A. One can see that from the War Diary it happened from case to case. It happened in waves. Sometimes there was peace and order, then there came another wave of sabotage acts and then calm and order reigned again. When these things happened, I could not tell you but you can find it in the documents.
Q. Well looking at the overall picture, not just one particular area or one particular incident, do you think that the execution of hostages had this same beneficial effect through the whole Corps area? Do you think that the result of it was that sabotage dwindled and lessened as a result of it? Of these executions?
A. Yes, that is what I said just now.
Q. Well now, look at this first order that Col. Steinbeck issued. It is Document NOKW-657. Do you have it there?
A. On page 90 of the German.
Q. That is right, 37 of the English. Now look at paragraph 2-A.
A. Two you mean?
Q Yes, 2-A. "Notwithstanding the discomforts which living in the forest no doubt entails, particularly during the winter months, the band nuisance increased steadily."
A. I ask you where this is? I haven't found it yet. Well, it is entirely possible from the overall situation but nevertheless in between there might have been periods of order. Let me offset this with the War Diary. It shows quite unequivocally which says that band activity has decreased. I can show you a number of passages. If you give me a moment, I can tell you where. In the War Diary on 18 September "Activity by the bands against the railroad remained on a negligible scale."
Q. Now, what particular area did that refer to, General? The passage you just-
A. Quite generally in the Corps area, the area of my Corps. On the 17th of September, it says "Activity by the bands has decreased the last 24 hours." This you can find on the 17th September.
On the other hand, on the 24th September, you find "increase in band, activity."
On 28 September, you find. "In the last 24 hours, activity by the bands was relatively small as it would appear that an operation has taken its effect."
And there are several more passages.
Q. Well, Col. Steinbeck, as your Chief of Staff, was familiar with those reports that you just alluded to, wasn't he?
A. I assume so, yes, but after all these are entries in the War Diary. Whether he knew them or not I of course couldn't swear to it, but I assume so.
Q. Then in spite of those entries for the month of September, he was still making the statement in December that the band nuisance increases steadily?
A. But there are later entries as well where it says that it decreased. This expression there where ho says "Band nuisance despite living in the forest during the winter increases steady," you must not take this expression too literally, because after all there are other things in the documents as well. He merely wants to stress his own opinion thereby. Therefore, one should not proceed arbitrarily but very deliberately. This merely shows how very careful and scrupulous he is.
Q. Now let's go back to this basic order of September 15. When did you say you first saw that?
A. What order do you mean--the army order?
Q. Yes.
A. On page 11 in Volume 14, I believe. I assume that my Chief of Staff reported to me about this after I returned from leave.
Q. And you testified on direct examination that it never occured to you that there could be anything illegal about an order which the army had issued. Is that correct?
A. Whether I said that in detail I don't know but what I did say was if I remember rightly that it never occurred to mo that an order coming from a higher or the highest agency could contain anything illegal.
That, I think, is what I said.
Q. Now, it didn't occur to you that this provision to the effect that you ought not to take prisoners might possibly constitute a departure from the recognized rules of warfare?
A. As I said, on direct examination, this provision which is quoted here was never applied at all in the area of the Corps.
Q. Well, but we are talking about your reactions to the order. You said it never occurred to you that there could be anything questionable about it. Now you are talking about something else. When you first saw this order or when you were first told that an order had been issued, according to which you were not to take prisoners, that didn't strike you as unusual from the standpoint of the rules of warfare?
A. What I thought at the time I cannot tell you today.
Q. Well, tell us, though, General. That is the thing. You said that you didn't see anything wrong with it.
A. Yes, speaking quite generally. If an order came from higher up, I thought at once that under no circumstances could it contain anything, against international law nor do I believe that it contains anything which is not in accordance with international law, if I may quote you a report which you probably know yourself from the daily reports where it says that bandits, for instance, dumped their arms or something, I forget what the passage said in detail--then raised their arms and suddenly got hold of their arms again and then shot, which surely was against international law and I assume that this passage in the army order was thinking of something like that. But as I said before, this provision was never applied at all in the area of the Corps.
Q. Well, what was your reaction to the provision that hostages were to be executed in a fixed ratio? Didn't it occur to you that that perhaps might be a violation of the rules and customs of war, either?
A. The ratio mentioned here leaves everything at one's discre-tion. It gives here as the rule and the way we looked at it was that the minimum measure was to suffice for us to achieve what we wanted to achieve, so that was left to us, in other words.
There is no definite order that so and so many must he seized as hostages. It says "as a rule."
Q. In other words, the way you interpreted the order, you were given some discretion as to how the execution of hostages should be carried out?
A. Yes, quite, nor was the order ever carried out in the sense it is put down here.
Q. Well, how much discretion did you think you were given?
A. If something occurred which we had to take a reprisal measure for, then there was in Croatia, above all, the Croatian authority holding executive power and they were responsible in the first place and it was they who as a rule carried out the reprisal measure. If in an exceptional case, a Divisional Commander acted on the basis of this order, then of course he had first of all to investigate the case scrupulously. Then he had to issue a warning and issue more warnings. Then he had to seize hostages and finally he had to inflict a reprisal measure if and when too much had happened and the partisans left no other possibility open to him.
Q. Now the way you are describing this order now, it sounds as though you interpreted it as a restriction on your power to execute hostages. That wasn't really your interpretation of it, was it?
A. There is no restriction there at all. I would like to point out that we were then committed in a sovereign state who was holding executive power. Now if the state does that itself, we could only be pleased because no soldier likes to do this work.
Q. Well, if this order was not mandatory, then did you interpret it as simply a suggestion?
A. What do you mean "suggestion?" "Suggestion" from whom?
Q. From the army?
A. The order by the army is so worded that it leaves a certain amount of latitude.
Q. That is what I am getting at. Now then, how much latitude?
A. It says "as a rule", so therefore you had to decide from case to case because each case is different from the other.
Q. Well suppose, for example, that you felt on principle that the execution of hostages was not only inhumane but useless, that it didn't accomplish its purpose, would you have felt that you were given enough latitude under this order so that you could ignore it entirely and not execute anybody?
A. Yes, this is my opinion.
Q. So that the fact that you, as Commander of the LXIX Corps, agreed fundamentally with this order is the reason that hostages were executed in your area, is that right?
A. I haven't understood the question.
(The question was repeated by the interpreter.)
A. I don't know why you should say that.
Q. You said the order gave you a certain amount of latitude?
A. Yes.
Q. And I asked you how much latitude and you said that it gave you enough so that if you didn't want to, you wouldn't have had to execute any hostages at all--at least that is what I thought you said.
A. Well it didn't depend on us. It depended entirely on the behavior of the population, how they behaved themselves.
If the population remained calm, the Commanding Officer has no reason to do anything, and for the rest it was always the Croatian authorities and police who did everything. After it was entirely up to the population. Had the population remained calm, nobody would have dreamed of doing anything. We would have only been too happy. That would have suited us very well.
Q. In other words, you had the discretion to execute hostages or not to execute hostages, and whether you decided to do it depended on how well satisfied you were with the behavior of the population?
A. It depended on the population. I might mention here that I had nothing to do with this business because if the necessity arose at all, the Divisional Commander concerned had the authority to do these things because he was the judicial authority. I myself had nothing to do with it. I would not issue the order to shoot hostages. That authority has been once and for all invested in the Divisional Commander by the highest headquarters.
Q. Well, who then had this latitude, this discretion you are talking about if you didn't have it? You are saying now that the Divisional Commanders had it but that you didn't?
A. This becomes quite clear from the order. The Divisional Commander is the responsible man, which is for the various reasons which I have given on direct examination. He is the judicial authority. He is geographically closer to the incident than I would be as a Commanding General who had no possibility of coming into close contact with these things. Sitting hero in Zagreb, for instance, how can I know what is going on 150 kilometers up there, which is one of the reasons why it is monstrous to say that I would have been in a position to overlook the matters or to carry these things out.
The order makes it quite clear that the responsibility rests with the Divisional Commander.
Q. Now you testified that you spent a good deal of time traveling around in the area of your command to visit the various divisions.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever discuss this matter of hostages with the Divisional Commanders?
A. As a rule, there was no cause to do so because, as I have said time and again, this work or these problems of the hostages were dealt with by the Croatian authorities who held executive power. That was the rule; it might have occurred in individual cases that the Divisional Commanders did it. In fact, that they used their right which was given them in the army order. Of course, I discussed these things with the Divisional Commanders but what I discussed I can't say in detail.
Q. Now you testified on direct examination that from a number of these daily reports from certain divisions, it is not clear whether the execution of hostages was carried out by the division itself or by the Croatians. Didn't you ever interest yourself in that? Didn't you ever make any inquiries of the Divisional Commanders when you got these ambiguous messages about people being executed?
A. I don't think the reports were ambiguous at the time. I am quite sure that my Chief of Staff would make inquiries of each case and report to me in every detail; it is only ambiguous now because it is laid down hero in telegraphic style. Four years have elapsed and all particulars arc lacking. The many reports which are missing make everything so difficult now. In the old days, it was entirely clear. My Chief of Staff never came to see me without knowing very well what had happened and so on.
Q. Now you of course knew perfectly well that there were executions of hostages going on in the Corps area?
A. Yes. As a rule carried out and executed by the Croat Agencies, as the reports clearly show.
Q. Well, you have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the part that the Croatians played in executing these hostages "but let's look at this order of General Rondulic's for a moment. This same order of the 15th of September. Look at paragraph numbered five which deals with hostage executions and then please read the next to the last sentence in that paragraph, that starts our "In no case." or-
A. There are only two sentences there. You mean the last but one sentence?
Q. That is right, just a moment please.
A "Surprise attacks on members of the Wehrmacht"--do you mean that one?
Q. No, just a second. It is on page 13 of the German. It begins "Keinesfalls."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the English page, please?
MR. FULKERSON: Page 15 of the English.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
A "In no case must it be allowed that German soldiers be endangered by delaying action on the part of the Croats."
Q. What does that mean?
A. No disadvantage must arise from the fact that perhaps reprisal measures were not taken in good time. I don't know any more. In urgent cases, a responsible officer can act on his own.
Q. Well, that is without consulting the Croatians?
A. In urgent cases, -- well as I said--that in individual cases the Divisional Commander is responsible and has the authority but an order was available, in fact several orders, whereby the Divisional Commander concerned had to act always by closest arrangement with the Croat authorities, closest arrangements. I know of no case which would come under the category which you just pointed out to me.
Q. What was the procedure for executing these hostages? Was it done by the army? I am speaking now of the cases in which the army ordered the execution?
A. No.
Q. Now if the army actually ordered the execution of hostages, I mean if some unit of your Corps did, who actually carried them out?
A. That case is not debatable because it never happened. The army never ordered-
Q. I meant - I said some unit of your Corps. If one of the divisions in your Corps area ordered the execution of hostages, then who actually carried it out?
A. It was always the Croat authorities. That is contained in the army order even.
Q. Where were these hostages obtained? Did the divisions already have the hostages on hand or did they go out and round up some?
A. As far as I know, there were small hostage camps available at first. Under the 187th I believe--but very soon they were turned over to the Croat authorities and the hostages were either looked after by the Croatian authorities or by the police as far as I know.
Q. Who rounded them up in the first place?
Q. Who rounded them up in the first place?
A. What happened was usually this. Following an operation prisoners would cone in and those prisoners after having been screened were turned over to the Croatian authorities end in that short period of time when they were being screened, they remained with the troops. If they were found not guilty, if it was found that they did not belong to the bands, they were released, but if it could be proved they had belonged to the bands, they were turned over to the Croatian authorities. This is the purpose of the order issued by the chief of staff. It was the Corps endeavor to avoid under any circumstances that innocent people would be seized as hostages at any tine. It was there that my very conscientious chief of staff directed his principle efforts with my approval.
Q. And it was for that reason that you used these elements of the SD from time to time to do this screening?
A. I believe, Mr. Fulkerson, you will see from the orders which proceed this that we made every effort not to be connected with the SD and that we did not want anybody to fall into the hands of the SD. This becomes clear from the order which we discussed before, dated December. I think it makes it unequivocally clear, I believe it is 1694 where it says on page 92: "If members of the bands are being apprehended in the course of this operation and if the troops do not have sufficient trained personnel to screen the suspects, there is nothing to be objected to in calling the SD." And now comes the decisive thing, Civilians are to remain prisoners of the Wehrmacht, however pending the results of the investigation are to be treated as civilians." It then says specifically: "Those who are arrested for being hostages must not be handed over to the SD."
Q. But, the SD actually did the screening for you?
A. No, they did not. If many prisoners came in we were always short of people who were sufficiently trained as interrogators. The SD of course was well trained and equipped for that purpose and the SD was asked by us to help us out, but the commanding officer concerned had always to watch so that the SD would not keep anyone.
The people must come back to the Wehrmacht, that was our endeavor.
Q. But, whether or not a man was classified as suitable for a hostage or not, suitable for a hostage in the last analysis depended upon what the SD said in such a case?
A. No, the responsible divisional commanders would take a hand there with their 1c interrogating officers and their personnel. The SD did not have a free hand, they were very closely and carefully watched. All they had to do was interrogate and then they were checked up on again by us.
Q. Now let us turn to the problem of these teletypes for a minute. What was the procedure when you wanted to send a teletype message from your headquarters to the army, to the 2nd Panzer army, in the first place who drafted the text usually?
A. As I explained on direct examination, the various reports came in from the divisions, then a draft was made by the A.D. C., that is to say by the 1a, together with the A.D. C. Then the draft would be reduced to its most concise form so that it could be sent out on the teletype or Morse channel without trouble. I mentioned also that our regulations laid down specifically that a teletype letter must be as short and concise as possible so it could be passed on quickly. Then the teletype letter was sent to the chief of staff. The chief of staff then crossed out this or that perhaps and then the letter would be given to the hand of the communications officer as quickly as possible because there were always these acts of sabotage and two or three disduptions might occur daily. This thing must be sent out as quickly as possible. If there was anything which first required a decision, then of course I would be consulted if I was present. That is how it was handled usually.
Q. Were these messages coded or ciphered before they were sent?
A. No, they were secret but were not ciphered. I think you are asking me too much.
I really don't know, the communications officer would do that and then we had a signal expert there. I don't think they were ciphered first as that would have taken much longer and we would not have been able to get through with it at all.
Q. Were copies of these reports kept for the war diary?
A. What happened was this. The A. D. G. who worked on the war diary would look in at every department once of an evening to see what came in that day. He saw the chief of staff, 1a, the medical officer, etc., and asked them whether anything had happened which could be made part of the diary and then he would include it in the war diary, if it was complete. If it was still not complete, he deferred it for one or two days perhaps so that the final remarks would be correct.
Q. But a good many of these teletype reports to the army found their way right into the war diary as they were without any change?
A. Well, it depended on the man who was keeping the war diary. It depended entirely how he personally felt about it. If ho regarded this or that as of importance he included it or perhaps he asked the 1a or the chief of staff.
Q. But sometimes though actual copies of these teletypes were inserted in the war diary, were they not?
A. I cannot remember a passage where it is contained verbatim. I think as a rule they were summarized and made more concise, but it is possible that this or that term was included verbatim. That is quite possible.
Q. Well now when these teletypes were submitted to you, and you say in some cases they were, before they were actually sent out, you say you signed them?
A. As a matter of principle I initialed every document or every letter with my initials and put the date next to the initials. I did that with a persistence, because I had once made a very unpleasant experience when I was adjutant, so I put my signature and did this automatically and the experts were told very strictly they must hand every thing back to me if I should forget to put initials on them.
Q. Well, did you sign the teletypes at the bottom so that your signature was part of the message, or did you....?
A. No, at the right hand corner on top.
Q. So that if the.....?
A. Immediately under the date.
Q. Then if the teletype happens to be a copy of what was received, then it would not show your signature anyway. Then in other words the recipient of the message would have no way of knowing that you had read it or had not?
A. I think you are starting on the wrong promise there. The so things were transmitted by Morse symbols on the teletype message. The arty, for instance, received the reports but it did not have my signature. This was done by Morse dash -- dash -- dash, etc. , without signature, of course, and the actual original is a letter, and you have some of those documents in one of the document books.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General, how many Croatian troops, I am speaking now of the actual Croatian military plus the Ustasha, were subordinate to you in your Corps area. I don't mean subordinate to you, I know you object to the term; how many were located in your Corps area?
A I also object to the term militia, it was the armed forces, the Croatian armed forces, that was how we regarded them, it was not the militia, if you will excuse me. You mean how many were stationed in my area?
Q Yes.
A That fluctuated on different occasions. I remember the 1st Mountain Battery, and then reference is made to Regiment 8, which I have seen here from the documents. On one occasion I had dealings with Pretschko and there to relieve Pretschko for about a fortnight was the 3rd Croatian Mountain Brigade which was subordinate to me tactically. It fluctuated, in other words, if they were subordinate to me it must be contained in the war diary.
Q What was the relationship between the Croatian troops and the German troops within a certain divisional area so far as tactical cooperation was concerned?
A I said before tactical cooperation was limited to a definite period of time for a certain operation. Let us assume the operation "Snowstorm" was to be started. For that operation the army then contacted the Croatian government and requested this or that unit for a fortnight to serve for this or that purpose be tactically subordinate for that purpose. Then permission was given dr disapproval, which happened also very often as the Croats were a very stubborn race and frequently refused. This would all come back through official channels to me.
Q Approximately how many kilometers of railroad were there in your area that you were entrusted with guarding?
AAs I said on direct examination, the many railway lines from Zagreb to Novska and from Brod to Vinkovci and up here to Belgrade Court No. V, Case No. VII.
(indicating on map) This amounted to about 45O kilometers and on the railway we had branch lines which went down to the south with which I was not concerned. But from time to time there was a period of time when we had to guard the strength, roughly down to here, but this was only for a short period of time.
Q And in addition to guarding the railroad you carried out these various tactical operations in the area of the Corps?
A It was the endeavor to prevent by constant tactical operations on a small or large scale the partisans from seizing the railroads.
Q Now, you had under you General, two or three division, didn't you, they moved around and varied some as a general rule; is that not true?
AAs I remarked before, there were under me the 173rd Reserve in the eastern part and the 187th division in the western part and I had the 1st Cossack Division which carried out operations and marched from east to west and finally took over this area. The lin of demarkation varied.
Q Well, now even when the 1st Cossack division was with the Corps, it was moving around in an area close to the railroads most of the time, was it not, conducting these operations "Snowstorm?"
A I don't think so. On the whole they were usually stationed near the railway lines. I can tell you in detail how they were usually stationed. First they arrived in this area and carried out an operation in the area of Fruska-Gora, then went along here always along the railway up to here. Then in this area they carried out also an operation, so in this area, if you remember the letter by Colonel Ruckser where he complains about the cossacks that always in this area they carried out operations, then in this area there then for a time they were withdrawn and made an advance in this area and finally they settled down in that area there. They were in my area between 5 October and unless I am very much mistaken to 20 November. After which one Brigade was taken away by the division staff. Then for a Court No. V, Case No. VII.
short period of time the Brigade was in my area. (Indicating on map.)
Q That is something else I didn't understand. General, now you said this morning when you left and went into Hungary, as I understood it, on 15 March that you turned over the area to the 1st Cossack Division. As I understood you, the 1st Cossack Division took over your old Corps area; is that correct?
A Yes, what happened was this......
THE. PRESIDENT: Pardon me, General, in making reference to places on the map if you will describe them by town or by locality it might be advisable. I do now know whether historians in later years will want to make a study of these proceedings they cannot be very enlightening if you refer then to this, there or certain places. If you will refer to a particular spot it would make perhaps a better record at least.
THE WITNESS: Yes, certainly, your Honor.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
Q You didn't tell me how it came about that the 1st Cossack Division took over your Corps area after you left.
A I think it was on 20 December that the last brigade of the 1st Cossack division was withdrawn from the Corps area. Unless I am very much mistaken, they were then sent to the adjacent Corps in the South.
Q That was General von Leyser?
A Yes, they left my area. I think they carried out operation "Torch" (Brandfackel) if I remember correctly. Then they came back to the Corps. I don't have the exact particulars there but I think before we left for Hungary and then from 15 March it took over the Corps area, because the LXVIIII Reserve Corps together with another two divisions went via Zagreb to Varistin in the direction of Lake Balaton in Hungary. When we marched into Hungary we made all this area free and that area was taken over by the 1st Cossacks and was there responsible afterwards.
Q Now, between the time the 1st Cossack division left, I think you said around 21st of December, was that about the time the first Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Cossack division went down to General von Leyser's Corps area, the time between that time and the time that the whole .......
A Excuse me. I am not very well informed about this point. It may well be that for a time they were stationed for themselves and then committed to the Corps of General von Leyser, but all I know is that it was during that period of time.....
Q I don't think it matters, General. What I was getting at, General, is they were out of your Corps area in any case?
A Yes, quite. On 20 December the 2nd Cossack Brigade left the Corps area.
Q Now then, between that time, between the 20 December and the time they came back in the middle of March, you were left with only two divisons in your area?
A I had in my Corps area the two reserve divisions, namely the 173rd and 187th, to which reference was made before. I also had the Cossack division and toward the end of 1943, I had the 367th Division to which I also referred on direct examination. Then I had a number of other units, which were attached to the division, such as railway security battalions and a number of divisions which had been transferred to the area without being used for tactical purposes, because they were still being established and had served in different theaters of the war, such as in Russia and suffered many losses. They joined me and were committed somewhere near Esseg or Vukover and for instance they were stationed there and carried out local security tasks and replenished themselves.
Q Did the Croatian troops also help guard the railroads up there?
A If somehow a Croatian unit happened to be stationed near a railway line, of course they did so.
Q They watched out after particular points in the line that were susceptible to sabotage, such as tunnels, bridges, etc., just as your troops there?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
AAs on the Zagreb, Brod, Belgrade line there were at certain intervals watch towers near bridges or other important points, not always but mostly, they were surrounded with barbed wiring, and trenches had been dug.
Q How did you guarantee the security of the rest of railroads, I mean by that did you put barbed wire on both sides of the line for the whole length of it, that was impossible was it not?
A That would have been entirely impossible. There isn't enough barbed wire in the whole of the world.
Q How did you, I mean literally, how did you guarantee the safety of the length of the railroad lines..?
A Each division was given a certain sector and there they established their patrols and there operations were in the areas. In sectors where this happened so often and where the railroads would be raided frequently and the partisans would withdraw to the mountains, the divisional commander would decide that he must chase the partisans away from there and then planned and carried out an operation.
Q Where did these Cossack troops come from in this 1st Cossack divison, what was their origin?
AAs far as I know they came from Lithuania from a troop training center there. It was there they had been interned, they were trained there and from there they came down to us.
Q Well, were they originally Don cossacks, they came from the Don basin, did they?
A There were Don cossacks and Kuban cossacks, I really don't know.
Q. They were originally Russian prisoners of war. Is that where they came from?
A. No, no, certainly not. They were volunteers. They had volunteered. They, in fact, were extremely keen.
Q. You say there were about 25,000 of them in that division.
A. Yes, there were two brigades consisting of 12 or 13 thousand men, and each brigade had six regiments. It was a very strong division with modern equipment.
MR. FULKERSON: I believe that is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of this witness?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. General, on cross examination the question was discussed whether you were held responsible by the army for anything and everything occurring in the area of your corps. What were you really responsible for in your corps area?
A. I was responsible in the second instance -- because it was in the first instance it was the Croarian state -- for security and order in my area, in particular for the security of the main railway line and I had to fight against such partisans as appeared in my area.
Q. Who was responsible in the first instance for the occurrences in your area?
A. In the first instance, needless to say, the divisional commander.
Q. No, I mean quite generally, who was the first responsible agency?
A. The Croat state and its government.
Q. And who, apart from that, I mean among German agencies, was responsible?
A. The Croat state had to secure the law and order and we had to support it.
Q. Who else supported the Croat state?
A. Various agencies, the police, Croatian agencies; Croatian armed forces of course, in the first place.
Q. In order to make one thing quite clear, were you in any sense responsible for measures taken by the police?
A. I said this so often before: certainly not. Police were subordinate simply and purely from case to case in this or that unit for tactical purposes only for a certain tactical operation. This you can see from the report where it says, for instance, that the police had furnished one company for the operation, let us say, operation "Arminz". The operation lasted for a fortnight and during that fortnight I am in charge of the police for tactical purposes and for tactical purposes only.
Q. Is it, therefore, correct to ask whether you were made responsible by the army for anything which occurred in your area?
A. Of course, that is out of the question because so many things happened in my area. I am not responsible for what happened in the area to those units which are not subordinate to me.
Q. Then it was discussed what was your responsibility while you were on leave. Who appointed your deputy while you were on leave?
A. The superior agency; namely, the army. It was laid down in an army order; while the commanding general of the 69th Corps was on leave he will be deputized by this or that person.
Q. While you were on leave were you informed about measures which occurred in the corps area?
As of this point there is something wrong with the film.
A. That was quite impossible.
Q. Did you have any authority to issue orders to the corps while you were on leave?
A. Of course not.
Q. Did the deputy have the same authority which you had when you led the Corps?