A No. These directives of service regulations already existed when I came there in August '43; while this directive is dated 30 October.
Q Now, witness, the next subordinate command was very clearly not subordinate to the military command.
A No official subordination of my command had not been ordered.
Q You said yesterday that about 70 to 80 thousand men were under your command, in your capacity as military commander southeast?
A That's right approximately.
Q Would you give orders to these troops independently without asking Army Group F first?
A I was entitled to this. It was part of my responsibility.
Q And when you did this, this was a tactical measure, was it not?
A Yes, after reporting this to the Army group.
Q Witness, you said before, you were responsible for order and peace, and that you were able to employ the troops under your command technically for your own purposes.
Would it not have been better then to say that von Weichs was Supreme Commander concerning strategical matters in the Balkans?
A That is correct.
Q You said yesterday that in the summer of '44 an order for retaliation measures was given. Do you mean by that, this directive which I would like you look at? It concerns your Honor OKW document # 172, Exhibit 379.
A No, this is not the order I quoted. The order I mean was issued on the 1st of July 1944, when the chief of the general staff was no longer Feertsch but General Winter.
But looking at this order is based on this order as well. This order of December, I cannot remember at all. It is possible that it might have been sent to my office when I was on leave in January. The only retaliation measure I know is that of July.
Q Would you look at this order again, particularly at the opening words, where it is explained that this order was issued with the approval of the Military Commander Southeast?
A Yes, I believe that is the explanation. It indicates that Neubacher was responsible for conducting the political fight in the Balkans against the communist danger, and that during discussions which we had together in Weissen Schloss with the Commander-in-chief we discussed the execution of such an order and agreed to it. But the formulation the Commander-in-chief Southeast used for these directives, I personally cannot remember and I cannot say that he is orientated about that purpose.
At that time, on the 22nd of December, Loehr acted as deputy because I was on leave. That I discussed retaliation measures with Loehr when deputying Weichs, that is not true.
Q When did the first discussion take place between Fieldmarshal von Weichs, Neubacher and you, about retaliation measures?
A It started immediately after I had arrived as stated in my diary. We had five discussions, the first days of September about these matters.
Q During this discussion, was it considered that a basic order should be issued concerning retaliation measures?
A No, in September, these matters were not considered it necessary by us, as we were both new there.
Q In other words, you wish to *y about issuing order, which I just submitted to you, you did not know anything?
A I do not remember.
Q Witness, you said that you remember an order of similar content, which you received in July?
A I know this so clearly because the officer who dealt with it, Lt. Col. Ratjen came to me and reported to me, because he wanted, to harmonize this order with that of the general staff, and we worked on it in detail because the difficulty insisted of the fact that they had to find an order which served all, and could be applied to everything that happened in the Balkans or anywhere else because of repeated retaliation measures by the Army Group.
I cannot state the cause however.
Q Could you tell us whether the No. of this order was 296/43, of the 22nd of December?
Witness, would you please look at Document NOKW 469, which bears the date 20 June '44, and where at the bottom there is a remark in which General Winters in his own handwriting, that this order 296/43, should be looked up?
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, we really submit that the Court please instruct defense counsel to give us the exhibit numbers of documents that defense counsel is referring to, if you please.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Dr. Laternser, if you will kindly follow that, it will be appreciated.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, unfortunately I am not in a position to give the number of the exhibit yet because this document NOKW 469has not been submitted to this Tribunal as yet. I am conscious of the fact, but I also know that I am entitled during cross-examination to submit to a witness any document which I have in may possession.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Very well.
Q May I ask you to look at this document, NOKW 496?
A I now see why in July, another order was issued, because the Army Group writes here to Neubacher, that the incidence in Greece, was the cause for the retaliation order of December, of which they wished to remind us. And the Army group, owing to this, ought that this old order of date and following that on the first of July, or the second or third of July a new directive was issued for the entire southeast by the army group.
I believe that is how it was connected actually on the first of July an improved order was issued.
Q What you said now, that a new order was issued, is something you presumed, is it not?
A No, I don't presume that. I knew that for sure, just because this general staff officer reported to me personally and discussed these matters with me in detail
Q. But this document, NOKW-496, shows according to General Winter's remark that this original order of the 22nd of December was to be pointed out again and used again.
A. That's right.
Q. I now have another last point. In what capacity were you in the East?
A. As Commander in Chief of XIII Corps.
Q. To whom were you subordinate at the time?
A. The Commander in Chief of the Second Army.
Q. And who was the Commander in Chief?
A That was General Field Marshal von Weichs.
Q How was the order from the Commissar treated?
A The Commissar's order -- you probably asked concerning me or concerning Weichs?
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Pardon me just a minute. We're interested in the examination and the questioning. You're overlapping a little bit. If you will both the witness and the examiner, will give the Interpreter time to make the interpretation, it will be helpful, and to the Tribunal.
A The Commissar's order arrived, as I recall, about two weeks before, and I was still subordinate to the 4th Army at the time.
Q Another question please. You received the Commissar's order from the 4th Army?
A Yes, from the 4th Army.
Q And who was the Commander in Chief of the 4th Army at the time?
A Field marshal von Kluge
Q How did you deal with the Commissar's order?
A I did not hand the Commissar order in writing, but my two division chiefs commanders were called to me. I informed them of the contents of this ordering that they should not carry out this order, That took place, and both division commanders agreed with me.
Q Concerning this Commisar's, did you discuss it with Field Marshal von Weichs?
A But I do not remember the discussion, but owing to my relations with Weichs, no doubt we discussed this subjects which touched us personally, and I can't think it could have been any different than that we fully agreed.
Q Do you know about anything further about this concerning Field Marshal von Weichs?
A I only remember that one of my division commanders at that time, General Loch, once told me, while in captivity, that he discussed this matter with Weichs once, and that Weichs informed him, he also believed it to have been an order which I didn't receive; however he based it again on the fact that Weichs took over the 4th Army. This took place about the 1st of June 1941.
Q And on what was this order to be based?
A That the Commissar's order should not be complied with.
Q I have no further questions.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Dr. Rauschenbach for the Defendant Foertsch. Witness, on the 8th of January of this year you gave an affidavit to the Prosecution, the document which Dr. Laternser has submitted to you as NOKW-611, which the Prosecution identified as Exhibit No. 440-a. On page 6 of the German version of the affidavit you said that the Higher SS and Police Chiefs often were ordered to the Army. I now ask you to what time does this refer. Does it refer to the time when General Winter, as successor of General Foertsch, was Chief of the Army Group, or does it refer also to that time when General Foertsch himself was Chief?
A In my opinion, as far as I remember the matter at the time, Foertsch was Chief.
Q In such discussions was Meissner present?
A Yes, sometimes Meissner was present during such discussions which Neubacher and I had with the Field Marshal. However, I heard from Meissner himself that he repeatedly was called to the Commander in Chief of the Army Group, without my being informed previously. What was the subject of these discussions I can not say. I can't remember either whether and what Meissner told me anything about it.
Q What was your impression about these discussions? Was there actual cooperation between Meissner and the Chief of the Army Group, or were there differences?
A No. Concerning cooperation between Foertsch and Meissner, I wish to say the opposite.
Q. And how did they show it itself?
A. By very cool methods concerning these discussions whenever I took part.
Q. Did you have the impression, therefore, that with General Foertsch and the Police Chief Meissner there were differences - tensions?
A. Whether there were tensions I can't say now. In any case I had the impression that they were not very good friends, as the rest of us.
Q. In this affidavit you also said that General Winter, the successor of defendant General Foertsch, fully cooperated with the Reichsfuehrer SS and approved of it.
A. I came to this conclusion because I know that Winter had a very long discussion with Himmler, which must have been in the summer or early autumn of 1944, about which he was very deeply impressed after returning, and the result of which we found out very soon, because suddenly the thought arose that the military administration in the occupied territories was to be taken from my command and to be transferred to the Police Chiefs and SS chiefs.
Q. And to make it quite clear, that was at the time when General Foertsch was no longer in charge?
A. Yes.
Q. From your own observations can you add anything about General Foertsch's attitude toward the Reichsfuehrer SS?
A. No, I can't say anything about that. I can't remember now.
Q. Do you remember whether there were any direct connections?
A. I don't know.
Q. Another matter. You said yesterday during your cross examination by the prosecution that the Chief of the General Staff, General Winter, was responsible for keeping the War Diary, particularly about the correctness of the contents.
A. This statement is based on my experience of many years and practice as Commander in the High Command.
Q. You did this of your own initiative?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know how it was actually done in Army Group F?
A. I don't know anything about that.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q.- I would like to ask you, before answering to wait a moment to give the interpretor a chance to translate. Witness, in the beginning of the cross-examination you were asked about conditions in the Balkans and the war there, about its peculiarities and other similar things, and you said approximately that cruelties were every day occurances but were not reported to you. In any case such was the case in Serbia. You added that until the end Serbia was a comparatively peaceful area. I don't know, witness, whether I understood your statement correctly. For days now we have heard that many thousands of retaliations were made for possible violations, that thousands and thousands of Serbs and natives, partisans and similar people were shot and hanged. Do you really want to say that this territory down there was so peaceful? It seems to me that there have been contradictions. Please state your opinion about these contradictions.
A.- I repeatedly pointed out that conditions, after we took over the command in August 1943; were considerably improved. Many attempts for retaliation measures had to be made because there were very high numbers of violations I think mostly during the years 1941 and 1942. Among us too at the beginning at least there were a number of very bad violations, even in the Serbian territory, which I want to point out as I know a lot about that. But later, already in the fall, late fall, and in winter it was considerably improved and I believe that it is mostly owing to the fact that the Mihajlovic bands from their position which they first took towards us slowly came around and tried to come to an agreement with us. That is what they decided. In that way, about the turn of the year, a great number of occasions were given for such violations. There were also, of course, in 1943 and 1944 many violations which occurred. Only I believe that the extent in the years '42-'43, at least, as it appears to me when I went down there, was very much higher.
Q.- Witness, was the conduct of warfare in the Balkans, was it similar, did it follow the laws of humanity and the laws of international law? You know that violations happened in every Army but it is important to me whether the conduct of warfare in the Balkans was about what it used to be in front of the enemies at other times or whether the violations of international law and of human laws was particularly great. Perhaps you would say something on that subject.
A.- About the warfare of the enemy, the prosecution was informed by me in the memorandum which I have explained in detail.
Q.- We cannot use that because it has not been submitted as evidence or if it is important you can tell us the contents later.
A.- My general impression about the enemy's warfare in the Balkans is that the warfare and the methods, the gangs used, was not the warfare which I came across with any other enemy I have met in any theatre of war, not even in fighting against the partisans in the winter 1941-42 in Russia. In my opinion one cannot call it warfare at all but these insidious acts which took place in the night and these violations, with their unpleasant endings, in my opinion, prove that this method of fighting, according to human rights, does not conform with it at all. The drastic acts already quoted are again proof that as a soldier, one could not possibly agree to these methods and really when visiting my troops I always had to tell them again and again to encourage these brave men who only did their duty, to stop them from taking retaliation measures which were continuous and to stop them from doing so. We generally succeeded but that occurrences occurred occasionally when one knew one's comrades were being killed I believe one cannot consider proof that the German warfare in the Balkans was not in accordance with the laws of humanity. I also talked with the Commander in Chief Southeast and we were always worried about this. It was Commander Weichs, who had exactly the same opinion at the time. I would like to think that if it had been said before that many atrocities which took place that can be accepted as true.
Q.- Witness, for several weeks now, we have heard of numerous retaliation measures and reprisal measures in this Tribunal, which the German Army and the German Commanders ordered, or rather carried out. Is it your opinion that these retaliation measures generally would have been avoided if the warfare of your enemy at the time would have kept to international law and to the laws of humanity at the time?
A.- That is natural for me.
Q.- If I may go into detail about your reply. Please tell me, if I understood you correctly, you considered the situation thus as you say, if the enemy had not done these things, then the Germans would not have had any cause to take retaliation measures and reprisal measures and similar matters. Is that right?
A.- I agree.
Q.- Witness, General Ritter von Geitner was Chief of Staff. He had a number of associates on his staff. Which position on his staff did you hold?
A.- I had the tactical staff, the tactical operations staff. You can say Operations Staff; it sounds better. It was, therefore, a general staff with the chief, Ia, Quartermaster General, and departments which a tactical staff usually requires. Apart from that I had separate administration staff which consisted of officials, Military Officials, but also of civilians of all grades and of all professions.
Q.- Chief of the Tactical Staff was the defendant Ritter von Geitner?
A.- Yes.
Q.- Did you hear von Geitner had anything to do with tho administrative staff as well as you said?
A.- Of course he was connected with it because he knew about the important matters in the administrative staff. Of course the chief of time administrative staff in no manner wanted to be subordinate to the Chief of Staff and it was difficult for him to achieve it.
The first deputy, occasionally came to us and this shows that Geitner had actually could not interfere in the administrative staff.
Q.- Was the Chief of the Administrative staff in Ordnance, that is the staff who had to do with administration matters, was he subordinate to the Chief of the Tactical Staff, Herr von Geitner?
A.- No, I tried but could not achieve it.
Q.- Is it right when I come to the conclusion that officially, according to orders, the defendant von Geitner had nothing to do with the matters of the administrative staff, as you said, he might have been interested in order to be informed, but on the other hand to see what went on but I want to know whether he officially or unofficially acted as superior, Had he anything to do with the matters of general administration staff?
A.- No, it was definitely denied by the Chief of the Administrative Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I take it you will not be able to complete your cross examination this afternoon?
DR. SAUTER: No, I don't think so.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 0930 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal will recess until 0930 o'clock tomorrow morning.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 13 August 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal 5. Military Tribunal 5 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will ascertain as to whether all the defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge George J. Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
HANS GUSTAV FELBER - Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, at the end of yesterday's session we stopped around the description that you gave us about your co-workers you had in your staff, and you told us that you had two staffs, one administrative staff and one so-called tactical staff or command staff, and you further reported that the chief of the tactical staff was General Ritter von Geitner. Further, you explained to us that Ritter von Geitner did not really have anything to do with matters of the administrative staff but, as a matter of course, he was informed about the activities of the administrative staff. He had to keep himself posted on these matters in order to make sure that his department worked in a uniform manner. Now, we shall continue at this point. The defendant von Geitner, according to you, then was chief of your tactical staff. When you were not present, let us say, for instance, you were on leave or you were home, who was then your deputy?
A. That was decided from case to case and especially ordered.
Generally speaking, it would be the senior general of my command area. It might have been General Geip or at another time it was General von Geibel.
Q. This deputy then, who was appointed in cases where you were prevented, according to my knowledge, had jurisdiction too, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. I beg your pardon?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. What function according to the conception of the General Staff did your chief of staff, General von Geitner, have as chief of the tactical staff? What I mean, witness - I'm asking you to answer to the effect of the executive powers, if any, the chief of your tactical staff had and which orders he had.
A. The position of the chief of the general staff of a higher command post, he was the first advisor of his military commander. He had no executive functions with respect to tactical orders. That is, he could not issue them on his own account. Furthermore, he had no authority over admonishments or other objections to anything in connection with the work of the troops. With legal matters he had nothing to do at all. His duty was clearly established in a special instruction which generally was called among army people as the "Red Scapegoat".
Q. That, of course, is a joking expression, isn't it? But the official title was Manual for the Service of the General Staff in Wartime, and that was the Army Service Manual G-92. In this Manual for the Service of the General Staff in Wartime the duties and authority of the chief of the general staff are clearly defined. Your Honors, in my case in chief for the defendant Geitner I shall submit as evidence this official instruction. Witness, now yesterday we were informed about a document No. NOKW-1731. That is Exhibit No. 440-a-1. I repeat, 440-a-1. That is your affidavit of the 9th of February 1947. And in this document you designated von Geitner as your deputy. Now, just previously you told us that your deputy was nominated for the time of your absence from case to case.
That is, always the senior officer of your sphere of command. Can you explain to us why, in spite of this fact which you mentioned just now, you designated Geitner as your deputy in your affidavit, or whether your former statement that he was your deputy -- are you going to correct this statement about it? Just a minute, I believe the prosecutor would like to say something.
MR. RAPP: If I may make this interruption, the document referred to by this defense counsel has not been offered as an exhibit, as stated by the defense counsel, but it was merely marked for identification only.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I believe the Tribunal understands that.
DR. SAUTER: That is correct. I only named the number which the prosecution gave this document in order that the Tribunal knows what document I'm referring to. Witness, did you get the question clearly and do you remember it?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Then I ask you to make your comments, whether there is a discrepancy, whether you would like to change your statement, or what attitude you have to these questions.
A. One must make a difference between a deputy in command for a lengthy period, let us say at least a few days, and a deputizing in current affairs when, for instance, the commander in chief and his chief are physically separated, which can happen, for instance, and did happen when I went for two or three days to visit the troops in a band area. In that case no special general was nominated as deputy, but in that case the chief of the general staff looked after my affairs as deputy for me -- that is, after the current affairs. But even then, in such a case he was not authorized, according to Manual, to issue orders of a tactical nature without my knowledge. I believe, therefore, that the expression deputy, as it is put down in the document mentioned, would apply to this case.
Q. As far as I know, witness, even in this very temporary prevention of the military commander the chief of staff was only allowed to deal with such matters which were very urgent and could not possibly he delayed, which had to he dealt with immediately. And then only under the condition that the military commander could not he got in touch with. Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q That is shown from the Service Regulation for the General Staff, which I shall later submit as evidence. If now, you, as military commander, were absent for a short period so that a real deputy in the person of the next higher troop commander was not appointed -- in that case could your chief of staff deal with all matters, or even in this temporary case were there some exceptions as to certain functions of your which the chief of staff could not deal with?
A In such a case he was, for instance, not allowed to deal with judicial and court matters nor with tactical orders. For instance, referring to the deployment of the troops, he was not allowed to deal with it. Only in a desperately urgent case was he, and then he had to carry the responsibility for his orders. But may I add that in practice of war it happened that other ways and means had to be employed. In those cases it was a question of military agreement between the two persons concerned so that the chief could judge whether his commander would be willing to subscribe to an order which he might have issued, maybe merely as a formal order. According to the regulations he might not have been allowed to issue it, but if he had to issue it he would have to make sure that his commander would agree with it.
Q Witness, you said before that even in such a very temporary prevention of the commander judicial matters were excluded, that is, everything concerning legal matters. I suppose that was because the chief of staff was not allowed to be in charge of the courts. Is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q Then, you talked about the tactical decisions and other matters which were excluded, which basically the chief of staff was not allowed to decide on, even if in temporary cases he had to deputize in a certain sense to the military commander.
A I could think of decisions about persons -- personnel decisions.
Q I am not thinking about personnel decisions. I am thinking about something else which is concerned more with the matters at hand here.
A May I please have a hint as to what you are referring to?
Q Yesterday you talked about executive authority, and I'm asking you now whether your chief of staff as such, on the basis of your general position as chief of the tactical staff, authorized to deputize for you in any matters concerning executive powers.
A I would like to qualify this with the following. Generally speaking, he was not allowed to do it.
Q Generally speaking he was not allowed to do it?
A But I could think of one case or another where things had to be hurried. In those cases the chief, just as I described matters in the tactical sphere before, had to deal independently on matters of a territorial character and could have occasionally made a decision.
Q Now, Witness, how did that -- I am talking about the relationship between General Felber and Chief of Staff von Geitner -- how did that appear in practice? What I mean is, if you were absent from Serbia for a longer period, there would be a deputy appointed for you in any case. That is, in the person of another commander. If you were absent for a very short period, for instance, if you had to go across country for a couple of days, wasn't, in those cases von Geitner completely independent, or did you yourself have a telephone connection with him daily -- say once or twice with your chief of staff, in order to get reports from him, in order to give him orders and things like that? How did that actually work in practice?
A It was handled in the way which you last mentioned. That is, a procedure which was usual with all troops in status of war. It happened thus that sometime during the day we had telephonic connections and discussed the very important matters at hand.
Q So that, if I may draw a conclusion from your statement, if ever was the case that Geitner was in any very important matters in a position to issue an order without having had a chance to talk to you and to ask for your consent.
Is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q That is correct then about the competency of the chief of staff -- what I'm interested in, Witness, is the following: Was the Higher SS and Police Leader subordinate to this Higher SS and Police Leader which has been discussed here several times? Was he subordinate to the chief of the tactical staff or who else was he subordinate to?
A The most rather difficult personality of this particular kind would never had been willing to be subordinate to a chief of staff. They found it very difficult already to find themselves subordinate to a commander in chief, that is, a subordination of Meisner under the chief of the General Staff was quite out of the question.
Q Who was Meisner subordinate to then?
A He was only subordinate to me and apart from me nobody. Nobody except to Himmler, that is, Reich Fuehrer SS Himmler.
Q Witness, I would now like to come to the chapter of retaliation measures. If today you look back on those things and make a picture for yourself of things that happened then, if you think of the numerous discussions which you had about these matters with your chief of staff Von Geitner, can you then, quite generally speaking, say that Herr von Geitner was a trouble maker? That he was a ruthless person? That he was insistent that things be handled ruthlessly? Or can you say just the opposite, that Geitner would reject such collective reprisal measures on his own, and that he tried to smooth them down? What could you say?
A General von Geitner did not have anything to do really with reprisal measures, for this order were given by me and were regarded by me as a more judicial measure and, of course, I discussed these matters with him currently and in more extensive and important cases I discussed them with him in a very detailed manner. On these occasions I could only find out that he had a completely sensible and very legal and judicial basis in these rather difficult questions. To talk about trouble-making, I could at no time notice anything of that kind, but according to my personal experiences of his personality and character this would be not too nice.