At the most, we soldiers felt pit for these sad sacks but there was no hate.
In the course of 1943 we encountered increased partisan activities and frequently suffered unpleasant losses which unfortunately occurred from ambush. In the course of time I myself have seen about 300 captured partisans, however, I have never seen one of them in clothes which resembled a uniform.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
These bands, dressed in rags, did not only attack German troops in a treacherous manner, but in the same manner plundered their own countrymen and villages. It were the partisans and not the occupation power who terrorized the country. Numerous Greeks reported to us voluntarily in order to fight against this terror. With the explicit reservation not to fight against the Allies in case of an allied invasion of Greece, we nevertheless equipped these Greek troops with arms and they fought against the partisans independently. When it became clear that the German troops would leave Greece the General negotiated several times with the highest dignitary of the Greek church and also with other prominent persons, always with the sole objective to prevent a catastrophe through civil war after we had left the country. It was even said that the General would secretly enter into negotiations with a British General from Cairo for the purpose of surrendering the city of Athens. All this was done for the sole purpose of preventing the outbreak of bloody riots in the city following our withdrawal."
The next document, which is NO. 121, to be found on page 10, is an affidavit by Dr. Kurt Fritz von Graevenitz. It is offered as Exhibit 117. I should like to read this affidavit.
"I know General Felmy from Athens, where I served from 1938 to 1944 as Legation Councilor with the representatives of the Foreign Office, in his two capacities as Commander in Southern Greece and as Commander of the 68th Army Corps. Herr Felmy belonged to those leading military personalities who were constantly open to even- non-military points of view and had complete understanding for the needs of the civilian population. He would never have ordered severities without compelling military necessity and then only after a conscientious investigation. The situation became especially serious when a partisan war broke out in Greece, particularly in the Peloponnesus zone of hostilities, with an insidious enemy who could not be seized because he did not make an appearance in a military way. With regard to the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
reaction to attacks from ambush the commanders, moreover, did not have a free hand. On the contrary, they were bound by extremely strict orders, the force of which according to the general view -- even that of the Greeks -- was in those years open to no doubt. I have never heard from the Greek side, no matter how enraged they were over reprisal measures ordered, that the generals for their part could have acted any differently in view of their strict orders from above. Wherever margin was left for his own judgment General Felmy tried to put through the more lenient interpretation. Of the individual cases charged against him I only remember the Kalavrita case. As is well known, the reprisal measures there were not ordered by General Felmy, who at that time was not even present. I recall one conversation in which he criticized the measures sharply; he considered them, as he expressed it himself more or less, an outrage and only regretted that he was unable to do anything against them in view of the general trend prevailing behind them.
"Late in the summer and fall of 1944 Athens and its surroundings were already to a great extent in the hands of the Communist bandits. This made the general's position more difficult to an extraordinary degree and forced him to observe special watchfulness. However, I do not recall that for this reason he had to use especially severe measures against the people. He tried not to make the law-abiding elements of the population, who, he knew, themselves regarded the bandits as their enemies for more than the German troops, suffer for the excesses of the Communists. This attitude also explains his conduct before the evacuation of Athens. There too I remember conversations in which he expressed his endeavor to circumvent the strict orders which existed regarding the destruction of transport installations which were also useful to the enemy, or to soften them in their application. He also acted accordingly. Neither the reservoir for the Athens water system (Lake Marathon) was blown up, nor the electric power plant; in the case of the latter the plant was only temporarily Court No. V, Case No. VII.
put out of order. The general's cooperation with Archbishop Damaskinos and the Swiss Consul, Escher, for the purpose of preventing hardships during the evacuation of Athens is well known and might also be attested by the above-named individuals."
Document No. 122, to be found on page 12 is an affidavit by University Professor Fahrner. It is offered as Exhibit 118. I should like to read this brief affidavit.
"From 1939 to 1944 I was employed as a professor in the University of Athens and had no insight into military measures whatsoever. I met General Felmy on several occasions as host and conversely as guest, as well as on several visits on my part, and I received a deep impression of his chivalrous attitude and way of thinking which appeared in his every gesture and in connection with every topic of conversation. I should expressly like to emphasize that among all the representatives of the generals' class with whom I became acquainted in the course of the past war he seemed to stand out in particular in contrast to a few others. My ideas and concerns, which turned exclusively around saving individual threatened Greeks and around the problem of how the measures toward the Greek population could reasonably be moulded in the spirit of humanity without our military interests taking any harm, were always received by him with great willingness and the deepest understanding, According to all my impressions I cannot imagine anything less likely than that General Felmy could be found to be a war criminal."
The next document, if the Tribunal please, is Document No. 123, on page 13. It is an affidavit by Hans Keller and I should like to read it.
"I was a member of the Corps Staff of the 68th Army Corps from 1941 to May 1945 without interruption, at first as acting corporal and then in the higher ranks up to master sergeant, and also as 1st clerk in the Quartermaster's Battalion.
"During his years in Greece General Felmy made a constant Court No. V, Case No. VII.
effort to wage war as humanely as possible for the Greek people. The orders given concerning the partisan organization often seemed too mild to the German soldier in retaliation for the atrocities committed by the bandits.
"By declaring Athens an open city and leaving the Marathon Power Plant undamaged for the Greeks General Felmy saved the city, and more than that, the province of Attica, from terrible misery and disease.
"General Felmy's thoroughly humane way of acting with regard to the Greek people was gratefully acknowledged by the latter.
"To my recollection General Felmy was esteemed by members of the Greek government as well as by the Greek people as a German army commander who was not only deeply concerned about the welfare of his own troops but also the welfare of the Greek people and Greece altogether."
Document No. 124, which may be found on page 15, is an affidavit by Dr. Fbs Kautzsch, which is offered as Exhibit 120.
"From August 1941 until July 1943 I was assigned as a medical officer with a combat air force unit in Greece and Crete, from September 1943 on I was stationed at the air corps hospital in Athens and went through the whole Balkan evacuation movement with this unit, until April 1945.
"The band activities in the Athens and Peloponnesian sectors were insignificant until the summer of 1942. After this date out-ofthe-way roads could no longer be travelled without escort. In 1943, and especially in 1944, it was ill advised, for instance to drive in an unescorted vehicle from Athens to Corinth, because band attacks could be counted on. I, myself, never experienced an attack in the neighborhood of Athens, but I was informed that there had been attacks.
"In the summer of 1944 the base hospital for minor casualities and convalescent home Parnis near Athens, which was attached to my hospital in some respects, was attacked several times by the Partisans; however, these attacks were repulsed quickly and without casualties.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
The convalescent home was later protected with mines.
"On the convoy occasioned by the transfer of my hospital from Athens to Saloniki the 32 vehicles (10 ambulances, 5 passenger vehicles, 2 motorcycles, 1 bus and 14 trucks) all of which were identified as Medical Corps vehicles with the Red Cross - for this purpose we had drawn white pieces of cloth with a red cross over the canvas covering were attacked by the Partisans with machine guns, mortars and rifles. The incident took place north of Lamia between the 10th and 15th of September 1944 (I cannot say the exact day because I don't have my diaries any longer). It was shortly after noon. We had stopped to rest for about one hour and the firing began as the first vehicle started off. Luckily no one was injured. A police car came to our assistance with a heavy machine gun, whereupon the Partisans ceased fire."
"A few kilometers north of this spote our colum was again attacked by light anti-aircraft fire, which came from a position to the side of us in the mountainous terrain that could not be surveyed.
"The treatment of the Greek population by the unit was excellent. Expulsion from their homes, confiscation of the entire furniture and the like, as is still done today in Germany (for example, in Munich-Harlaching) never came to my attention. Billeting was restricted to giving us single rooms - so that, for instance, Greeks also lived in houses were staffs were billeted - or houses were used whose owners had evacuated them (for instance in Fleusis near Athens).After the introduction of cantine coupons in 1942 the soldiers could no longer maker purchases in the civilian sector.
"Illegal acts on the part of members of the Armed Forces were, in all cases, that I know about, handled by a court martial or at least with disciplinary punishment. The question often came up among the soldiers of whether we had won the war in Greece or whether the Greeks had. The voice of the G.I!
"Greek civilians employed by the various units were almost exclusively treated by the medical officers and in many cases their families were too. In other cases, too, the German medical officers gave assistance when no Greek doctor was available.
"After the dissolution of the air corps hospital in Athens a large supply of hospital linen and equipment, as well as medicine was made available to the Greek population through the Red Cross. So far as I know, the other army hospitals in Athens did the same.
"In the beginning of December, on the march back, we met the remainder of a motorized hospital on a pass behind Visegrad in Yugoslavia, which had camped there for the night a few days earlier and had been attacked there by the Partisans in spite of their Red Cross markings and had suffered considerable losses. Sometime between the 16th and 19th of December 1944 we were attacked by Partisans with anti-aircraft guns from a farm between Serajevo and Brod - I no longer know the exact place,anti-aircraft guns which were brought up drove off the enemy.
The next document is Felmy Document No. 125, to be found on page 18. It is an affidavit by Dr. Peter Biesalski, offered as Exhibit 121. I shall read the third paragraph:
"As 2nd Lt. M.C. and medical officer with the 68th Army Corps, which was under the command of Air Force General Felmy, I was sent, in Nov. 1943, to Githion near Sparta on the Peloponnessus as base doctor, I worked there until Feb. 1944 and took care of the troops stationed there. Be sides this official work I treated a great many Greek civilians, exclusively with Army medical supplies.
As everywhere on the Balkans I thereby won a great many honest and grateful friends and was able to gain an accurate insight into the true opinions of the Greek population, I mention this in advance as necessary for the statement which now follows.
"In Jan. 1944 (I no longer know the exact date) I was ordered to examine 11 German soldiers and one Greek civilian who had been found killed by the Partisans, to determine the cause of death. I found the corpses in a farm near Githion and made an examination of every single body, which lasted several hours; a report was made at the same time which I later forwarded through official channels.
"I remember exactly that almost all the bodies, excepting one or two, had been mutilated and injured by violent means, On several the skulls had been shattered, probably with rifle butts, others were entirely disfigured through injuries and blows in the face. Extensive hemorrhages and skin abrasions pointed to kicks and gun butts. Added to this there were more or less serious injuries through hand grenades and infantry ammunition. My former subordinates and I ascertained that several wounded or dead had also been shot with shotguns from close range.
"I remember clearly that some of the German soldiers had received relatively harmless bullet wounds like grazing shots or flesh wounds, and that the cause of death was undoubtedly due to the crushing of the skull or other blunt injuries. For me there was even at that time no doubt that a part of the wounded had been killed in this way or killed by being shot from close up. In some of the other corpses the cause of death was definitely due to hand grenades and rifle or machinegun fire. One Lieutenant had his ring finger with wedding ring cut off from his hand. So far as I remember papers and valuables were missing from all the corpses and most of the clothing from almost all. However, I cannot make any sure and binding statements about this. In all cases, death had not set in more than 12 to 20 hours, previously. An autopsy had to be omitted in all cases because of a lack of instruments.
"The burial, which took place the next day at the cemetery in Githion, where a few weeks before several German soldiers who had lost their lives similarly already had been buried, was attended by a great many people from all walks of life and by the clergy. Here, and also later, I heard again and again that the Greek people did not accept this method of fighting and had recoiled with herror from the instigators of this attack and similar acts of violence by the Partisans.
The next document is Document No. 126 on page 21 which is an affidavit by Heinz Buchspiess, offered as Exhibit 122.
"From 12 August 1942 to the end of the War I was with the 68th Army Corps.
"I am not in a position to comment on the individual counts of the indictment, as I was not in the units of the subordinated divisions, but was in the Corps formations which were directly under the command of the Corps, and the counts mentioned refer to matters that were the sole concern of the Strategic and Tactical General Planning Staff, which were dealt with by Army Corps Operational Staff Headquarters.
"I deem it worth while mentioning, though, how conditions were in that particular Corps unit in which I served, as we were under the direct command of General Felmy, and his ideas and actions had an immediate effect on us. Our unit always maintained unimpeachable relations to the respective population, which, in the course of weeks and months, our battalion was able to build up into a really cordial intercourse. In Paeania-Liopesi (On the AthensCape Sunion line), where we were stationed for a whole year, we never had any clashes or differences of any description. The population showed full understanding for the moderate demands of the troops. At no time was the security of the battalion endangered in any way, although it was billetted with its vehicles all over the village. There was not a single case of theft (for example vehicles, spare parts). The Corps never issued any orders to effect compulsory - or reprisal measures. The desires and rights of the population were always meticulously considered; for instance, the celebration of the traditional Greek Easter holidays with hocturnal processions, which had been prohibited since the British occupation of Greece, was fully permitted. Church and community leaders expressed their gratitude and recognition in a very cordial manner. To prove our cordial relation's with the population I mention that even nowadays we maintain correspondence with our hosts.
"I am certain that this would not be the case, if we had behaved like oppressors and if we had infringed any legal principles.
"This description of the relations, prevailing between the German Armed Forces and the Greek population, refers to, as mentioned before, the sector in which I myself was stationed; I had no knowledge of the individual local conditions in the areas of the divisions (on the Peloponneses and in Central Greece). It has been established, however, that a foreign power in Greece was bound to meet with particularly numerous difficulties, as the country and its population were not unilaterally directed as to purposes and conceptions, which condition is still prevailing. The differences between parts of the population, who were either Anglophiles, or favored the Germans, were imbued with nationalistic trends opposing any foreign powers, monarchists, republicans, or grouped in left-wing EAM and ELAS formations constituted the various courses of slashes and disputes. I am of opinion that clashes occurred always there, where the security of our own troops was endangered by constant raids.
A considerable part of the population reiterated time and again that they rejected, and were contemptuous of this type of warfare. It was a general belief that order could be restored, if the ever-increasing raids were to cease, an it was they that by necessity caused all countermeasures. It was thought that the actual fact of foreign troops in the country, regardless whether they were German or not, demanded subordination for the sake of peace and order.
"A growing insecurity developed on the roads, that were initially none too easy to negotiate, so that individual vehicles in the "bandit territories", which were also known as such to the Greek population, (parts of the Peloponnesus, the area round Thebes, Western Greece, Euboea), could not travel alone any longer. It became unavoidable that convoys were assembled. At the same time, there were constant attacks on the railroads. This applied in particular to the only rail connection to Saloriki, which had to carry all supply and leave-train traffic etc., and which was constantly threatened.
"Bearing all this in mind the responsible military commander was compelled to make arrangements for maintaining the security. Judging by my knowledge of Felmy's character and the ideology prevalent in the Corps Headquarters Staff, due to his leadership, I consider it quite impossible that General Felmy should have harrassed and oppressed the Greek population.
"There were orders for the troops according to which any excesses by German soldiers against Greeks and their property were to be severely punished.
And then he proceeds to give a few examples which he has experienced but I shall not read those.
The next document is Document 127, on page 24. It is an affidavit by Ernst Joachim Bradel, who was formerly an active colonel. It is offered as Exhibit 123. I shall read only a few passages from this affidavit; paragraph 2:
"According to entries in the military pass the 1st Armored Division, of which I was a member, was in Southern Greece in the period from 6 June 1943 until 22 October 1943.
During this time until the beginning of July 1943, I was the commanding officer of the reconnaissance battalion in Pyrgros, after that commanding officer of the Tank Regiment 113, with chief garrisons in Tripolis and Sparta. I knew the then General Felmy very well, as he often visited troop units and as I, being the commanding officer of Tripolis, his headquarters town, was his neighbor and frequently his guest."
And the last paragraph on this page:
"Concerning Count 3, page 17, Subsection 12i: This order according to which Italian officers and enlisted personnel were to be shot, was not promulgated at the 1st Armored Division. The Tank Regiment 113, under my command, at that time disarmed and interned the Italian Division 'Cagliari.' I personally with my adjutant took the pistol away from the Italian commanding officer of the division and imprisoned his staff. At no point of this operation did any incidents occur. It could hardly be prevented that the Italians sold weapons and equipment to the partisans formation. On several occasions German soldiers had to protect the disarmed Italians from attacks by the Greek population, as they were furious about the Italians, I know that during this operation not one single Italian was shot."
On page 25, the 4th paragraph:
"When General Felmy visited me in Pyrgos, at a time when the troops had to build their own bakeries because the bread supply system had broken down on account of the intensive heat, he went from one bakery to another and convinced himself personally that no hardships were imposed on the population, also giving an order that a laid-up bakery should be taken over, although it had to be renovated first, and was not as suitable as others.
"After the Italians had left the country, the people felt extremely relieved. Trand and commerce, which had entirely bogged down under the Italians, not under our rule, gradually returned to normal. On orders, we supplied vehicles for procuring food supplies, and, in addition, also convoyed freight, and mostly passengers, when out trucks travelled back empty. The population was very grateful for this."
And, finally, the last paragraph:
"I do not believe that the ten General Felmy has given orders to effect the severe reprisal measures, as mentioned in the indictment. I cannot conceive this, as only a four months before, during my time, this was not the case. As a soldier, a person knows well enough whether his superior is a very strict man, or inclined to be lenient. The latter, anyhow, was the case as far as General Felmy was concerned. He is one of those military leaders who endeavor to assist, and who will intervene personally, if there are any difficulties. I was often his guest, and I am able to state that, by this fact, I knew him quite intimately. I am of the opinion that it is fundamentally wrong to put him in the category of war criminals."
The next document, No. 128, on page 27, is an affidavit by Franz Eisele, offered as Exhibit No. 124. I shall not read it.
The next document is 129, on page 29, an affidavit by Helmut Hagelauer, offered as Exhibit 125. I should like to read this affidavit.
"Following an airplane crash on 17 October 1944, in the area round ARJA-Greece-at the time I was duty officer to the 68th Army Corps under the command of General Felmy - I fell into the hands of the ELAS partisans.
During the period from 3 December 1944 to 20 January 1945 I was a prisoner at the prisoner camp Larissa. My experience gained then is hereby summarized as follows:
"The German prisoners of war, who were in the hands of the ELAS partisans in the Larissa area, were mainly billeted in the barracks near the Larissa airfields. The partisan battalion MO (Mecanicos Olympos ) was in all respects responsible for their accommodation and supplies; this battalion was billeted in the barracks at the same time.
"At first, the German camp inmates consisted of 3 officers and approximately 150 enlisted men, of whom approximately 80 enlisted men and 2 officers were members of the crew of the former German torpedo boat TA 18, and members of the German Armed Forces stationed in Greece, including units of the German Navy and the Mediterranean Shipping Company Mittelmeer-Reederei. The following conditions given in detail, prevailed in the camp in December 1944:
"Billeting: We were billeted in 3 hutments with concrete flooring. Hay, which was completely infested with lice, was at the disposal of only one hutment. There was no kind of illumination, nor any heating facilities. Under the danger of their lives, the camp inmates stole fire wood for their self-made stoves. Wool blankets were not in existence; the blankets which had been sent by the Greek Red Cross had been taken away by the partisans.
"Guards: A barbed-wire fence surrounded the billeting area. The guards in and outside the camps were mostly adolescent Greek boys who handled their fire arms more than frivolously. The prisoners were pressed into performing unofficial work.
"Clothing: There was hardly one of the camp inmates who was wearing shoes; the majority had their shoes taken away under threats and beatings with carbine butts. Because of the wear and tear, the outer garments did not offer any protection against the then extra ordinarily grin cold.
In spite of the rains, and later on snows, the prisoners were daily compelled by the partisan officers, who threatened then with their weapons, to work in the open.
"Food: The following items were supplied, mostly in irregular intervals:
Approximately 7 - 8 kilograms of legumens daily, for 150 men Approximately 1250 grams of olive oil weekly, for 150 men Approximately 625 grams of bread daily, for one person and some cooking salt.
"During all that time we had only once an issue of meat, approximately 25 kilograms on the day, when the representative of the International Red Cross announced his visit. Beverages were not issued. For cooking their meals the prisoners had only a gasoline barrel which they had converted; fire wood was only rarely issued, however no tools to cut it with. The food was mostly issued in very corroded cans of preserves; there were no spoons.
"Sanitary-and Hygienic conditions: An Italian army doctor acted as medical officer, who inspite of his numerous attempts, could not obtain any medicaments, although the partisans were in possession of medicament stocks, which had been deliberately left behind by the German Armed Forces. Because of the living conditions, the place was infested with lice and other vermin to such an extent, and skin rashes were so prevalent, that they could not be mastered even by a hotsteam delousing, which took place on one occasion. The water supply was very irregular from tap-water. We only received insignificant Quantities of soap from a donation of the Greek Red Cross. A request to supply tools and building materials for a usable latrine was rejected. As the season advanced, diseases from lack of food and ailments of the respiratory organs increased, and, apart from those that died during that time, many prisoners were later on in sick-bay in British hospitals because of these complaints. The Commander of the 301 Transit Coy.
(British unit, at that time Volos/ Greece), who took over 40 inmates of this particular camp on 20 January 1945, ordered more than 20 men to be immediately supervised by a medical officer. Those that were wounded in combat received medical care in only some isolated cases.
"Welfare: During the whole of my stay in Larissa I was able to have only one single conversation with the representative of the International Red Cross. All my complaints, which I was forced to submit in the presence of the partisan officers, were denied by them respectively were excused by untrue explanations. Twice only, we were permitted to write letters to our closest relatives; however, I myself witnessed how, on 19 January 1945, all forms, which we had handed in to the camp leaders, as well as all personal documents which referred to us, were burnt. Greek civilians, who wanted to assist us with material donations, were prohibited with threats to their life to enter the camp, or to get in touch with us.
"Miscellaneous matters: Approximately on or about 6 December 1944 2 officers, 3 master sergeants, and 1 corporal were collected from the camp and taken away on a motor truck. Later on the last survivor, Heinz Gerd Fengler, reported to me about the shooting of the five others. According to him, this took place in the Tempi Valley on or about 8 December 1944. As all my notes were taken away from me, I can only furnish the names of the two officers: Kapitaenleutnant Schmidt from Liegnitz in Silesia, and 1st Lieutenant Fey from Coblenz. I myself was refused any information by the partisans concerning the fate of my comrades. On 20 January 1945 I and approximately 40 men were handed over to the combat forces stationed in Volos. Even on the evening before our departure, the young partisans, threatening us with their carbines, stripped us of all garments that appeared of any use to them. All moves, made by various persons, including Greek civilians, to prevent that the prisoners' health was inpeded, were rejected by the camp leadership without giving any reasons."
The next document, Felmy No. 130) on page 32, is an affidavit by Hans Dyckhoff, offered as Exhibit 126. I should like to read this affidavit:
"I served as captain in various official positions under General Felmy in Greece from 1.4.1944 until I was taken prisoner on 25.9.1944; in particular I was entrusted with the task of the "Chief of the Liaison Staff with the Headquarters of the Greek Volunteer in the Peloponnesus".
"During this time I came to know General Felmy as the model of a soldier trained and bred in the correct principles of the imperial army, who thought and acted in a chivalrous way towards the enemy. As a man he was of a fundamentally humane disposition and thoroughly kind character. It is characteristic that the members of his army corps spoke of him as "Papa Felmy".
"Conditions with respect to the chain of command in Southern Greece were extremely confused and there was never any clear limitation of jurisdiction. Throughout the entire period special difficulties existed with the agencies of the SS. When I once expressed the opinion to the Adjutant of the Higher SS and Police Leader that one measure which he had ordered could bring him before a court martial I received the stereotyped answer: "For such views, of the ossified Wehrmacht we have only a weary smile. We have the short wire for this purpose". (He meant a telephone call to Himmler, which could always be quickly put through.)
"The difficulty of the situation in which General Felmy found himself also becomes clear from the following occurrence: Some time after the accomplishment of "Operation Kalavrita" I was invited by the Chief of Staff of the 68th Army Corps, Colonel Goerhardt, to a dinner at which, besides the other gentlemen of the Corps Staff, the Field Intelligence Staff Officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division was also present. Colonel Goerhardt deliberately directed the conversation to the execution of reprisal measures.
The Field Intelligence Staff Officer of the Division, Captain Weber, remarded that he had recently accompanied the Division Commander to the Fuehrer's Headquarters. During tho discussions which had taken place there they had received the impression that Very severe reprisal measures were considered absolutely necessary in the Peloponnesus.
"The leader of the Greek Volunteer Units in the Peloponnesus, to whom I was assigned by the 68th Army Corps, was Colonel Papadongonas. As a reprisal measure for the death of General Krech he had 100 Greeks shot. In spite of the regular investigation of all prisoners by the Volunteer Units he specified that only such prisoners should be shot as were guilty of such serious crimes that they would receive the death penalty from the Greek courts in any case.
"In conclusion I should like to describe another experience which shows that even the British Liaison Officers with the ELAS bands were unable to assert any authority and were helpless in the face of their generally recognized atrocities:
"At the end of September 1944 in Tripolis a British captain called upon me and my 2 friends, Durst and Dr. Jansen, who had been assigned as a liaison team by the 68th Army Corps to the Volunteer Units of Colonel Papadongonas, to leave Tripolis. I thereupon requested him to make out an escort pass to Corinth, in case the Greek officers desired our disappearance in their own interest. The British captain declared that he naturally could make out such a pass, but that I should not overestimate the influence of a British liaison officer. He said that such an escort pass would probably be good only as far as the next fairly large body of partisans and there they would probably cut our throats. He proposed that we should surrender to him as his prisoners and he would then bring us to the British base in Kalamata by his own personal efforts. He said that he hoped in this way to get us through alive, even if here too there was no 100% safety.
"The events after the evacuation of Greece by the German Wehrmacht the revolt of the "ELAS" and "EAM" against the British in the winter of 1944/45, the fighting still going on in Greece between Communist bands and troops of the legal Greek Government, and not last the charge brought by Soviet Russia and her satellites that the present Greek government is made up of collaborationists, should confirm the correctness of the above opinion."
Document 131 on page 35 is an affidavit by Mathias Dicks, offered as Exhibit 127.
"From 1942 to 1944 I served in Corps Signal Detachment 468 as a technical sergeant.
"On 18.10.44 our airplane flew against a mountain in the region of Antanati in Greece as a result of a sea fog, broke apart and immediately caught fire. By jumping out in time I was able to save myself from certain death by burning, but nevertheless suffered very painful burns in my face and on my hands. We had hardly regained consciousness when a band of about 60 partisans appeared and brought us to the above-mentioned village in no very courteous way. Here we were received by the population with kicks and blows with sticks, and after it had been decided not to shoot us right away were lodged in a partisan billet. We were denied any medical aid, but were relieved of everything we had in our pockets; I was not even allowed to keep a photograph of my family. On the following morning an enraged crowd of people demonstrated before the house in which we were lodged and called for our immediate execution. The partisan captain, however -- after he had calmed the crowd with some words which we did not understand -- got us out of the house by another exit and after a very painful 6-hour donkey ride we reached the village of Aiga (about 20 km. north of Larrissa). Here we were received by 3 English officers and conducted to a doctor. In view of the fact that there were neither medicine nor bandages available the Englishmen asked that we be sent back to German lines. However, this was vigorously refused by the partisans. We then lay here for 3 days with festering wounds without any kind of help. After our clothing had been torn from us down to our shirts we were brought to Larrissa in a truck loaded with coal. In the meantime I became blind and only owe the recovery of my sight and my life itself to a captured Italian doctor who was working in the military hospital. After 2 weeks the latter was forbidden by the partisans to treat us any longer. When he still continued to look after us he was sent to a camp. The treatment now employed by the so-called partisan doctors was in every respect highly inadequate.
On lb December, although by no means healed, we were driven into a prisoner of war camp clothed only in a shirt and some rage which could no longer be described as pants. The conditions in this camp were horrible. There was no clothing, no blankets, no straw, no stove, and we lay on a concrete floor covered with some lousy chopped straw. Our food consisted of a quarter of pound of bread and half a liter of watery soup per day, as Christmas and New Year's presents received no food whatsoever. Since we no longer had any toilet articles at all in our possession we became visibly lousy; in spite of our extremely scanty clothing and lack of shoes we had to work in cold slush. Each of us received kicks and blows with a stick according to the whim of the overseer. In a very short time we were all exhausted and sick; in 2 weeks we had 4 cases of death. As the result of an oversight by the camp directors I myself was sent to Volos to the British at the end of January 1945 with the seriously sick. The Englishmen who were held prisoners by the partisans did not fare much better than we did in Larissa."
The next document 132 on page 37 will become Exhibit 128. It is an affidavit by a former British captain, Robert McGregor. In this affidavit he mentions a letter by Guenter Kleykamp of 26 August 1947. I therefore would like first to read the letter on page 37.
"Dear Sir, when, in spring 1944, you were made a prisoner in an action of German troops against Greek "andartes", in the region west of Theben, I dealt with your and Lt. Capsis' interrogation at Athens.
I was then a captain in the Headquarters of the 68th corps. You stated your having had the order of blowing up a bridge and having carried it out. Later on you and Lt. Capsis had been in charge of liaison duties to Greek ELAS units.
"You and Lt. Capsis have never been regarded and treated by me otherwise than as POM British officers. Your caution in disclosing military affairs I did respect. But you will probably not be aware of the fact that the corps' superior authorities took another view of these things, i.e., they looked upon you and Lt. Capsis as members of so-called commando-troops, who, according to a strong order by Hitler of October 18th, 1942, had to be treated not as POW's but had to be handed over to the SD.