Continuing with the next order, dated 5 May, 1943, Commanding General, Commander in Serbia, to the 809th Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters:
"In retaliation for the murder of the Head of the village on 27 April by Communists, as well as for the murder of the former platoon leader of the village militia, G. Jeschanitza, 10 Communists are to be shot.
Execution is to be reported together with enclosure of a copy of the public notice."
The next is an order dated 6 May 1943 to the 610th Sub-Area Headquarters:
"In retaliation for the attack on the station at Kosevi on 2 May 10 Communists are to be shot.
Execution is to be reported together with inclusion of a copy of the public notice."
Continuing with the daily report of the 7th of May, 1943, bottom of page 191 of the English, page 147 of the German, Daily report of 7 May 1943, sent from the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, to the Commander in Chief Southeast:
Communists: dead 34, of these 27 shot as reprisal, wounded 4, captured 4, arrested 10. D.M. Supporters: 62 dead, of these 50 shot as reprisal, 3 captured, 112 arrested.
Continuing on page 192 of the English, 147 of the German, the daily report of the 8 of May, 1943, from the Commanding General, Commander in Serbia, to Commander-in-Chief Southeast:
"Communists: dead 38 (reprisal shootings) arrested 38; DM followers 17 (reprisal shootings) captured 1, arrested 3."Next an order dated 11 May 1943 to the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, to the 599th Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters:
Subject: Retaliation measures In retaliation for the murder of 4 and the wounding of 5 German soldiers as well as for the killing of 12 Serbian Police in the district of Smederevo on 23 April 1943 a total of 150 Communist reprisal prisoners, if possible from the districts of Mladenovac, Arandjelovac, and Palanka, are to be shot.
The public notice must lay special emphasis on the treacherous and cruel execution of the deed. Also it must be mentioned that the villages in the neighborhood were only saved from being burned because the inhabitants, according to their duty, informed German and Serbian headquarters of the presence of the band.
Execution is to be reported together with enclosure of a copy of the public notice.
Continuing daily report 15 May 1943, sent from the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, to the Commander in Chief Southeast:
"Communists: 34 dead (including 20 shot in reprisal) 11 captured, 6 arrested."
On the bottom of the page 194 of the English, and 149 of the German, from the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, to the 823rd District Headquarters, dated 19 May 1943:
"In retaliation for the murder of the two Custom Officials, Wolf and Gahner, of the Frontier Guard Station at Rebenberg during the night of 12/13 May 1943, 100 Communists are to be shot."
Your Honors will note the ratio there of 50 to 1.
Next, the order from the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, dated 20 May 1943, to the 809th Administrative Sub-area Headquarters:
In retaliation for the Bulgarian soldier murdered while carrying out Railway Security duties, on 1 May 1943 by Communists 8 km South of Leskovac, 50 Communists are to be shot."
There, your Honors, will note the application of a ratio of 50 to 1.
Next on page 196 of the English, page 150 of the German, another order dated 21 May, 1943, Commanding General, Commander in Serbia, to 809th Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters:
"In retaliation for the murder of the Serbian Chief of Police in Leskovac 10 Communists are to be shot."
At the bottom of the page 196 of the English, and 150 of the German, Daily report 25 May 1943, Commanding General, Commander in Serbia, and Commander in Chief, Southeast:
"Communists: 103 dead, including 100 reprisal prisoners, 5 arrested. DM followers: 2 captured, 2 dead.
At Zajecar 25 persons arrested. (As yet not known to whom they belong.)" On page 197 of the English, 151 of the German, is a survey of reprisal measures carried out during the period 1 January, 28 May, 1943:
"Cases avenged by human lives (execution by firing squad) during the period: 80 4 more cases of telephone sabotage are being avenged by monetary fine or extra guard duty."
Then there follows a breakdown of the types of attacks which make up the 80 cases mentioned.
Finally, at the bottom of page 197 of the English, and 152 of the German:
"In retaliation for the 80 attacks and plots, during the period 1 January - 28 May, 1943, 2332 persons were shot, i.e. 1628 Communists, 704 DM followers.
The shooting of 235 Communists and 105 DM followers is ordered but not yet carried out. The total will then be 2672."
Continuing with the daily report of the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, Commander in Chief Southeast, for the 28 May, 1943;
"Communists: 25 dead, including 20 shot in reprisal, 1 wounded, 1 captured, 1 arrested.
DM followers: 1 dead, 23 arrested."
Continuing now on page 200 of the English Document Book, page 153 of the German, Document NOKW 1759, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 543, these are directives of the 118th Jaeger Division for the behavior of troops in operation.
The order is dated Division Staff Headquarters 12 May 1943:
2.) "Prisoners:
Whoever openly participated in combat against the German Wehrmacht and is captured is to be shot to death after interrogation. Deserters and other arrested persons (suspect persons) are to be delivered to the prisoner collecting points. Sufficient guards! Leaders and persons who are able to make important statements are to be presented to the Division (point 1). Prisoners and those arrested should be interrogated briefly. The minutes of the interrogation are to be delivered when the persons are transferred. When the statements are the same, a collective interrogation is sufficient. The interrogations must also contain personal data, place of the arrest or capture. The delivering office is also to be noted down.
3.) Cetniks:
All Cetniks without exception are to be disarmed; if necessary by using force. In compliance with the orders of the Duce, all Cetniks bound by duty to the Italians up until now or under Italian leadership are also to be disarmed, if necessary by force. In case of Intervention of Italian offices against the disarming of Cetniks which is to be carried out ruthlessly all German commanders are to refer to the order of the Duce to disarm Cetniks which is known to all German troops. Non-execution of this order of the Duce is to be designated as treason. All offices are to be informed about this on x - 1 day. Report of execution to the Division on x day. Cetniks who have used arms against German troops are to be treated like Communist bands, otherwise they are to be transferred as prisoners of war to the prisoner collection points.
......
DM followers who are not directly under the leadership of Italian troops are to be considered completely as enemies to which the regulations of point 2 of these instructions are applicable.
......
8.) Attitude toward the population:
The unit has to operate without consideration and with brutal severity against the population which proves hostile and is to take away from the enemy every possibility of existence by destroying abandoned villages and securing existing food supplies. Important water points which are not destroyed because of our own needs and the ****ds of the peaceful population must be guarded. The peaceful population in the occupied area is to be treated kindly and to be employed in the service of the purpose as far as possible. For guide and scouting services rewards in money or kind up to 100 Reichsmark may be offered. The customs of the population and especially religious customs of the Moslems must be taken into consideration. Churches, Mosques, and church yards are never to be used as billets or for horse stables or warehouses. Rooms and their furnishings used for billets are to be treated with consideration and are to be handed over in a proper and clean state."
"Severest measures must be taken from the very beginning against plundering even if it is carried out in a camouflaged form ("requisitioning" "organizing" etc.)
.
. . . . .
11.) The commanders are responsible to me, that these important directions are made known immediately and most clearly to all members of the division and of the 4th Croatian Jaeger Brigade and especially to all Commanders."
Signed: "Kuebler Brigadier General" Commander of the 118th Infantry Division.
We continue now on page 203 of the English, page 155 of the German, Document NOKW 1761, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 544. These are excerpts from the War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division, and your Honors will note at the top of the page 203 of the English, and 155 of the German, the 1st Panzer Division was subordinated from one June 1943 to 16 October 1943 to the Corps Headquarters of the 68th Infantry Corps for Special Employment. Entry in the War Diary for 12 July 1943:
In the night of the 11th to 12th July two members of bands were captured by the 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment. By negotiations with the civilian population they tried to draw over to their side a Russian voluntary helper who was with the 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment. According to their statements the bands consist of groups which in part are well equipped, they have radio etc. The 2 partisans wore shot to death in compliance with the Fuehrer's order.
. . . . .
I think we may skip the entry of 20 July 1943 at this time, and continue on page 205 of the English, and 156 of the German.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The entry of 29 July 1943 in the War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division:
"29 July 43:
"The relief group led by Colonal Neumeister at first reaches Kalandritsa where a Carabineri post was also attached by bandits. The place has been evacuated by the civilian population members of bands could not be captured. As a reprisal measure the place was destroyed by fire. In Erimanthia which was reached at 1300 hours several dead and wounded Italians were found. In other respects, the situation resembles that in Kaladritsa. Erimanthia too is being destroyed. According to statements of an escaped Italian, 25 Italian soldiers are supposed to be in the hands of the bandits. The bands are said to have expressed the intention of killing these prisoners in case any relief group approaches Erimanthia, Therefore, by order of the division several hostages were picked up from the vicinity and later on turned over to the jurisdiction of the Italians. Furthermore all civilians mayors in the neighborhood were told that for every German or Italian soldier killed the severest reprisal measures will be taken against the civilian Greek population."
Continuing with the entry in the War Diary for 22 August 1943 at the bottom of Page 206 in the English, Page 158 in the German:
"In the evening two serious incidents occurred with civilians. An NCO, of the auxiliary anti-aircraft detachment 299 was molested, a corporal of the same detachment was attacked. His bayonet was taken from him. The garrison commander immediately had 10 hostages arrested.
"At the same time he ordered the mayor to find out the actual perpetrators and to hand them over the next day."
Next, the entry for 24 August 1943:
"24 August 43:
"At 1800 hours three of the arrested were shot to death after a partial confession, the others were released.
As the Italians continue to complicate matters, among others things they abrogate orders of the German garrison Commanders to the Greek civilian population, the Division demanded the subordination of the Settere Argolide, Hqs. The request was granted at 2400 hours."
I think we may skip the intervening entries and pick up again on Page 208 of the English, Page 159 of the German, the entry for 5 October 1943. "As the weapons of the German soldiers were attacked near Dimena were not delivered according to the imposed conditions 4 hostages were hanged at 1300 hours in Chiliomedon." Finally, at the bottom of Page 208 in the English, Page 159 in the German, the entry for 9 October 1943: "At 1030 hours the 5th company reached the villages of Charma and Kathara (12 kilometers southeast of Molov) they were destroyed because weapons and ammunition were found there." That, if Your Honors please, completes the reading of the excerpts from the War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division, which, during the period mentioned, was under the command which was subordinate to the Defendant Felmy. We continue now on Page 209 of the English, Page 160 of the German, Document NOKW-1751, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 545. This exhibit consists of extracts from the War Diary of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia during the month of June, 1943. During that period the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia was General Bader, and his Chief of Staff was the Defendant Geitner. The entry for the 19th of June 1943: "Telephone authorization to Senior SS and Police Leader for the execution 550 hostages for attack on Auxiliary Police Detachment (8 dead, 7 wounded)." And then the entry for the 27th of June 1943: "Commanding Officer of District Headquarters Krusevac reports by telephone that 320 guilty persona are available by the SD from other areas." And the entry in the War Diary for the 28th of June 1943: "Order for execution by shooting of 25 Communists to Administrative Sub-area Headquarters 599 for the German Police Sergeant wounded during an attack Ralja on 24 May 1943."
Your Honors will note the retaliation quota applied in that case 25 to 1 for the wounding of a German soldier. Next, on Page 211 of the English document book, Page 161 of the German, Document NOKW-1762, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit No. 546. This exhibit consists of a series of three reports which were sent by the Commander of Southern Greece to the Commander in Chief Southeast, who was simultaneously Commander in Chief Army Group E. The first report is dated 4 June 1943; the Commander in Southern Greece at that time was the Defendant Speidel. The first portion of the report deals with the political situation. Yours Honors will recall that at this time, June, 1943, when the Defendant Speidel was Commander of Southern Greece, the Defendant Foertsch was the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief Southeast, to whom the report of the Commander in Southern Greece was sent.
I. Overall impression:
"The abandonment of the North African front has made a profound impression on the Greek populace. Enemy propaganda which started immediately has tried to exploit the success of this so-called "boxing of the Germans and Italians out of Africa" in every respect and liberation of Greece from its "conquerors".
"The Greeks are thereby kept in a state of excitement this psychological effect seems to be carefully calculated - and their sense of resistance and desire for liberty is constantly being whetted. This also explains why the appeal for a cessation of bandit warfare has met with no decisive or tangible success.
"Outwardly, the situation - irrespective of political attacks on the present Government - remains perfectly quiet. The steady rise in prices on all vital consumer goods which is due to the rise of the gold Pound, is cleverly exploited in the form of strike slogans by the Communists.
In the Italian area the onset of strikes has been detected. The Rallis Government order, peace and security, to reinforce the police and gendarmerie and to purge it of unreliable elements.
"The relative peace in the "State of Athens" is to be attributed to a great extent to the energetic measures taken by Rallis. A vehement struggle has started on the part of all political parties in order to assume the leadership and patronage of the two police battalions. Democrats, royalists, Denizelists and even Communists are trying to take over the leadership."
The next portion of the report from Commander of Southern Greece, at that time, the defendant Speidel, deals with strikes and demonstration: "Food supplies for the population were plentiful to be sure at very high prices and therefore despite all instigations there was no reason for strikes and demonstration. The following incidents have been reported during the period covered by this report:" I am calling Your Honors' attention to sub-paragraph "b" of this section, dealing with strikes and demonstrations:
"The workers of the Chemical Plant "Lipasmata" in Pirieus staged a sit down strike on 24 May 1943; other employees joined the next day.
"District Headquarters Piraeus had ten hostages seized from among the workers and ordered the resumption of work. The order was followed immediately.
"In Athens, bank employees started a sit down strike. When on 29 May 1943, almost all banks had gone on strike, the Greek Prime Minister decreed the closing of all banks in Athens on 31 May 1943.
"In Piraeus work was not interrupted again. The officials were informed by District Headquarters that all strikes would be considered as directed against the German Occupation authorities and would be dealt with accordingly."
Finally on Page 214 of the English, Page 162 of the German, the section of the report from the Commander in Southern Greece dealing with economic development enemy situation?
"Overall impression: The bandit amnesty was proclaimed at a most unfavorable time. The fall of Tunis has incited the will to resist of the Greek populace and even of those people who have thus far looked on passively. It has convinced the insurgents that they would be able to vanquish the axis Troops just like the "Sacred army of the Greeks" which fought in Tunis had done. Nevertheless, the opinion was expressed that after 20 May 1943, the German occupation troops in particular would carry out an extensive operation against the bandits.
"The successful mopping up operations in the Olympus and Othry's area were not the least important factors which contributed to this belief. This is the only way of explaining the movement of the bandits from the more open area of Eastern Greece to the less accessible mountains of the middle and of the West. Apparently, the Giona Massif has become the central headquarters of the bandits.
"It is possible that this movement to the West Coast was prompted by an English directive in preparation for an eventual landing in these somewhat inaccessible areas.
"Bands have been observed on the Pelopennesus. They crossed the ocean East of Patras near Lepanto and infiltrated to the Southern tip of the Pelopennesus."
I think we need not read the remainder of this particular report. Your Honors will note what full exposition the activities in Greece are given by the Commander of Southern Greece, the Defendant Speidel at this time, in his report to the Commander in Chief Southeast, who at this time was General Loehr, whose Chief of Staff was the Defendant Foertsch. I call Your Honors' attention to Page 219 in the English, Page 165 in the German, which is the estimate of the situation made in his report by the Commander of Southern Greece:
"Expecting a sudden large scale action by German Troops after 20 May 1943 - the last day of the amnesty - the bands have withdrawn West into more inaccessible areas.
"The Giena Mountains must be regarded as their central headquarters. The reputation of the German troops has suffered considerably because no operation has taken place. In general Greek circles define this attitude of the German troops as weakness. Thus the door has been left wide open for British propaganda. The blasting of the tunnel located near 255 kilometers during the night of the first be the second of the month in the course of which an Italian Troop Transport Train has been destroyed completely and the railroad line Saloniki Athens was interrupted for two days must be regarded as a sign that the resistance will of the bandits has flared up. The threat to the only supply line Saloniki Athens and continuing to the Pelopennesus, will presumably increase during the next period. Even the German troops recently brought into the area of Southern Greece are unable to suppress the bands and the insurection movement on the area of Attica and Boeotia because the greater part of them has been assigned to the Pelopennesus which has also become a center of unrest.
"The reputation of the German Occupation Troops and ultimate peace and order (which in view of an eventual English landing is more necessary than ever) and the reputation of the German occupation can be established and maintained only by the ruthless resistance of bandits which has been demanded repeatedly."
And the report is signed for the Commander South Greece, by the Chief of Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(The Tribunal recessed at 1500)
THE MARSHAL: The persons in the Courtroom will be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, prior to the recess, we were looking at Exhibit 546, which is a series of three reports from the Commander of Southern Greece to the Commander in Chief Southeast. We had finished the first report and now we look at the second, which is on page 221 of the English and page 166 of the German. This is a report from the Commanding General and Commander of Southern Greece, dated 5 July 1943. At this time, the defendant Speidel is the Commander Southern Greece. The report covers the period 4 June to 3 July 1943.
"Political Situation Overall impression:
The rapid defeat of the Italian Isles of Panetelleria and Lampadusa, the almost undisturbed control of the Mediterranean Area by allied naval and air forces, the decrease of German U-boat successes as well as the constantly increasing air attacks on Germany and Italy were exploited by enemy radio and whisper propaganda, by dropping of pertinent illustrated papers and leaflets which try to prove the superiority of the Allies. The greater part of the Greek population at this time is convinced of the imminent landing of the Allies in Greece and in particular of the final victory of the Democratic Powers. The lack of any larger operation against the bandits contributes to this opinion. It is also interpreted as a weakness of the Germans that the Allies were successful in attacking the important air fields of Kalamaki and Eleusis without suffering any losses.
"Any visible success of the Allies, no matter how small, now is exaggerated because of the total situation and is considered to be a weakness of the Axis Powers.
Only thus can it be understood that the anti-axis movement in the Greek population increases more and more.
"90 per cent of the Greeks today are unanimously hostile toward the Axis Powers and are ready for open revolt. The fact that all strike attempts and all strikes up to now were camouflaged with economic reasons, and that the general strike attempted on 25 July 1943 was carried out openly under the slogan of a protest against the hostage shootings of 17 July 1943, prove the correctness of the statement. The extent which this strike seemed to achieve at first, made its political significance perfectly clear.
"Those Greeks who are still pro-Axis --- they usually make money by supplying the German or Italian Wehrmacht decrease more and more or they do not dare to confess themselves to be friends of the Axis. The enemy radio publishes the names of Greeks working in German offices. If people are particularly prominent, their death sentences, pronounced in absentia, are published.
The EAM also publishes the names of the Greeks working for the Axis powers in its numerous party papers and party leaflets. It warns and exhorts the to join their ranks. An additional important argument expounded to the Greeks who are still willing to work is the small wages paid by German offices.
"The indigenous volunteer forces serving with German units -- identifiable as such by their uniform - are being molested and threatened right out in the streets. The Communists movement has gained in strength impact, and reputation in particular by its indisputably great political successes in all of Greece, mainly however in and around Athens.
By use of clever camouflage, the EAM including all its subsidiary groups has succeeded in gaining the direct support of the British Secret Service. A major contributing factor to an abatement of the struggle against Communism is the belief that England will be strong enough after the war to keep Communism out of Greece at least. This has made the EAM with its combat organizations the main bearers of the entire resistance movement against the Axis powers. The greater part of the bands is subordinated to it. It is in a leading position, politically speaking and, because it is very active and enjoys a co-ordinated leadership it represents the greatest danger to the occupying powers."
Then follows a section on Strikes and demonstrations.
"The food supply for the indigenous population is asbefore-more than sufficient and to a great degree it is better than that of the German soldiers. However, wages are unable to keep up with the rapid rise in prices. Nevertheless, economic reasons are the decisive factors for only a very few of the attempts at strikes. All strikes carried out thus far have been organized and led by Communists. They have tried to shake the reputation of the occupying powers and to weaken whichever Greek Government was in power. Simultaneously, however, they were endeavoring to determine the resistance power of the Axis. Unfulfillable demands such as a 7 hour day, granting of credits, supplying shoes, garments, food stuff, were to serve as camouflage for these operations. Thus it was all the more surprising that all camouflage was dropped when the general strike of 25 June 1943 was called and the political strike was proclaimed openly. It is true that only minor strike attempts have been observed in the entire area which is under German Sovereignty because the careful interference by German offices prevented any outbreak.
Yet, the reputation of the occupying powers was greatly impaired because the Italians in Athens did not apply the same severe measures as was the case in the area of German Sovereignty. The Greek does not differentiate between the German and Italian occupying power. He only knows the axis powers.
"The shooting of hostages on 17 June 1943 and the ensuing strikes must be considered from that point of view. On 25 June many plants in Athens actually went on strike and the owners were compelled by the Strike leaders to close their factories. Several columns of demonstrators tried to march through the city but they were dispersed within a short time. The political impetus of the strike called by the Communists in protest against the shooting of hostages was particularly emphasized by the fact that most of Athens Police Officials (about 1200 men) went on strike. On 2 July 1943, the Police returned to duty after the Government had disarmed 395 officials and dismissed them from the service. 35 of these striking officials were arrested by the Italians. The table enclosed shows the strikes which occurred in the month of June. The decree issued by the Commanding General and Commander South Greece -" -- and that, if Your Honors please, is the defendant Speidel --- "on 27 June 19A3 which threatened particularly severe procedure in case of strikes in the area of German Sovereignty - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - was revealing and served as a deterrent.
" The report next deals with enemy propaganda, economic development, and finally we have a portion on the enemy situation.
I ask Your Honors to pay particular attention to this next portion because it is quite a good description of the ELAS organization, one of the two large Greek partisan organizations which came into being during the German occupation of Greece. Your Honors will recall the oral testimony of the witness Triandaphylidis on the nature, size, military structure, and organization of the EDES partisan organization, and now we have in the report from the Commander of Southern Greece, the defendant Speidel, an account of the ELAS partisan organization.
"Enemy Situation.
"Overall Impression.
"The ELAS (Greek National Army of Liberation) includes about 70 percent of all the bands. About 20 percent of the bandits consist of socalled nationalist bands, leader, Colonel Zervas." This is on page 226 of the English, Your Honors, page 168 of the German. "About 20 percent' of the bandits consist of so-called nationalist bands, leader, Colonel Zervas, The rest must be considered as politically uncertain. According to a report received here, the ELAS is organized as follows:"
Then Your Honors will note the diagram which appears on page 227 of the English document book, page 109 of the German document book, showing the organization of the ELAS units: General Leader Athanasios Klaras, Lamia, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd General Staffs.
And on page 228 of the English and 169 of the German, the numerical strength of the ELAS:
"RED Andartes in action - 7,000 men.
"RED Adnartes in reserve - 24,000 men.
"All of these are armed, but for practical reasons the majority of them remains hidden in the guise of 'peaceful, working' population.
"The bandit situation is as follows:
"The majority of the bands controls the high mountain range of Pinbos-Giona Massif. Staffs and main forces are located in a switch position which extends through north and central Greece from northwest to southeast.
"The nationalist bands under Colonel Zervas, whose English advisor is Colonel 'Eddy', are situated north of the line Agrinion-MacrokomiUpper Sperohia Valley. Headquarters is in Metsovon. The communist bands under their leader Aris - whose deputy is Belis - have their headquarters on the east side of the Giona Mountains. The bands have no uniform equipment. There is a lack of uniforms and shoes. Armament is of English, Italian, and German origin. Every large bandit group has radio equipment. U-boats and small sailing boats take care of the supply. The northeast coast of Euboea, the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, south of Parnassus and of Helikon, as well as the west coast from Preveza to Astakos, are the main landing places. Frequently the population procures the foodstuff.
"Since the German counter measures expected after the amnesty period had expired did not occur, a considerable number of the bandits have been returning since about the middle of July to the territory which they occupied before. The movement is coming from the west and the east. The greater number of the bandits still continues to remain in the Goina Mountains.
"Communication with the English, who fly in almost every night to bring supplies, takes place by means of light signals. About 4,000 bandits are in the villages of Kukuvista, Diaselon, and Sideroporto on the eastern slope of the Giona Massif.
"An attempt was made to blow up the steamer 'Citta di Savona' in the harbor of Piraeus by a magnetic mine fastened to the bow of the ship. A leak 50 x 70 was sprung. The bow sank about two meters and then touched bottom. Sixty-nine horses were drowned. No casualties. After a few days the ship was serviceable again. There is a possibility that the mine was put in at the port of Patras on 11 June. Investigations still under way. As a counter measure from the German side, ten hostages -- mostly communist leaders -- were shot to death on 17 June.