The unit employed in band combat is not to be satisfied merely to chase away the bands but it must attempt again and again to exterminate bands or at least parts of them. Of course the plan of the operation is to take this request into account.
2) "The severity of the fights against the cunning enemy often makes it impossible to bring in prisoners without endangering one's own men. The precautionary directive under No. 3 of the OKW order below not to take prisoners will frequently become necessary against the bands in the Serbo-Croatian area. Should the individual bandits nevertheless be captured alive by our own troops they are to be treated in accordance with the attached order of the OKW/WFSt/Operation (N) No. 3408/43 secret, dated 18.8.43.
3) "On the other hand another medium to reduce the bands is applicable, having proven its value of the Eastern Front: propaganda to induce desertion. This propaganda has to be carried into the homes of the population, (women and parents of the bandits who are in danger of losing their houses, or who may become hostages, if the bandit does not desert in time). The bandit is to be given an opportunity to desert; outside of combat action, with the assurance of good treatment and the description of the foolishness of band combat by leaflet and by the propaganda of confidential agents (V-Mann).
"A well organized reception organization and careful counter intelligence measures a necessary for that. The numbers of deserters will increase when people start talking about the good treatment and food the deserters receive.
"Bandits deserting only during battle cannot count on any favors. The divisions are to report the number of deserters of the preceding month or the first of each month. They are also to inform the Corps HQs of executed or intended measures to increase the number of deserters. On the 8th of each month the latter will submit a collective report to the Army Ic.
"4) In territories permeated by bands in which attacts are to be expected and also in the areas where attacks have occurred the arrest of hostages from all classes of the population is a successful means of intimidation.
"As hostages are to be considered primarily:
a) The dependants of members of the band
b) persons guilty of having assisted bands
c) Other suspicious persons The Population of the territory concerned is to be informed of the arrest of hostages and to be told that the hostages will be shot at the first attack which occurs.
The threat is to be put into effect immediately if the attack is executed.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Mr. Rapp.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, prior to the recess we were on page 17 of your document book and we are now approaching paragraph 5 of this document.
"Attacks on German members of the Wehrmacht and damages to warimportant installations are to be answered in every case by the shooting or hanging of hostages and the destruction of surrounding villages which latter is to take place, if possible, after the arrest of the male population inform the German authorities if bandits collect so as to avoid reprisal measures.
"Unless in individual cases different orders are issued, the rule for reprisal measures is;
1 German killed 50 hostages 1 German wounded 25 hostages."
Your Honors, in the original document we have also the words, "shot or hanged" after 1 German wounded and "25 hostages"; and then it says "shot or hanged." I would kindly ask the Tribunal to enter this on your document book and I will also hand the document to the court interpreter for proper authentication, if that is agreeable to the Tribunal.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That may be done.
INTERPRETER: The translation from the original German is as follows: "Unless in individual cases different orders are issued, the rule for reprisal measures is:
1 German killed 50 hostages 1 German wounded 25 hostages shot or hanged."
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Is it agreed that that represents the translation of the German text? The correction may be made.
MR. RAPP: "Kidnapping of a German will be considered equal to killing a German unless the kidnapped person does not return within a definite period. According to the severity of the attack a hundred hostages may be hanged or shot for each attack against war essential installations.
The reprisal measures are to be executed if the culprit is not caught within 40 hours.
"Where possible, reprisal measures in Croatia are to be executed by Croatian police under the supervision of executive bodies of the Secret Field Police of the Field Gendarmerie, or the SD, but in no case is it permissible that a delaying of measures by the Croatian authorities creates a disadvantage to or imperils German soldiers. In urgent cases the responsible leader has to act independently. The execution of reprisal measures with the reasons therefore is to be made known to the population by leaflets.
"The Divisional Commanders or independent Regimental Commanders are to issue orders for the arrest of hostages and for reprisal measures. These commanders decide whether the reprisal measures are to be executed at the scene of the action or in prison camps. Arbitrary excesses of subordinate authorities and of individual soldiers are to be prohibited. The arrest of hostages and the execution of reprisal measures is to be contained from time to time in the Daily Report of the 2nd Panzer Army.
"Male inhabitants aged from 15 to 60 years are to be evacuated from those band infected areas which are particularly important for the conduct of the war. At first they are to be collected in work camps under guard. The Army will order further employment for labor. The evacuations are to be executed by surprise action in order to avoid a previous flight of the population.
Areas to be evacuated are: the country neighboring on important heights of passes and roads of passes sectors along railroad tracks which are particularly in danger, etc.
"Intentions to execute evacuations are to be reported by the Corps Headquarters to the 2nd Panzer Army Ia and 2nd Panzer Army OQU., 1 copy each."
Signed: "illegible signature" and then "Signature General of the Infantry. Certifying the correctness of the copy: Corps Headquarters dated 2.12.43. (Signature illegible) Captain. Distribution: PP."
Your Honors, on the next page, page 19, page 10 of the German document book, we find a letter from the "Corps Headquarters 69th Reserve Corps, Operations Officer No. 1078/43/1074 secret II.A. "dated 23rd of September 1943, at a time when the defendant Geitner commanded the 69th Special Purpose Corps.
This letter implements the letter which the defendant Geitner received from the defendant Rendulic which was previously read into the record. The reference is: "The Commander in Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army Intelligence Officer III, Registration No. 38/43, secret, dated 15.1.43; To Corps Headquarters 69th Reserve Corps, Ia No. 1078/43/1074 dated 19.9.1943."
"To supplement the order previously issued by the Commander in Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army, the following has been ordered.
"1 to 3) Propaganda to induce desertion.
"a) Suggestions for leaflets are to be submitted to the Corps HQ's by the division before 5.10.43. Soldiers of all grades (newspaper men and publicity experts, teachers, professors, etc) are to be interested in suggesting these drafts. The best leaflets will be printed by the Corps HQ's and will be dropped over the band territory in the German and Serbo-Croatian languages. A punctual report on the 1st of each month is to be observed.
"b) The Corps HQ's will apply to the Army for monetary rewards in return for timely reports of intended attacks and for information on the hiding places of the bandits. These monetary rewards are to be paid. If these attacks are frustrated and if bandits are found in the hiding places. Monetary rewards also are to be paid for turning in of arms, ammunition and explosives. Special suggestions for leaflets concerning these monetary rewards are to be submitted to the Corps HQ's.
"II. to 4, 5 and 6 Hostages.
"a) Divisions are requested to report the number and location of hostages in their custody or in the custody of the units before the 1.10.43. They will submit lists showing name, age, sex, profession and place of resistance.
In taking hostages close cooperation with the German and Croatian police? with the SD and the Croatian authorities is requested in order to avoid affecting circles of the population which have nothing to do with the bandits. The wishes of the Croatian authorities to arrest certain persons as hostages are to be granted as long as no particular reasons exist to the contrary.
"a) The divisions are requested to report before the 5.10.43 which territorial sectors are being evacuated, together with a time table of evacuation. At the same time it is requested that a report be made in which work camps the male inhabitants between 15 and 60 are collected, together with the number.
"b) Reports concerning the taking of hostages and the execution of reprisal measures are to be contained in the Daily Reports from time to time."
And then there are some handwritten illegible notes: "War Diary No. 1 (?) 69th Reserve Corps? 46521/4."
Your Honors, if you will kindly turn to page 21 of your document book 15 of defense counsel, we will find another letter from the 69th Reserve Corps at that time under the command of the defendant Dehner dated 6 October 1943:
"Subject: Combatting of bands, reprisal and evacuation measures."
Then there are references:
"1) Corps HQ's LXIX Reserve Corps Ia No. 1078/1074/43 secret II Ang.
2) 187 Res. Div. Ia/E Az. 5 General No. 7613/43 secret, dated 27.9.43
3) 173 Res. Div. Ia No. 930/43 secret dated 29.9.1943."
These are units within the 69th special purpose corps.
"I. Regarding installation of reprisal camps at evacuation camps we refer to Figure 4.) of the order "The Commander in Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army.
The Army has issued orders that captured members of bands, hostages and evacuees are not to be transferred until further notice.
II. The Army requests an exact report of the territories to be evacuated with a time-table of evacuation attached. Only males from 15 to 60 are to be evacuated but no old men, women and children, as the 187th Reserve Division supposes. This will do away with objections the 187th Reserve Division has voiced regarding the erection of camps. As a result of the evacuation many buildings in the villages on the railroad tracks will be made free, or they could easily be emptied by consolidating old men, women and children in billets. Without much effort and additional construction the evacuees and the hostages are to be billeted in these buildings.
Of course the camps of the evacuees are to be kept separate from those of the hostages - since the first mentioned are to be considered free workers. As ordered previously only such persons as are politically suspect, or whose relatives are proved to have joined the bands or those who cannot or do not wish to give any information as to where their relatives are, are to be taken as hostages.
Croatian soldiers to whom a German cadre is assigned may be used for guards. A German officer or non-commissioned officer must always be the camp commander. Officers having been promoted from non-commissioned officers will be particularly suitable as commanders.
The Communities are to supply rations for the evacuees until other rules are prescribed. Corresponding tribute is to be exacted from the communities.
Until further notice the rations of the hostages are to correspond to other prisoners of war.
III. Evacuees and hostages are to be employed in hard labor for clearing the sector (prohibited zone of 300 meters each on both sides of the main roads). And order will be issued regarding wages for the evacuees.
IV. The 187th and 173rd Reserve Divisions are requested to report immediately from which villages on the railroad - except those villages reported previously by the 187th Reserve Division - the male population from 15 to 60 years of age is to be evacuated and at what time.
For the Corps HQ's Chief of the General Staff signature illegible Then the distribution list:
187th Res.Div.
173rd Res.Div.
In the Building:
Qu. (simultaneously IVa) Ia (draft) War Diary If your Honors will now turn to page 24, we will find a document which was sent by a regiment within, or a part of the 187th Reserve Division, which was in turn again a part of the Special Purpose Corps, commanded by the Defendant, Dehner.
We would like to call your Honors attention to the fact that this document is possibly one of the very few documents that has come into the hands of the prosecution staff, in which the number of hostages executed is less than the numbers of soldiers killed on the German side, and we wish to point out that we are putting this document in nevertheless.
This document is to the 187th Reserve Division. Reference -- I believe this is on defense counsels' page 24, (page 24 of the English):
Reference: Commander in Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army, Intelligence Officer As reprisal measures for the attacks on railroads executed on 8.10.
1943 near Paulovac, 17.10.1943 near Vukosavljevica and 19.10.43 near Severin and Paulovac during which 12 German soldiers, 9 German gendarmes, 1 Croatian gendarme, 1 member of the Croatian legion, 5 members of the Croatian armed forces and 2 members of the Ustacha were killed and during which 12 members of the Gendarmerie were wounded and from which 10 members of the Ustascha still are missing, 25 bandits and followers of bandits were shot to death by order of the area command by the Croatian Gespanschaftpolizei on 19.10.1943. The population has been informed of the execution of the reprisal measure, by means of leaflets which contained all the reasons for it. Since the urgency of the case did not permit time to ask for authority post factem agreement is requested.
Signature For the correctness of the copy Dr. Gernstein, Captain Your Honors, turning now to page 26, I believe page 20 of the German Document book, we will find a report on the training of the troops, the attitude and morale of the division, the preparation of troops, and various references to a Cossak-Division which fought in that area:
....The long lasting preparation had alerted the bands and had given away our aim. Therefore band troops were able to retreat unhindered towards the South across the Save. The carefully planned and ordered operation Herbst II became void.
2.) Degree of training of the troops employed. The police company particular the one from Djakovo is extremely inferior. It is poorly trained, or not at all, and poorly disciplined. The fully trained Domobranes (all instructors) were distributed as riflemen and quite useful. The young recruits of the regiment were extraordinary. Even though they had not come to battle they proved themselves to be all right despite the short term of training (two weeks basic training). They were disciplined, their appearance was striking, they were attentive as guards, they kept very good fire discipline. The Ustaschal Company had not received any training at all.
3.) Attitude and morale of the population. The population was extremely obliging and glad to cook the rations for the soldiers. Since no field kitchens were available civilians brought the food to the soldiers at their posts. No friendliness to bands was noted. The population open heartedly notice the tremendous difference between the German soldiers and the cossacks. Demands for help and protection against the Cossacks were not infrequent.
The Cossacks behaved like the Huns. Their behavior toward the population led to the conclusion that the influence of the German leaders and sub-leaders was not very great. The Cossacks confiscated anything they could find: vehicles, bicycles, horses, cows, oxen, pigs, chickens, geese, hay, oats and straw. This was regular pillaging without asking any questions and without any compensation or receipt.
They procured for themselves special rations and everywhere enforced a surrender of alcoholic supplies. In a state of intoxication they annoyed the women, regardless of age, forced their way into their apartments at night, threw civilians out of their beds, and with force and threat abused many women. Later reports stated that among these were even girls from 12 to 15 years of age. Not infrequently a woman was abused by several cossacks throughout the whole night. It became known that in Gradiste alone 11 women had to have medical treatment. Complaining women asked for the removal of the Cossacks. In its own sector the regiment had employed patrols and had known how to stop excesses on the part of the cossacks. In almost every case the complaints could not be checked because different Cossack units passed through constantly. The population could not be helped.
4.) Passwords. Notwithstanding orders, different passwords had been issued to the German units and to Cossacks, so that wild shooting developed at one time on the East blockade. The Cossacks mostly did not know any password. Finally one had to be satisfied, after an agreement that the Cossack identify himself, if stopped, merely with the word "Cossack". The passwords are much too difficult to enunciate. It is impossible for either Croats or Cossacks to remember them (for instance Friedrichshagen, Lausanne, etc.). If possible, simple one or two syllable words should be selected in order to make allowance for the lack of intelligence of these soldiers.
5.) Field kitchens. Field kitchens must be taken along if the commitment lasts longer than 2 days. It is going too far to ask a soldiers to subsist on cold rations for almost 10 days. The usual consequences are that he practically attempts to bed (warm milk, soup, etc.).
6.) Means of communication. The broadcasting sets are very old and require a through overhaul after each employment. At this time 6 Dora sets are out of use due to this.
A new supply of broadcasting sets is required since one can usually work only by radio during an operation."
Your Honors, we find in Paragraph 7:
"Special incidents.
19.10.: 2 bandits arrested in Andrijasevci shot while trying to escape.
20.10.: Battalion Meinicke takes 2 prisoners which were transferred to the SD Vinkovci.
21.10.: I/130 arrest 9 deserting Domobranes in Babinagreda. Handed over to Vinkovci.
22.10.: Because of cowardness in the face of the enemy 2 Croatian auxiliary policemen were arrested and handed over to the unit leader.
23.10.: Domobrane Josip Berinc of the 1st Company/II/Syrm.Brig. was found intoxicated while on duty as guard in Gradiste. He resisted arrest using his gun and said that he would join the bandits because it is better there. He was given over to the E.K.3. Vinkovci.
2 drunks cossacks threw hand grenades at their own troops and shot off their rifles. The Cossacks were arrested and given to Cossack Regiment No. 5 in Zupania.
25.10.: Captain Meinicke arrested a Croatian unit leader for cowardness in the face of the enemy.
IV. Losses.
a) Own: 1 non-commissioned officer wounded.
b) Bands: 3 dead, 8 prisoners.
c) Deserters: 15 Domobranes were brought in.
Then on the next page is "captured materials." We don't have to go into all of the details.
Your Honors, it is pointed out that during this time a Cossack Divi vision in this area was fighting under the over-all command of the defendant Dehner.
Here again we find a document addressed to the 69th Reserve Corps at that time under the command of the defendant, Dehner, from the 2nd Panzer Army. The date is the 19 December 1943, defense counsel on page 28, I believe:
Evacuation measures outside of the area the 1st Croatian Mountain Brigade may be continued. However, they are to be checked once more according to the following points of view:
1) Reprisal and evacuation measures are to achieve best possible effect in combatting of bands.
2) For this purpose it is useful not to evacuate villages adjacent to the railroad line but to use the inhabitants as far as possible to help with the security.
3) For this purpose definite sectors of the tract should be allocated to individual villages. Appropriate reprisal measures are to be executed where attacks occur which the population did not stop or regarding the preparation of which nothing had been reported. These reprisal measures include arrest of hostages, partial evacuations of the population, burning down of individual houses.
4) Bandit nests near the railroad tracks are to be evacuated entirely and to be destroyed.
Signed 2nd Panzer Army, Ia
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors will turn now to page 32 of this Document Book, defense counsel I believe page 16, we find a report addressed to the 187th Reserve Division which fought in Defendant Dehner's corps at that time. It is called, "Subject:
Operation "Herbst II" (which is operation Augumn) and "Wildsau" (which is operation Boar".
Reference: Discussion with the Cossack mounted regiment.
To the 187th Reserve Division:
Operation Herbst II ended with the order of the Division to the Commanding Officer of the Reserve Grenadier Regiment 45 to transfer all Battalions to Colonel Schulze and to take over the command of the blockade and to strengthen the blockade as far as possible.
The purpose of the blockade is clear and does not require any clarification. Parts of the 5th Don Cossack Mounted Regiment came from an easterly direction on 22.10 about 1600 o'clock and went into bivouac.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, then we find the order of battle of this outfit, and it is continued.
Having suffered casualties while units were matching to Cerna the regiment immediately made contact with the commanding officer of the regiment. On this occasion it came out that the Cossacks not only were ignorant of the road block East Vinkovci - Zupanja but that they were surprised to find German troops there. The Regimental Commander informed the leader of the Cossacks (Adj) of the operation Herbst II and the events up to now and himself asked for a short orientation regarding the situation of the Cossack Division. That the Cossack Division - in particular the 5th Don Cossack Mounted Regiment - was ignorant of the existence of a blockade line, now having an inverse front toward the East - results from the fact that the regiment went into bivouac in Stitar and Cerna, in order to prepare for an attack in this area after a rest day. Asked why they could not get ready for combat just as well in Gradiste and Zupanje since the country did not contain any enemy, it was explained that they were following orders.
They were also ignorant of the battle around Brcko as well as the existence of the Group Colonel Schulze and of the newly established southern blockade of the regiment in the area of Brcko-Bosjnaci. The order of bottle as ordered also proves that the existence of these German forces down there was not taken into consideration.
The German Regimental adjutant of the Cossacks was informed of the situation by the regiment (the pertinent radio message dated 22.10 from Colonel Schulze to the division has been monitored) and gratefully accepted the information.
On the 24.10 at 1600 o'clock the 5th Don Cossack Regiment made ready for an attack in the area of Stitar on both sides of the Gradiste in a Southeast direction with artillery positions close to the southern edge of Gradiste.
MR. RAPP: Then, we have some geographical subdivision of the various lines different units were to hold. And now we come to the last paragraph of this page, which illustrates the purpose of this document:
The behavior of the Cossacks: The Cossacks - to say it mildly are degenerating into a public calamity. The population is scared and has sufficient reasons to be. The Cossacks are actually "pillaging". They take away without compensation horses and vehicles, hay, oats and straw, cows, pigs and bicycles, and care little for the complaining population. Frequently the population avoids the Cossacks with alarm because it has received information of assaults, which are said to have occurred.
(handwritten)
For the files.
Then it continues:
The population reacts pleasantly to the behavior of the German troops and by implication connects the Cossacks with Bolshevism.
Information received states that the officers attached to the Cossack Regiment are almost powerless. The men do many things without the knowledge of the officers. There are Russian officers here too!
According to the statement of a commanding officer the thought was expressed that Russian peculiarities must be considered to a very large extent where this detachment is concerned.
The regiment has found it difficult these two days to quiet the population. Wherever possible, assistance was given but it was a hopeless enterprise. Manes and tails of the horses were cut off so that they would become immediately unrecognizable. Even if horses and vehicles are recognized they are not being returned or no compensation is being given.
The regiment doubts that in this respect the behavior of the Cossacks toward the population can be improved.
signed: Ruckser D/II Staff Headquarters dated 28.10.1943
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors turn now to page 35 we find that this report from the Regiment was sent to the 187th Division, which, in turn, endorsed this report to higher headquarters, this being the 69th Reserve Corps. It did come, in other words, from the Regiment which issued the original copy, to the attention of the Corps. If Your Honors turn now to page 36 we find a teletype message - on page 22 of the German Document Book - we find a TWX addressed to the Fliegerfuehrer, the Air Commander, Croatia Ia, Zagreb. It says in Paragraph 1:
Heavy enemy concentrations in the villages of Potocci Vojakovci, V. Poganac (3, 5 and 14 N. Krizevci.) Sizeable food, ammunition and medical installations in V. Poganac. The population of the 3 villages supports the communist bands.
Corps requests destruction of the villages by sizeable air force operation (Stuka; the German Dive-Bomb version).
Kapela and Rakitnitci (9 N. and 12 NW of Bjelovar) main assembly places of 3 communists brigades who are seemingly preparing large scale attack on Bjelovar.
MR. RAPP: On page 37, "Corps requests strong air force operation against these villages." And that then is signed by the "Air Liaison Officer, LXIX Reserve Corps, Korth, 1st Lieutenant."
DR. FROESE: Dr. Froese for the defendant Dehner. Might I please look at the teletype which has just been read. From the German text there's no date. Also, from the original one can see when it was sent, and I can't see why it is brought forward in this connection, whether it is a teletype with an order or whether it is a fact from this period. I must object to the introduction of this.
MR. RAPP: That, as has been pointed out previously to the Tribunal, this particular document like many others, was found in Washington within the files of the various corps, division, and army headquarters we had screened for that purpose. We feel that since this particular instrument was included in these documents, not through us but by the German Army, we felt that it should be introduced as part of the record at this time.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: For the same reasons heretofore assigned by the Tribunal, and with the same limitations, the document will be received.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors turn now to page 38, which is page 23 of the German Document Book, we will have before us a rather bloody account of the excesses of the Cossacks, which were part of the 69th Special Purpose Corps, at that time under the command of Defendant Dehner, who was subordinate to General Glaise-Horstenau. That is page 38 of the English Document Book.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
MR. RAPP: It is called "Excesses of Cossacks, 20 November 1943", and the heading is subdivided in columns, which on the top from left to right read: "No," - "Facts of Case" - "Reported by" - "1st Cossack Div. requests investigation on" - and then "Action taken by 1st Cossack Division." I now cite:
"No. 1; Facts of Case: Pillaging in Divosch; Reported by: District of Vuka; 1st Cossack Div. requests investigation on: 19.10. 43 Ia; Action taken by 1st Cossack Division: 1st Cossack Division Facts of Case: Hanging of the German; Reported by: District of Vuka; 1st Cossack Div. requests investigation on: No. 1651/2458/43; Action taken by 1st Cossack Division: dated 22.10.42 number - Facts of Case: Deputy Mayor Kuhn; Reported by: No. 1246/43; 1st Cossack Div. requests investigation on: Secret and No. 1652/2459/43; Action taken by 1st Cossack Division: 1345/43 secret" and then we come to Confiscation of Cattle in Mandjelos (district Mitrovica); Reported by: Secret 14/11/43; 1st Cossack Div. request investigation on: Secret." And then we go to the right column and we find "Concerning Mayor Kuhn: care has been taken that similar incidents will not occur; concerning requisitioning of Cattle. 1st Cossack Div. Ib dated 30.10.43: issuance of pertinent orders of the day. Kuban-Mounted Regiment has been requested to report regarding confiscation of vehicles and horses." And, Your Honors, the second incident was "Confiscation of horses and mistreatment of farmers in Hrvatski Karlovci." And it was reported by the "German Plenipotentiary in Croatia Zagreb dated 23.10.43". And we find no entry for the "1st Cossack Div. requests investigation on" and no "Action taken by 1st Cossack Division." The third is "Raping of women and girls and pillaging in Oriovac (20 W. Brod.)" And there we find, "Teletype II. Croat. Corps HWs. No. 1141 dated 26.10.43." 1st Cossack Div. requests investigation on: "Teletype dated 27.10.43, Ia No. 1790/2784/43, secret. Teletype dated 30.10.43, Ia No. 1853/2936/43 secret." Action taken by 1st Cossack Division:
"Teletype 1st Cos. Div. dated 31.10. No. 1469/43 secret: The divisional court martial dispatched local court on 19.10. 8 Cossacks shot to death for looting and raping between 25th and 28th of October."
On the next page, Your Honor, page 23 of the German document book, we find entry number four, the facts where thefts and rapes in Podvinje, district of Brod, were reported by the 187th Reserve Division, and the 1st Cossack Division requested an investigation, and it says:
"Action taken by 1st Cossack Division: Investigation by Kreigsgerichtsrat Mueller of the 1st Cossack Division" -- that is Judge Advocate -- "enclosed with 1st Cossack Division Brigade," dated so and so, "secret, dated 6.11.43. Report of the investigation to 2nd Panzer Army, 1.10.11.
"5. Confiscation of horses and vehicles. Shooting to death of a 70 year old man in Sibinj on 26.10.43.
"6. Rape of 16 women and girls in Mlinci (district of Brod).
"7. Confiscation of 11 pigs in the village of Grabarje.
"8. Looting and burning of the apartment of 1st Lieutenant Bosanac in Novo Topolje (claim for damages).
"9. Confiscation of vine and brandy in Brodskl Varos on 30.10.43."
I think Your Honors have 13.10.45 in the books but it should undoubtedly be 1943.
"10. Murder and looting in Babina Greda on 26.10.43."
We find in the document pertaining to the incidents between entry number five and entry eight any action that has been taken. Also for nine.
Then paragraph ten:
"Murder and looting in Babina Greda on 26.10.43.
"11. Theft and threats in Podvinje on 7.11.43.
"12. Looting and rape in Gromacnic."
Reporting by the II Croatian Headquarters and an investigation was ordered.
"13. Looting and murder in Andrijevci (13 Cossacks shot to death)."
1st Cossack Division. Copy went to Corps Headquarters.
"14. Looting and assault in Andrijevci. Complaint of Oberfaehnrich Pindaric.