Mopping up operations?
Q. Yes, I am talking about mopping up operations of the troop. Therefore, I would like to ask, did the troop on the occasion of mopping up operation--did the troop carry out executions of hostages?
A. I cannot recollect a case of this nature but it may be possible and there again I have to point to the Bulgarian units that occasionally a spontaneous excess might have happened.
Q. A spontaneous excess? That would be on the part of the troop without any underlying order by you of by another responsible department, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Witness, another question. In December 1943 you vent on furlough to Germany. I think you went to Dresden?
A. Yes, I went to Dresden.
Q. All I am interested in is this: Is it correct that at that time also your Chief of Staff, von Geitner, went on furlough at the same time, that is, a furlough which had not been booked and that then you extended it, Geitner's leave, when you were in Dresden, for a few days. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is right. I had to force Geitner to go on furlough because he would not, on his own accord, have gone and I thought it was necessary that he get a good rest.
Q. Witness, did it occur that reprisal orders as far as you were informed were made and signed by Geitner?
A. Such a signature on a reprisal order I cannot think of.
Q. I have here in front of me a document which is in Document Book X, German page 11, Exhibit 246. This document has been submitted by the prosecution; it has the date of the 5th of November 1943 but obviously should mean the 5th of January 1943. I think that must have been a typographical error when the document was copied. "The Commanding General and Supreme Commander in Serbia" -- it says here -- "Subject: Reprisal Measures." Then it reads: "To Administrative Headquarters 809. The Deputy Commanding General, Major General Tuppe, approved the application of the district headquarters Leskovac of 29 September 1942 to shoot to death 35 hostages." Then the details of the order are mentioned and then comes the signature: "For the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Chief of General Staff," signature "von Geitner". Witness, I am submitting to you a copy of this document. Please look at this order and then tell the Court what conclusions you draw from this order -- as you have it before you -- in respect to the responsibility of the defendant von Geitner.
A. This concerns an order which is doubtless of January 1943. That is before my time. The form of the order seems to me a little unusual because on top it reads, "The Deputy Commanding General has approved."
That means he has ordered the reprisal measures and then details are mentioned which would have been really a matter of this reprisal order of the Commanding General. What the cause of this was, to put up an order in this particular form, I cannot explain.
Q. Witness, do you assume in agreement with me that this order which at a quick glance looks a little unusual to you, that the reason for this unusual form may well be that your deputy - let's say the deputy of your predecessors - was not present at the time when the order was given and could, therefore, not sign the order himself at the time when the order want out.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, we submit that this Court is not interested in the opinion of counsel to ask whether or not the defendant agrees with him. We respectfully submit, Your Honor, that the witness should be questioned about these things.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The objection is sustained.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, you should therefore not answer the question since it concerns my own opinion, but you are supposed to answer the question completely according to your own opinion. What explanation can you give for the fact that the Commanding General did not sign the reprisal order himself, but the Chief of Staff himself?
A. It might well have been that such a decision was given to the Chief over the telephone in the absence of the Commanding General and also that these individual instructions for the individual hostages were given because the Commanding General, who was absent, could not possibly know how these individual cases were to be treated in detail; that was a matter of the competent officer who worked on these reprisal measures, as I already mentioned. In any case, the form, the official form, as it is expressed in this particular order, is unusual.
Q. How would you, as Chief of Staff, have formulated this order if you consider this unusual?
A. I would have asked my commanding general to give clear instructions as to the individual cases and then I would have informed the troop of his order. This order does not show clearly whether it was meant this way.
Q. According to the customs which are usual in the German Army, can one arrive at the opinion that was expressed in this communication was an order of the Chief of Staff or the receiving department - would that department see clearly that it concerned an order of the Deputy Commanding General while the Chief of Staff, with his signature, merely approved it in the usual official channel, the order of his Deputy Commanding General.
A. I assume that it was meant this way, in this case; that it was merely literally an unhappey formulation which says: it is therefore ordered and signed von Geitner. It would have been clearer if it had said, "The Commanding General has ordered," if "it has been ordered," and according to this formulation it might have been Geitner as well as the Commanding General.
Q. By chance I have here a second order from the same time period again signed by the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia and Chief of the General Staff von Geitner. This is an order of the 6th of January 1943. This again is subject: "Reprisal Measures". Again: "To Administrative Sub Headquarters 809", and this reads:
"The Deputy Commanding General, Major General Tuppe, has ordered--" and then come the individual instructions. This is Document NOKW-973which document has been submitted as an exhibit.
A. In my opinion this second order has the right official form because it shows quite clearly that the Deputy Commanding General had ordered. Now, it says, or it gives, his decision, which is merely passed on by the Chief of Staff to the local headquarters through official channels because I suppose the Commanding General was not present at the time.
Q. Now, witness, you look at the second order and now compare the first order with it.
Do you, in this, find a confirmation of the fact that the first order which I gave to you was meant in the same way as the second order which was dated one day later? That is merely passing on an order of the Commanding General through official channels.
A. That is quite my opinion. Anyway, the Chief of the General Staff would never volunteer to decide or to order a reprisal measure on his own account.
Q I have one last question to put to you, witness. In the course of these proceedings the question arose, what is the meaning of the formulation which occurs in several documents "signed in draft"? On the 34 of July we received an explanation for this which is my opinion was not quite clear. What can you, on the basis of your own knowledge of the condition, tell us; what should be expressed if under an official document of this nature we find the words, "signed in draft"?
A The explanation for this can be formulated thus. It happened frequently that a decision was submitted by the chief to his commanding general and was obtained and that the commanding general had full knowledge of the document, that is, not on the basis of an oral report but the Commanding General had full knowledge of this report but that for some reason he did, for some reasons of time, or other reasons, could not wait for the official completed version because he had other tasks outside of the headquarters. Therefore, if he signed it in draft, the contents are completely approved by the responsible superior officer.
Q Was it established then that the form of the document as submitted was in agreement with the wishes of the Commander that he approved it and that the person who added the words, "signed in draft" merely wished to express that the formulation and presentation would be exactly the same as it complied with the wishes of the Commander and the orders as issued, not the officer who then certified the document was liable for the contents of the order, but he did certify for the wishes of the Commanding General?
A Yes.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Do you have any objection, Mr. Rapp.
MR. RAPP: We will withdraw any objection we were preparing to make.
DR. SAUTER: No further questions.
BY DR. WEISGERBER (Attorney for the defendant General Speidel):
Q General, in your memorandum which has been quoted here several times dated on the 15 of June 1948, that is, the document NOKW 1735which was not submitted as an exhibit by the Prosecution, in this document we find the following sentence: "The Military Commander Greece was a torso" I would like to ask you for a short explanation of the reasons for this conception.
AAccording to my impressions which I gained quite soon after my arrival in Belgrade, and after a very impressive report of the Commander of Greece, who was General Speidel at that time, I had gained the impression that with a great name and nicely formulated written tasks one wanted to exaggerate something which in reality was hardly suitable to live. I completely understood at that time that General Speidel requested of me to affix my attitude to the facts that he quite soon or he would approach me with an application for resignation because he was not willing to take over the responsibility for matters for the achievement of which he did not have the means at his disposal. He even, as far as I remember, compiled these files in Belgrade maybe - I don't remember- I do remember in any case that he submitted to me a lengthy document which expressed these things very clearly. I, on my part, then tried to calm him down and told him that after such a short period I could not survey matters sufficiently in order to put myself out for him and according to his ideas and I achieved that he took back his resignation and let a certain period lapse in the hope that matters would change. He let a certain period lapse in the hope that matters would change. His most important point of objection as far as I remember today dealt with the feeling of complete dependence, in this field work, which he had, that is, the territory administration of the country, or, as we have quoted here now, executive powers. The most important prerequisite for this work, that is a sufficiently large troop, was not at his disposal. He further complained, even at that time, about a strong endeavor of the tactical departments; especially of army Group E, to interfere with his functions, and this complaint did not cease during the whole time of his presence in Greece.
I believe in Spring 1944 matters came to a head and at first, as far as I remember, he was subordinate to Army Group E, merely for administrative matters, for operational matters he was in any case thus subordinated, and finally his full subordination in everything that was ordered to Army Group E.
Q When did that happen?
A I cannot name here the exact date but I believe that that happened after Speidel left because the battle which the Army Group F waged for the complete subordination of all military commanders, that is my own department too, that battle was already waged since the end of 1943 and the OKW for some reasons which I cannot survey and did not know delayed matters until finally, for me, on the first of September 1944 the complete subordination was ordered but it is possible that the subordination of the Military Commander Greece under Army Group E is prior to that date.
Q It was thus that military tactical tasks for the Military Commander Greece could not be carried out because of the lack of troops which were necessary for these tasks and therefore such tasks were not even put to him. Is that correct?
A In general outlines this conception is correct.
Q The crucial point of the task is, therefore, purely in the administrative sphere?
AAnd possibly in the political sphere, that is to keep on good terms with the Greek government but the responsibility for administrative matters in that respect is again to be limited because it is important here that the German Ambassador, Neubacher, in the Southeast area, be an intermediary.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point we will take a recess.
(a recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Weisgerber.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q Witness, yesterday you said that the High SS and Police Leader Greece, to the Military Commander in Greece was subordinate in the same way as the Serbian Command in Serbia in the SS was with the SS Gruppenfuehrer Meissner.
A Yes, that is what I said.
Q You were on quite good terms with SS Gruppenfuehrer Meissner, you said?
A No, I must make a certain limitation to that. From a purely military sphere he was always ready to help me if I needed it from his troops and he always placed them at my disposal but on the other spheres we had considerable tensions.
Q Now, do you know something about the relation between General Speidel and his High SS and Police Leader, General Schimana?
A The relations between Speidel and Schimana I cannot remember exactly. I only know that his successor, General Scheuerlen expressed very clearly the great difficulties which Schimana made for him, but I can remember one incident which also happened in Speidel's time where one day the Chief of General Speidel came to us in Belgrade and protested that Schimana, in the absence of his Commander, when the Chief asked him to come to a conference in the Headquarters, Schimana refused. With a Chief of Staff he had nothing to do. From this I would like to see the proof that the relations were so between Speidel and Schimana, and his staff was full of considerable tension because -- nevertheless this attitude -- this conduct, after all, this was war -- was very remarkable.
Q The Tendency for.....
the greatest possible independence; wasn't this characteristically for the Higher SS and Police leader?
A. As I stated in ay memorandum that was the same everywhere.
Q. The prosecution, in the course of their submissions submitted a number of daily reports from the Military Commander to your office, the Military Commander Southeast, from these daily reports one learns about shootings at Communists and DM followers or reports about reprisal measures, etc.
I now assume that the prosecution shows the responsibility of the Chief, or the Commander, of the office surely sends out these reports, the responsibility for the measures contained in these reports--and now I would like to clarify this complex. I think I could do this more simply by presenting you with a report which I just pick out at random.
This is Document NOKW-670, Prosecution Exhibit No.437, document book 18, page 43 of the English, page 50 of the German. I would like you to take a look at the bottom of this page and the next page of this report. This is the daily'report, the morning report, of the military Commander in Greece from the 15th of March 1944. I would like you also to look at the next page to this.
I would like to ask you three questions which I will ask you one after the other and then I would like you to give your answer to these three questions.
First of all, what was the purpose of these reports? Secondly, how did they originate; and, thirdly, what conclusions can be drawn from those reports what the responsibility of the Commander was with regard to that responsibility of the leader of the Office which sent them?
A The purpose of this report was to inform about the current events in the sphere of work in the offices concerned. It can be seen here that they are only directed to the superior office that is the military Commander Southeast and, at the same time, I would like to make this limitation to Department Ic and, at the same time, to Army Group E Salonika, again to Department Ic. The responsibility for the retaliation measure which had been carried out was borne by the Military Commander in Greece who carried out the executive powers there.
Q Might I ask for the third question......
A That is my second question about?
Q How this report originated.
A The Military Commander in Greece also received his reports from his Feldkommandantur (District Headquarters). He compiled it together in his staff because he needed it at the end of the month for his monthly report and then he gave the most interesting reports, especially as they concerned the tactical sphere, to my office and also to the tactical offices associated with him, Army Group E.
Q There is another question -- it is not correct to say that the lowest offices from which the first reports came, events which were in that sphere or the neighborhood in which they were stationed, they recorded these reports without having had anything at all to do with these events themselves. Didn't they report these events to the next highest office?
A Yes, that's correct.
Q. Isn't it right that perhaps the second or the third office then could not ascertain at all who had ordered any kind of measures so that if such event was reported to higher quarters, nobody without having seen it could have known whose responsibility it was?
A. Yes, that could be right; that depends on the contents and the subject of the report concerned.
Q. Then could I ask you to look again at this morning report from the 15th of March, page 2, where retaliation measures are mentioned? I would ask you to explain whether this report allows the conclusion to be drawn that these retaliation measures in no case, come expressly from the military commander in Greece, but that these could also have been measures which any kind of office in the whole of the Greek area could have been ordered.
A. Yes, that is quite possible, especially because under one number here, a "corps" is mentioned, "Regiment EAKR". I don't know what it means. I do not know now whether it was subordinate to the Military Commander then.
Q. But at any rate one thing is correct, that the report, regarded in itself, it did not happen that the report which some office passed on above, and did only contain that which happened in its own sphere of command, and fell under the responsibility of its commander?
A. That is correct. Especially it is correct for the report I have already mentioned, the one which was sent on in the Ic channel.
Q. One more question , - the so-called hostage orders, the orders in which quotas were laid down, there came from the OKW, and then through the official channels, they went through you, to the subordinate commanders, etc?
A. I can only make one limitation here. In my time the orders were already then there when I arrived, but otherwise they went through the channels, through me to the subordinate units. The connective reprisal order which is mentioned here had already been present in the Balhaus when I was not there.
Q. According to my information this retaliation order came from the first 1 to 50 order, when the first time came with General Speidel when you were still there, could it have been possible that the order could have been passed on to General Speidel when you were then military commander in southeast?
A. Yes, I think one should understand the link there, that in an installation of an officer, as with the case with the military commander Greece, that there all the fundamental orders had already been issued previously but had not yet arrived in the staff, were not yet placed at the disposal of the staffs. This was not the issuance of a new order, but merely orders of all kinds being placed at the disposal, among them this collective order.
Q. About your personal attitude towards this collective reprisal order, did you also inform General Speidel about this?
A. Yes.
DR. WEISGERBER: I have no further questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Is there further cross-examination of this witness? --(Defense counsel indicated they did not)-
Have you further direct examination Mr. Rapp?
MR. RAPP: Yes, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, yesterday, in connection with the cross-examination by the defense you were asked about various authorities of the defendant, von Weichs, and one of the questions, at the end of the this certain period about which I am speaking concerned, this was the question which you were asked: "Would you think it correct if I said that his main task was a stragetic task?", and thereupon witness, you answered , "Yes, that would be correct". Witness, in the introduction or or further statement to the question, and answer which you gave to this couple of questions, I would like to ask you first of all, did you have so-called territorial authorities in Serbia?
A. After it has been made clear to me, yes.
Q. Did you have territorial authority as Military Commander Southeast in the southeastern area?
A. On paper, and according to official directives, yes.
Q. Witness, did the defendant Weichs have so-called security authorities in the southeastern area, that is to say on matters regarding security?
A. Yes. Might I make a limitation to the question which was previously asked, about territorial authority in the southeastern area? In Croatia, I didn't have any such territorial authorities. There, the Croatian government had this.
Q. Witness, did you have security authorities in Serbia?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have these security authorities yourself, or did you have these security authorities by reason of the security authority which Weichs had for the whole southeastern area?
A. We both had the authority simultaneously.
Q. You are now speaking about Serbia?
A. Yes, only about Serbia.
Q. Witness, would you please explain to the Tribunal what you understand by "security authority"?
A. By "security authority", I personally understood that the task assigned to me, to maintain peace and order , and for the tactical foundations; I had to safeguard these, and if necessary, by making use of the troops at my disposal.
Q. Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal what you understand by, "territorial authority"?
A. The territorial authorities was covered by that of the Executive power, in that power in which the competent office expressly was ordered.
Q. Witness, the whole territory of reprisal and retaliation, can this be described as the expert field of "security authorities"?
A. I should like to answer this question with -- yes!
Q. Witness, the so-called tactical or police -- or necessary for police reasons -- reprisal or retaliation measures about which we spoke yesterday, as well as the day before yesterday, were these matters of security authority or matters of territorial authority?
A. I would like to answer this question by saying that they were the tasks of security authority.
Q. Witness, the next question which I would like to discuss with you quite briefly, - you said yesterday in reply to a question from the prosecution, that the warfare in the Balkans could be formulated by saying that the warfare carried on by the bands was in no way equal to the warfare which you had met with any other enemy in any other theater of war, and not even in the very bloody fighting with the partisans in Russia in 1941-1942?
A. That's right.
Q. Would you please explain to me further whether by this you mean that in other words, the bloody battle in Serbia or in the southeastern area were so to speak forced upon you? Do you mean that by that statement?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, do you know who invaded the Balkans, which Army?
A. Which Wehrmacht you mean?
Q. Yes, which Wehrmacht , which Wehrmacht was that?
A. That was my own. The German.
Q. And then when were the Balkans invaded?
A. In 1941.
Q. Do you know the date witness?
A. In think in May 1941.
Q. May?
A. No, before then, in April, 1941.
Q. Before April 1941. Up to then witness was Yugoslavia and Greece in a state of war with Germany?
A. No.
Q. Now further, witness, did you say that the German Army, so to speak, came into this territory and hoped to meet an honest and brave enemy who fought in accordance with international conventions. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were asked yesterday about the Commissioner order. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you told us that as Corps Commander inside of the 4th Army you received this Commissar order?
A. Yes.
Q. I think Field Marschal Fuechler or Kluge commanded the 4th Army?
A. Kluge.
Q. Now witness, did you think that the Commissar order was an order which originated from Hitler?
A. Without doubt.
Q. Do you know who at that time was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and how they received the Commissar order?
A. Of course; Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.
Q. And who was the Supreme Commander of the German Wehrmacht at that time?
A. That was Hitler.
Q. Was the German Army a part of the German Wehrmacht?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the then Supreme commander Hitler at that time the superior of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch?
A. Yes.
Q. Now witness, were you as a professional officer under oath to the Supreme Commander of the German Wehrmacht at that time, and what did this oath mean?
A. This oath meant for the German soldier, that he should give themselves completely to their duty as he had sworn to do.
Q. Witness, does this also include unconditional fulfillment of the orders of the Supreme Commanders?
A. Yes.
Q. You told us yesterday, witness, that you did not pass on the Commissar order. Is that right, witness?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't you pass on the Commissar order?
A. Because for the first time in my life as a soldier, I was of the impression that there was an order which was given to me which I could not be responsible for to my inner conscience and the carrying out of this order would be such a burden for the officers and men under my command, and for this reason I refused it, and tried in another way to carry it out in a weaker form, to use other words for the word "sabotage".
Q. Is it correct , - do you mean by this, that it was possible that Fuehrer orders could not be carried out?
A. In reality, absolutely, but the consequences of such an action had to be clear to one.
Q. Then you did not carry out the fuehrer Commissar order?
A. No, I did not carry it out.
Q. Now witness, in order to come back to our original subject, that is the fighting methods in the Southeastern area, and you compared this to the fighting methods in the east by which the otherwise honorably fighting Wehrmacht was forced to fight in this way; I would, therefore, like to ask you to answer the following question: When did Germany invade Russia?
A. On the 22nd of June, 1941.
Q. Your Honor, I am now giving the witness NOKW 1076, Exhibit 14, Document Book 1, that is the famous so-called Commissar order. Witness you told us that the German Wehrmacht attacked Russian in June; do you know the exact date, witness?
A. 22nd of June.
Q. 22nd of June. The document which I have given you is the socalled Commissar order. In this case comments to the Commissar order. What is the date of this document, witness?
A. From the commander-in-chief oi the Army, the 8th of June.
Q. 8th of June?
A. June.
Q. According to your statement, Russia was attacked on the 22nd of June, so that two weeks before that, oh 14 days before the attack, and before it was even known how the Russians fought or what their fighting methods were, this order was issued; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, in connection with this question, I would like to limit myself specifically to the southeastern area in which you maintained yesterday, that there the brutal methods of fighting and the inhuman methods of fighting, were forced upon the brave German soldiers. Somethings you have told the Tribunal, witness, that Yugoslavia or Greece, was attacked in April by Germany; is that correct, witness?
A. Yes.
Q. And yesterday in your statements witness, you were asked how you explained that in 1943 the so-called, I think you described it as massacres, were less numerous, as in 1942 or 1943. Were you asked this question, witness?
A. Yes. This question was put to me.
Q. You told the Tribunal that the reason for this was that perhaps under your predecessor, or even under those commanders who before your time had been active in the Balkans, the fighting methods of the enemy must have been of especial brutality; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. First of all, I would like to give you a document, NOKW1111, Exhibit 4, Book 1.--
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: What is the number of the exhibit please?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, the number of the exhibit is 4; exhibit 4, book 1.
Q. Witness, what is the date of this document?
A. The date is the 27th of April, 1941.
Q. During this time you were in the southeastern area?
A. No.
Q. Witness, who signed this document?
A. A Commanding General --- von Kortzfleisch.
Q. Would you now please read the second paragraph, firstly for yourself ..... (witness reading document)..
Would you now please read this paragraph to us again, witness?
A. The whole paragraph?
Q. Yes, the whole paragraph.
A. "I expect every instance of resistance to be broken with ruthless force. Every person encountered resisting or fleeing with weapon in hand, is to be shot dead immediately. Persons surrendering are to be handed over to courts martial or summary courts martial to be judged immediately. We draw attention to the decree, OKW -here follows the numbers of 2nd of April 41, sent with commander-in-chief of the 12th Army" and then -
there are diary figures A "...In areas of unrest, furthermore, hostages are to be taken whose shooting to death is to be applied for in case further enemy resistance should occur.