A This incident I remember very well. This happened within the framework of the assignment of this regiment for the security of Boeotia, that was a task which was still my responsibility. At that occasion this company, because of its tasks concerning security, got into combat and had great losses, the extent of which I could see from the war diary. The losses were 8 dead, 33 wounded and 55 missing. No reprisal measures were taken.
Q Did surprise attacks of that sort happen frequently?
A Yes, they did. It was just in connection with the security tasks of the regiment that such attacks frequently occurred. I myself was a witness to such an attack once when I inspected the security positions at the mountain pass. According to my custom, I visited the various posts on the road leading to the pass to the west of the mountain. The company at one point there was attacked and in the ensuing combat had some losses. I myself saw one dead and nine wounded.
Q Could you ascertain whether these Guerrilla bands were in uniform or had any sort of insignia?
A I myself inspected the captured and dead bandits, they all were in disorderly civilian clothes without any insignia whatever, not even the Soviet Star, which was mentioned so often. They were civilians and had rifles which they fired.
Q And for the murder of those policemen, did you order reprisal measures for that?
A No, these were losses which occurred in combat.
Q The prosecution referred to exhibit 280 in volume 11, page 67 of the English text and page 52 of the German text. This is a regulation by tho O.K.R. concerning the designation of Band--Formations dated 13 June 1943. Do you remember having received this order?
A I do not remember ever having seen this order. I also do not think it likely that I did see it for it is an order which was brought out by the OKH, and as can he seen from the warding it only refers to the eastern theater of war.
From the supplement it is also quite clear, for I who speak Russian, I can judge that only Russian designations are used for examples and it is not to he assumed that I got this order or knew it. It is of no importance whether I saw it or not, for I had nothing to do with guerrilla fighting in the actual sense.
Q Mr. President, I would like to turn to a new chapter now and I would like to make the suggestion to start the afternoon recess at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will have our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General, I think we will now deal with a few basic points about the position of the territorial commander so that your tasks, your position and your responsibilities may be correctly understood. You were in Greece as territorial commander after the reorganization or after your appointment as military commander and as such you held executive powers. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. In this courtroom the term "executive power" has been discussed and commented on on several occasions. In spite of this, I think you should also discuss this term and give us your comments on the responsibilities of a territorial commander. Are both those terms identical?
A. No, by no means; those two terms are entirely different although in most cases they are mixed up and misunderstood. One can also hold executive powers without being a territorial commander.
Q. Will you then please define your conception of those two terms?
A. "Territorial commander" is a military concept. "Executive power" is a conception of the state and of international law.
Q. And what explanations would you give for the term "territorial commander?"
A. A territorial commander has tasks primarily towards his own forces; by this I mean in a certain territory, which again means within his area he has to solve those tasks which need a common regulation for all parts of the armed forces concerned and which are conditioned by the special conditions in the territory involved.
Q. What tasks are these actually, General?
A. The tasks of a territorial commander have been clearly defined and established although at the moment I cannot tell you where. They comprise, to the best of my recollection, as main points: (1) securing of the country, (2) organization of the communications and transports, (3) securing of communications, (4) organization and securing of signal and communication installations, (5) accommodation and supply of the armed forces, (6) all those economic problems which can be solved in this territory for all armed forces concerned uniformly, (7) administrative tasks of all kinds, (8) making use of the country for purposes of the armed forces, (9) medical care and, finally, (10) the material and above all spiritual care for the armed forces, what we in those days called taking care of the spiritual needs of the soldiers. Those are, briefly put, the most important points, or rather the theoretical tasks.
Now, in order to turn to the case of Greece, the first four points did not apply for practical purposes. I shall repeat these four first points. They were: (1) securing of the country, (2) organization and securing of means of communications, (3) organization and securing of signal and communication installations and (4) -
Q. I believe you mentioned railroad communication lines.
A. Yes, that's right. Those four tasks were not part of the tasks of the Military Commander for Greece because they were in the hands of the Army Group or other agencies.
Q. Now, let us turn to the concept of executive power.
A. Executive power -- for this concept of state and international law, cannot, of course, give you a legal definition but I can tell you that to me it meant authorities and duties towards the population.
I said before a territorial commander has tasks towards his own armed forces and executive power means rights and duties towards the population of the occupied country; that is it means holding executive as well as legislative power in the area occupied.
Q. Let's start with legislative power. How did you execute this power in Greece?
A. Legislative authority -- I was for practical purposes not in a position to execute and this for the following reasons: (1) a government existed in the country; (2) the administrative machinery was still intact and working inasmuch as it was not disrupted by the bands; and (3) -- and this is the decisive factor -- this government which I mentioned received all decisive instructions on political, administrative, legislative, and economic spheres from the frequently mentioned special plenipotentiary of the Reich.
Q. Who was this special plenipotentiary of the Reich?
A. That was Minister Neubacher.
Q. He was not subordinated to you?
A. No, on the contrary.
Q. If I understand you correctly, you could not do any positive work in the sphere of legislative authority.
A. No positive work; but, if I may put it this way, I could act in a negative manner. By this I mean I had the so-called authority of veto. All laws and decrees which the Greek government intended to issue had, before they were made public, to be submitted to me and I had to examine them as to whether they were in any way contrary to the interests of the German Armed Forces. I was only to take care of the interests of the German Armed Armed Forces. This right of veto, to the best of my recollection -- I may be mistaken but I believe I am correct -- I used only at one time and this veto I withdrew later when the government gave me an explanation which satisfied me.
Q. General, you will remember that a few days ago the opinion was voiced here that the Greek government had possibly been only a puppet government dependent on the German occupation force. After all, you worked together with this Greek government for many months and, therefore, I believe that your statements in connection with this question can be of great importance. How would you characterize the Greek government, the Greek governments with which you had contact?
A. To answer this question one has to be clear about two conceptions and these are the following: (1) what does one expect from a government of an occupied country which has to work in accordance with directives from the occupation power and (2) what is a puppet government altogether? If for instance, one regards the South German governments of today as puppet governments because they work in accordance with directives by the American Military Government, then I must say that the Greek government of those days was also a puppet government because it was bound to the directives of the occupation force.
I had at that time never once the idea that this was a puppet government. The endeavor of German politics seemed from a political, as well as from a military point of view to give this government as much independence as ever possible, to support it and to find in it an ally in the struggle against Communism.
If I am to answer your question in more detail yet, I believe you asked me about the various governments which existed; one brief word about the personalities involved. I worked together with three prime ministers. The first one was General Zolacoglu. I worked with him only for a very short while so that I am in no position to voice an opinion about him.
After that I worked for about six months with his successor who was Prime Minister Logothetopoulos, an affidavit of whom was read here before the recess. This man was a scientist rather than a politician and took over his difficult post with the idea of serving his people and his country. He proved to be too weak in order to stand his ground against the party political intrigues.
The next person with whom I worked together was Prime Minister Rhallis. This prime minister Rhallis, who I believe was also mentioned yesterday by Professor Stadtmueller, was a man in whose character it was not at all to be a puppet. I held him in particularly high esteem because he worked with energy, with conviction and with a great frankness in the interests of his country. I had fullest understanding for the fact that he represented them in this way because I showed him the same frankness and honestly and represented in this way the interests of my armed forces.
On this basis of mutual esteem and frankness we worked together in an excellent manner. I understood his problems, his national attitude, his national ambitions and he understood mine. I cannot remember one single incident where our deviating opinion could not be bridged by a human and gentlemanly manner and clarifying action.
To summarize it briefly, he was not a puppet; he was a man.
Q Now to talk about executive powers, what did this mean? What authorities did it comprise?
A Even if I have to repeat what I said before, I must first of all state that I had not the forces at my disposal to carry out executive powers because I had no troops. That is, the forces of the Higher SS and Police Leader were not at my disposal either because they were either committed in the band combat areas or, according to instructions by the Reichfuehrer SS, they were committed for police tasks. The last factor which remained was the frequently mentioned subarea administrative headquarters which had at their disposal the following forces: one gendar merie platoon of exactly 16 men and these gendarmerie platoons only arrived towards the end of December 1943 or beginning January 1944, as I gathered from the war diaries.
Q. Could you, with these forces at your disposal which you mentioned just now, maintain law and order in Greece?
A. No.
Q. Then, for you there existed an unsoluble problem. Was this discrepancy between the task which you had and the possibility of its solution the result of the reorganization and of the multitude of channels of command?
A. Yes, owing to the complicated dualistic conduct of operation in the Greek area, the following sub-divisions of power and authority existed: On the one side there was the troop leader--the tactical leader--namely, the Commander in Chief of Army Group E, with the corps and divisions subordinated to him; and on the other side there was the Military Commander without troops, who had a command post in an entire area subordinated to him, and, thirdly, there was the higher SS and Police Leader, with his frequently described spheres of work; so the duplism mentioned by me was really a triple system.
Q. How did that dualism or triplicity affect the actual conditions?
A. The development continued to be one of increasing unrest in the country. Band activities became more frequent and extensive and, simultaneously in the same area, the activities and commitments of the troops became more extensive. In the same measure, as the activities of the troops increased, the possibilities of the Military Commander to exert influence decreased, so that eventually it had to be restricted to the small pacified areas which, in the final analysis, were the seats of the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters and the vicinity of these agencies. Only these very small districts could be designated as "pacified areas."
Q. You, as holder of executive power, had, for all practical purposes, no powers, because the focal point moved more and more to tactical leadership?
A. Yes, that is correct. That was a necessary consequences of the development of the band movement and of the unclear and contradictory orders and channels of command.
Q. We had started from the concept of executive powers. Now, did you regard reprisal measures as a part of executive powers?
A. Executive powers is the pre-requisite for the ordering of reprisal measures.
Q. Is that the only pre-requisite?
A. In theory, yes; in practice the situation was this: Executive power could only he used to the extent that my own power allowed me to do that. That is in the small pacified areas, which I mentioned before, and over which I had jurisdiction.
Q. And what happened to the other areas? Who carried out reprisal measures there?
A. In the other areas -- those were combat areas -- the troops carried out independently their own reprisal measures.
Q. In order to clarify this contrast I would like to ask you whether your conceptions--that the troops had the right to take independent reprisal measures and actually carried out such--was supported by orders of higher agencies.
A. Yes, the most important proof which I can mention in this connection is the frequently quoted Exhibit No. 306 of the Prosecution. It is an order of Army Group E, concerning reprisal measures, of which only the first sentence is of interest in this connection. It says: Reprisal measures are not administrative tasks, but combat measures."
Q. You refer, General, to Exhibit No. 306, submitted by the Prosecution?
A. Yes, I do.
This has become a fixed concept.
Q. It is contained in Document Book XII, page 112 of the English text and page 94 of the German text.
A. That was the first order. The second order, which confirms this conception, is an order of which I do not know the exhibit number, but which, I believe, can be recognized if I call it the "Loehr Order of 22nd December 1943."
Q. You mean the order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, as it is contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution, Exhibit No. 379, page 47 and subsequent pages of the English text, and page 98 and subsequent pages of the German text?
What are the reasons for your reference to this order, General?
A. Because this order itself quite clearly mentioned reprisal measures of the troops, and it can be taken as an established fact that it is so. If I do not take into consideration, for a moment, these two orders from higher agencies, my own opinion is being confirmed by an order of a subordinate agency -- the reprisal order of the First Mountain Division, which was touched during General Lanz' examination, and which is contained in Document Book XIX or Document Book XX of the Prosecution. The importance of it is that it is being confirmed there that the troops had orders to carry out reprisal measures independently for their own losses. Those are the three orders which I would like to mention as confirming my assertion, with regard to reprisal measures of the troops in contrast with reprisal measures under executive power.
Q. In the third order, which you mentioned, I believe you were referring to Prosecution Exhibit No. 455, which is contained in Document Book XIX of the Prosecution, page 139 of the English text and page 150 of the German text. Did you have, in this connection, a right to direct, order, or check-up on the troop?
A. No, I had no right to direct or check-up in this sphere. The troops were subordinated to me merely in a territorial respect. It was subordinated for those spheres of work which I mentioned before when I listed the 10 points -point one through 10.
Q. Were the troops to report to you in respect to tactical measures, or reprisal measures?
A. No, they did not have to do that.
Q. Did you hear about such measures? Were you informed?
A. I was informed inasmuch as communication possibilities existed, and the members of my staff and the various departments of my staff attempted to compile reports. This was possible where the territorial conditions permitted it -to receive reports, for instance, from the LXVIIIth Corps, which was stationed in Athens. However, I did not receive any information or news at all from the 22nd Mountain Corps because there were no communications there. Also, I did not receive any information about combat or reprisal measures from the Commander Saloniki-Aegean, who, for territorial reasons and reasons of communications reported directly to Army Group E.
Q. In order to interpolate here for a moment, in the document books submitted by the prosecution, there are several reports of the 22nd Corps and of the Commander Saloniki-Agena. Can you say that these reports were addressed immediately to a higher agency without going via your agency?
A. That is what I mentioned before. These reports went directly to the superior agency of the agencies just mentioned. That is to Army Group E I did not even get informational copies of the reports. I learned about the facts now and again from the situation reports of Army Group E covering the total area. That is, I learned from them through the evaluation of these reports at a time when they were usually out of date.
Q. I would like to ask you one other question before we continue. You mentioned just before the small pacified districts. Do you mean to say that the occupation of Greece in the other areas was not an occupation de facto?
A. I believe that comparison in this connection is not very well chosen. These two facts have nothing to do with each other. The occupation was an occupation de facto. The tactical leadership was in a position at all times to reach any locality they wanted to and to occupy it.
Q. That was the tactical leadership which was not part of your task as Military Commander for Greece. The tasks arising from this responsibility were executed by the troops?
A. Yes, that is correct, by Army Group E and the units subordinate to this Army Group.
Q. Did the Higher SS and Police Leader have an independent right to order reprisal measures?
A. It depends in which connection and in which capacity. One, as long as police regiment 18 was subordinated to me for tasks of security in the Boeotian area, from August to the middle of November, I was responsible for the commitment of this unit and thus also for possible reprisal measures. Two, after the Higher SS and Police Leader at the beginning of November had been appointed the tactical leader for Army Group E and had been commissioned with the safeguarding and pacification of the Boeotian area, he as tactical leader and divisional commander, had the same right and the same duty as all other divisional commanders to carry out reprisal measures independently and to order them independently; more so, since according to instructions and channels of command he was independent in this area or, as it says in the service instructions, he acted on his own responsibility.
Tactical measures and reprisal measures cannot be separated from each other. Reprisal measures of the troops are part of those tasks. Three, the third factor is that to the extent to which the Higher SS and Police Leader had to carry out his police tasks, he was subordinated to the Reichsfuehrer SS. If, within the scope of these tasks, reprisal measures became necessary, for instance for acts committed on Greek policemen, he as divisional commander, was again authorized to order reprisal measures on the basis of the reprisal measures on the basis of the reprisal orders which existed.
Q. General, I would like to quite briefly discuss with you the individual reprisal orders and the individual reprisal ratios as they have been submitted here by the prosecution. What was the situation when you, late in 1942, arrived in the area of Southern Greece?
A. I believe I testified as to that this morning when I talked about the first reprisal measure, and I said that I had found there an order which ordered reprisal measures in certain events but did not establish any ratios. That is all which I know about reprisal measures and reprisal orders until that time.
Q. Was the so-called Keitel Order, dated 16 September 1941, made known to you or submitted to you when, in October 1942, you came to Greece? I am referring to Prosecution Exhibit 53 contained in Document Book II of the prosecution on page 67 of the English text and 52 of the German text.
A. This Keitel order, so frequently mentioned in this trial, dated 16 September 1941, had been issued more than one year before I took over my post in Greece and at the time that it was ordered I was still in Rumania. From the distribution list it cannot be gathered that the Military Commander Southern Greece actually received it. I ought to have found it at the office.
It is questionable that the Commander Southern Greece received the order at the time. I cannot decide this question, because the order referred, according to its title, quite generally to the fighting of communist insurgent movements. I would therefore feel inclined to assume that it did not reach Southern Greece was, as I have stated, only a very small, very restricted area and furthermore at that time nobody thought that at some later date there would be unrest there. I believe, to recall that, General Felmy stated that he had a similar opinion during the time when he was there. I can, therefore, not state with certainty whether this order was contained amongst the many documents which I found on my arrival in Greece. I don't believe it was, though.
These high reprisal ratios of 50 to one and a hundred to one would have certainly struck me at the time and I would be certain to remember them. Since these figures up till now did not mean anything to me, I feel inclined to assume that this order was either not amongst the documents or if it was that I did not have a chance to see it. I am quite sure that I read it here for the first time.
Q. The prosecution in the presentation of their case referred to Document NOKW-458 which is Exhibit 69 contained in Document Book II of the prosecution on page 138 and 139 of the English text and page 106 of the German text. Did you know that order.
A. In any case, when that order was issued, I was in Rumania. The commander Southern Greece, according to the distribution list, certainly received this order. It is quite possible I would even say it is probable that I found that order when I arrived. I do know, however, that I did not find when I got there that this order was being carried out, namely hostages were kept ready according to the categories mentioned here. I myself saw no cause to carry out this order at the time when I got there, since I liked to wait and see where the hostage question was concerned and, above all, I did not want to have any hostages from Nationalist and democratic circles because those were the very circles which supported me and by which I was supported. That is what I can say in connection with this particular order.
Q. With Exhibit of the Prosecution 306, contained in Document Book XII of the prosecution contained on page 112 of the English text and page 94 of the German text, you are not actually being charged by the prosecution. In spite of this fact, I would like to discuss it briefly. It is an order by Commander-in-Chief Southeast dated 10 August 1943. Did you receive that order?
A. May I ask you again where it is contained?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q It is Exhibit 306, contained in document book 12 of the prosecution, page 112 of the English and 94 of the German text, did you receive that order?
A If I am correct here, that is the Loehr order, isn't it the Loehr order dated 22 December 1942?
Q No.
A Well, then I received the wrong document.
Q Since you are not charged with it by the Prosecution, I believe we can skip this particular problem and instead let us turn to prosecution exhibit 371, contained in document book 15 of the prosecution on pages 61 and 62 of the English text and page 88 of the German text. These are several communications to agencies in the Croatian area, the 2nd Panzer Army, the XVth Mountain Corps and at this particular point, I am somewhat embarrassed, since I can find no explanation why the prosecution charges you with events which took place outside of your area of command, perhaps you can clear it up for me?
A The majority of the document undoubtedly does not concern me, because it deals with events in Serbia and Croatia, but I assume that the annex of this exhibit could be referred to me. It is a decision of the military commander southeast to the commanding general and military commander in Serbia and this decision contains some comments on the issuing of collective fines. Since this decree and this decision has been sent with an informational copy to Southern Greece with the added remark, copy for information, I feel inclined to assume that is why I am charged with this exhibit. I state in this connection that this decision was passed on to me merely for informational purposes. Of course, I cannot remember it any longer. Secondly, I cannot remember either that I ordered at any time collective fines as a reprisal measure although I realize of course that such a thing exists, not only on the basis of this German communication, because collective fines as reprisal measures have been applied by the Allies in Germany after they took over command in Germany.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Did you order collective fines in your area as reprisal measures?
A No, never.
Q Apart from the orders we discussed just now, did you receive any further orders which might have formed the basis of reprisal measures?
A Yes, I received approximately toward the second half of the month of October, 1943, or possibly at the beginning of November, a reprisal order which was a decisive one for me, but which I have so far not found in the documents. At that time, since I had been subordinated to the military commander Serbia, with which I shall deal in a minute, an order was sent to me. I can explain this in the same way as it was stated here by General Felber on the witness stand that he sent me both orders, which were valid for him, because I had been subordinate to him. At least he sent me at the time an O.K.W. order, and O.K.W. reprisal order, signed by Keitel where reprisal quotas are established as follows and I remember that very clearly: 50 to 1 as reprisal for murder of a German soldier, 25 to 1 for one German wounded and then there were other ratios, which I don't remember exactly, but I remember that there was one ratio of 10 to 1, which was also mentioned. That might have applied as reprisal for German civilians or applied for high indigenous people. I can no longer remember, but I know these ratios were contained with the other things. I know for certain that it is not identical with the so-called Keitel order of 16 September 1941.
Q Can you still remember when that order was dated?
A No, I can no longer remember that, I don't know the date, but I do know that Keitel signed it and that Felber had made additional remarks and these additional remarks said this order is valid. I would like to add that was the first reprisal measure on a large scale, which I received at all.
Q Did that order have any particular effects on you?
A This order, which was new to me, concerned me very deeply.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
There was no doubt of the basic justification and legality of this order as far as I was concerned. I can only repeat what I said yesterday and again today that orders of superior agencies were decisive and binding and I could have no doubt that they were valid and legal, because I knew that the O.K.W had a legal department, which undoubtedly would have examined such orders.
Another question, which concerned me, was whether the execution of this order was expedient and in this respect I had serious misgivings. I can at this point only repeal what ideas moved me at the moment, ideas which had no connection whatsoever with this trial and which were my ideas at the time. This very sharp reprisal order apparently started from assumptions, which did not apply to my area. This very sharp order could be correct and could be authorized and proper in Serbia, about which I could at the time not judge at all, it could be justified and necessary in Greece and also in band areas, because I could not form a judgment on the combat conditions in those areas. At this time, however, it seems to me that the application of such an order in the areas described by me just before as pacified areas was not expedient, and even damaging. Particularly so when taking into consideration the mentality of the Greeks, which up to a certain point I could judge at that time. My consideration of this order was restricted to its applicability in the so-called pacified area.
Q One concluding question to this particular chapter, what did you order on the basis of this order?
A I have to admit that my first idea at that time was to suppress this order. Of course, I did not act in accordance with this idea at all because it was an idea which was in contradiction to my military feelings of responsibility and duty. In any case, the order would be made known in some other manner and eventually the troops would receive their own orders through some channels. Therefore, I personally changed this order, including the supplements by the military commander southeast-it was one Sunday morning when I worked on this--and I formulated it in Court No. V, Case No. VII.
such a clear manner that the unclear parts contained in it up to then were cleared up and the order could not be mistaken or misunderstood. I added one decisive addition to this order, which stated that nobody had any right to act on this order and right for reprisal measures excepting myself and that I myself for myself would have to consent to such measures in every individual case. Thus, I believed to prevent hasty decisions and measures and until such requests reached me, the whole situation would look much more peaceful.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 12 December 1947.)