This is a report of the 724th Infantry Regiment dated 8 October 1941. It is a report on the commitment of a Jagerkommando on the 4th of October 1941. The strength of employment is listed and the mission of the unit, its departure and its return. Then under paragraph 5 of the document which is on page 130 of the English and on page 100 of the German, paragraph 3: Course of Events. I believe these next six lines were mistakenly omitted from the German document book. I will read the English text which is in the English document book and the interpreter will be able to translate these first six lines into German for the German defense counsel.
We have to pause a moment, your Honors, until the Secretary General gets the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me supplement the statement that I made earlier following the comments made by defense counsel. This Tribunal desires desires counsel to know that they stand before this court on the same basis as counsel for the prosecution and I trust that we will by our actions and our demeanor show to you that you are accepted on that same basis.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, we have another copy of the document in question which we are now submitting to the interpreters to read the six lines question.
5. Course of events:..................
On 4.10.41, 0200 hours, I left Aragujevac in the direction of Kraljevo with three groups of the battalion. At the city limits of Kragujevac I met the detachment led by Lt. Sickel which two hours previously had encountered enemy machine gun fire about two kilometers further on the road to Kraljevo and which had turned back. In the vicinity of the place on which Sickel's detachment had been attacked, I met a Jagdkommando of the II./749 which likewise consisted of three groups and like myself had been assigned to search the terrain for dispersed and wounded men and then to advance to the railway tunnel leading along the way from Kragujevac to Kraljevo and which was located about 11 kilometers from Kragujevac. Together with this Jagdkommando, I drove beyond the place of attack on which a derelict truck of Sickel detachment was standing, about 3 to 4 kilometers in the direction of Kraljevo until we hit the road block. After having removed the road block which consisted of a stone wall situated in oblique position to the road, we continued about 500 meters. There a ditch ran across the street about 3 to 4 meters broad and 1 meter deep which had not been quite finished. At this spot we left the vehicles in the protection of two groups and we walked ahead along side of the road. After an additional 500 meters we ran across a second similar ditch behind which some men were moving. After we opened fire these men took to flight. After that we searched some houses situated West of the road which had been abandoned by their residents with the exception of one man, he was taken to Kragujevac and hanged. Two houses were set on fire, two Serbs who were within these houses were shot to death and the truck which had been left there was towed away. The truck showed many bullet holes on the sides. About 0700 hours, I returned to Kragujevac with my Jagdkommando.
Own losses: None.
(signed F. Barth Feldwebel and Deputy Battalion Adjutant Report on Jagdkommande of 10.
10.41.
Commander: 1st Lt. Jost Strength:
3/Infantry Regiment, 1 Officer, 4 Non-commissioned Officers, 36 men.
Mission: Search of the woods and of the houses situated to the right of the road Kragujevac - Kraljevo.
...........................
Course of events: The houses north of the hayloft were searched for weapons and the woods combed through up to the Northern edge about 1.5 kilometers. No persons could be arrested since the residents had fled before our arrival. I issued an order to burn the abandoned houses (about 12 of them). Some of them I did not have burned down since the high voltage current Kragujevac-Kraljevo leads about these.
Loot: None Experiences:
None (signed) Jost 1st Lt.The next portion of the same exhibit which begins on page 132 of the English and on page 101 of the German is a. report from Higher Headquarters for Special Corps 65, General Bader, Tacticial Unit and it goes to the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia.
It is dated 10 October 1941 and it reads as follows:
Commanding General-Plenipotentiary in Serbia The Commanding General of Higher Headquarters for Special Missions LXV had sent me to Topola on Wednesday 8.10.
41 to have Captain Fiedler Commander of III. Company 749 Regiment account the fact he did not carry out the order: to burn down the village of Gr. Milanovac, to seize hostages and to bring them back.
Captain Fiedler gave me the following explanation:
He had entered Gr. Milanovac on 5.10.41 about 17.30 hours and 120 hostages had been seized immediately. At sundown this mission had been carried out. Among these hostages there had been a Chetnik courier who stated during his interrogation that he had the order to report on that day to the local Chetnik leader. He had been unable to do so because this leader had not arrived as yet but probably would arrive on the following day. He, Captain Fiedler, was of the opinion he would be able with the help of this Chetnik courier and of the expected Chetnik leader whom he hoped to capture to ascertain where the Landesschuetzen Company was and then be able to effect their exchange against a corresponding number of hostages. He believed this to be the primary aim of his mission. Furthermore, he thought it would be senseless to burn down this village immediately on the same evening, because this would immediately destroy any hope of an exchange of the Landesschuetzen. He believed that it would have been absolutely all right to carry out that part of his mission on the following day in case the exchange would have been rejected.
On the morning of the following day, he received the surprising order to march off the the direction of Rudnik at 6 o'clock in the morning. The radiogram did not contain any reason for this. However, during the night, his radio station had monitored an S.O.S. from the direction of Rudnik. Consequently he believed that a detachment near Rudnik was in difficulties and that the order to go there was in connection with that. He clearly realized that it now had become his most important task to provide help for the detachment Rudnik and that the order to burn down the village would have to take second place. This assumption had been reinforced by the consideration that after having brought help to Rudnik, he no doubt would return via Gr. Milanovac. As such time he would be able to carry out the order to burn down the village even if the exchange of prisoners should at that time prove impossible. The hope to achieve that aim was a dim one however, particularly if the skirmishes around.
Rudnik doubtlessly had involved the band which was in Gr. Milanovac too. He was now faced with the question of how to dispose of the hostages. He realized that the march on Rudnik would be difficult and would be impossible without fighting. He knew that road blocks would have to be removed. If he took the hostages along guarding them would have decreased his combat strength. They would only be an impediment. Because of these considerations, he had sent a radio message as to what should should be done with the hostages now. He did not receive an answer.
As a result of these considerations, he decided to release the hostages as he was convinced that he could seize them again on his march back via Gr. Milanovac. Then he could take them to his point of departure and thus carry out, the orders he had received.
It has been established that the radio mentioned was actually transmitted but it was addressed to his regiment was was stationed in Kraljevo instead of to his division. The regiment could not estimate the situation and consequently did not answer. If the radio message had been sent to the division, he would have received pertinent orders. I told Captain Fiedler that one could understand his considerations regarding the exchange of prisoners, the burning down of the village, and the carrying out of this part of the order on his march back. Captain Fiedler could not know that it was intended to send him toward the Norht, without touching Gr. Milanovac again. In my opinion, this is an excuse for his behavior and for his omission to burn down the village before marching off. He could easily think that great sped was indicated in order to assist a detachment which had gotten into trouble near Rudnik.
However I told him that I could not understand his considerations regarding the taking along of hostages. If obstruction would have to be removed during the march, hostages would have been the obvious labor forces, would have served as a means of sparing the strength of his own men. Furthermore according to general opinion, taking along a greater number of manacled hostages who were distributed through the march column represented the best protection against attacks.
Hence I could not see any valid reason for his failure to carry out the order. Personally, Captain Fiedler makes a thoroughly soldierly impression, he wears the Iron Cross 1st Class, of World War I. He is Oberstudiendirektor (College Instructor) by profession. He was thoroughly aghast at my reproaches and told me that he not activated by any sentimentality. He was generally reproached for being too hard and ruthless against the residents of Kragujevac. He had tried to carry out his order as well as possible. He remarked on the fact that it was very difficult for him to co-ordinate the short radio message ordering him to march on without any reason or explanation with his mission he had received up to now. He had been completely under the impression that highest speed was required and he had behaved accordingly in order not to delay his advance and not to impede it in any way.
(signed) Krewisch Colonel and Chief of the General Staff For Corps Command 65, General Bader.
Continuing on page 135 of the English and 103 of the German we have the distribution by General Bader as Commander of the 65th Corps Command to his subordinate unit, the 704 Infantry Division of the well known 100 to one retaliation order. It is dated 13 October 1941:
"In the future 100 prisoners or hostages are to be shot to death for every soldier killed in action or murdered, and for each wounded man 50. For this purpose as many Communists, Nationalists, Democrats and Jews are to be arrested from each garrison area as one can be guarded without imperiling combat strength. Certified True Copy. Unterroffizer."
This is a distribution to subordinate units in Serbia of the titled directive of the 16 September 1941.
DR. LATERNSER: The deduction which the prosecutor draws from this order is not correct if one looks at the original. The original shows quite clearly that this order was merely sent to the 704 Infantry Division
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I was under the impression that all I had stated was that Higher Headquarters of the 65th Corps had distributed an order to the 704 Infantry Division subordinate to it for the execution of the 100 prisoners for each German soldier killed and for the execution of 50 prisoners or hostages for each German ' soldier wounded. I think you will be able to see in one or two documents later that the text is the same as the Keiter order of 16 September 1941.
DR. LATERNSER: I have to object even against these comments. The prosecutor should not assert this. He should prove it.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the prosecutor should limit his remarks to that which is shown by the evidence and to await making any deductions from these documents until his argument.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Yes, Your Honor.
Now, prosecution Document NOKW-1341 which becomes prosecution exhibit 68. It is on page 137 of the English and page 105 of the German. This is the notification by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast to Task Forces Rosenberg of the Wehrmacht on economic and disciplinary matters to Commander Southeast who at this time was the defendant Felmy.
The document is dated 2 October 1941 and it has the receipt stamp of the 12th Army dated 3 October 1941.
"Effective 1 October 1941, Detachment Rosenberg is assigned for rations and quarters and for discipline to Commander South Greece. Lt Ritter von Ingram, the leader of the Detachment, is to make contact immediately with the Staff of the Commander Southern Greece. (signed) Foertsch. for Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, The Chief of the General Staff."
The Prosecution's next document is NOKW-458 which becomes prosecution Exhibit 69. It is on page 139 of the German and page 106 -- rather, page 138 of the English and page 106 of the German.
This is a directive of Field Marshal Keitel at OKW Headquarters in Berlin dated 28 September 1941. It is to OKH and to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. There were five copies distributed of which this is the second.
"Subject: Taking of Hostages.
"Because of the attacks on members of the Wehrmacht which have taken place lately in the occupied territories it is pointed- out that it is opportune for the military commanders to have always at their disposal a number of hostages of the different political persuasions:
that is, "1) Nationalists "2) Democratic Middle-Class and "3) Communists "It is of importance that among these are leading personalities or members of their families.
Their names are to be published. In case of an attack hostage of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit belongs are to be shot. It is requested that commanders be informed in this sense.
"(Signed) The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Keitel."
The second page of the document, on page 140 of the English and 107 of the German, shows the distribution of the Keitel directive by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. The distribution is to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, the Commander of Salonika Aegea, and the Commander of Southern Greece.
"Enclosed copy for further action in accordance with the political situation prevailing in the area. Please report action taken.
"For the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, the Chief of the General Staff Foertsch."
Our next document is N0KW-203, which becomes Prosecution Exhibit No . 70, in an order of Field Marshal List dated 4 October to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, General Bader.
"The male population of the territories to be mopped up of bandits, is to be handled according to the following points of view:
"Men who take pare in combat are to be judged by court martial.
"Men in the insurgent territories who were not encountered in battle, are to be examined and -
"If a former participation in combat can be proven of them to be judged by courts martial.
"If they are only suspected of having taken part in combat, of having offered the bandits support of any sort, or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way, to beheld in a special collecting camp.
They are to serve as hostages in the event that bandits appear, or anything against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory mopped up or in their home localities, and in such cases they are to be shot.
"All other unsuspicious men are to beled under guard into their home towns. In the most simple form they are to be obliged to offer the bandits no support of any kind and not to undertake anything against the Wehrmacht. The mayors of the individual localities who arc to be replaced, circumstances permitting, must testify as to the local residence of the individual.
"Men foreign to the region are to be held in the collective camps. The localities arc to be searched for weapons first.
"This regulation is to be made known to all the men named under paragraph 2. It is to be explained to them furthermore that the most severe measures of punishment will be used without further investigation against localities. above all against the male population of such localities in which or in the proximity of which bandits appear, bandits are supported, surprise attacks take place, sabotage acts take place or anything is undertaken against the Wehrmacht.
"It is to be explained to them further that similar treatment will be meted out to the male population of localities and to localities themselves from which men join the bandits, surprise attacks and sabotage acts arc practiced, or anything is undertaken against the Wehrmacht.
"Signed in the draft: List, General Field Marshal."
The next document is on page 143 of the English and page 110 of the German, Document NOKW-262 which is offered as prosecution Exhibit 71. This is an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. General Boehme, dated 6 October 1941 and it relates to the erection of a concentration at Zasaviza. The order is distributed to the Commander Serbia, Chief of Military Administration to the 65th Corps under General Bader and to the 342 nd Infantry Division.
1.) The current attacks on arrested Serbs makes necessary the erection of a concentration camp to be guarded by restricted forces and closed from the outer world. The terrain between the Save and Zasaviza west of Sremaka, Mitrovica is especially adapted.
2.) In the proximity of the locality Grn-Zasaviza a camp sufficient for holding some 30,000 prisoners is to be created first of all in the open air, so that the transfer of the inmates in Sabac can take place by 20 October. In the course of further construction the locality is to be included into the same camp for winter quarters.
3.) Construction, erection and leadership of the Zasaviza concentration camp is to be transferred to the Chief of Military Administration with the commander of Serbia. Suitable Serbian workers from the Sabac concentration camp are to be utilized for construction.
Captain Kriess, 522nd Bridge Bn. is assigned as construction foreman. Organization Tedt is to supply the necessary technical personnel for leadership and construction in agreement with the chief of the military administration. The building equipment necessary for the construction will be furnished. Wood for construction is to be hewn on the spot. Herewith the aspects of the terrain are to be improved at the same time.
4. ) The 342nd Inf. Div. is to evacuate the terrain between the south border of Mitrovica and the isthmus 1 km. Ne of Bavnje of the entire population by 8 Oct. The economic evacuation of this territory is to be carried on urgently. The population to be evacuated is to be distributed among the localities lying south of Zasaviza.
In addition four hundred workers (carpenters, cabinet makers, smiths, etc.) capable of working are to be brought to Zasaviza from the inmates of the Sabac concentration camp by the 342nd Inf. Div. Rendevous 8 Oct. 1200 Hours Grn.Zasaviza/church. The Chief of the Military Administration is to decide the time of transfer of the majority of the inmates from Sabac to Zasavica. The 64th Police Btln. is to be employed for guarding the Zasavica concentration camp.
It is intended to let the Sabac camp remain further as a reception camp. Taking over by Dulag 183 is being considered.
5. ) 750th Inf. Rgt, is to furnish , until the taking over of the concentration by the 64th Police Res. Btln, the necessary troops for guarding the 400 prisoners, and takes over the supply for construction and guard forces as well as prisoners. Taking over of prisoners by the 342nd Inf. Div., 8 Oct., 1200 hours Grn. Zasaviza Church.
6. ) The chief of the Military Administration is to decide the time of the transfer of the majority of the inmates from Sabac to Zasavica. The 342nd Police Patrol is to be employed for guard-4 ing the Zasaviza Concentration Camp. It is intended to let the Sabac camp remain further as a reception camp. Taking over by Dulag 183 is being considered."
I think we need not read the rest of the document at this time. It is signed: "For the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, The Chief of the General Staff Pemsel."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The next document is No. 3138, which becomes Prosecution Exhibit 72, on page 146 of the English and page 112 of the German. The document consists of extracts from the secret report issued by the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin on 6 October 1941.
Most of the events involved concern the Union of Soviet Republics but there is an excerpt which relates to Serbia. The first page of the document simply lists the number and type of attacks which have occurred in Germany against the German Wehrmacht.
Page 2 of the document, which is on page 147 of the English and 112 German, and page 113 of the German, reads as follows:
"Enemy losses: 10074 dead, including 742 killed in the fighting during mopping up in the Save bend; prisoners, including the fighting in course of mopping up in the Save bend, 7280; 15 wounded. During mopping up in the Save bend an additional 190 men were shot by firing squads. Through executions approved by the Military Commander in Serbia, 150 were shot in Belgrade, 34 at Cuprija, and 14 at Uikinda (Banat). In Belgrade three police agents were shot and one poisoned. In course of screening of sections of the Vity 171 persons were arrested.
"Serbia.
"Telephone line sabotage at Belgrade; Danube traffic temporarily interrupted by bands at Gradiste.
"Mopping up in the Save bend proceeds according to plan. Near Lajkovac, northeast of Valjevo, an infantry regiment shot twelve insurgents.
DR. LATERNSER: There is a mistake in the translation which changes the meaning, which I would like to correct. In the German text on the document, on page 113, towards the middle of the page, it reads:
"Mopping up in the Save bend, 190 were summarily shot."
The translation which has just been read will read, "...were shot by firing squads" does not seem to have the same meaning.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Perhaps we can have the interpreter read the sentence in question.
THE PRESIDENT: If that is agreeable with counsel, that procedure will be followed.
INTERPRETER: The translation should read:
"During mopping up operations in the Save bend an additional 190 men were shot summarily."
THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreter refer to the page and line of it.
INTERPRETER: This sentence is on page 147 of the English, line 5, page 113 of the German towards the middle of the page. It was approximately the last but one sentence that Mr. Fenstermacher has read.
Shall I repeat the translation?
"During mopping up operations in the Save bend an additional 190 men were shot summarily."
DR. LATERNSER: I do not know whether this expression just hits the meaning. What does "summarily" mean? Does that mean "standrechtlich"? "Standrechtlich means according to court martial procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will keep in mind the fact that there is some question as to the translation of this particular phrase and counsel may be sure that we will have in mind that there is some question as to the translation of this particular phrase.
DR. LATERNSER: But the discrepancies can be quite important, Mr. President, since, when it says here "standrechtlich", that means "according to court martial".
INTERPRETER: Dr. Laternser wants it translated "standing court". There is no such word as "standing court". "Standrechtlich" is "court martial".
MR. FENSTERMACHER: In accordance with the reading of the document, page 147 in the English and 113 in the German:
"Through executions approved by the Military Commander in Serbia, 150 were shot in Belgrade, 34 in Cuprija, and 14 at Uikinda (Banat). In Belgrade three police agents were shot and one poisoned. In course of screening sections of the city 171 persons were arrested."
I think we need not read the rest of the document at this time.
The next document appears on page 149 of the English, page 115 of the German. It is Document NOKW 1388, which becomes Prosecution Exhibit 73. This is an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to subordinate units dated 7 October 1941, and it is particularly important because of the insignia references which are made.
The first page of the document simply gives the distribution list of the order, but on page 150 of the English and on page 115 of the German is this:
"In this area units of Cetniks and groups of partisans have appeared.
"a) Organization and strength:
"Cetniks: Fourteen companies, one machine gun company, one death platoon leader: Captain Racic. Strength about 1,000 to 1,500 men. Armament: rifles and machine guns. Insignia: Yugoslav eagle or "P".
"Partisans: Strength uncertain (1,000 to 4,000 men?) It is certain that there are four Macava and five Cer companies. The armament is not as good as that of Cetniks. The leader is the former teacher, Kebosja Jarkovic. Some are identified by red insignia."
In the next document, beginning on page 151 of the English, page 117 of the German, Document No. NQKW 1129, offered as Prosecution Exhibit 74. This is an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, General Boehme, dated 6 October 1941, and it prohibits negotiations by his subordinate units with the partisan enemy.
"Subject: Negotiations with Insurgents.
"On 29 September 41 a local defense company in Grn. Milanovac was attacked by insurgents; after a short skirmish the former was captured en masse and led off into the mountains.
"On 4 October 41 a guard commando of the Field Ordnance Battalion 1 and 18 with a strength of four NCO's and forty men was also captured by the insurgents, after an only short skirmish without any losses of our own.
"In both cases the same circumstance was responsible for the out come which was very unworthy of a German soldier.
On our side the very serious mistake was made of negotiating with the insurgents. In both instances the troops let themselves be deceived by the promise of an "honorable withdrawal", instead of defending themselves to the last cartridge.
"On the basis of these events I order the following:
"1) No negotiations are to be held with the insurgents.
"3) Parlamentaires of the insurgents do not enjoy the protection which is due to parlamentaires of a regular troops. In case negotiators appear before the opening of a combat action, they are to be arrested and sentenced by summary court martial as franc-tireurs. If negotiators appear during or after a skirmish, they are to be fired upon immediately.
"The Corps Command LXV and the Commander in Serbia are to see to it that this order is made known to all subordinate troop units and offices in the shortest time."
The distribution list is given.
The next document, page 154, Document No. NOKW 263, which becomes Prosecution Exhibit 75. This is a ten day report dated 9 October 1941 of the 347th Infantry Division to higher headquarters, the Plenipotentiary Commander in Serbia. It is dated Belgrade.
"During the period from 24.9. to 9.10 at 1600 hours the enemy suffered the following losses:
"88 killed in action.
"1127 executed.
"17,420 prisoners.
"During the same period the following cattle was brought in as booty:
"1205 head of cattle.
"1861 sheep.
"940 hogs.
"of which "952 head of cattle "1811 sheep "809 pigs "were shipped to Belgrade by rail."
Signed: "For Divisional HQ. The 2nd General Staff Officer, Schuler, Captain."
The prosecution's next document is on page 156 of the English, page 120 of the German, Document NOKW-71, which becomes Prosecution's Exhibit 76, an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, General Boehme, dated 9 October 1941, and it relates to the operation of military courts in the suppression of the uprising in Serbia.
"The suppression of the uprising in Serbia must be performed ruthlessly. Above all it has to be carried out by purely military means. Insofar as cooperation of the Military Courts appears to be required, it has to conform to the following principles:
"1) Only the most severe penalties promise a penetrating impact on the population. The death penalty is therefore generally essential in all cases of sabotage, acts of espionage and attempts to join a foreign army. Also in cases of illegal possession of arms at present the death penalty is the only adequate atonement.
"2) The judicial procedures are to be executed quickly and impressively. The execution, especially of death sentences, has to be carried through immediately.
"3) The troop sentences according to martial law insofar as the military situation permits such procedure, those persons who participate in combat personally, i.e. by direct assistance of any other support. The steps taken are to be reported to the competent chief of court.
"4) Sentence by Court Martial is to be applied only in cases where the evidence is absolutely clear; confession of the defendant or when the smallest and directly available evidence is sufficient. If it can be assumed that the defendant played a leading role in the uprising or if he gives credible statements as to the fact that he was compelled to support the action by irresistible pressure by the insurgents, but that he himself has undertaken nothing against German troops, the captured person is t+ be taken behind the front with an exact statement of the reason. Further treatment of this person is the task of the field gendarmery (military police), the collecting camp, or if need be the court martial.
"5) In cases when persons who generally are to be sent to collecting camps, are suspected of participation in the combat, its preparation or support, particularly of insubordination against the German Wehrmacht, its orders or against organs acting on behalf of German Domestic offices, the following procedure has to be observed:
"a) if proof can be furnished for the participation in the military action or its support, the prisoners are, after effective Contact has been established between the camp commanders and the court of the military commander for Serbia, to be sent to court action.
"b) In all other cases they shall servo as hostages in the event that in the cleaned up territory or in their home localities any action is taken against the German army or administration.
"signed: Boehme "General of the Infantry"
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The final Prosecution document in Document Book II is on Page 158 of the English and Page 122 of the German. It is Document No. NOKW-1386; which is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 77. This is an extract from the War Diary of the 704th Infantry Division, dated 9 October 1941, and it relates to the occupation of Monica by a band of two hundred men in uniform. It reads as follows: "Valjevo: Illrd Battalion 125th Infantry Regiment conducts reconnaissance with one company from Divci to Mionica. Monica is occupied by a band of 200 men in uniforms. Enemy losses: 12 dead. Own losses none."
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(Recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution may proceed.
MR. DENNEY: May it please your Honors, during the recess. I have placed on each of your Honor's desks a mimeographed copy of the list of the exhibits in document book I by document number, by exhibit number. The reference to the counts to which each exhibit has been offered, and the reference to the defendants against whom these exhibits have been offered. There has also been distributed to each of the defense counsel a copy of this and at this time -- I don't think it is necessary to read it into the record but I have given the Secretary General a copy of it. The interpreters have a copy and the stenographers and I suggest that it be marked Exhibit 78 in the record if that meets with your Honors' approval.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Denney. This refers to Document Book I only?
MR. DENNEY: Only to Document Book I, yes, Your Honor. It is a list of the exhibits numbered I to XXXVIII which are contained in that document book which have been received in evidence only. There is not there included one which has been marked for identification nor two others, one of which was passed and the other of which, if your Honors recall, was out of place and at the time the book was offered it was requested that the Tribunal disregard that one page.
THE PRESIDENT: In marking this as Exhibit 78, it is not to be considered as an exhibit but merely as explanatory?
MR. DENNEY: For the purposes of identification, yes, Your Honor. Perhaps it would be more convenient for your Honors if we, when we present those -- this idea just occurred -- if we mark this 38-A, which is the exhibit right after the last exhibit in the book.
THE PRESIDENT: I believe that would be better.
MR. DENNEY: And then if we did that in every case, it would be clear both for defense counsel and for the court and for anyone reading the record, so if we change this from 78 to 38-A and hereafter we Hill follow that procedure, when those are offered, we will give them an "A" number which follows the last exhibit in the book to which it refers, and of course as your Honor has stated this is only being received for purposes of identifying the offer of the evidence as against the defendants and as to counts.