Q At these discussions which you had with Herr von Geitner, I believe daily, and where these chapters were discussed too, although really they did not belong under the authority and jurisdiction of Herr von Geitner, allegedly Geitner had repeatedly shown the following attitude to you. He had the principle that one should establish a winning administration -- an administration that wins the love of the population -- that is, an administration which helps to win the indigenous population and gives them a good impression of the occupation power. Is that correct?
A That is quite within the line of the relations which were established yesterday of the very happy military combination of the two of us.
Q Allegedly that is supposed to have been that he had jokingly told repeatedly, "You von Geitner, you are almost half a Serb." Can you remember these joking remarks?
A That is possible, but I cannot say that for sure today.
Q According to what you told us yesterday we assume that the SS and Higher Police Leader Meisner had a considerably more ruthless tendency. Is that correct?
A Yes, that can be definitely said.
Q Is it now correct that von Geitner, even in his very first report which he submitted to you after you arrived in Serbia, in order to inform you -- were you told already about Meisner and his ruthless attitude? Can you remember that?
A That's completely correct.
Q He allegedly said that Meissner should not be allowed to influence anybody and he behaved like a hooligan.
A This is quite possible. I cannot remember it for sure now.
Q Is it correct, according to your own experiences, that the defendant von Geitner expressed his attitude which rejected these matters, expressed his attitude personally too SS and Police Leader Meissner, and that you yourself found out that Meissner asked, subsequently, when he had to make any request or demand or wanted to give any order -he would so over Geitner's head and dealt directly with you or with another staff commander? That is, according to your own experiences?
A It is correct that Meissner never visited the Chief of the General Staff prior to a discussion with me, and I remember quite well that the personal relations between the two, especially from Geitner to Meissner, were rather tense.
Q At this initial report which you received after your arrival in Belgrade and which was submitted to you by von Geitner and at the occasion of which he informed you of the way in which Bader had handled matters in the Balkans, on this occasion he is supposed -- von Geitner is supposed to have explained to you that he was happy that he, Geitner, was glad that he had basically nothing to do with retaliation measures. And the conception that your predecessor, General Bader, had also dealt with these measures personally and had always ordered them himself, and he had never had anything to do with them and he was glad that he was rid of this pressure because he for his part had always rejected these measures. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct. And the conception that also my predecessor made all the decisions independently and alone I have to take it that that is completely correct.
Q You said, witness, these retaliation measures were mainly according to your feeling. You regarded them and dealt with them in your capacity as a -- within your legal jurisdiction. Is that correct?
A That is completely correct.
Q Now you said also and you talked about the executive powers and it has crystallized from your statements yesterday that you had executive powers even earlier than you recollect now. Today, witness, are you aware of the fact that also your predecessor, General Bader, too had already executive powers and that he exercised those executive powers?
A No, I have to assume that.
Q So now you have to assume it, so it follows, your Honors, this is also seen from a service regulation which has already been submitted by the prosecution and which I shall submit again in my case in chief for Geitner, also in connection with the Serbian area.
Witness, we have during the last days talked repeatedly about executive powers and you have told us, I believe it was yesterday, you had executive powers in order to be able to maintain law, order and security in the occupied countries?
A Yes, that is the idea of executive powers.
Q Can you now tell us because maybe that is a conception which is not quite clear to the Honorable Judges here, what executive power really is? Or to put it a little more clearly what function does a man have who has executive powers?
AAs far as I can remember the service regulations today, executive power includes first of all the maintenance of law, order and security and for this purpose executive powers are given to the Commander concerned and he should be allowed to exercise all means necessary in order to maintain law and order in the occupied countries.
For this purpose, he has at his disposal all troops subordinate to him.
Q Witness, this definition is a little too general. I would like to read to you a definition which is contained in a service regulation, and at the end of this I want you to tell me whether you can agree to this definition, either generally speaking, or whether you can say that it applies to conditions in Serbia as you knew them. It reads, then:
"Executive power is the right to issue orders and laws in an occupied territory by the commander of the occupying forces under exclusion of the up-to-then valid indigenous authorities. Executive power includes simultaneously the right of the commander to nominate officials and judges of the civil population or to dismiss them."
Witness, so far the definition which I found in a service regulation, I read it to you because it is quite difficult to formulate anything like that right off the bat. Would you in your personal opinion say that this definition applied to Serbian conditions and to your particular case inasmuch as you, as not a legal person, can understand these difficult questions? That is, the right to give orders, issue orders and laws in the occupied territory by the person who has the occupation power and exclusion of the indigenous authorities with the right to nominate and dismiss judges and officials of the indigenous government. Is that correct?
A Yes, in the main, that is correct. That is the same as what I said rather generally -- to issue law and order.
Q This definition which I read is consented to you, generally speaking?
A Yes indeed.
Q And new subsequent to this question with particular reference to von Geitner, did the Chief of Staff in his capacity as chief of staff -- did he have anything to do with executive powers or is it right that executive powers were purely a matter of the Commander-in-Chief? That is, the Commander-in-Chief who simultaneously was supreme judicial authority?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, we object to this type of questioning. I believe the defense counsel has gone way beyond what could generally be called as leading the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: This is cross-examination, however, and while counsel has taken the liberty of covering rather broad territory, I think he may proceed.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, I thought it was suitable and serves a purpose to clarify this question, because the concept of executive power will turn up again and again in the course of the further proceedings, and therefore it is difficult for everybody who has not in the course of his occupation to do with these things. It is very difficult to get a clear picture of first of all what is executive power, and -
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think we have a fairly accurate idea of it at this time.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, you said that von Geitner had nothing to do with executive powers. Who then dealt with reprisal measures within your staff?
Witness, I don't want to know the name, but I want to know his official designation, whether he was Ia, Ic.
A This was an ordnance officer, member of the Department Ia who apart from other things had the task to collect all these cases, to compile them, and to submit them to me, and he did that in the following manner. He did not previously go to his superior general staff officer -- that was the first general staff officer, neither to the chief, but as an exception, he came directly to me.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. That was not Geitner?
A. No.
Q. Witness, you told us that the daily reports--I am talking about daily reports--which were sent off daily, had to be prior to being sent off or submitted to you--these daily reports were initialed by von Geitner?
A. He either initialed them or he was present when these compiled reports were submitted to me.
Q. Who signed them?
A. Generally speaking, they went under the signature Chief of the General Staff. However, I found it sufficient to put my seal on the daily reports which had been approved by me.
Q. Is it correct that, I believe it was during your time, a special order arrived which for some unknown reason expressly ordered that such dally reports from a certain date had to be signed by the Chief of Staff or to at least be initialed by the Chief of Staff? That was supposedly a special instruction.
A. It was a general custom in the whole German Army that a Chief of Staff compiled, initialed or signed the daily reports, and according to how the Supreme Commander wished it, showed them to him previously, either previously or as it usually happened in practice afterwards. Therefore, there was really no need for this special instruction which I do not recollect either.
Q. Witness, what meaning in your opinion has the signing of initialing of daily reports by the Chief of Staff? I will put the question even more concretely. What responsibility of the Chief of Staff was expressed by the fact that he had to sign or initial these reports?
A. He took over all this, the complete responsibility for the contents of the reports.
Q. What do you mean by he took over complete responsibility for the contents?
A. I cannot think of any other purpose of his having to sign and initial reports.
Q. If in the daily reports, reprisal measures were mentioned which had been carried out on the previous day and the Chief of Staff signed this daily report, what responsibility could he then take over?
A. He carried the responsibility of the honest and clear report to a superior command.
Q. In other words, then, the responsibility he had was that the report which he initialed or signed was in compliance and agreement with the reports which he himself received, that he was responsible for the correctness of the report, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. He was not liable therefore for the reprisal measures but he was merely responsible for the correctness of the reports?
A. That is right, only for the correctness of the reports.
Q. There is no doubt about that, is there?
A. No.
Q. Witness, you did at one time talk about mock executions. Can you remember that? What did you understand by mock executions? What did you understand today under mock executions?
A. The day before yesterday I believe I mentioned and described these mock executions and tried to explain their purpose. These mock executions, if I may repeat that, had the purpose to give outsiders--that is to the Serbian population--the impression that for one case of a retaliation, reprisal which had been threatened to the population by a local headquarters - for instance, for a case that perpetrators of an attack did not report up to a certain fixed date-that in that case the measures which were well known to the population and I think were also feared by them, these reprisal measures would be carried out.
If nothing had happened, than probably quite soon it would have happened and it could have been expected that there would be excesses of surprise attacks, murders, etc. and they would have grown to an extent which in order to secure law and order would have caused us to more ruthless, considerably more ruthless measures.
Therefore, at least externally, the headquarters had to announce to the population that four or five or what other figure might have been a case, four or five hostages would be shot, on announcement which actually was not executed. I thought that these mock reprisal measures would further save human lives to an extent which otherwise would have been impossible for me, if I had approved and carried out the reprisal measures as it had been requested.
Q. If I understand you correctly, witness, mock executions were not carried out, not even just as a fake, out if I understand you correctly you are trying to say mock executions consisted in practice in the following: Posters or announcements in newspapers one day or the other, proclaiming to the population that certain reprisal measure had been carried out, in spite of the fact that actually these reprisal measures had not been carried out. Did I understand you correctly then?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Yes, And the purpose again, if I understood you correctly was that to frighten the population so as to prevent them from participating in sabotage, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, if it known to you that due to the emergency situation in which you and your co-workers found yourselves, that such false reports were sent to higher headquarters with respect to reprisal measures--that is, false reports inasmuch at it was reported to higher headquarters that certain reprisal measures had been carried out, whereas actually they had not been carried out.
A. I myself cannot recollect such a case but I do think it is quite possible that such--well shall we say such a pacifying report to higher headquarters was made.
Q. And what would you say was the reason for that?
A. I already took the liberty yesterday to point out that we were very sharply controlled on the part of the SS political people and that the other side, I am sure, thought that we were exaggeratedly soft and that they would have immediately reported anything like that to Himmler.
Q. Further, is it correct, witness, that for similar reasons you or your staff repeatedly did not report surprise attacks and sabotage action although they had occurred and for that reason that not in a manner which was thought exaggerated by you, reprisal measures were ordered, talked about.
A. Today I cannot recall a specific case after such a long time, but I think it would be quite within the lines of our general conception and I think it is quite possible that it happened.
Q. Witness, in one of your affidavits at one time you talked about the executions of hostages at mopping up operations?
A. I could not understand the last word.
Mopping up operations?
Q. Yes, I am talking about mopping up operations of the troop. Therefore, I would like to ask, did the troop on the occasion of mopping up operation--did the troop carry out executions of hostages?
A. I cannot recollect a case of this nature but it may be possible and there again I have to point to the Bulgarian units that occasionally a spontaneous excess might have happened.
Q. A spontaneous excess? That would be on the part of the troop without any underlying order by you of by another responsible department, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Witness, another question. In December 1943 you vent on furlough to Germany. I think you went to Dresden?
A. Yes, I went to Dresden.
Q. All I am interested in is this: Is it correct that at that time also your Chief of Staff, von Geitner, went on furlough at the same time, that is, a furlough which had not been booked and that then you extended it, Geitner's leave, when you were in Dresden, for a few days. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is right. I had to force Geitner to go on furlough because he would not, on his own accord, have gone and I thought it was necessary that he get a good rest.
Q. Witness, did it occur that reprisal orders as far as you were informed were made and signed by Geitner?
A. Such a signature on a reprisal order I cannot think of.
Q. I have here in front of me a document which is in Document Book X, German page 11, Exhibit 246. This document has been submitted by the prosecution; it has the date of the 5th of November 1943 but obviously should mean the 5th of January 1943. I think that must have been a typographical error when the document was copied. "The Commanding General and Supreme Commander in Serbia" -- it says here -- "Subject: Reprisal Measures." Then it reads: "To Administrative Headquarters 809. The Deputy Commanding General, Major General Tuppe, approved the application of the district headquarters Leskovac of 29 September 1942 to shoot to death 35 hostages." Then the details of the order are mentioned and then comes the signature: "For the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Chief of General Staff," signature "von Geitner". Witness, I am submitting to you a copy of this document. Please look at this order and then tell the Court what conclusions you draw from this order -- as you have it before you -- in respect to the responsibility of the defendant von Geitner.
A. This concerns an order which is doubtless of January 1943. That is before my time. The form of the order seems to me a little unusual because on top it reads, "The Deputy Commanding General has approved."
That means he has ordered the reprisal measures and then details are mentioned which would have been really a matter of this reprisal order of the Commanding General. What the cause of this was, to put up an order in this particular form, I cannot explain.
Q. Witness, do you assume in agreement with me that this order which at a quick glance looks a little unusual to you, that the reason for this unusual form may well be that your deputy - let's say the deputy of your predecessors - was not present at the time when the order was given and could, therefore, not sign the order himself at the time when the order want out.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, we submit that this Court is not interested in the opinion of counsel to ask whether or not the defendant agrees with him. We respectfully submit, Your Honor, that the witness should be questioned about these things.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The objection is sustained.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, you should therefore not answer the question since it concerns my own opinion, but you are supposed to answer the question completely according to your own opinion. What explanation can you give for the fact that the Commanding General did not sign the reprisal order himself, but the Chief of Staff himself?
A. It might well have been that such a decision was given to the Chief over the telephone in the absence of the Commanding General and also that these individual instructions for the individual hostages were given because the Commanding General, who was absent, could not possibly know how these individual cases were to be treated in detail; that was a matter of the competent officer who worked on these reprisal measures, as I already mentioned. In any case, the form, the official form, as it is expressed in this particular order, is unusual.
Q. How would you, as Chief of Staff, have formulated this order if you consider this unusual?
A. I would have asked my commanding general to give clear instructions as to the individual cases and then I would have informed the troop of his order. This order does not show clearly whether it was meant this way.
Q. According to the customs which are usual in the German Army, can one arrive at the opinion that was expressed in this communication was an order of the Chief of Staff or the receiving department - would that department see clearly that it concerned an order of the Deputy Commanding General while the Chief of Staff, with his signature, merely approved it in the usual official channel, the order of his Deputy Commanding General.
A. I assume that it was meant this way, in this case; that it was merely literally an unhappey formulation which says: it is therefore ordered and signed von Geitner. It would have been clearer if it had said, "The Commanding General has ordered," if "it has been ordered," and according to this formulation it might have been Geitner as well as the Commanding General.
Q. By chance I have here a second order from the same time period again signed by the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia and Chief of the General Staff von Geitner. This is an order of the 6th of January 1943. This again is subject: "Reprisal Measures". Again: "To Administrative Sub Headquarters 809", and this reads:
"The Deputy Commanding General, Major General Tuppe, has ordered--" and then come the individual instructions. This is Document NOKW-973which document has been submitted as an exhibit.
A. In my opinion this second order has the right official form because it shows quite clearly that the Deputy Commanding General had ordered. Now, it says, or it gives, his decision, which is merely passed on by the Chief of Staff to the local headquarters through official channels because I suppose the Commanding General was not present at the time.
Q. Now, witness, you look at the second order and now compare the first order with it.
Do you, in this, find a confirmation of the fact that the first order which I gave to you was meant in the same way as the second order which was dated one day later? That is merely passing on an order of the Commanding General through official channels.
A. That is quite my opinion. Anyway, the Chief of the General Staff would never volunteer to decide or to order a reprisal measure on his own account.
Q I have one last question to put to you, witness. In the course of these proceedings the question arose, what is the meaning of the formulation which occurs in several documents "signed in draft"? On the 34 of July we received an explanation for this which is my opinion was not quite clear. What can you, on the basis of your own knowledge of the condition, tell us; what should be expressed if under an official document of this nature we find the words, "signed in draft"?
A The explanation for this can be formulated thus. It happened frequently that a decision was submitted by the chief to his commanding general and was obtained and that the commanding general had full knowledge of the document, that is, not on the basis of an oral report but the Commanding General had full knowledge of this report but that for some reason he did, for some reasons of time, or other reasons, could not wait for the official completed version because he had other tasks outside of the headquarters. Therefore, if he signed it in draft, the contents are completely approved by the responsible superior officer.
Q Was it established then that the form of the document as submitted was in agreement with the wishes of the Commander that he approved it and that the person who added the words, "signed in draft" merely wished to express that the formulation and presentation would be exactly the same as it complied with the wishes of the Commander and the orders as issued, not the officer who then certified the document was liable for the contents of the order, but he did certify for the wishes of the Commanding General?
A Yes.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Do you have any objection, Mr. Rapp.
MR. RAPP: We will withdraw any objection we were preparing to make.
DR. SAUTER: No further questions.
BY DR. WEISGERBER (Attorney for the defendant General Speidel):
Q General, in your memorandum which has been quoted here several times dated on the 15 of June 1948, that is, the document NOKW 1735which was not submitted as an exhibit by the Prosecution, in this document we find the following sentence: "The Military Commander Greece was a torso" I would like to ask you for a short explanation of the reasons for this conception.
AAccording to my impressions which I gained quite soon after my arrival in Belgrade, and after a very impressive report of the Commander of Greece, who was General Speidel at that time, I had gained the impression that with a great name and nicely formulated written tasks one wanted to exaggerate something which in reality was hardly suitable to live. I completely understood at that time that General Speidel requested of me to affix my attitude to the facts that he quite soon or he would approach me with an application for resignation because he was not willing to take over the responsibility for matters for the achievement of which he did not have the means at his disposal. He even, as far as I remember, compiled these files in Belgrade maybe - I don't remember- I do remember in any case that he submitted to me a lengthy document which expressed these things very clearly. I, on my part, then tried to calm him down and told him that after such a short period I could not survey matters sufficiently in order to put myself out for him and according to his ideas and I achieved that he took back his resignation and let a certain period lapse in the hope that matters would change. He let a certain period lapse in the hope that matters would change. His most important point of objection as far as I remember today dealt with the feeling of complete dependence, in this field work, which he had, that is, the territory administration of the country, or, as we have quoted here now, executive powers. The most important prerequisite for this work, that is a sufficiently large troop, was not at his disposal. He further complained, even at that time, about a strong endeavor of the tactical departments; especially of army Group E, to interfere with his functions, and this complaint did not cease during the whole time of his presence in Greece.
I believe in Spring 1944 matters came to a head and at first, as far as I remember, he was subordinate to Army Group E, merely for administrative matters, for operational matters he was in any case thus subordinated, and finally his full subordination in everything that was ordered to Army Group E.
Q When did that happen?
A I cannot name here the exact date but I believe that that happened after Speidel left because the battle which the Army Group F waged for the complete subordination of all military commanders, that is my own department too, that battle was already waged since the end of 1943 and the OKW for some reasons which I cannot survey and did not know delayed matters until finally, for me, on the first of September 1944 the complete subordination was ordered but it is possible that the subordination of the Military Commander Greece under Army Group E is prior to that date.
Q It was thus that military tactical tasks for the Military Commander Greece could not be carried out because of the lack of troops which were necessary for these tasks and therefore such tasks were not even put to him. Is that correct?
A In general outlines this conception is correct.
Q The crucial point of the task is, therefore, purely in the administrative sphere?
AAnd possibly in the political sphere, that is to keep on good terms with the Greek government but the responsibility for administrative matters in that respect is again to be limited because it is important here that the German Ambassador, Neubacher, in the Southeast area, be an intermediary.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point we will take a recess.
(a recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Weisgerber.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q Witness, yesterday you said that the High SS and Police Leader Greece, to the Military Commander in Greece was subordinate in the same way as the Serbian Command in Serbia in the SS was with the SS Gruppenfuehrer Meissner.
A Yes, that is what I said.
Q You were on quite good terms with SS Gruppenfuehrer Meissner, you said?
A No, I must make a certain limitation to that. From a purely military sphere he was always ready to help me if I needed it from his troops and he always placed them at my disposal but on the other spheres we had considerable tensions.
Q Now, do you know something about the relation between General Speidel and his High SS and Police Leader, General Schimana?
A The relations between Speidel and Schimana I cannot remember exactly. I only know that his successor, General Scheuerlen expressed very clearly the great difficulties which Schimana made for him, but I can remember one incident which also happened in Speidel's time where one day the Chief of General Speidel came to us in Belgrade and protested that Schimana, in the absence of his Commander, when the Chief asked him to come to a conference in the Headquarters, Schimana refused. With a Chief of Staff he had nothing to do. From this I would like to see the proof that the relations were so between Speidel and Schimana, and his staff was full of considerable tension because -- nevertheless this attitude -- this conduct, after all, this was war -- was very remarkable.
Q The Tendency for.....
the greatest possible independence; wasn't this characteristically for the Higher SS and Police leader?
A. As I stated in ay memorandum that was the same everywhere.
Q. The prosecution, in the course of their submissions submitted a number of daily reports from the Military Commander to your office, the Military Commander Southeast, from these daily reports one learns about shootings at Communists and DM followers or reports about reprisal measures, etc.
I now assume that the prosecution shows the responsibility of the Chief, or the Commander, of the office surely sends out these reports, the responsibility for the measures contained in these reports--and now I would like to clarify this complex. I think I could do this more simply by presenting you with a report which I just pick out at random.
This is Document NOKW-670, Prosecution Exhibit No.437, document book 18, page 43 of the English, page 50 of the German. I would like you to take a look at the bottom of this page and the next page of this report. This is the daily'report, the morning report, of the military Commander in Greece from the 15th of March 1944. I would like you also to look at the next page to this.
I would like to ask you three questions which I will ask you one after the other and then I would like you to give your answer to these three questions.
First of all, what was the purpose of these reports? Secondly, how did they originate; and, thirdly, what conclusions can be drawn from those reports what the responsibility of the Commander was with regard to that responsibility of the leader of the Office which sent them?
A The purpose of this report was to inform about the current events in the sphere of work in the offices concerned. It can be seen here that they are only directed to the superior office that is the military Commander Southeast and, at the same time, I would like to make this limitation to Department Ic and, at the same time, to Army Group E Salonika, again to Department Ic. The responsibility for the retaliation measure which had been carried out was borne by the Military Commander in Greece who carried out the executive powers there.