was stationed. I could not find any other indications which would allow me to make a statement here. I merely assert that these leaflets did not originate in the 68th Corps. We did not compose such clumsy leaflets. If we worked with leaflets at all, and on frequent occasions we had to do that, then we were a little more subtle and adapted those leaflets to the mentality of the Greeks and the actual situation better than these leaflets here show.
Q You can't imagine either whose initials could be on there?
A No, there are abbreviations here. The abbreviations are not known to me, S.E.K.O.H.V.
Q This brings me to the next document in this document book, that Exhibit 470 on page 69 of the English text and 49 of the German text, NOKW-1355. This document contains daily reports by the Commander in Chief Southeast amongst other reports referring to Communist activity in Athens also to the mopping up of Volos and reprisal measures in the area of Katherini. What can you tell us about these things?
A There is really nothing I can tell you other than that here again you have the proof for the fact that the 68th Corps was not involved in these activities. Here again the events in Southern Greece have been reported under the label of the 68th Corps. Volos and Katherini were located outside of the corps area which I can show on the map here. North of the island Euboea is the Gulf of Volos. On its Northern coast is the small town of Volos and Katherini -- that is further north yet.
Q That brings me to the next document, NOKW-1363, Exhibit 471, on page 73 in the English document book and page 52 in the German document book. In this document is as I-c report of the 68th Corps dated 20 September 1943, a combat report of the Panzer Grenadier Regiment 113 which concerning an action took place in the area of Arachova. What can you tell us about this?
AAround that time the 68th Corps was subordinate to General Krueger because during that time I was in charge of the Army Group Southern Greece. I don't believe that I ever learned of this daily report those days. Actually, it contains a combat report, nothing else.
Q That brings me to the I-c daily report dated the 22nd of September 1943 on page 73 of the English text and page 53 of the German text. This I-c daily report of the 68th-Corps reads as follows:
"In Kalamata 10 Communists shot."
Further the report contains the note says: "Not to be transmitted." What does that remark mean, General?
A It probably means the communication lines were distrupted at some point. I was stationed in Athens at that time and it appears that it was not possible to transmit the report. At least, I don't remember receiving that particular report.
Q The next entry in this document is the I-c report dated 11 October 1943. This contains an enumeration of the enemy losses from the 4th until the 10th of October 1943. Under the 47 prisoners there are 4 American flyers mentioned. General, can you give us any details about this incident?
A Yes, I can make one fundamental remark which is that all captured prisoners, according to an OKW order, had to be sent to our air force offices for interrogation. That was actually a matter of course because the air force was naturally interested in the characteristics of the enemy air force so that the interrogation was reserved for air force agencies. Otherwise, this report deals with losses during combat actions. It is a compilation of losses suffered during combat actions.
Q In the report for the 14th of October it says on page 78 of the English and 56 of the German text the prefect of Kalamata was murdered in the train at Asplokoma, 3 kilometers west northwest of Kalamata. A state of emergency was proclaimed at Kalamata and 50 hostages arrested."
Will you please give us your comments on that, General?
A I remember that particular incident because it was directed against a high administrative official, the prefect or the head of government, as we would call it, of the province of Kalamata. He was murdered. This is an indication that the bands did not direct their activities against the Germans alone but against also the Greeks and, thus, against high administrative officials.
Q This brings me again to a defense document contained in Felmy Document Book V. It is Document No. III on page 90, Felmy Document Book V. This will become Exhibit No. 49.
It is an excerpt from a document submitted by the prosecution, NOKW-1245, which is contained in Document Book XX. It is a report of the 117th Light Infantry Division addressed to the 68th Corps and dated 30 October 1943.
I am, first of all, reading from paragraph I. Political situation.
From the transfer of the 1st Armored Division, the troop movements of the 117th Light Infantry Division and the fact that the Italian booty has been shipped away, the populace of the Peloponnesus has concluded that these were preparations for an evacuation by the German army.
The effect of these circumstances, which became increasingly serious, was that the anti-Communistic part of the populace has become completely intimidated and often, especially in the socalled intellectual circles, shows a tendency to come to terms with the EAM or to gain its favor. So far as the Communist elements of the population are concerned, they are characterized by an increasingly bold manner which was climaxed by a formal ultimatum from the ELAS to the prefect of Messenien which demanded, among other things, the surrender of the government administration, the release of all national Greek officers, and ended up with the statement that: "The High Command of the ELAS and EAM movement is in Cairo".
Hand in hand with this constantly increasing supremacy of the Communists went a series of political murders and the pursuit of the small number of anti-Communist bands fighting in the mountains northwest of Tripolis and in Taygetos, as well as various mine attacks against railways and roads, attacks against German trucks, against a surveying unit and, lastly, against a company of the 749th Light Infantry Regiment which had penetrated into the area around Kalawrita on a reconnaissance mission.
On page 81 on the top of the page, the document goes on to say:
The prerequisites for the creation of such a Greek volunteer's corps are realized in the fact that the declaration of the Allies that the Balkans were within the sphere of Soviet interest has convinced the anti-Communist part of the population that England has already forsaken the Greek people and delivered them up to Bolshevism.
Finally, under:
III, Our tactical position and plans.
...............
The task of the division is to:
"Reinforced 117th Light Infantry Division is to defend the Peloponnesus against enemy attack from the sea, the land and the air".
...............
The reports which I now want to deal with contained in NOKW-1245, Exhibit 468, which we are just discussing contain the arrest of band suspects during mopping-up operations in various localities. Will you please briefly give us your comments on this? General?
A. Such mopping up operations took place quite frequently. They served the purpose of apprehending the unreliable elements within the population. In my opinion, that is a very natural Security measure which every occupation power is entitled to take if grounds for such an action are given. That was the case in these particular instances.
Q. In the Ic Daily Report dated 31 December 1943, on page 81 of the English text and page 58 of the German text, it says amongst other things, "In Athens by German Police was arrested 117 Communists. "
A. This report also shows that under the common denominator, 68th Corps, events were reported which were not carried out by units subordinate to me. The German police in Athens, as is well known, was not subordinate to the 68th Corps.
Q. General, does the same apply to the Daily Report dated the 24th of December, 1943, which says "SS arrested one bandit leader and ten bandits at Levadia?"
A. Yes, the same applies here because the SS also was not subordinate to the 68th Corps.
Q. In the next Ic Daily Report dated 11 November 1943, it says:
"During raid at Levadia, 67 band suspects and communists were arrested." What can you tell us about this?
A. Levadia was part of the area where the 18 Police Regiment was committed and this regiment was not subordinated to the 68th Corps.
Q. On page 84 of the English text, which is page 61 of the German text, in a report dated 20 November 1943 the destruction of several houses in Kastritsi near Patras is mentioned.
A. You mean the report of the 20th of November, 1943.
Q. Yes, that is the one. Do you remember that incident?
A. No, I don't remember any details. From the report, however, I gather that in Kastritsi, rifles, ammunition, and signal equipment was seized and that ten band suspects were arrested. It can therefore be assumed with a certain amount of certainty that only those houses in Kastritsi were destroyed where rifles, ammunition, and signal equipment was found. The inhabitants were obliged to deliver up such equipment which served purely military purposes. If they did not comply, they became liable to punishment.
Q. The next report, the Ic Daily Report dated 23 December 1943, is also contained in Document NOKW-1246 which was Exhibit 472 of the prosecution on page 93 of the English text and page 65 of the German text. According to these two reports, during the mopping-up of the area on both sides along the Sparta-Tripolis Highway, 13 bandits were shot while attempting a sabotage act on a telephone line. Do you remember that incident?
A. Around that time I was on furlough. The report merely shows as it says here: "Bandits are continuously making sabotage attempts on the telephone line Tripolis-Sparta. 13 were shot to death during the mopping-up operation carried out against this."
They were caught during the act in this case.
Q. This brings me to the next document in this document book, NOKW-1246, Exhibit 472. This is on page 88 of the English text and page 63 of the German text. Here we have the War Diary No. III, which has already been mentioned, of the 68th Corps covering the last six months of 1943.
On the page just mentioned, page 88 of the English text and 63 of the German text, in a report dated 30 August 1943 it is mentioned that a village, Skupi, was burned down. General, do you know of that incident?
A. I don't remember. The report is so brief that one cannot gather from it whether Skupi was burned down in a reprisal action or whether there was some fighting around Skupi. It is merely said "one of our own patrols encountered bandits in a skirmish."
Q. The entry dated 25 October 1943 mentions a band attack North west of Argos on a surveying detachment, as a, reprisal measure eight hostages were arrested and some houses destroyed. Can you tell us something about this?
A. Here again I cannot give you any details. I don't remember that particular incident.
Q. I would now like to discuss Document NOKW-1257 which is Exhibit 474. Here again we have an activity report made by the 117th Light Infantry Division. General, at least you could not have gained knowledge of the incidents in the form in which they are reported here. We will discuss in another context most of the events mentioned in this report. I would like to ask you this. Can you remember on page 94 in the English and 66 in the German--the reprisal action reported under the 5th of November which entailed the burning down of the village Verbatim. Can you remember the band attack reported under the 6th of November which was carried out on a German freight train near Aghion?
A. No, I am afraid I can't do that. Along that particular railroad line there were quite a number of surprise attacks which were started from the Area Kalvrita; therefore, I cannot distinguish between all the individual cases now in retrospect.
Q. Under the date of 5 November 1943, under Paragraph 4, it is stated that "after lengthy negotiations Sub-area Administrative Headquarters 1042 claimed that the right to order reprisal measures was to be transferred to the Division. Was anything of that known to you, General?
A. No, I did not hear about that, but the authority to order and carry out reprisal measures, had been invested in the Divisional Commandery. Every single directive from higher agencies expressed that. I don't see anything special in this particular report, quite apart from the fact that it was not shown to me at the time.
Q. That would bring me to Document NOKW-1063, which is Exhibit No 480, on Page 136 of the English text and Page 99 of the German text. This document contains excerpts from the War Diary No. 4, for the LXVIIIth Corps, covering the period from 1 January 1944 until 30 June 1944. Yesterday I offered the complete War Diary for this period as Felmy Document Book No. 4. The majority of the entires contained in the excerpts in Document Book XX have been dealt with in other contexts. Therefore, I only want to deal with the entry of 17 January 1944, which is contained on Page 137 of the English and Page 99 of the German text. In this report it says: "As reprisal for an attack on one officer, Second Battalion, 670th Artillery Regiment, near Ritsais one kilometer southeast of Tripolis, 20 Communists were executed." These same facts are reported in Document Book XXV of the Prosecution, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667 and Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804, on Pages 65, 119, and 125 of the English text and Pages 49, 90 and 92, respectively, of the German text.
General would you please give us your comments on this incident?
A. I can't tell you any details about this incident, but I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize again that it has been proved through statistics, on the basis of the War Diary which was presented by the Defense, that during the six months from January until June, 1944, inclusively, in every month there were 55 sabotage acts, surprise attacks, and clashed with bands, which shows that one cannot possibly remember details. This amounts to almost two of such incidents perday.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, that concludes my discussion of Document Book XX of the Prosecution, This brings me to Document Book XXI.
General, the first document with which you are charged in this document book is the first document contained in the book. It is NOKW-469. Exhibit 482. This is the so-called "Blood Bath of Klissura" with which you were also charged in the Indictment, as Commanding General of the LXVIII Corps. Will you please give us your comments on this operation?
A. I don't know why the Prosecution charges me with this action. Klissura was not situated within the area of the LXV III Corps. The place Klissura which is meant here, as I gathered when studying the documents, must be located in Macedonia, somewhere within the vicinity of Salonika. The 7th SS Regiment, mentioned in the document was, at that time, not subordinated to the LXVIIIth Corps. The proof for my assertion is contained in the document. On Page 3 of the German text is Exhibit NO. 482. The investigation of this incident is undertaken by the Corps Group Salonika under Ia, No. 3509/7323/44 Secret; it is dated the 12th of June 1944. Reference is made I suppose to the Army Group, and the report is made to the Army Group. It is signed by General Pflugradt. I, therefore, do not see why this incident should be charged to the account of the LXVIIIth Corps.
Q. In the next two documents, contained in Document Book XXI, NOKW-081, Exhibit No. 483, and NOKW-467, Exhibit No. 484 the socalled Operation "Distomon" in mentioned.
General, was Distomon situated in the area of your Corps?
A. Distomon was situated in the area of my Corps.
Q. Was the SS Tank Infantry Regiment 7 which is involved in this incident subordinate to you at that time?
A. According to the War Diary of the Corps, this regiment was, for a limited time, subordinated to the Corps Headquarters. This was the time when the 18th Police Regiment had to be withdrawn from the Levadia area for combating bands on the Peloponnes. That was the time period around the end of May and the beginning of June and July, 1944. It was sent to that area because of threats from the bands directed against the Itea-Lamia Road. Itea is situated on the Gulf of Corinth. Another threat was directed against the ThebesLamia Road which lead to the Thermopyles Pass. The railroad leading along that stretch was also threatened. That district could not be left unprotected; so the Army Group transferred the SS Tank Infantry Regiment 7 to that area for this particular time in question. During this particular time the regiment was subordinated to me or rather to the Corps Headquarters for tactical purposes.
Q Of which division was this regiment a part and where was the division stationed?
A The Regiment was part of the IV SS Tank Police Grenadier division. Where the divisional staff was stationed and where the other parts of the division were located, I don't know, how did I know it at the time either, certainly they were not located within the Corps area.
Q For what period of time was the Regiment subordinated to you at the time for tactical purposes?
AAs I have already said, approximately during the months of June and July, 1944, the Police Regiment 18 had to be committed counter activities against bands on the Peloponnes. After that period was over, the 18th Police Regiment returned to its old area of committment around Levadia, and the 7th Police Regiment was withdrawn from that area. To the best of my knowledge, it was transferred back to Macedonia.
Q General, during these two months in question while this Regiment was for tactical purposes subordinated to the Corps was there a close relationship between the Corps and the 4th Police Regiment, I beg your pardon, I mean Police Regiment VII, a relationship approximately of the type which existed between the Corps staff and the troop unit, which were subordinated to the divisions under the Corps?
A I did not know the Regiment prior to its subordination to me, because it was stationed outside of the Corps area. Also during the eight weeks it was subordinated to me I did not get to know it particularly well, because in this comparatively short period of time I had no opportunity to visit it. Furthermore I did not feel any inclination to take up close contact with this Regiment, because the contrasting attitude, which existed between the Waffen SS and the army units were not particularly inviting to make any efforts to get into any good relationship with the SS. It was just a cool existance of the units next to each other and the contacts were purely official.
Q When and how did you gain information of this operation Distomon?
A The incident near Distomon reached my knowledge through a report of the VII SS Regiment shortly afterward.
It struck me that in the Greek propaganda and from the district chief in Levadia the whole incident had been described in a completely different manner, at least different compared with the way in which the Regiment described the incident.
Q In Felmy document book No. 4, which is the war diary of the Corps, it says on page 64 in the entry under 10 June, 1944, under Boeotia:
"During the course of a mopping up operation in the area of Distomon southeast of Arachova, strong partisan forces offered stubborn resistance from well constructed positions with machine guns and mortars. The enemy was beaten back after a long flight and withdrew to the mountains. Cur casualties: 3 dead, 14 wounded; enemy casualities: 105 dead, a number of wounded could not be determined."
General, how did you learn the true facts?
AAround the 11th or 12th of June I must have learned of these, because on the 10th day of June the incident near Distomon took place. Then, as I mentioned, the Greek press and propaganda made quite a number of assertions which was nothing particularly new. It was part of the sphere of work of propaganda to exaggerate, to give false reports, to lie, so for the moment I did not take this fact very seriously. I became suspicious, however, when I heard from a non-commissioned officer of the secret field police that the statement made by the Regiment could not be correct. This non-commissioned officer whose name was Koch was stationed with a small command staff near Levadia. Secret police is usually dispersed in small units all over the country, that was in the nature of their assignment and task. This particular non-commissioned officer Koch had taken part in the operation Distomon. Since this group of the secret field police was subordinated to the Corps, he reported his observations to the Corps Headquarters.
I saw from this report quite clearly that the Regiment, the SS Regiment, had reported the events in Distomon to the Corps headquarters incorrectly. Consequently the event was reported to the Army Group, because the original report, as it has been read just before in the war diary, could not longer be sustained.
As a consequence, the Army Croup commissioned me to investigate the incident. There can therefore be no doubt that the Army Group was informed by me in writing and orally about the true facts. Unfortunately among the documents here there are no copies or excerpts from those reports, but they must have been submitted because otherwise the Army Group would not have commissioned me to carry out an investigation. How could the Army Group know about it unless I reported it?
There can also be no doubt that the conduct and behavior of the Regiment was strongly disapproved of by the Corps Headquarters. If I had been in agreement with the conduct shown by the Regiment, I would not have contributed to uncovering the false report and to making sure of the true facts.
Q General, but you agreed to the disciplinary procedure that was undertaken?
A That is quite correct. There is a note which I put under the report of the Regiment to the effect that I agreed to the disciplinary procedure suggested by the Regimental Commander, but this remark refers to the false report, which was issued, not however to the incident which forms the basis of this report.
Why I wrote a remark to that effect at the time is difficult to state for me, as now I don't know it any longer. I can only admit that this note is illogical. The Regiment was not subordinated to me in a disciplinary respect, all Waffen SS units had their disciplinary channels which led up to the Reichsleader SS. I was in no position to force the division to start a court martial procedure, all I could do was to report to the Army Group, which I did. Thereafter the O.K.W. had to contact Himmler, he was the only man who could decide about a procedure taken against the Division.
Q General, was the regiment which undertook the Operation Distomon the same regiment which was also responsible for the Action Klissura?
A Yes, it is the very same regiment.
Q Did you know at the time that this regiment was also responsible for the incident in Klissura?
A No, I did not know it at the time. I gathered it here from the documents - from a communication from Army Group E in answer to the report sent in by me.
Q This would be contained in Document NOKW-467, Exhibit 484, in Document Book XXI of the Prosecution, on page 39 of the English text and 28 of the German text. In this report of the High Command of Army Group E addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 10 July 1944, it says in the second paragraph, and I quote verbatim: "Obviously it is a similar case to that which happened at that time near Klissura....." (and then in brackets comes the reference number) ...."Here, as there, the incident reports pertain to the SS Tank Grenadier Regiment No. 7." General, you are telling us that at the time you did not know that the same regiment was involved in the Klissura Operation?
A No, I did not know it at the time.
Q And you are further telling us that your agreement to the disciplinary procedure taken in the matter only extended to the issuance of the wrong report, not, however, to the incident which formed the basis. Why is that?
AAs I have already stated, NCO Koch of the Secret Field Police, who presented quite a different channel, informed me that the report of the regime, which had originally been submitted to the Corps, did not represent the true facts. I therefore investigated this discrepancy. I was interested in it and I wanted to clear up the differences and I wanted to establish whether the regiment had actually lied to me. When I had the report from NCO Koch I reported the whole incident to the Army Group. That can, in my opinion, be clearly seen from the report of the regimental commander, where he asks for consent to the disciplinary procedure regarding the inconsistencies, as he put it, in the combat report.