Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Would you describe to the Tribunal an average day?
A One cannot talk about an average working day, because as a result of the inspections and journeys which had to be taken almost continuously. I repeat, as a result of the inspection trips and all kinds of trips, every day was different. When I was absent when the reports accumulated, the reports about the fighting and all the other correspondence, which came in, in such cases then it was almost impossible for me to read every single report personally. The la, deputizing for the chief of staff, then went through all the reports, combat reports, etc., and reported them orally often in the presence of the Adc, who had all the various maps, etc. The preparation, the execution and evaluation of the smaller and larger operations were my main worries and in addition, of course, there was the reconnaissance of the terrain with the air corps or the convoy. The continuous discussions with commanders and then the detailing of the troops, they were of course reserve divisions, had to receive special attention. These activities took quite a lot of time and it was no wonder than in the time in between the various trips, the A.D.C., the Lc, the quartermaster, the doctor and the veterinarian surgeon were also trying to see me.
Q Who dealt with the incoming reports from the division?
A The incoming reports from the division were received by the A.D.C. He submitted them to the la and he then submitted them to the chief of staff.
Q What kind of reports came into the Corps?
A There were telephone reports, written reports, so-called teletype and radio reports.
Q And how were they dealt with?
A The written reports, that is the non-secret reports, were opened in the registry and were submitted to the chief of staff, who then marked them off for the people they concerned. The telephone reports and teletype reports were, as I said, submitted to the la by Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the OI, that is the A.D.C. and then to the chief of staff, who then usually reported orally to me and made a summary for me when I returned back to the staff after an absence.
Q Were these reports also submitted to you and read by you?
A This was only very rarely the case and in this case I always initialed them with a (D) and with the date.
Q Were all the teletypes and the daily reports submitted here all known to you formally?
A Many, many of these documents I saw here for the first time and particularly those documents which concern the period before and after my presence in the Balkans and which concern certain other areas than the Croatian area. I must admit that here for the first time, through the submission of the documents, I had a complete picture of the events in the area there, such as I had never had before.
Q Can you remember particularly the daily reports in detail?
AAmongst all the incidents which took place in that area, I most certainly cannot remember the daily reports in detail.
Q Were you informed about the fact that they came in?
A No, only about those which were important to the Commanding General.
Q General, how can it be seen whether a document was submitted to you?
AAs I have already said on principle, I initialled every document with the date and with my initial and the experts were told that every document not signed by me was to be given back to me so that I could do this.
Q And what does it mean if a document does not bear your initial?
A This means I did not see the document.
Q How and by whom were the out-going reports to the army drawn up?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A The la, supported by the A.D.C., drew them up on the basis of the reports which came in from the division, that is the morning reports and the daily reports, these so-called daily reports, which we called morning reports. Then these, since they had to go by teletype, radio or by Morse, were compiled very briefly, as briefly as possible as can be seen from the drafts and then these documents were submitted to the chief of staff. He took these documents and perhaps crossed out something or added something and then gave them to communications, who passed them on to the army. If any kind of a decision had to be taken before hand, then of course this task was carried out by me if I were there and important daily reports were submitted to me. Of course large and very important reports had to be sent up very briefly. The superior officers were always urging that they should be sent off in time and we were always in a very great hurry in order to pass the reports on in time, because there was sabotage threatening the whole time and the telephone lines could at any time be broken off for a short period or for a longer period.
Q In order to make it quite clear, General, were all the out-going reports submitted to you for information?
A No, there were reports which were not submitted to me. For instance when I was absent, when troop movements were underway or if reports were not terribly important, I did not have to know about them particularly.
Q What were the tasks for your chief of staff?
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, that will probably necessitate a long answer. We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:30 o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
(Following recess)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. General, which were the tasks of your chief of staff?
A. As superior of the members of the staff, he had to look after the staff and to make sure that all work was carried out smoothly. He was the first advisor of the commanding general in military fields and when the commanding general was absent, he was his deputy in current matters and in urgent cases.
Q. What were the tasks of your la?
A. The la was the man who dealt with all tactical questions and with all questions of training.
Q. That were the tasks of your quartermaster department?
A. It was the task of this department to take care of the supplies.
Q. And what were the tasks of your lc?
A. The lc worked on enemy information and enemy situation news.
Q. To what extent did the departments of your staff work independently and to what extent were they supervised by you or your chief of staff?
A. The individual departments were independent in small unimportant matters. They could receive long distance calls independently and answer them if those telephone calls were of no particular importance. Important matters of course had to be referred back to the chief of staff. This had to be done before these matters were dealt with as well as for signature after they had been dealt with. I myself had no occasion nor the duty to supervise the individual departments. I relied on the chief of staff. Through regular channels within the staff it was achieved that the corps staff worked uniformly and information and directives were given in a uniform manner.
Q. Who was in charge of the war diary on your staff?
A. The war diary was kept by the A.D.C. of the operational department.
Q. I now show you from document book 16 of the prosecution on page 2 of the English text and page 4 of the German text, document N.O.K.W. 648 which is exhibit 574 of the prosecution. This is the war diary of your corps; what does your signature mean under the 30th of September, 1943?
A. That means that the war diary was on that day submitted to me, that I saw it, that I checked the note of the chief of staff, saying that he had read it, and that I had checked it, and that this war diary was correct up to the last day of the month. If possible and if the necessary time was available, it can also mean that I took one or the other spot checks.
Q. Who was responsible for examining and checking the war diary?
A. The chief of staff.
Q. Did you sign the war diary every month, General?
A. The documents submitted show me that this did not happen every month. I cannot give you any reasons why this was so. Possibly it was overlooked, it is also possible that I happened to be absent or that the man in charge had put a few communications aside in order to await the conclusion of certain operations, and so it might be that in the end it was altogether forgotten to submit it to me.
Q. What can you tell us generally about the incorrectness and in exactness of the entries in war diaries and in Daily reports?
A. It is possible that here and there in the daily reports, as well as in the entries in the war diary, errors occurred or that expressions were used which were not adequate and satisfactory. This is somewhat connected with the uncertainties and the whole character of a war even under entirely normal war conditions, but it is the case all the more so taking into consideration the uncertain conditions in the Balkans. These vast areas and then particularly the very few means of communication, the poor and inadequate radio connections, the lack of all cable communications, the frequent sabotage acts of the partisans, all these facts together may explain this fault. A further source of errors and unclear expressions was the brief formulation of communications and telegrams which could not be avoided.
This was often caused by constant interruptions.
The short time, which was available between the individual sabotage acts, had to be used immediately to send through a report quickly.
Q. Can you give us any more reasons for the incorrectness and unclearness of the entries in the war diaries and in the reports?
A. Yes, the staff consisted for the most part of reserve officers, older reserve officers. They were by no means on the same level as they had been at the beginning of the war. Their training had not been as good as that of the active officers. This applied particularly to the reserve division. The staff of the Corps consisted, with the exception of the commander, of reserve officers only. A problem child for us was also the Cossack division, in that respect there were constant inquiries, because of unclear and incomplete reports, which led to misunderstandings quite frequently, but these could be explained by bad translation from the Russian language into the German language. There was one constant complaint that the Cossack division did not have enough interpreters. Most members of the Cossack divisions were illiterate.
A further instance which frequently led to unclear reports was the overburdened radio channel which was only supposed to be used during tactical operations, however, on frequent occasions it had to be used because the telephone lines were disrupted. As I stated before they did not function in the mountain area and furthermore the instruments were old types. Then there is one further reason: the personnel of the Corps was over-worked. As I mentioned before the staff did not have enough personnel, and apart from its tactical tasks, it also had to do with the training questions.
Q. Were the events of the day always entered into the war diary immediately on the same day?
A. No, I believe I touched upon this earlier on quite frequently several days were dealt with together, as can be seen from the documents.
Q. That brings me to a different chapter. Could the units subordinated to you carry out operations independently?
A. Yes, the units subordinated to me could do this.
Q. Were you the solely responsible man in the corps area?
A. No, the main responsibility was borne primarily by the Croatian government which held and exercised executive powers and this government was the responsible agency for the ordering and carrying out of reprisal measures. I had the limited task to support the Croatian government in the maintenance of law, order and security.
Then there were other responsible agencies within the corps area such as the police. The administrative sub area headquarters in the normal course of events had nothing to do with the corps and within their own sector they were responsible to their own superior.
DR. GAWLIK: In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a document submitted by me as Exhibit 10. It is Dehner Document No. 16 on page 29 in Dehner Document Book III. That is an excerpt from the war diary where, under the 25th of August 1943, it is stated that in Croatia the fight against the bandits is rendered more difficult by the fact that the corps is operating in a so-called friendly state.
Q. What was the situation you found, General, when you arrived in that country?
A. The situation was somewhat confused and confusing.
One needed a certain amount of time to find one's way around in this chaos. Croatia was an independent sovereign state which was being built up at that time and likewise the Croatian armed forces, 3 corps strong, were about to be built up.
Concerning the band situation, there were numerous small partisan groups or band groups which, for the most part, appeared as house partisans in the district north and south of the Save district in small villages. The partisans were mostly to be found in the mountainous area north or south of the railroad from Zagreb to Belgrade. They concentrated for the most part in the mountains which were inaccessible terrain. In these mountains here, in the Majevica Mountains, which was a difficult terrain, the bands congregated and then in small groups, mostly at night time, they tried to cross the Save in this district here where a certain strong point was of specific importance for the partisans.
(Indicating on a map) This was Jamina near the Save Holz and around there were inaccessible jungles and swamps and the partisans then moved over to this district near the Pozega and from here they frequently in individual groups invaded the Di Mountains north of Brod. From there they would move over the Babuk Mountains with the band infested area Pozega, P o z e g a ; then they crossed the area of the Moslavacka, M o s l a v a c k a, and there they reached the mountains, the so-called Kalnik Mountains, K a l n i k Mountains. From there again they would move over to the area of the neighboring corps as we have already heard, which was General Leyser's area. There were the Kozara Mountains and the Samarica and this the circle of the band movement, either way around. (Indicating on a map)
Q. What types of partisans were there in the corps area?
A. There were Tito's followers. They were the Communist partisans and then there were very few so-called Cetnik followers. They were Mihajlovic followers and we have already heard of them. They were the so-called National Serbs. The Cetniks themselves hardly appeared in the corps area at all.
Q. What was Tito's attitude toward the exiled government in London which had been recognized by the Allies?
A. Tito was in opposition to this government.
Q. How do you know? Where do you derive this knowledge?
A. I gathered this from official reports and from Ic reports.
Q. What was the relation between Tito and the Cetniks?
A. There was a hostile attitude but, as I have already mentioned, in the corps area the latter hardly appeared at all.
Q. Which was the group with which the corps had to deal particularly and which was the group which was the actual enemy of Germany?
A. Those were the Tito followers.
DR. GAWLIK: As proof for the fact that these Tito followers were not only the enemy of Germany but also the enemy of the Croatian population, I have chosen Document No. 16 which has been submitted as Dehner Exhibit 10 and in this connection I would like to direct the Tribunal's attention to Document Book III, to page 28 of this document book.
In particular I would like to concern myself with the entry of the 25th of August 1943. It says there:
"For the first time a report has come in according to which residents have repelled Communist bandits 16 and 17 kilometers off Pozega."
This same applies to the entry on page 29 of this document book under the date of the 28th of August 1943.
"187th Reserve Division reports a large number of attacks which clearly indicate that the bandits are systematically preparing for some large scale operations. They are organizing raids on motor trucks in order to motorize part of their formations and besides remove large quantities of grain; cattle, fodder and food after raids on farms."
I would further like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to page 35 of this same document book where we find an entry of the 26th of September 1943 where it is stated that:
"It looks as if the criminal elements are beginning now without having any direct connection with the bands to plunder and rob on their own responsibility. Among other things, numerous cases of plunder and levying of war contributions in the country carried out by the individual armed bandits were consequently reported by the rural police headquarters from the Vukovar area.
This last entry goes to show that next to these Tito bands there existed so-called criminal bands.
Q General, were the German troops strong enough to annihilate the bands wherever they appeared?
A Yes, the German troops in the corps area were distributed in such a way that they were mainly stationed along the railroad line and apart from that covered the whole area, particularly the important points. They were at all times in a position to concentrate and thus appear everywhere in such strength as was necessary where band concentrations occurred. In this way they were in a position to combat these band concentrations successfully. Furthermore, in the Panzer-Grenadier training regiment 901, -- which I forgot to mention when I enumerated the troops under my command before, the corps had a fast mobile flying unit with an extreme firing power which could appear everywhere where it was necessary.
Q Did the troops of the 69th Corps in Croatia always succeed in dispursing the bands if these had concentrated in one particular area?
A Yes, all larger and smaller operations of the corps led to the desired result. This can be seen from the war diaries. The partisans were disbursed, and as a consequence of the constant operations of the corps they never found any rest.
Q What part of the troops committed in Croatia would have sufficed if the bands had not committed acts in contradiction to international law have been described here?
A In my opinion, a very small part would have been sufficient in the corps area, possibly a division or even less.
Q How do you explain the many sabotage acts along the main line?
A It is a fact that military experience shows that an objective such as this railroad line almost five hundred kilometers long cannot be guarded and protected at all times and completely even if we had had twice or three times as many troops as we had. This is impossible, particularly where the enemy, under violations of international law, appears as a harmless peasant near the railroad line in his cornfields in order to at the proper time carry out sabotage acts along this railroad line.
DR. GAWLIK: To prove that the corps did everything that could be done in order to guard the military and military-economic objectives, I have produced the previously mentioned exhibit Dehner No. 10 which is my document Dehner No. 16. In this particular connection, I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to Document Book III, page 30, where under the date of the 29th of August, 1943, we have an entry which reads as follows -- I quote:
"By order of the 2nd Armoured Corps Headquarters dated 27 August the corps reports local restricted security measures for such military or economic objectives which must be constantly guarded."
Also on page 32 under the date of 15 September we have the statement:
"Corps Headquarters orders renewed checking of security measures for protection of the railway lines and installations taken in the area of the 173rd Reserve Division."
On page 33 under the 20th of September 1943 we find an entry stating:
"173rd Reserve Division reports with No. 770/43 Secret that the checking of railway security measures in accordance with the order of corps headquarters of 15 September has been carried out."
On page 34 under the date of the 21 of September we have statement saying:
"The army orders to protect the transport of harvest stores from the area Broko that the protection on the line Broko-Vinkovci is to be increased immediately. 187th Reserve Division and German railway security staff Croatia receive corresponding orders."
On the basis of the order of the army received on 20 September the corps headquarters issued the standard order for the protection of the main line and, finally, we have an order on the 13th of October:
"Corps Headquarters reinforces the railway guard for the section Kukujevci-Deletovci with cavalry patrols of the First Cossack Division because of renewed and increased acts of sabotage."
This last entry I have produced to prove the fact that sabotage acts were not simply answered by reprisal measures but that they were countered with increased military protection.
This brings me to another chapter of my general examination.
Q To whom were the police units subordinated, General, the police units committed in Croatia?
A These were subordinated to the plenipotentiary of the Reichsfuehrer SS with the Croatian government. This was Gruppenfuehrer Kammerhofer. He held the rank of a Major General.
Q To whom was Kammerhofer subordinated?
A He was subordinated to the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Himmler.
Q Were you in a position to give orders to police units?
A No, I couldn't do that except on an occasion where we might have succeeded in having at our disposal one or the other small unit of the police for a certain operation and in combining this police unit with the troops of the corps. To achieve this was in most cases extremely difficult and diplomacy had to be employed. The police was extremely ambitious and wanted to do everything alone. If police units were at one time or another subordinated to some other units, then police units could be given tactical orders only, but they would never be subordinated in a disciplinary or judicial respect.
Q Were the police district leaders subordinated to you, General?
A No, the police district leaders were subordinated to their own superior which was the Higher SS and Police Leader Kammerhofer. They were completely independent of the corps.
Q Did you have to depend on cooperation with the police district leaders?
A No, that was only planned once during my period of service in the Balkans for the operation "Cannae" which was never actually carried cut. It was at a period of time shortly before the march into Hungary.
Q. Did you have an opportunity to prevent any measures taken by the police?
A. No.
Q. Were police operations reported to the Corps by units subordinated to the Corps, where these police operations fell into the area of the Corps?
A. They were not always reported. Frequently they were reported much too late to our extreme regret. We made every effort to be informed of police operations in the Corps area in good time -- at least through informational copies -- so that we could employ our own operations in conjunction with police operations and not work against each other at cross purposes. Our efforts were not always successful which was unfortunate. Where small-scale police operations were concerned we rarely were informed of them.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10, which is contained in Dehner Document Book III, on Page 41. There we have an entry dated the 10th of November 1943, and this entry shows the relation which existed between the Corps and the police. This entry reads, and I quote:
"On 9 November SS-Oberfuehrer and Colonel of the Police v. Sammern was requested to relieve Koprivnic with a Police Battalion from Virovitica. Colonel V. Sammern pointed to the fact that operations outside his security zone were subject to the agreement of his superior office, the Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer and Major General of Police Kammerhofer.
Endeavors made by the LXIX Reserve Corps and by the 187th Reserve Division in order to obtain this agreement from Major General Kammerhofer take more than 12 hours. The consent arrives on 10 November at 09.05 hours, i.e., at a time when the Police Battalion is already on the march from Virovitica back to Esseg."
In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the further entry of the 11th of November 1943 where it is stated: "As it is known by now, on 9th November a police operation was started against a guerrilla camp on the Letenka Mountain (13 Km north of Mitrovica) which is fortified by numerous pillboxes."
This last entry shows that the police acted completely independently, and the preceding entry shows that the Corps was in no position to give any orders to the police, but, instead, that such orders could only be given by Kammerhofer within the area of the LXIX Reserve Corps. That is why I read that particular entry.
General, did you gain knowledge of any measures carried out by the police, particularly reprisal measures?
A. No.
Q. In a large number of reports which have been submitted by the Prosecution we find reports concerning operations of the police. Why did the units of the Corps report about police operations?
A. This was done because these operations took place within the Corps area and because the Corps had to be kept posted about everything that went on in the Corps area. This had to be done so that their own operations could be started in conjunction with other events. Furthermore, this was also based on an order from a higher level, according to which everything that went on in the Corps area -- even operations carried out by troops not subordinate to the Corps -- had to be reported to higher agencies.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to mention that the order to which General Dehner refers now will be submitted by me in Dehner Document Book V.
Were the orders issued to your troops concerning measures about bands also applicable where police units were concerned?
A. No, the police units received orders through their own channels from Himmler.
Q. Did these orders apply to the Croatian Armed Forces?
A. No, the Croatian Armed Forces received their orders through channels from the Ministry of War, -- The Croatian Ministry of War.
Q. You, as Commanding General, were you in agreement with all the measures carried out by police units in your Corps area?
A. No, by no means. I was not in agreement with all measures of which I was informed, but I had no possibility to intervene officially because police units were not subordinate to me.
Q. That brings me to the end of the general part of my examination, and brings me to the chapter concerning hostages. First of all, I'd like to ask some general questions about this problem.
General, did you, at any time, give an order for the execution of hostages?
A. No, I never gave an order for the execution of hostages.
Q. If troops subordinated to you did, at any time, carry out executions of hostages who then would have issued the order for such an action?
A. According to orders, that would have been the responsible division commander who was, at the same time, the judicial for the area.
Q. Why would it have been the divisional commanders who were responsible for such measures?
A. They were responsible in accordance with orders from a higher level. They were judicials, as I mentioned before, and they were also within easy reach; thus, they were in a position to decide personally.
Q. Did the Corps Headquarters, at any time, order the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A. No, the Corps Headquarters has never ordered the carrying out of reprisal measures.
Q. Did the Corps Headquarters ever authorize subordinate units to take reprisal measures?
A. No.
Q. Did the Croatian authorities have to take any part in the ordering and carrying out of reprisal measures?
A. Yes, that is so, and it can be seen from a number of orders and documents. It becomes apparent from the basic Army order of 15th of September 1943, and it also can be seen from a Corps order, which I believe was dated the 23rd of September. It can also be gathered from a communication from the Corps addressed to the Army, and, if I am not mistaken, also from a War Diary entry.
Q. If the Tribunal please, the Army order of the 15th of September, 1943, just mentioned is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 15 of the English text and Page 3 of the German Document Book. This is Prosecution Exhibit No. 340, Document No. NOKW-509. The Corps order of the 23rd of September 1943 is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 19 of the English text and Page 10 of the German text. This is Prosecution Exhibit No. 340, Document NO. NOKW-509. The just now mentioned communication of the Corps addressed to the Army, dated the 23rd of September, is contained in Prosecution Document Book XIV, on Page 45 of the English and Page 25-A of the German text. This is Prosecution Document No. NOKW-509, Exhibit No. 340. The entry in the War Diary which General Dehner mentioned is contained in Dehner Document Book III, on Page 38 of the German and of the English texts. This is Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10. The entry is dated the 16th of October, 1943, and it reads as follows:
"In order to avoid mistakes in taking of hostages which could result in far reaching consequences for the relations between the German Wehrmacht and the Croatian population, Corps Headquarters orders that taking of hostages and arrest of Croatian citizens should, as a principle, only be carried out in close agreement with the Croatian authorities."
Q. Were representatives of the Croatian Government attached to German military units?
A. With the divisional staffs, and, partly also when tactical operations were carried out, also with the Corps staff.
In order to confirm these statements made by General Dehner I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to Dehner Document No. 16, Dehner Exhibit No. 10, Dehner Document Book III, Page 43. There we have an entry of the 19th of November 1943, where it states, and I quote: "Ustascha Colonel Servatzky, Vukovar, reports to the Ia as delegate of the Peglavnik with the LXIXth Reserve Corps."
What were the tasks of this representative?
A. It was the task of these representatives to guard and represent the interests of the Croatian State.
Q. Did these representatives raise any complaints because of excesses of German troops?
A. It is not known to me that they raised any complaints because of excesses on the part of German troops, but there were complaints about the behavior of the Cossacks.
Q. Were these complaints followed up by the Corps?
A. Yes, they were followed up to the last whenever they came to the attention of the Corps. The guilty persons were taken to account in a severe manner.
Q. Were you in a position to take away from the divisional commanders the right which they had received through superior orders-namely, to arrest hostages in reprisal cases?
A. No, the divisional commanders would have then had the right to make complaints. On the basis of such a complaint any measures taken by me would have been rescinded. Furthermore, the divisional commander exercised the authority of a judicial. I, in my capacity as Commanding General, was not the judicial authority in the area and could, therefore, not restrict him in this respect. The Corps could not reserve for itself this right because, as I mentioned previously, for ter ritorial reasons this was not possible.
Q. When you arrived in Croatia what did you know about orders which had been given to the divisions under your command, concerning the arrest and treatment of hostages?
A. My units were, before my arrival in Croatia, subordinate to the Commander of the German Troops in Croatia, General Lueters. The units acted in accordance with orders, decrees, and instructions which existed at that time. These orders, decrees and instructions had been issued before my period of service down there. Whether the Chief of Staff had informed me in detail about these orders originating from an earlier period, and whether these orders were at all with my staff at that time I can no longer tell you today with any amount of certainty. (The staff arrived in Brod from Vienna; the troops were already there; the staff was a new installation). I still remember that at the beginning we had tremendous difficulties in billeting and accommodating our members. We were just then in the first phases of getting into our stride, and I believe that I can well remember that there were a number of instructions, decrees and orders applying to earlier periods which were not there at all, and we had to go to a lot of trouble to get them.
Q. Did you have any occasion to instigate any amendments of the orders which the two divisions had?
A. No, I believe, as I stated just now, that I didn't even know all those orders in detail. I started from the assumption that these orders were admissible under International Law without doubt.
Q. Could you revoke an Amy order?
A. Only the leader of the Army himself could revoke an Army order, or the agency superior to the Army.
Q. What was your opinion of reprisal measures after you had got to know the situation and conditions on the Balkans?
A. The Balkans have been, for decades, a source of unrest. At the present time also there is no peace on the Balkans, although one cannot say at the moment that there are Germany troops down there.