It will also be proved that his remonstration with the German Army H.Qu. were in vain, and even considered as evidence for his weakness. I shall explain that the measures taken so far by the WB-South-East (Military Commander SouthEast) were, in a sharp manner quite unusual among military men, called inadequate and that orders were issued to take the harshest measures possible.
Moreover, the defendant KUNTZE also endeavoured to mitigate the measures he had to carry out in consequence of orders received, as I shall prove. I shall also prove that the defendant KUNTZE even allowed that captured partisans whom he ought, on account of the orders issued, to have shot, were not shot, but employed as laborers, thereby saving them from the death which in fact they would have deserved.
As far as the defendant KUNTZE is charged by the Prosecution with the responsibility for orders issued and measures taken by commands subordinated to him, it will be proved that not all the orders and measures of these commands were brought to the knowledge on the defendant KUNTZE. It will be explained that those orders and measures which came to the defendant KUNTZE's knowledge at all, did not allow any action on his part, as they did not exceed the binding orders of the (OKW) Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the orders and measures which did not come to KUNTZE's knowledge, cannot be charged to his account. In this respect, any responsibility on his part is out of question.
Furthermore, I shall refute the allegation of the Prosecution that partisans had been shot without any judicial procedure. Contrary to what the Prosecution asserts I shall prove that, when the fighting subsided, at least a simplified summary court martial procedure has been instituted.
In as far as the Prosecution blames the defendant KUNTZE for the so-called "Commissary Order", it will be proved, that this order was issued exclusively for the Eastern theatre of war. But even in the East that order was not carried out by the defendant KUNTZE in the form submitted by the Prosecution. I shall prove that captured commissars were, by explicit order of the Supreme Commander of the 9th Army, under which the defendant KUNTZE was in the East, not to be shot, but to be treated as Prisoners-of-War. In accordance with this order the matter has then been treated in the area of the 9th Army.
As far as General KUNTZE is charged by the Prosecution with the so-called "Commando-order" it will be proved that the defendant KUNTZE was, at the time when that order arrived at the Military Commanded South-East already with the Reserve Army, and had, as Chief of the training in the Reserve Army, nothing to do with that order, so that he was not in a position to carry it out nor to pass it on.
Besides, in this respect, a conclusive statement on the part of the Prosecution is lacking.
Count 4 of the indictment refers to the charge to have terrorized the civilian population by deporting them for forced labor and detaining them in concentration camps. In opposition to the allegation that deportation of so-called unreliable elements into concentration camps had been ordered and carried out by the WB (Military Commander) South-East or by Commands Subordinated to him, I am first going to prove that those camps were no concentration camps as known today but only so-called Community Camps (Sammellager); so far the Prosecution has really in no way alleged, let alone proved, that the characteristics of a concentration camp in the currently accepted meaning of that word can be applied to these camps. The necessity to establish so-called Community Camps, however, is in no way incompatible with the rules of International Law, as I will explain in my closing speech, the more so, as also other states considered it necessary to establish camps of this kind even in recent times, and did, in fact, establish here.
Furthermore, I am going to prove what membership to a certain national group or, race or political grouping were, in themselves, no reasons for concentrating people in such community camps. It will be shown that on the Balkans, Communists, Jews and Gypsies were particularly active in the Intelligence Service of the partisans or helped them in other ways, thus proving themselves suspect of being connected with guerrillas and as unreliable elements. Besides, evidence will show that detention in these community camps was not ordered arbitrarily. On the contrary, explicit orders were issued to the effect that it had to depend on the results of the re-examination of the detained, whether they had to remain in these camps.
I will show that people who proved to be innocent were released. This is, as I will explain, clearly shown by various documents submitted by the Prosecution itself, where, in speaking of Community Camps, also releases are mentioned.
Moreover, I shall prove that the people left in these camps after reexamination were particularly after December 1941, almost exclusively captured partisans or their helpers, who would have deserved to be sentenced to death according to the laws in force. Therefore, it was only just to use these people in the first place when reprisal measures had to be carried out. Incidentally, the defendant Kuntze found those Community Camps, when he took over his official duties, already fully established, so that it was not he who ordered to establish them.
Never has the defendant Kuntze, as alleged by the Prosecution, ordered to establish Jewish Concentration Camps in the current meaning. The Prosecution has produced no evidence for that. Camps of that kind did not exist in the South-East.
Inasfar as the defendant Kuntze is charged by the Prosecution with the crime of using partisans in Serbia as workers in the interest of the Germans, it must be replied that this measure was in the very interest of the persons concerned. This way they were saved from welldeserved death. Besides, the Prosecution neither conclusively contended not proved that any facts about a treatment of these laborers in a manner contrary to human dignity had come to the defendant Kuntze's knowledge while he was in command.
Furthermore, it is asserted that only the Police was authorized in matters regarding employment of prisoners. The police received their orders from the quartermaster General and from Himmler himself, as I shall prove. In so far there is no responsibility on the part of the defendant Kuntze.
In this connection the partly overlapping command-channels will be demonstrated, as found by the defendant Kuntze when he took over. In the first place it will be proved that the Military Administration often acted quite arbitrarily and that repeated representations were made by the defendant Kuntze regarding the Administrative Staff of the Military Commander in Serbia, even, that frequently the relief of the Chief of the Administrative Staff had been demanded from the O.S.F. (Supreme Command of the armed forces).Having concluded my statements referring to the counts of the indictments I deem it my duty to point again to the difficulties confronting me as a counsel for the defense.
I can, at this moment, deal only with material that has been chosen and submitted by the Prosecution from the point of view, that of-course-suits it best. The evidence concerning the events that induced the defendants to take the various measures, is, on the other hands, generally not accessible to me. In as far as the documents submitted by the Prosecution do not yield circumstances apt to exonerate the defendant, I am in the main reduced to relying on my client's memory which has suffered in consequence of the long duration of the war and the frequent changes in his military appointments but particularly also as a result of his being psychically affected by the events of the post-war period, so that it has become deficient in a way. Thus, the defense is not in a position to contribute their share in clarifying the extensive material of the trial which would be necessary in the interest of conducting this trial objectively. In addition, the time available to the defense for preparing the evidence must be considered a very scanty one compared with the time at the disposal of the Prosecution for collecting their evidence and preparing their line of action. In this connection I well may point to the difficulties encountered on account of the prevailing state of affairs regarding mail and communications in Germany in carrying on the necessary correspondence in view to collecting evidence. Under these conditions I feel bound, by way of precaution, to reserve all those rights for the further conduct of the procedure which may result from that difficult position of the defense in the further course of this trial.
In conclusion, may I be permitted to mention the following facts concerning the personality of the defendant Kuntze, which I shall prove by submitting affidavits.
General Kuntze was a general of the old school, who was never eager to push himself to the foreground or to expose himself, but on the contrary did his duty with reserve and modesty. He wa,s deeply religious and had a pronounced sense of duty. By all people who know him he is described as a just superior whose paternal care was appreciated by the soldiers entrusted to his care. His attitude to the population of the occupied countries was also humane, and to the best of his ability he looked after this population. It is significant that he never enjoyed the favour of the people then in power.
It was known that he was not in good repute either with Hitler, or with the Supreme Staff of the Wehrmacht, which is shown by the fact alone that he was not promoted during the whole war and was not appointed Supreme Commander of the 12th Army nor Military Commander South East.
Surely an officer of this type was not capable of consciously committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, such as he is charged with.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH (Counsel for the defendant General Foertsch): The interpreters have the translations -
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute, please. I understand that the translation for the defendant Lanz has now been furnished to the Tribunal -- or can be furnished to the Tribunal - in its English translation. If Dr. Sauter is agreeable, we might hear it at this time.
DR. SAUTER: (For the defendant General Hubert Lanz) Your Honor, General Hubert Lanz has merely been indicted because of alleged incidents in the Epirus sector which was under his command (including the Jonian Islands). It is an established fact that Lanz was never military commander ("Militaerbefehlshaber") for Greece or her north-west districts but merely troop commander as commander of the XXII Mountain Corps.
He was given this post in Athens in the middle of August 1943, but in fact it was not until 9 Sept. 1943, that he tool over the command in the Epirus sector (See Doc. Vol XIX; page 82) which he kept until 13 Oct. 1944 until the evacuation of German troops from Greece.
During this period he was absent for almost 4 months (i.e. from 11 Jan. 1944 to 25 Feb. 1944 on home leave and from 5 March 1944 to 4 May 1944 on assignment to Hungary) so that by this reason alone he is for the above mentioned periods, not responsible for actions which at that time were supposedly carried out in the Epirus sector.
DR. SAUTER: "Courts of the Indictment against General LANZ" The Prosecution charges all defendants, thus also General LANZ, with having PLANNED THE TERRORIZATION OF THE BALKAN PEOPLES and having made this plan the basis for their conduct.
Defendant LANZ knows nothing of such a plan, he neither received orders concerning such a plan nor did he ever hear of such a plan in the course of official or private conversation. The defendant encountered this supposed plan for the first time in the bill of indictment of this trial."
Then, Your Honors, on Pages 2, 3 and 4 I have compiled the individual points of the indictment which the Prosecution charges. And I have marked the individual documents to make it easier for the Tribunal. I do not want to read this compilation here; instead I shall turn to the second chapter on Page 4, under Roman numeral II.
"General-LANZ'S Reply to the Indictment LANZ makes the following reply to the individual counts of the indictment, reserving legal problems (such as the Tribunal's competence, the right to make reprisals, limitation of the binding force of military orders, etc.
etc.) to be dealt with at a later date.
A.) General remarks:
1.) In the Epirus sector, LANZ had the task to prevent a landing of Allied troops on the north-west coast of Greece and, for the purpose, to maintain peace, security and order in the country. It was his intention to fulfill that latter task in a peaceful manner, if possible, in order to save his troop from losses and at the same time to spare the country and the population of the occupied territory.
In the course of his efforts in this direction, during the whole period of his activities in the Epirus sector, LANZ
a) worked in Joannina on a peaceful footing with the authorities of the state, the towns and the church;
b) supported as far as possible the International Red Cross under direction of the Swiss BICKEL,
c) assisted the peaceful population and spared them as far as permitted by war conditions and
d) by mutual agreement avoided whenever possible fights against the national partisans (under General ZERVAS).
General LANZ' efforts were also successful and were recognized by the Greeks.
2.) In the course of his troop inspections which took place nearly every day as well as his numerous conferences with the commanding and line officers he continuously pointed out that all unnecessary severity towards loyal civilians should be avoided so as to ease the inhabitants' heavy burden.
Whenever he learnt that the troop had nevertheless taken measures which were unnecessary in the light of the military position he intervened rigorously and took steps for the punishment of the culprits.
3.) Defendant LANZ opposed the question of hostages on principle. On a single occasion only forced by conditions, did he order the taking of hostages; the hostages were released again as this measure had the desired results.
Besides, the above mentioned order was fully justified from a military point of view and it was also in keeping with American regulations since it was meant as a protection of lines of communication of special tactical importance.
LANZ never ordered any measures for reprisals.
He did, however, express the hope in an obituary notice for a regimental commander (Lieutenant Colonel SALMINGER) murdered by partisans (see order of the day to the Corps dated 1 Oct. 1943 contained in Doc. Book XIX page 128, NOKW 867 Exh. 453) that the division would avenge this murder by a ruthless action of retalia tion.
With this he did not intend to hit innocent inhabitants but to send the culprits to their deserved punishment; as he must have thought that the latter were hiding near the place of murder, he ordered that the area for the carrying out of the action be restricted (20 km).
LANZ never ordered or approved of the destruction of localities unless such destruction was tactically necessary during a battle. The Prosecution's assertion referring to the existence of concentration camps does not apply to Gen. LANZ' command.
4.) As can be seen from Document Volume XIX p. 1104. NOKW 1104, Exh. 451 and Volume XIX p. 150 NOKW 864, Exh. 455, which have been submitted by the Prosecution, the first Mountain Division under the command of General LANZ issued in September and October 1943 "special orders" concerning the Ic-department (that is, enemy propaganda and counter intelligence) which, among other things, also contained instructions about measures to be taken with regard to hostages. General LANZ learned about these "special orders concerning the Ic-department" only now that these two above-mentioned documents have been submitted.
5.) With regard to the reports frequently mentioned in the documents, LANZ, in connection with the procedure and in order to clarify his sphere of responsibility, states the following:
Reports by battalions, regiments, etc, etc, to the divisions which were not transmitted by them to General Headquarters remained unknown to the latter. Therefore, the commanding general (LANZ) could not be expected to know about them.
Reports from the divisions to General Headquarters went to HQ Department Ia (operations), were coordinated there, and were then submitted to the chief-of-staff. The chief-of-staff in turn made an usually oral report to the commanding general about all the essentials in the sphere of daily tactical orientation. If at that time there were objections, uncertainties, or if it was necessary for General Headquarters to issue orders, the chiefof-staff was instructed to clarify the circumstances or to carry out the orders, respectively.
If the chief-of-staff, in the course of his examination of the circumstances, would establish that an offense against issued orders or another misdemeanor had been committed, the offenders were held responsible for their actions by the commanding general in the appropriate manner.
The relay of daily reports from the corps to the superior command (army or group of armies) took place usually by way of telephone or telegraph through Ia or his assistant (the 01) after having been read by the chief-of-staff, in important cases after having reported it to the commanding general.
The written daily reports which came into general Headquarters from the subordinate mixed forces were submitted to the commanding general only in exceptional cases, namely, if it was a question of matters which were important from a tactical point of view or of reports personally signed by the division commanders. Whether or not a division commander would personally sign a report was left to his discretion.
6.) General LANZ will prove further that at the time when he had dealings with them and within his sphere of jurisdiction, the majority of the partisan organizations did not act according to the provisions of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations, and, specifically, that their manner of warfare in many cases grossly violated the regulations of warfare and the law of humanity. In this connection, the civilian population in many cases illicitly supported the partisan organizations and participated in the fight against the German troops. The counter measures ordered or approved by LANZ were essential for maintaining order in the country and for the security of the German troops.
The warfare of the partisan organizations and of part of the civilian population, which ran counter to international law, also had the result that the troops themselves on their own initiative carried out retaliation measures in their indignation about the enemy's atrocities. However, since the troops knew that General LANZ was in principle opposed to such measures, they were sometimes not reported at all, or they were reported in such a manner that they appeared as having been taken solely in the course of battle, so that the General would not have any reason for interfering.
7.) On the occasion of the capitulation and disarming of the Italian army in Greece (September 1943) General LANZ, in contradiction to orders issued by the Fuehrer, took it upon himself to carry out measures favoring the Italians, which caused the disapproval of his superior officers at the time and his down-grading because of "lacking severity". Details are reserved for the actual presentation of evidence.
Specifically:
To the individual points mentioned above under I, General LANZ will bring evidence for the following facts:
To No. 5 j:
Not ordered by LANZ and not known to him at the time of execution. If he should have received a report about that from the First Mountain Div. dated 30 September 1943 afterwards -- a fact which he cannot recall -- this subsequent report obviously could not lead to the conclusion that it was here a case of subsequent revenge, but rather the report gave the impression that it was a question of a tactical measure, that is to say, of shooting partisans in the act of sabotage during fighting with parts of the First Mountain Division.
To No. 5 L:
It is here a case of a surprise attack by a gang of partisans on a part of the escort party of General LANZ which was overtaken and left behind on 3 October 1943, on the main road, 13 kilometers south of Joannina, General LANZ learned about that only during the day.
It is not a case of shooting "hostages" (that is, persons who had already been captured before the surprise attack), but, rather, it is a case of killing the attacking partisans in the course of action (surprise attack).
It is possible that further "retaliation measures on the part of the troops were instituted", but there is no further report on and about what is supposed to have constituted these "retaliation measures" and whether or not they were really carried out.
To No. 9 f:
The destruction of Akmotopos and the alleged execution of its entire population was not an act of reprisal, but was carried out in the course of a tactical "mopping-up operation" against a strong partisan group which had been operating from the area around Akmotopos for a long time, which carried out continuous attacks on the main communication road Joannina - Filippias, and which maliciously murdered first the chief of a bakery company (thus not of a fighting group but of a supply organization) by name of STITZINGER (father of five children) and soon after that the commander of the Mountain Infantry Regiment 98 (Oberstlt. SALMINGER).
The order for this mopping-up operation was given independently by the 1st Mountain Division on the strength of their knowledge about the enemy situation even before the "daily corps order" of 1 October 1943 at 1900 hours had been received by the Division. The daily corps order, by the way, did not contain any instructions about shooting hostages or any other concrete reprisal measures, but aimed only at punishing the malicious killing (murder of regiment commander Oberstlt. SALMINGER) in the person of the perpetrators whom General LANZ thought to be in hiding near the spot where the murder was committed. It was the duty of the General to protect his troops against continuing malicious partisan attacks from such supporting bases and from thereby suffering heavy losses.
According to the report of an eye-witness, the population of Akmotopos had left the village already before the fighting began; parts of the partisan group were fighting with rifles and machine guns in the village itself and nearby, so that the village had to be stormed by the attacking troops with mortar and artillery support.
To No. 9 j:
Was not ordered by LANZ nor did he know about it at the time of execution. The Korea area in Albania was always made insecure by Communist bands, and the civilian population regularly participated in the fighting on the side of the bands. The village in question was occupied by bands and was defended by them with the aid of the civilian population. The report of 1 December 1943 (NOKW 755 Exh. 449) expressly states that the village was taken "against resistance". Therefore, this is not a case of reprisal measures, but of house-to-house fighting in the course of a combat operation. The mopping-up operation taking place in the area of Korea at that time was aimed against the bands operating there. The corresponding order did not originate with LANZ, but was independently given by the local troop commander.
To No. 12 b:
The "Kommissar Order" dated 8 June 1941, was not issued by LANZ nor transmitted by him during the whole term of his activities in the Epirus.
To No. 12 h:
The "Kommando Order" dated 18 October 1942 was not issued to General LANZ nor transmitted by him during the whole of his term of activity in the Epirus.
To No. 12 i:
The so-called "Italian Order" of 11 September 1943 (Doc. Vol. XIII, p. 40, Doc. NOKW 910, Exh. 327) concerns Rendulic only. LANZ had nothing to do with it.
To No. 12 j:
The Italian General GANDIN had twice been ordered to lay down arms and to surrender to the German Wehrmacht. This order was once given by his Italian commander-in-chief, and the second time by General LANZ himself, after GANDIN had voluntarily surrendered to LANZ and had requested such an order. General GANDIN, however, did not execute these orders, but commanded his troops to fight, yes, even to attack the German troops on the island of Kephalonia. This was how General LANZ was forced to suppress the Italian revolt and at the same time, to relieve the German occupation force on the island Kephalonia who were in distress. In the course of this fighting which lasted several days, and which General LANZ had attempted to avoid, both sides suffered great losses. General GANDIN, contrary to his orders, commanded and tolerated this fight against the German troops, which went on without Italy being in a state of war with Germany at the time. In spite of this, General LANZ did not execute the order issued by his superior according to which at first every Italian and later at least every officer who offered resistance to the German troops was to be shot.
On the contrary, he ordered an investigation by a summary court martial against GANDIN and the other officers of his staff who were guilty. The shooting of General GANDIN and of a part of the officers who had been pronounced guilty then took place on the strength of the verdict of this summary court.
To No. 14:
General LANZ had nothing to do with this. These matters belonged into the sphere of competency of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Athens who was not subordinated to the commanding general of the XXII Mountain Army Command, General LANZ.
To No. 15:
General LANZ had nothing to do with this either.
In conclusion, Roman numeral III, "Presentation of Evidence by General LANZ", I have to state that "General LANZ intends to support his evidence on the following:
1.) his own interrogation under oath,
2.) the testimony of various co-defendants, insofar as they are called into the witness stand,
3.) a series of affidavits, partly from German and partly from foreign witnesses; some of these witnesses will be called into the witness stand; the names and the number of these defense witnesses who are to be heard in court is at present not yet established."
That is my Opening Statement for General LANZ. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Tribunal adjourns, it might be well to state that the translations have been promised as to the Defendants Felmy and Leyser, and that they will undoubtedly be ready for delivery to the Tribunal and the translators, and the Reporters in the morning. The Opening Statements for the Defendants Dehner, Foertsch, Rendulich, and Speidel will undoubtedly have to be presented through the Interpreters of this Tribunal. However, they will be furnished in typewritten form to the Tribunal at a later date.
The Tribunal will adjourn until 0930 tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until tomorrow at 0930.
(The Tribunal adjourned at 1635 to resume session at 0930, Tuesday, 16 September 1947).
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, Against Wilhelm List, et al., Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 16 September 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Carter Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session, God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
May it please your Honors, all defendants are present in the court room.
The persons in the court room will be seated.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Judge Carter will preside at today's session.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH(For the defendant Hermann Foertsch): The interpreters have a manscript of the translation.
OPENING STATEMENT FOERTSCH Your Honor, the Honourable Judges, The Prosecution charges the Field-Marshals and Generals who were active in the South-East area with having carried out a well-thought out unlimited program of terror and destruction, by denying and undermining the most fundamental principles of civilization and by arrogant contempt of human beings in enemy territory.
In that manner they madly let loose a senseless torrant of deaths in South-East Europe. In the course of this they are supposed to have shown themselves Henchmen and tools of Himmler, Sauckel and of other Nazi worthies. The Prosecution charges General Foertsch in particular with having played an important part in the realization of this so-called program of destruction and extermination stressing that he was an experienced chief of staff. This is shown by the assertion that the physical presence of Foertsch is supposed to have given the terms of authority of List, Kuntze, Loehr and Weichs a steady and tragic uniformity.
As against that I am going to prove that
1) the exposition of events in their totality as given by the prosecution with regard to South-East area does not correspond to the actual developments in any of the four counts, since the prosecution gives an incomplete and therefore incorrect picture of such events, which does not give sufficient consideration to conditions in the Balkans, to the actions perpetrated by the opponents, nor to the activities of those authorities which were not under the jurisdiction of military commanders, thus making no mention of the reasons for the measures of the German Army . With regard to above I agree to the argumentation of counsel for the defense, of the defendants List and Weichs and I shall add a few supplementary remarks thereto.
2) In order to refute the allegation that the defendant Foertsch disregarded and denied the most primitive principles of civilization I shall prove that he always considered the laws of morality and of the Christian religion as binding and that he also observed these laws in as far as he was free to do so during his term of office in the South East.
3) With regard to the further accusation that his attitude arid behavior towards the people in enemy territory was distinguished by arrogant contemptuousness. I shall prove that he was in reality a man of varied interests and of comprehensive ideas whose aim it was to, by thorough research to acquire conception of land and soul of foreign nations in order to act to their advantage.
4) With regard to the accusation that the defendant permitted himself to be guided in his activities by a well-thought-out program of terror and destruction , I shall refute that by proving that in order to pacify the country it was all important to him to make the occupation bearable and as little oppressive, as possible, to take into account all desires in any manner reasonable and all needs of the population and further to do all in his power in order to exclude or limit the influence and activities of men and authorities which in ignorance of the problems prevalent in the Balkans aggravated conditions by their faulty measures.
5) To refute the allegation that the defendant proved himself a henchman and tool of Himmler, Sauckel and of other Nazi worthies, I shall give a true and complete picture of his personality, and thereby make clear his attitude to the dictatorship.
6) As to the accusation that the defendant Foertsch had proved himself the evil spirit who was responsible for the tragic uniformity of the terms of service of List, Loehr and Weichs, I shall refute that by giving an explicit picture of his activities as they really were. Therefore I shall first prove what tasks and authorities were not those of a chief of staff of an Army or of an Army Group according to the service regulation then in force. The following limits were set to the activities of the chief of staff:
a) He had no authority to give orders or commands to the troops.
b) He had no authority to supervise the troops nor did he have a disciplinary or judicial authority with regard to the troops.
c) He had no right to decide in fundamental questions.
d) Thus he had no responsibility with regard to the troops. I shall prove that the defendant Foertsch observed the limits which according to the existing regulations were set to his activities and that thus he never
a) gave any orders himself
b) made any decisions himself exceeding his authority. I shall prove that according to the existing regulations his task was merely that of a first adviser to the commander-in-chief. He actually understood his responsibility in such a manner
a) that he never tried to provoke stringent measures
b) that it was rather his aim to help reasonableness to prevail
c) that in consequence he was not a bad but a good spirit.
7) But in order to point out the difficulties with which he had to cope, I shall describe the obstacles which he had to dead with. These were:
a) The dictatorship which could be felt on all sides.
b) He was bound by his oaths.
c) The orders which were issued to the commander-in-chief by his superior authority and were considered by him himself as binding.
d) The orders which had to be issued directly to subordinate troops by these superior authorities which made their activities independent of the orders of the jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief.
e) The throat of punishment existing according to the laws then in force.
f) The small understanding which the High Command of the Army showed to his submissions and suggestions.
8) That General Foertsch in his capacity as chief of staff did not help bring about the tragicuniformity of the reprisal measures, which has been stressed by the prosecution I shall refute by proving that
a) he was absent just during such times when incisive and fundamental orders were issued.
b) he did not consider the part which he had to play as in any manner satisfactory but he tried to be released from these tasks which he felt to be unpleasant and oppressive.